The Valuation History of Danish Wind Power:The Ongoing Struggle of a Challenger Technology to Prove its Worth to Society by Mortensen, Henrik Bach
 
  
 
Aalborg Universitet
The Valuation History of Danish Wind Power
The Ongoing Struggle of a Challenger Technology to Prove its Worth to Society
Mortensen, Henrik Bach
DOI (link to publication from Publisher):
10.5278/vbn.phd.tech.00040
Publication date:
2018
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication from Aalborg University
Citation for published version (APA):
Mortensen, H. B. (2018). The Valuation History of Danish Wind Power: The Ongoing Struggle of a Challenger
Technology to Prove its Worth to Society. Aalborg Universitetsforlag. Ph.d.-serien for Det Tekniske Fakultet for
IT og Design, Aalborg Universitet https://doi.org/10.5278/vbn.phd.tech.00040
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            ? Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            ? You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            ? You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at vbn@aub.aau.dk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from vbn.aau.dk on: December 27, 2020
THE VALUATION HISTORY 
OF 
DANISH WIND POWER
THE ONGOING STRUGGLE OF A CHALLENGER
TECHNOLOGY TO PROVE ITS WORTH TO SOCIETY
BY
HENRIK BACH MORTENSEN
DISSERTATION SUBMITTED 2018
TH
E VA
LU
ATIO
N
 H
ISTO
RY O
F D
A
N
ISH
 W
IN
D
 PO
W
ER
H
EN
R
IK
 B
A
C
H
 M
O
R
TEN
SEN
 
 
THE VALUATION HISTORY OF DANISH 
WIND POWER 
THE ONGOING STRUGGLE OF A CHALLENGER 
TECHNOLOGY TO PROVE ITS WORTH TO SOCIETY 
by 
Henrik Bach Mortensen 
 
Dissertation submitted 
 
. 
  
Dissertation submitted: 28.03.2018
PhD supervisor:  Professor Peter Karnøe
   Dep. of Planning, Aalborg University
PhD committee:  Professor Susse Georg (chairman)
   Aalborg University
   Professor Claes-Fredrik Helgesson
   Linköping University
   Associate Professor Kristian H. Nielsen
   Aarhus University
PhD Series: Technical Faculty of IT and Design, Aalborg University
Department: Department of Planning 
ISSN (online): 2446-1628 
ISBN (online): 978-87-7210-183-5
Published by:
Aalborg University Press
Langagervej 2
DK – 9220 Aalborg Ø
Phone: +45 99407140
aauf@forlag.aau.dk
forlag.aau.dk
Front Cover image: SWT 7.0-154 at the Danish test site of Østerild.
Image Credit: Peter Lyhne Højberg, 2017
© Copyright: Henrik Bach Mortensen
Printed in Denmark by Rosendahls, 2018
 
 
CV 
Henrik Bach Mortensen (Viborg, Denmark, 1983) obtained his Master of Arts in 
International Business Communication from Aarhus University in 2011. He began 
his professional career in the Siemens Wind Power Graduate Program, working in a 
business support role in the R&D blades departments in Aalborg, Denmark and 
Boulder, Colorado. After completing the program in 2013, Henrik continued his 
work in Siemens Wind Power through the Business Development unit of the 
Technology Department. In the fall of 2014, Henrik moved to the Cost of Energy 
team, wherefrom he commenced on this industrial PhD-dissertation with Aalborg 
University. Henrik remains employed within Product Portfolio Management in the 
merged company that is today called Siemens Gamesa Renewable Energy.      
 
 
 
 
English summary 
This PhD-thesis analyzes the valuation history of wind power in Denmark, by 
studying the valuation devices that have been used to frame wind power as a 
worthwhile or not worthwhile investment to the Danish society. This is done 
through an analysis of key reports, calculations and public statements about the 
societal value of wind power. This is combined with interviews of key actors from 
the valuation history to create as complete a picture as possible. Drawing on 
Strategic Action Field Theory and Valuation Studies, I examine how the value of a 
challenger energy source, wind power, has been produced through various and 
competing framings. These framings consist of qualities that are inscribed into the 
object of wind power and make it more or less valuable as a societal investment. 
Furthermore, I examine the historical valuation drama between incumbent- and 
challenger-coalitions by focusing on particular critical moments of valuation.  
The valuation history of Danish wind power can be seen as consisting of five 
periods, each with their dominant valuation frame and a corresponding network of 
human and material actors upholding it. In the 1970’s and 1980’s wind power was a 
Unique Supplement, which had a large future potential instead of nuclear energy, 
but was still confined to a peripheral role in the energy market. In the 1990’s, wind 
power was framed as indispensable climate change mitigation solution, and a 
valuation network of enabling devices were enacted to stretch the market to 
accommodate wind power. This period was followed by a dramatic shift in valuation 
in the early 2000’s, as new calculative centers frame wind power as a value-
destroying market distortion. After five years of a stand-still and a disassembled 
valuation network, a new valuation network re-framed wind power   as a worthwhile 
investment to society. A broad coalition of actors gathered around investments in 
wind power which could provide a global advantage for Denmark both in terms of 
mitigating climate change, gaining energy independence and growing an export 
industry. This seemingly broad consensus was, however, contested and partly 
broken in the fifth and final period. Even as wind power now was recognized as an 
industrial benefit to Denmark and the cheapest technology to build, Wind Power 
was temporarily framed as a subsidy burden to Danish society, through the taxes and 
subsidies which enabled its presence in the energy market. This most recent framing 
however turned out to be fragile going forward, as several powerful actors oppose 
this framing of wind power.  
The study identifies 12 qualities which actor coalitions combine and rank in various 
ways to make up the competing frames of the valuation history of Danish wind 
power. These qualities are assembled throughout the above described periods by five 
coalitions, of which some overlap or emerge from others. These coalitions struggle 
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to assemble a strong enough valuation network to stabilize their framing of value 
through market frameworks, materiality and calculative devices.    
It is my ambition that this study can contribute to the emerging field of valuation 
studies by providing an in-depth empirical analysis of the valuation frames and 
valuation networks that uphold them. By understanding which qualities have 
historically been used to frame wind power as worthwhile, the actors who represent 
wind power, can better challenge any entrenched meanings in the energy market. If 
the climate crisis it to be solved in time it is necessary for framings that recognize 
wind power as valuable to society and position it as the standard investment for the 
future.
Dansk resume 
Denne PhD-afhandling analyserer historien om hvordan vindkraft blev værdisat i 
Danmark ved at studere de instrumenter der er blevet brugt til at frame vindkraft 
som værdifuld eller ej for det danske samfund. Dette gøres gennem en analysis af 
centrale rapporter, beregninger, og offentlige udtalelser om den samfundsmæssige 
værdi af vindkraft. Dette er kombineret med interviews af centrale aktører i historien 
om vindkraftens værdisætning for at give et så komplet som muligt billede af 
historien. Ved hjælp af Strategic Action Field Theory og Valuation Studies, 
undersøger jeg hvordan værdien af en challenger energikilde som vindkraft er blevet 
produceret gennem forskellige konkurrerende frames. Disse frames består af 
qualities eller karakteristika, som bliver indskrevet i det object man kalder vindkraft, 
og gør det mere eller mindre værdifuldt som en samfundsmæssig investering. 
Derudover undersøger jeg det historiske værdisætningsdama mellem koalitioner af 
etablerede aktører, Incumbents, og udfordrer-koalitioner, Challengers, ved at 
fokusere på de kritiske Moments of valuation i mødet mellem de to koalitioner.  
Historien om værdisætningen af dansk vindkraft kan forstås som bestående af fem 
perioder, hver en med sin dominante Valuation Frame  og et tilhørende netværk af 
mennesker og materialle aktører som opretholder den specifikke framing. I 1970 og 
1980’erne var vindkraft framet som et unikt supplement med et stort potentiale 
istedet for atomkraft, men det var dog stadig begrænset til et periferært hjørne af 
energismarkedet. I 1990’erne blev vindkraft framed som en uundværligt løsning til 
at mitigere klimaforandringer, og et netværk af love og materialle forankringer blev 
opbygget for tilpasse energimarkedet til at akkomodere udbredningen af vindkraft. 
Denne periode blev efterfulgt af et dramatisk skift i værdisætning i de tidlige 
2000’er, idet ned beregnings-centre framede vindkraft som en værdi-ødelæggende 
forstyrrelse af energimarkedet. Efter fem års stilstand og et ødelagt værdinetværk, et 
nyt netværk, som igen framede vindkraft som værdifuldt, blev langsomt opbygget. 
En bred koalition af aktører samlede omkring investeringer i vindkraft som en global 
fordel for Danmark idet det kunne mitigere klimaforandringer, give Danmark højere 
energi-uafhængighed samt skabe en voksende eksportindustri. Denne tilsyneladende 
brede konsensus ville imidlertid blive udfordret og delvis brudt i den femte og 
endelige periode. Selvom vindkraft var anerkendt som en erhversmæssig fordel for 
Danmark og den billigste teknologi man kunne bygge, ville vindkraft midlertidigt 
blive framed som en subsidie-byrde for det danske samfund gennem de afgifter og 
subsidier som muliggjorde vindkraften i energimarkedet. Denne seneste framing 
ville vise sig at være skrøbelig fremadrettet, da adskillige magtfulde aktører 
modsatte sig denne framing af vindkraft.  
Studiet identificerer 12 karakteristika som aktører kombinerer og rangerer i 
forskellige konstellationer til at udgøre de konkurrerende frames som udgør 
værdisætningshistorien om vindkraft i Danmark. Disse karakteristika samles og 
kombineres af fem forskellige koalitioner af aktører, hvoraf nogle overlapper med 
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hinande og andre opstår fra tidligere koalitioner. Disse koalitioner kæmper for at 
skabe et værdisætnings netværk der er stærkt nok til at stabiliserer deres framing af 
værdi gennem regulering, material udbygning og kalkulative instrumenter.   
Det er min ambition at dette studie kan bidrage til det fremvoksende teorifelt som er 
valuation studies, ved at levere en dybdegående empirisk analyses af Valuation 
Frames og de værdisætnings netværk der opretholder dem. Ved at forstå hvilke 
karakteristika der historisk er brugt til at frame vindkraft som værdifuldt kan 
vindkraft-aktører bedre udfordre gamle intuitive meninger i energi-markedet. Hvis 
klimakrisen skal løses i tide er det nødvendigt at skabe framings som producerer 
vindkraft som værdifuldt for samfundet og positioner det som fremtidens standard 
investering.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In accounts of the global transition to green energy, Denmark is lauded as a wind 
power pioneer. By successfully integrating large degrees of wind power while 
maintaining stable supply, the small country in Northern Europe has created an 
efficient energy sector that many experts view as a model for the rest of the world 
(IEA, 2017b; McKenna, 2016). Danish political leaders often highlight the success 
of the nation’s energy policies on the international stage, and there appears to be 
consensus on the high value of wind power in completing Denmark’s transformation 
into a green society by 2050. But did lawmakers and entrepreneurs in Denmark 
recognize the value of investing in wind power at a much earlier date and on a larger 
scale than those in most other countries? Did the key legislators in power all agree 
that wind power was a worthwhile investment, or is this apparent consensus an 
illusion? Did broad political agreement exist, and does it exist today? To answer 
these questions, it is important to examine Denmark’s struggle to find the societal 
value of wind power.  
During its 40-year history in Denmark, wind power has evolved from being a highly 
contested and marginal challenger energy source to becoming a central component 
in Denmark’s future renewable energy system. In 2017, the equivalent of 43.4% of 
Danish electricity consumption was generated by wind power, and the 3-year rolling 
average for 2015–2017 was 41%—a world record high (EFKM, 2018; EnerginetDK, 
2016a). Despite this global acclaim as a world leader and to the surprise of many, 
recent events in the Danish energy field have revealed an apparent lack of shared 
meaning or political consensus about the value of investing in wind power in 
Denmark.  
Indeed, escalating debate in the media and political shifts in the energy policy in 
recent years reveal a surprisingly strong divide over the question of whether wind 
power is a worthwhile investment for Denmark. For example, claims such as “Wind 
powers subsidy costs are a too large burden on society” or “wind power is too 
unreliable to be more than a supplement to the energy system”, that circulated 
widely when wind power was strongly subsidized in the 1980s, persist, even though 
the technology is significantly more advanced and much less subsidized per Kwh 
today. Recent calculative comparisons of electricity-generating technologies that 
Denmark could build even show that wind power is the cheapest available option to 
build. This conundrum is what sparks my interest as a researcher. Why is it that the 
value of wind power remains contested in the country where it is the cheapest to 
build and it gives the industrial benefit per capita? If the value and legitimacy of 
wind power cannot stabilize its own world and be considered valuable in Denmark, 
it would be difficult to achieve this in other countries.  
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An examination of the Danish energy sector in the 1970s and 1980s reveals how the 
anti-nuclear movement enabled the emergence of a sister movement advocating for 
renewable energy, in particular the challenger technologies wind and solar (Beuse, 
2000; Karnøe, 1991). Following the 1973 energy crisis, proponents of wind power 
succeeded in obtaining a foothold despite strong protests from the incumbent 
utilities, which at the time were the authoritative “go-to” experts on the energy 
system. The uniqueness of the Denmark case is that wind power has evolved from 
being a highly contested challenger energy source to being a major component of 
Denmark’s energy system and industry (EnerginetDK, 2016a; Karnøe & Jensen, 
2016), supplying more than 40% of the nation’s electricity, 4% of its total exports 
and 33,000 jobs (Damvad, 2016). Several negotiations around energy agreements 
led to this position, the most recent one being the 2012 Energy Act. This Act was 
considered a game-changer by many, as it appeared to stabilize the policy 
framework and conditions for wind power that would allow it to grow beyond its 
challenger technology status. The Energy Act mobilized a broad political coalition 
around shared ambitions, including wind power as an integral component towards a 
fossil-free energy system by 2050 (DEA, 2016b). The 2012 goal to be fossil free in 
2050 appeared to have public support in surveys of the Danish population which 
showed that a majority agreed that a green transition is needed, and that associated 
costs are worth bearing (DKvind, 2014a). Thus, Denmark’s green transition could 
on the surface appear to be built on a foundation of broad public acceptance of wind 
power and its associated costs of subsidies and grid investments.   
However, wind power remains controversial after more than 40 years of 
implementation in Denmark, and continues to be a challenger energy source in the 
context of the long history of fossil fuels. Fossil fuels have been integral to the 
construction of modern society, and have had more than 150 years to become the 
incumbent energy sources of the western world technically, politically, and 
economically (Mitchell, 2009). Recently, it has become clear that agreement about 
Denmark’s strategic direction was not as strong or enduring as the 2012 Energy Act 
seemed to indicate. Old controversies re-emerged in 2015 and 2016 that were driven 
by a new Danish government opposed to the perceived high cost of wind power. 
Recent events in the Danish energy field have revealed a lack of shared meaning and 
legitimacy in relation to so-called subsidy costs and ambitions for wind power in 
Denmark (Karnøe & Jensen, 2016), surprising many stakeholders who thought that 
the broad consensus from 2012 would hold. Indeed, escalating debate in the media 
and recent policy shifts have revealed a (surprisingly) strong divide over the 
country’s energy strategy, with a media-public and political coalition fully 
supporting wind power on one side, and another media-public and political coalition 
only modestly, and at times reluctantly, supporting wind power on the other side. 
The latter group utilizes the opportunity of being in government to roll-back earlier 
policies while creating new uncertainties about current subsidy frameworks and 
agreements (Steel, 2016a). Entrenched beliefs such as “subsidy costs are a burden” 
or “wind power disturbs the energy system” seem to have taken hold and are now 
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mobilized in the current debate about wind power’s legitimacy in the Danish energy 
system. In addition, the claim that “wind power is expensive” persists despite recent 
calculative comparisons and material demonstrations showing wind power to be the 
cheapest available technology to build. This is a rather sudden destabilization of the 
conditions for wind power so shortly after the 2012 energy act.    
Looking at wind power today, Denmark hosts the world’s largest wind power 
manufacturers and developers in an industrial cluster which employs roughly 33,000 
people (Damvad, 2016). Denmark is due to good wind conditions and a high 
interconnectivity with northern markets ideally positioned for wind to supply an 
even larger share of electricity demand than the current 43% (DWIA, 2016a). It is 
the country with the highest per capita share of wind power in the world and the 
fourth largest total offshore wind capacity, only surpassed by the UK, Germany and 
China (GWEC, 2017, p. 61)1. Building the infrastructure required to integrate wind 
power has not destabilized the Danish energy system, as Denmark ranks among the 
top 3 countries in Europe on all key metrics for energy security (i.e., power 
shortages, supply independence, etc.), while charging some of the lowest raw 
electricity prices in Europe (Quartz, 2015). In 2016, Denmark’s energy system was 
ranked as the best in the world by the UN-accredited World Energy Council, with an 
especially high level of energy security earning it the top spot (WEC, 2016). 
Denmark also has the world’s largest industrial per capita benefit of wind power 
exports with the industry comprising 4.1% of total exports and 6.9% of total goods 
exports in 2016 (DWIA, 2017b, p. 3).  
Wind power as a technology should thus have favourable policy conditions in 
Denmark, but is by the sitting government still problematized as being too 
expensive, thereby increasing investor uncertainty and destabilizing the regulatory 
framework for the challenger industry. The resulting political uncertainty and high 
risk of market instability is delaying the transition to a sustainable energy system, 
and I find this instability highly interesting after 40 years of existence. Moreover, 
since Denmark is still ahead of other countries in terms of wind power infrastructure 
and integration, the International Energy Agency (2006) has described it as a 
“microcosm” for analysing some of the pathways and obstacles to a green transition. 
The challenges that Denmark has faced and will face in making wind power one of 
the central components of the low-carbon energy system are worth examining to 
reveal insights that may help other countries when they encounter similar 
challenges.  
In this thesis, I analyze these present controversies in the context of the historical 
struggles of producing the challenger technology wind power as a worthwhile 
                                                          
1
 In 2007, Denmark had the 6th largest installed capacity of wind power in the world comprising 
about 3.3% of global installed capacity (GWEC, 2008, p. 8). Denmark had until then ranked 
number 1 in offshore wind power installations, but lost the first place to the UK in 2007 (GWEC, 
2008, p. 63), and the second place to Germany in 2015 (GWEC, 2016, p. 49).  
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investment for society. One perspective would be to think that it is purely a matter of 
the technical performance of the technology. A second position would be that the 
economic characteristics are given by straightforward market prices or costs. A third 
could be that it is purely a matter of political meanings. But all of these perspectives 
neglect the question of how calculative instruments and methods intervene in the 
valuation of wind power. By contrast to these common positions, I examine the 
valuation work that has been used to frame wind power as valuable or not to the 
Danish society, in particular how calculative instruments and methods intervene in 
the meaning-making and valuation processes. This understanding has shaped the 
title of the thesis and its object of study, namely the valuation history of Danish 
wind power. Why is it an ongoing struggle and how can we understand this 
valuation history of wind power as a challenger technology seeking to demonstrate 
its worth to society?   
 
1.1. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In order to understand how meanings about societal value are formed, maintained 
and challenged, it is necessary to inquire into how devices, such as calculations, 
form statements and meanings that enable certain framings, and produce certain 
valuations of wind power. I therefore use the following overall problem statement to 
guide my inquiry:  
 
What has been the historical role of valuation devices in producing wind power as a 
worthwhile investment for Danish society?  
 
To answer this question, I examine existing theories on sustainable transition and 
how change occurs in otherwise locked-in fields such as the energy sector. The aim 
is to understand how a challenger energy source (e.g., wind power), comes to be 
valued by proponents, opponents and incumbents in the energy sector, and how a 
current dominant framing of value can be challenged by a coalition supporting a 
challenger energy source. The first Research question focuses on how power is 
enforced in the framing of wind power. Actors who are able to propose new 
framings can create new knowledge and meanings about the value of wind power, 
and thereby try to change the governance structures to favor their perspectives. To 
understand valuation devices, I draw on the emerging field of valuation studies, 
wherein it is acknowledged that the devices used to create meanings affect the value 
of the object being categorized. By examining the empirical field through this lens, I 
hope to cast light on an under-studied aspect of the emergence and development of 
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wind power in Denmark—specifically, which political priorities and assumptions 
about the world affected the qualification of wind power as a worthwhile 
investment.  
 
Research question 1: Which valuation frames and devices have dominated in the 
history of Danish wind power, and which key qualities were used to produce wind 
power as a valuable societal investment or not? 
 
One cannot understand valuation frames without also analyzing the networks behind 
them. To analyze how the various actors have positioned themselves, I employ Neil 
Fligstein’s work on field theory with a specific focus on his recent work on strategic 
action fields with Doug McAdam (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). I use the 
terminology and understanding therein to show how challengers navigate the field of 
the Danish energy sector and specifically focus on the political governance of the 
field as well as the “rules of the game.” Within the overall scope of analyzing the 
power struggle between incumbents and challengers, I shine my spotlight 
specifically on the valuation devices that incumbents and challengers use to create 
meanings about the societal value of investing in wind power. If wind power had 
followed the typical trajectory of a challenger energy source, its presence in the 
Danish energy sector today would constitute the size of an incumbent. I thus 
examine if wind power is considered an incumbent in the Danish energy sector, or if 
it is still considered a challenger energy source, which is associated with field 
instability. Once this research question has been answered I will look towards the 
future and a broadened context in research question 2.  
 
Research Question 2: What can be learned from the valuation struggle of Danish 
wind power in terms of stabilizing a challenger energy source in energy fields in 
Denmark and Europe? 
 
I conclude this dissertation with a forward-looking chapter in which I reflect on how 
insights from the Danish microcosm can be applied more broadly. Applying these 
analytical insights, I examine potential future energy system developments to 
propose how the value of wind power can be framed in both Denmark and the EU. It 
is worth exploring how a theoretical understanding of valuation frames and 
valuation networks can be used to build strong coalitions and challenge entrenched 
meanings about wind power both in and outside of Denmark.  
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1.2. STRUCTURE OF DISSERTATION 
I will hereafter briefly go through the overall structure of the thesis that follows after 
this introduction chapter. In Chapter 2, I present the theoretical framework for this 
study and describe how I aim to contribute to the field. In the five empirical chapters 
that follow, I cover the valuation history of wind power, with a main focus on the 43 
years from 1974 to 2017.  
The empirical analysis starts in Chapter 3, where I briefly summarize relevant events 
prior to 1974, before focusing on categorization and valuation practices in the 1970s 
and 1980s. This includes the formation of actor-networks around the first valuation 
frames which enabled the emergence of wind power in Denmark, and the framed 
qualities which enabled wind power to evolve from being a grassroots movement 
darling to a small industrial cluster. In Chapter 4, I examine how wind power 
expanded in a reshaped market during the 1990s, when it was framed as a necessary 
solution to mitigate climate change. In Chapter 5, I describe the dramatic shift in 
valuation that occurred in the early 2000s, whereby new actors disassembled the 
previous valuation frame and instead framed wind power as a distortive factor 
within a perceived “natural market.” In Chapter 6, I examine the slow re-emergence 
of wind power from 2007 to 2014 as wind power was framed as a global advantage 
for Denmark with support from a broad valuation network. In Chapter 7, I turn the 
analysis to the most recent events since 2015, a period where a paradoxical mix of 
low technology costs and a strong focus on subsidy costs have been salient at the 
same time. The frameworks that enable wind power have been disassembled, and 
uncertainty has increased in a field that in the previous period had appeared to be 
stable.  
Following the five empirical chapters will be three chapters, where I present my 
findings and build on these insights to look forward and draw conclusions. In 
Chapter 8, I discuss findings that emerged through empirical analysis, primarily 
focusing on qualities and framings that enabled wind power to be viewed as 
valuable to society. Doing so reveals insights about the compositions of the 
valuation networks that constituted the framings and how they changed over time.  
In Chapter 9, I apply insights from Chapter 8 to propose how wind power 
proponents can constructively engage in valuation struggle going forward. Finally, 
in Chapter 10, I present overall conclusions based on my findings. The structure of 
this dissertation is visualized in Figure 1 on the next page.  
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Figure 1: Dissertation structure 
 
1.3. PHD PROJECT INFORMATION 
In this section, I provide a short overview of the activities undertaken in the process 
of writing this dissertation to fulfill the requirements of my PhD. I have completed 
the activities in Table 1 to accumulate 30.25 ECTS points for the project. 
 
Table 1: PhD-Courses and Conferences 
Date Course Institution ECTS 
10.02.15 Introduction to PhD AAU 1 
27.02.15 Industrial PhD Course DTU 7.5 
28.04.15 Writing Scientific Papers AAU 3.75 
07.05.15 Organizing Agents and Institutions CBS 5 
04.06.15 Science and Technology Studies  AAU-CPH 5 
07.04.16 
6
th
 Latin American and European 
Group of Organizational Studies  
EGOS 4 
06.07.17 
33
rd
 European Group of 
Organizational Studies (EGOS) 
EGOS 4 
  
 
30.25 
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In collaboration with my supervisor, Peter Karnøe, I co-authored and submitted two 
conference papers which were accepted and presented at the conferences listed in 
Table 1. The EGOS conference paper “Never mind your numbers” was presented in 
July 2017, and thereafter expanded and submitted to the Journal of Cultural 
Economy in the fall of 2017. The paper is currently in “revise and resubmit” status 
(H. B. Mortensen & Karnøe, 2018 Forthcoming). These papers are however not part 
of the Monograph.  
From July 2016 to December 2016, I studied at the Scandinavian Consortium for 
Organizational Research (SCANCOR) at Stanford University. SCANCOR enables 
Scandinavian PhDs, post-docs and professors to collaboratively work on research 
and interact with academic faculty at Stanford University. In addition to gaining 
valuable inspiration at various lectures at SCANCOR and the campus in general, I 
made two SCANCOR-presentations about my PhD work during the stay.  As a PhD 
candidate, my teaching activity at Aalborg University has been limited to a few 
undergraduate classes on energy economics related to the Bachelor-education in 
City, Energy and Environment. I have continued to work on projects related to 
market design and energy production costs in my daily work at Siemens Gamesa 
Renewable Energy. Specifically, I have interacted with members of the field through 
my work in the Cost of Energy team, which provides input for industry reports 
published by agencies such as the World Energy Council, IRENA and BVG 
Associates. Additionally, I have attended a number of industry events and 
conferences, including the Wind-Europe 2015 Offshore Conference (Copenhagen) 
and the Wind-Europe 2015 Annual Conference (Paris). It should however be noted 
that any opinions expressed in the thesis do not in any way reflect the views of 
Siemens Gamesa Renewable Energy, but solely that of the author.  
 
1.4. METHODOLOGY 
In this section, I present my approach to knowledge and explain how I conducted 
my empirical inquiry in the field. This is thus the framework for how I aim to 
produce answers to the two research questions posed in the previous sub-chapter.  
 
1.4.1 Ontological Approach  
No researcher acts independently of his or her research community (I. Andersen, 
Borum, Kristensen, & Karnøe, 1992, p. 162). I am a member of the Special Interest 
Group on Valuation and Markets at Aalborg University in Copenhagen, and a 
contributor to the Innovative Remaking of Energy Markets and Business Models 
(IREMB) research project. Thus, I draw my methodological approaches from these 
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research networks, and approach my study in accordance with similar valuation 
studies in the short history of the emerging field (Antal, Hutter, & Stark, 2015; 
Helgesson & Muniesa, 2013).  In valuation studies, scholars reject both 
methodological individualism (i.e., all individuals decide value) and methodological 
institutionalism (i.e., individuals are insignificant because they are ruled by 
structures) in favor of methodological situationalism (Antal et al., 2015, p. 3). This 
means that valuation is a “spatially and temporally localized” process requiring 
certain technologies and devices which are recognizable to the attentive observer 
(Antal et al., 2015, p. 4).  
I approached my analysis as a study of moments of valuation, as proposed by Antal, 
Hutter and Stark (2015, p. 4), who viewed valuation as an outcome of such moments 
that form a valuation process build on sites and methods which can be described as 
‘historic, contingent and disputable’ (Muniesa, Millo, & Callon, 2007, p. 3). This 
choice also equates a particular approach to an understanding of power. I focus my 
analysis on the actors which acquire the skills and techniques to produce and codify 
information to function as an organized power that can facilitate control at a distance 
(Cooper, 1992; Reed, 1999, p. 31). Ontologically, I adopt what is known as the 
pragmatic approach originally described by Charles S. Peirce and William James, 
and refined by John Dewey (Bernstein, 2010, p. 4). The original pragmatic idea was 
a departure from previous conceptions of the positivists, who believe a “given” truth 
is out there to be discovered. Pragmatists instead propose the notion that reality is 
effectuation and significance is an act (Muniesa, 2014, p. 17). Under pragmatism, 
beliefs are understood as rules for actions; the ways in which individuals conceive 
and enact qualities of an object become the full conception of the object (Bernstein, 
2010, p. 4). This original principle of pragmatism can be exemplified by the object 
of water. As an object, water is inscribed with many different signs and qualities 
depending on the purpose and device being considered (e.g., to sail over the North 
Pole, keep a nuclear reactor cool, or foster a salmon population in a river).  The 
same word, “water,” is a sign for objects that come into existence through work and 
interests, where actors conceive of the object in terms of the qualities relevant to that 
specific site. 
Dewey’s conception of pragmatism is especially well suited to studying valuation. 
He was philosophically opposed to the classic realistic/idealistic dualism on the 
meaning of value. To realists, value is inherent to an object and thus attached to 
something independent of an observer. To idealists, however, value is a 
characteristic which a thing gets by its relation to the consciousness of an organic 
being. Dewey counter argued that there is no such thing as value, only the process of 
valuation (Muniesa, 2011, p. 25). The value of an object is affected by the subject 
valuing it, but this does not mean that all valuation is merely subjective:  
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“Value is “objective,” but it is such in an active or practical situation, not 
apart from it. To deny the possibility of such a view, is to reduce the 
objectivity of every tool and machine to the physical ingredients that 
compose it, and to treat a distinctive “plow” character as merely 
subjective”. (Dewey, 1915, p. 516 in; Muniesa, 2011, p. 26) 
 
Dewey described a theory of inquiry, wherein a given problem would be 
transformed into a determined situation in which the inquirer would acquire new 
knowledge within the situated environment. Dewey understood inquiry as the 
struggle to replace doubt and ideas with settled belief. The notion that inquiry can be 
doubtful does not mean it is subjective, since even nature is an environment only 
when an observer is able to conceive it as such (Dewey, 1938, p. 2). Dewey sought 
to draw a connection between how conceptions of the world shape not only how 
individuals inquire about objects, but also how inquiry shapes future actions:  
 
“Thoughts that result in belief have an importance attached to them 
which leads to reflective thought, to conscious inquiry into the nature, 
conditions, and a bearing of the belief…to think of the world as flat is to 
ascribe a quality to a real thing as its real property. This conclusion 
denotes a connection among things and hence is not, like imaginative 
thought, plastic to our mood. Belief in the world’s flatness commits him 
who holds it to thinking in certain specific ways of other objects, such as 
the heavenly bodies, antipodes, the possibility of navigation. It prescribes 
to him actions in accordance with his conception of these objects”. 
(Dewey, 1910, p. 2) 
 
Thus, I argue that a study of valuation fits well with the pragmatic tradition. When 
an actor “ascribes a quality” to something, he or she “commits” to attaining 
alignment with other objects in the world.2 Dewey used the ancient belief that the 
world is flat to illustrate his idea. It was a belief that was thought to be fact “because 
people had not the energy or the courage to question” what seemed to be “confirmed 
by obvious sensible facts” (Dewey, 1910, p. 2). Just as believing the world is flat 
significantly impacts a traveler’s “possibilities of navigation,” the act of ascribing 
certain qualities to the components of an energy system impacts its builders’ future 
possibilities of navigation. Extending this parallel to modern times, the topic of 
                                                          
2
 Dewey went on to quote Locke’s text, On the Conduct of Understanding, published two years 
after his death, wherein Locke described what Dewey would call qualities as “images” which 
govern human minds: “But in truth the ideas and images in human minds are the invisible powers 
that constantly govern them, and to these they all, universally, pay a ready submission. It is 
therefore of the highest concernment that great care should be taken of the understanding, to 
conduct it aright in the search of knowledge and in the judgments it makes” (John Locke in Dewey, 
1910, p. 6). 
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climate change is causing the world’s scholars to question how to act in a world 
where science is politicized in an unprecedented way (Latour, 2011). If one 
acknowledges man-made climate change as an existential threat to mankind, it 
would in Dewey’s words “prescribe” one’s other actions in accordance with this 
conception. In the case of coal, the negative impact of burning it (i.e., the 
acceleration of climate change) would have to be included in its valuation. On the 
other hand, if one does not acknowledge climate change as an existential threat, 
beliefs about coal being the cheapest available energy source could remain 
uncontested. For an ecological issue on the scale of climate change, no single 
institution can oversee the scope of the task, and act as an authority to determine 
whether moral action is “right” or “wrong.” As a solution, Latour suggested that 
society should stop attempting to separate the worlds of science and politics:  
   
“Facts and opinions are already mixed up and they will be even more 
mixed up in the future. What we need is not to try isolating once again 
the world of science and the world of politics…Since it is now the worlds 
that are in question, let’s compare cosmologies with one another. Instead 
of trying to distinguish what can no longer be distinguished, ask these 
key questions: what world is it that you are assembling, with which 
people do you align yourselves, with what entities are you proposing to 
live?” (Latour, 2011, p. 7) 
 
This thesis will not go deeply into climate change science and will only briefly touch 
upon the moral discussion of mitigating climate change. But it is worth highlighting 
why it is important to ask the key questions that Latour states above. Several 
researchers have begun to use the term “Anthropocene” to define the epoch we are 
living in as one where humankind is the driving geological factor of the world. Our 
actions and plans affect the existence of all other species on the planet, and our one 
species thus have considerable impacts on the biological systems that enable all 
species’ existence (Bonneuil & Fressoz, 2016, p. 7). However, as will be seen in the 
analysis, calculative agencies attempt to ascribe a cost to CO2 emissions, and to 
ascribe a reasonable monetary cost to build mitigations to Climate change, such as 
wind turbines. An interesting question then becomes whether the Anthropocene 
epoch actually calls for an urgency imposed by nature that overrule the man-made 
rules of economic doctrines. Instead of ascribing monetary values to actions in 
attempts to incentives actions to mitigate climate change, it could be decided that an 
urgent exit strategy for coal was necessary. This may appear politically impossible, 
but as I will show later (Chapter 9: Insights), it is certainly not technically 
impossible. How various actors approach such questions related to climate change 
appears exactly to define what Latour called “the world that you are assembling”. 
Dewey’s notion that ascribing qualities to something commits one to a specific 
course of action is important to keep in mind as I make my way through the 
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analysis. This is especially relevant to how wind powers value through its ability 
mitigate climate change is commensurated (Espeland & Stevens, 1998) and weighed 
against other qualities to assess whether it is valuable or not. As Latour stated in the 
quote above, it is important to ask: With “which people” and “what entities” does 
one align?3 To me, this phrasing shows the importance of understanding which 
actors are assembling the networks that uphold certain valuations. To understand the 
assumptions behind a given valuation’s frame, one must sometimes aim to 
understand the broader assumptions held by the frame makers.  
 
1.4.2 Approach to Empirical Analysis:  Selecting the Empirical Material 
To explain how different actors in Denmark have categorized and valued wind 
power, I used actor-network theory (ANT) to trace associations. ANT provides a 
framework with the necessary breadth to learn how a given societal path has been 
altered. To answer my first research question, I adhered to ANT scholars’ 
recommendations to follow the trail of associations (Latour, 2005, pp. 3–5). Instead 
of trying to map relevant actors a priori, as would be done in traditional “sociology 
of the social” (Latour, 2005, p. 52), I began my investigation with the first valuation 
struggle. Struggles over the societal value of wind power are at the center of my 
research, and I focused on the decisive moments of valuation. Similar to the many 
moments of which time, skills, human motivations and assumptions go into 
constructing a building that may stand for decades or centuries (Latour, 2005, p. 89), 
there is much to be learned from understanding the moments wherein frames, that 
may determine the value of an energy source for years or decades, are constructed.  
 
Data Collection Tools 
A central component of this research is a qualitative content analysis of how the 
value of wind power has been framed through devices such as calculations and 
statements. I focused on identifying the devices which are used to frame whether 
wind is a worthwhile investment for Danish society. This occurs in moments where 
a calculation or statement upholds or challenges the dominant framing of the societal 
value of investing in wind power. I supplemented these calculations with historical 
and biographical literature to track the actors’ personal historical accounts combined 
                                                          
3
 It is especially difficult to claim objectivity when studying topics with large implications for the 
societal distribution of value, as Latour elaborated in a 2017 interview: “To have common facts, 
you need a common reality…Science has never been immune to political bias. On issues with huge 
policy implications, you cannot produce unbiased data. That does not mean you cannot produce 
good science, but scientists should explicitly state their interests, their values, and what sort of 
proof will make them change their mind” (Vrieze, 2017). 
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with public statements made at the time. Instruments of valuations, such as 
government energy plans and calculative reports are supplemented with framings by 
public actors in the media, as well as interviews with key actors. I collected the data 
presented in the empirical chapters by combining a “follow the actors” methodology 
with document mapping. For this purpose, I used Denmark’s largest and most 
trusted database for archival news texts, Infomedia. By searching for key terms, I 
was able to retrieve texts that reveal the qualities of wind power as they emerged4. In 
addition, I triangulated with historical accounts to identify major energy plans and 
legislative changes relevant to wind power. Doing so enabled me to create targeted 
searches focused on the valuation struggle leading up to a given change, or 
following a new major calculative report or energy plan. In Figure 2 (GBA), I 
present examples the three pillars of data analyzed in each empirical chapter.  
 
Figure 2: The three pillars of data analyzed in the empirical chapters. 
 
Prioritizing analytical breadth inherently requires sacrifices in terms of depth. Since 
this dissertation is an endeavor to examine how calculative devices, valuation frames 
and valuation networks change over long periods of time, limited space exists to 
cover each year’s events and discussions. This is not a thesis in history and it will 
therefore not comprise an empirically-exhaustive historical account of Danish wind 
power, but instead focus on the key calculations created throughout the historical 
trajectory. The thesis is within valuation and use moments of valuation to exemplify 
how calculative devices and concepts have been used to frame wind power as 
valuable or not. Since this is an analysis of the political negotiation over the societal 
value of investing in wind power, I address other interesting topics such as 
innovation or industrial policies only briefly.  Readers who are eager to gain more 
insights into the emergence of the growth and success of the Danish wind turbine 
cluster can find additional information in several academic (Garud & Karnøe, 2003; 
Karnøe, 1991; Karnøe & Jensen, 2016; Karnøe, Kristensen, & Andersen, 1999; K. 
H. Nielsen, 2001; Pallesen, 2013), and historic publications (Beuse, 2000; I. K. 
Jensen, 2015). 
                                                          
4
 Some articles in the reference-section have a code after their line, and I will also use the 
journalists name in the reference-section when available. This is so I can more easily track the 
article in the Infomedia database for further research. I hope the reader can accept the few extra 
lines in the references section.   
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Throughout the analyzed periods, wind power has expanded, as roughly shown in 
the graph on top of Figure 3 (GBA). In this study, I attempt to unpack both the actor 
networks involved in the valuation struggles and the enacted framing. This process 
is visualized through framings (large Squares) drawing on various qualities and their 
corresponding points of reference (small boxes) in the bottom part of Figure 3 
(GBA). These points of reference are part of the associations of heterogeneous 
elements – such as humans, calculation methods, technologies, documents - which 
form a network upholding the frame.  
 
Figure 3: Frames and points of reference 
 
Throughout the five empirical chapters, the level of detail increases, reflecting the 
number of available documents and coverage of actors’ movements. My 
descriptions of valuation struggles in Chapters 3 and 4 therefore rely more on 
historical documents and actor interviews, whereas descriptions in the chapters 5, 6 
and 7 are based on a larger set of available documents and media-sources.     
 
1.4.3 Following and Identifying the Trail of Claims for or against Wind Power 
In an examination of a field with a rich history like Danish wind power history, 
certain elements are highlighted, while others must be left out of the analysis. Since 
I view the empirical field as moments of valuation, the relevant trail of documents 
and statements pertain to the valuation struggle over wind power as a worthwhile 
investment for Danish society.   
Many accounts of Danish wind power history exist, a technology-industry history 
(Karnøe, 1991)  a network history of politics and technology (K. H. Nielsen, 2001), 
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a collection of first-hand actor experiences (Beuse, 2000), an interview-based 
narration of the key struggles (I. K. Jensen, 2015), making it impossible to capture 
all aspects of the emergence of this energy source and industry, even in 300 pages. 
In this thesis I take yet another perspective and address an issue that has been 
overlooked as a distinct theme. Drawing inspiration from valuation studies, I focus 
on the political struggles over what wind power is worth to society. Doing so has 
enabled me to construct a different account where the valuation approach reveals 
new aspects of the history of wind power in Denmark. This account will include the 
various calculative devices involved in shaping the valuation and the stabilizing or 
destabilizing effects that new meanings and framings entails for the challenger 
technology of wind power. However, like all studies, this approach also have 
limitations in that it does not yield in-depth accounts of technical developments, the 
growth and re-structuring of utilities and turbine manufacturers, and the construction 
of the Danish energy market. Instead, I have chosen to focus on instruments of 
valuation and on those policymakers and actors with sufficient authority to make 
statements about the societal value of wind power. Nevertheless, since no lens ever 
captures the full picture, there is ample opportunity to extend this analysis to include 
more actors and an even more fine-grained set of qualities.  
I acknowledge that for several qualities, one could argue for the necessity of some 
sort of an impact threshold to be included in the analysis. In order to make sense of 
“the messy practices of relationality and materiality” (Law, 2007, p. 2), assessments 
must be made, and perhaps discussed. One of the most difficult tasks of this analysis 
was organizing and weighing the many different types of qualities, and the 
authoritative importance of actors against each other. My earlier approach to the 
thesis was to examine calculative reports almost exclusively, and then compare their 
framings in that specific calculative approach. That was a less messy world, as these 
reports typically translated qualities into numbers. From there on it was a matter of 
checking which points of reference had been used to draw up the value of the 
different qualities, and how this weighed to form the final framing. However, in a 
SCANCOR seminar during my semester abroad at Stanford, Professor Mitchell 
Stevens challenged the notion that I could deduce something about the negotiations 
over wind power from the reports alone. The reports revealed nothing about the 
contexts, the networks that used them, and the underlying debates leading to their 
creation.  Some qualities may have an impact on a framing even though it is rarely 
calculated in the central documents of the period.  
 
Being Aware of My Position as an Observer 
Since I am studying valuation struggles in a policy field, a natural question has 
probably already crossed the reader’s mind. Is the author too embedded in the field 
to accurately describe and interpret it? However, according to Alvesson (2003, p. 
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189), an observer position with a risk of being too involved in the field (i.e., going 
native), can also be a valuable resource for understanding it. I believe my access to 
resources and key actors has been of great benefit to this study, and that I have 
sufficiently managed these risks by spending several years working with scholars at 
Aalborg University in Copenhagen, and 6 months working with scholars at 
SCANCOR at Stanford University in the United States. Nearly all of the empirical 
data (i.e., interviews and archival materials) relate to the history of wind power in 
Denmark, and are not directly related to Siemens Gamesa Renewable Energy.  
However, I believe that the strong engineering tradition of Siemens Gamesa 
Renewable Energy has forced me to reflect deeply about how this thesis can 
function for two audiences. The difference between the two audiences became 
especially clear when I was interviewing a sociologist who authored one of the 
theories used in this thesis. He advised me to shift my focus away from the technical 
details of who built what and at which time to the political negotiations over the 
value of wind power. Having spent three years in an engineering-focused company, 
this struck me as profoundly incomplete. How could I possibly describe various 
experts’ attempts to translate qualities into the object of wind power without 
providing a short description of the material properties of wind power and its 
interacting systems? I have thus attempted to write for both a sociological audience 
and a technical audience. If I have accomplished my task, the sociologist will find 
the various changes in counted qualities and the changing actor constellations of 
interest. An engineer who is purely interested in technology may find it interesting 
to learn what was known at a given time about wind power technology, CO2 quotas, 
etc. As originally identified by Kuhn (1962), much tacit knowledge is built on 
experience gained through repeated practices in the field, which cannot be 
accurately mapped at the outset of research. I therefore believe that being a member 
of both the university research networks and Siemens Gamesa Renewable Energy 
has helped me be more reflective about my own inquiry. As recently stated in the 
new journal of valuation studies, it is acceptable for researchers to deliver qualified 
interpretations of the valuation processes they observe:  
 
“It is possible to examine and make discussable the social practices of 
valuation while not being impartial to what is being studied. Open and 
blatant critiques of a particular valuation practice may bring greater force 
to discussions through the independent assessment (whatever this means) 
of the merits and demerits of what a certain valuation practice renders 
visible and invisible. There is indeed much to be said about the 
importance of, and even need for, critique within constructivist 
analyses...It is a perfectly acceptable academic (and not just political) 
point to say that a specific metric has strong limits and problematic 
consequences” (Doganova et al., 2014, p. 90). 
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Where necessary, I use my field experience to provide background information 
about both the specific metrics and points of reference used in a given framing. If 
elements are black-boxed and remain black-boxed today, it is the responsibility of 
the analyst to raise awareness of this in his study. Otherwise, we end up merely 
“telling interesting stories” as John Law once described one of the purposes of ANT 
(Law, 2007, p. 2). To be fair, Law also argued that researchers should possibly 
interfere in these stories, as he does not interpret material semiotics as a grand 
theory, but rather as a toolkit for telling said stories about “the messy practices of 
relationality and materiality of the world” (Law, 2007, p. 2).  When I provide 
background information, I do so out of the conviction that the reader will benefit 
more from this than from merely learning that “A claimed X and then B contested 
claim X.”  
This concludes my methodology section and I hereafter leave it to the reader to 
judge whether I have managed to “be close and avoid closure” (Alvesson, 2003, p. 
190). 
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2. THEORY 
In this chapter, I introduce the theoretical framework for my thesis “The Valuation 
History of Danish Wind Power”. For the sake of brevity, I provide a basic overview 
of the theories instead of unfolding their many nuances and complexities. I focus on 
new technologies that emerged during transitions, how incumbents and challengers 
fought over stability or change in fields, and power relationships in terms of how 
knowledge of valuation is created. Thus, my primary aim in this chapter is to show 
why valuation studies can help reveal the political struggle of the valuation work 
that occurs during energy sector transitions. The theoretical toolset presented in this 
chapter enabled me to understand how meanings about wind power’s societal value 
are produced through calculative technologies and connected to political action, 
which in turn is linked to capacity expansion decisions. Just as new meanings about 
wind power can affect political action and capacity expansion, it also can work the 
other way, where the materiality of previous expansion initiatives or legislative 
system changes affect future political actions and meanings about the value of wind 
power.   
When faced with the existential threat of climate change, it is intuitively tempting to 
expect that global society will make a technological leap when it is most needed. 
The designs of current energy technologies may appear obvious; it would be easy to 
assume that they would have been invented independent of political priorities and 
economic arrangements. But as will be revealed in the empirical chapters on the 
adaption of wind power in Denmark, innovation and political priorities are 
inherently intertwined. Hughes (1983) showed that the energy system we have today 
did not naturally evolve from rational technical choices, but was built through a 
complex web of intertwined technical, economic and political concerns. This is also 
empirically shown by studies of entities that today are described as “conventional” 
energy sources such as coal and oil (Mitchell, 2009; Unruh, 2000), which have gone 
from being false heroes to villains in a matter of a few years. Unruh (2000) and 
Mitchell (2009) have documented how fossil fuel extraction largely drove the 
proliferation of modern Western society and is an underlying component to many 
locked in societal structures. Today, it has become clear that the companies which 
have benefited the most from fossil fuel extraction have also delayed being 
perceived as villains. Since the 1960s, the American Petroleum Institute and several 
large oil companies have been aware that climate change would at some point reveal 
fossil fuel extractors as villains and not as heroes (Oreskes & Conway, 2010).  
The idea that the technical, political and economic spheres are intertwined is at the 
core of science and technology studies. Technologies “reproduce and embody the 
complex interplay of professional, technical, economic, and political factors” (Law 
& Bijker, 1992, p. 3), and thus mirror the societies we live in. Any account of a 
technical trajectory would be comprised of “messy networks” across the spheres 
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(Law & Bijker, 1992, p. 8,12); moreover, since all framings are imperfect, overflows 
should be thought of as the norm and not the exception (Callon, 1998). When 
studying sustainable transitions through this lens, calculative devices become central 
in producing ultimate value. This is exemplified by Mackenzie when it comes to 
economic models that shape financial markets (MacKenzie, 2009b, pp. 3–4), and by 
Fourcade when it comes to calculating environmental damages or oil spills 
(Fourcade, 2011, p. 1727).  
 
2.1. THE MULTILEVEL PERSPECTIVE 
The multilevel perspective (MLP) framework is among the oldest and most 
widespread within sustainable transition studies, making it a natural starting point 
for my thesis (Geels, 2005, 2011). The central point of the MLP framework is to 
study transitions as resulting from “the interaction between processes at different 
levels:” niche, regime and landscape (Geels, 2011, p. 29). From Geels’ perspective, 
an existing energy sector is a socio-technical regime, which is stabilized through a 
combination of technical, social, political and economic performance criteria, such 
as sunk investments and infrastructure restraints (Geels, 2011, p. 25). The concepts 
of niches (i.e., where radical innovations happen) and landscapes (i.e., broader 
contexts that may influence regimes) are derived from the studied regimes. Regimes 
represent established practices and associated rules that can change at the interplay 
between larger societal changes at the landscape level, and R&D innovations 
developed at the niche level (Geels, 2014, p. 23). Niches will be the areas where 
new challenger technologies emerge to change the existing dominant regime.   The 
MLP framework is beneficial for mapping exogenous events and niche actors 
involved in challenging a given regime (Smith, Voß, & Grin, 2010). However, like 
the other sustainable transition frameworks, its utility for analyzing political agency 
in power struggles is underdeveloped (Hess, 2014; Meadowcroft, 2011).  
 
“From the outset sustainable development was understood as a political 
project, because the operation of social institutions does not 
spontaneously generate a sustainable development trajectory…To put 
this another way: markets may drive the uptake of the iPhone (with a lot 
of help from a favorable regulatory environment), but they will not 
produce a carbon emission-free energy system—at least on a time frame 
relevant to avoiding dangerous interference with the climate system….So 
whatever else they may be, sustainability transitions are inherently 
political”. (Meadowcroft, 2011, p. 71) 
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This notion aligns well with Nobel-prize winning economist Nicholas Stern’s 
description of climate change as “the greatest and widest-ranging market failure ever 
seen” (Stern, 2006, p. i). If institutions in the MLP framework do not adequately 
mitigate climate change, the sustainable transition landscape becomes inherently 
more political, as the time element eventually requires lawmakers to make difficult 
choices through climate change mitigation policies (Meadowcroft, 2011, p. 72).    
 
“The politics of sustainability transitions requires a redefinition of 
societal interests and this implies political engagement to build reform 
coalitions, create new centers of power, buy off powerful lobbies, isolate 
die-hards, compensate losers, and so on….It is therefore important to 
develop an understanding of how political actors (understood broadly) 
can construct linkages between economic, social and environmental 
reform agendas;…what resistance strategies are most popular with 
transition opponents, how they can be countered by proponents; and so 
on”. (Meadowcroft, 2011, p. 73) 
 
According to Meadowcroft, the struggle between various incumbent actors and their 
strategies of resistance must be further developed in the MLP framework. This call 
for more focus on agency aligns well with Geels’ later work, wherein he described 
regime stability as an outcome of “active resistance by incumbent actors,” and 
encouraged scholars to “understand and enact the destabilization of fossil fuel-based 
regimes” (Geels, 2014, pp. 23, 25). In Geels’ 2014 paper on regime resistance, he 
highlighted a “core regime alliance” between incumbent firms and policymakers: 
 
“I suggest there are, at least, three ways in which firms influence 
policymakers. First, dependency leads to relational networks and close 
contacts between big business and senior policymakers, which provide 
policy access to firms….Second, frequent contacts may lead 
policymakers to internalize the ideas and interests of industries, which is 
a more subtle mechanism of influence…Third, firms use “corporate 
political strategies” to influence policymakers, which may contain 
information strategies, financial incentives strategy, organized pressure 
strategies, direct lobbying strategy, and confrontational strategies such as 
litigation…In sum, one way to introduce power and politics into the 
MLP is to conceptualize relations between policymakers and incumbent 
firms as a core regime level alliance, which often resists fundamental 
change”. (Geels, 2014, pp. 26–27)  
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Recent efforts to include a more political element have improved the MLP 
framework. Incumbents are seen as exerting influence through frequent interactions 
in relational networks, whereby policymakers “internalize the ideas and interests” of 
the incumbent industries. I agree with Geels on the importance of the networks 
between incumbent actors and policymakers. Building on Snow and Benford’s 
(1988) original frame concept, Geels proposed  three different framing dimensions 
of regime resistance—namely, diagnostic framing, prognostic framing and 
motivation framing. Geels explained that incumbents use their political power to 
frame which problems should be addressed (diagnostic framing), how they should 
be solved (prognostic framing), and which actions actors should pursue (motivation 
framing) (Geels, 2014, p. 29).  
Although Geels stated that challengers must propose alternatives to existing 
dominant frames, he did not explore the valuation work underpinning the creation of 
new frames. In the next section, I briefly discuss other branches of sustainable 
transition studies that have also dealt with this question of power in framing 
processes.    
  
2.2. SUSTAINABLE TRANSITION STUDIES 
Beyond the MLP framework, a number of other theories have emerged within 
sustainable transition studies that are worth touching upon. In a comprehensive 
literature review, Markard, Raven and Truffer (2012, p. 959) defined sustainable 
transition studies as “the analysis of the institutional, organizational, technical, 
social, and political aspects of far-reaching changes in existing socio-technical 
systems (e.g., transportation and energy supply), which are related to more 
sustainable or environmentally friendly modes of production and consumption”. 
They identified four major frameworks: MLP, transition management, strategic 
niche management, and technological innovation systems. In addition to MLP, 
strategic niche management and technological information systems are relevant to 
the context of this study.5  
Smith and Raven (2012, p. 1027)  explained how the strategic niche management 
framework distinguishes between a “formative phase,” wherein actors engage in 
experiments within a “protected space” phase, and a “growth phase” that typically 
follows characterized by system expansion and diffusion. Although Smith and 
Raven (2012, p. 1029) recognized that actors perform “intermediating work” to 
                                                          
5
 The exception is the transition management framework, which draws on the early works of 
evolutionary approaches to propose an “instrumental, practice-oriented model” to manage 
technological innovation (Markard et al., 2012, p. 958). This has not yet been developed on a 
national level, so although the framework has some applicability at the municipal- and city-level, it 
is not relevant to explore further in this context.  
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create robust knowledge networks, they contended that it remains “unclear precisely 
how niches compete and transform incumbent regimes” (Smith, 2007; Smith & 
Raven, 2012, p. 1030). So although both Geels and Smith and Raven designate 
niches as the place where challengers emerge, the interaction with the incumbent 
regime appears to have potential for further development.  
Drawing from Smith and Raven (2012), Lauber and Jacobsson (2016) has deployed 
the Technological Innovation Systems (TIS) framework to examine the German 
Energiewende. Specifically they aimed to analyze how various legislative acts 
function from two different perspectives. They found that when the “fit and 
conform” perspective is adopted, the value of renewables is framed based on short-
term cost competitiveness under current system configurations. When the “stretch 
and transform” perspective is adopted, however, modifications to the existing 
system are considered to accommodate renewables (Lauber & Jacobsson, 2016, p. 
148)6. Although this study shows that TIS can include the political struggles in a 
transition to some degree, one of the original critiques—namely, that it does not 
sufficiently map the processual dynamics of agency—still stands (Markard, Hekkert, 
& Jacobsson, 2015, p. 82). Lauber and Jacobsson (2016, p. 261) argued that 
achieving a greater understanding of the “politics of policy” in the green transition 
requires an approach that is even more interdisciplinary than Geels’ (2011, 2014) 
MLP framework. Proponents of the technological innovation systems (TIS) 
framework have acknowledged that their approach “does not address the decline of 
(incumbent) socio-technical systems, nor has it paid much attention to interaction of 
multiple technologies;” nonetheless, developing this branch of the framework is 
considered a worthwhile endeavor (Markard et al., 2015, p. 80). According to 
Markard, Raven and Truffer, all branches of sustainable transition studies have 
neglected the political aspect of transitions: 
 
“At a more conceptual level, issues of power and politics had originally 
been somewhat neglected…transition research has mostly focused on 
meso-level contexts, such as innovation systems and sociotechnical 
regimes. Therefore, the field might benefit from more in-depth studies on 
how system and regime structures are created and changed through the 
strategic interplay of different types of actors” (Markard et al., 2012, p. 
962). 
                                                          
6
 The authors show an emerging focus among especially the business wing of De Konservative on 
the ‘affordability’ of energy in the mid-2000s, and a warning from the four major utilities that 
expanding capacity for renewables could cause ‘grid destabilization and increased blackout risks’ 
(Lauber & Jacobsson, 2016, p. 151). Lauber and Jacobsson (2016, p. 160) concluded that the fit and 
conform discourse is currently dominant in Germany, which in part stems from an initial law from 
the 1990s which framed renewables as ‘an additional source, probably marginal’, and in part from a 
post-2009 backlash to the 2000 EEG law. They highlighted the high degree of controversy over the 
stretch and transform notion that market formation is ‘essential to reducing initially high costs’ 
(Lauber & Jacobsson, 2016, p. 160). 
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Although progress has been made in the six years since the four major frameworks 
were mapped, scholars in the field of sustainable transition studies still have “much 
to learn from…neo-institutional theory, actor-network theory, political and policy 
sciences” (Markard et al., 2012, p. 962).  
 
2.2.1 Smith and Raven’s Empowerment Framework 
Smith and Raven (2012) proposed an approach to analyze how actor networks seek 
to empower niche technologies by further developing the “fit and conform” and 
“stretch and transform” perspectives, now called empowerments. The fit and 
conform empowerment involves niche technologies trying to become competitive 
within “conventional, regime criteria,” whereas the stretch and transform 
empowerment involves an attempt to “convince the wider social world that the rules 
of the game need to be changed” (Smith & Raven, 2012, p. 1033). When the stretch 
and transform empowerment is enacted, the coalitions advocating for the niche 
technology attempt to justify system change by arguing that the niche technology 
presents a “realistic resolution to instabilities, conflicts and tensions” in the current 
market or system. This proposed framing of the world must be accepted by a 
“sufficiently powerful coalition” for it to translate into a system change (Smith & 
Raven, 2012, p. 1030).  
To achieve power, coalitions use three types of narratives to “reshape perspectives” 
and possibly enable desired market-changing reforms (Smith & Raven, 2012, p. 
1032). The first narrative focuses on future performance improvements that will 
justify investing in the niche today; these can include promises about future 
reductions in technology costs or more reliable output. The second narrative 
advocates for present day reforms to make the niche competitive, for example, by 
promoting job growth in the renewables sector. The third narrative involves 
reframing the past by challenging prevailing understandings of priorities, for 
example, by reframing which energy sources are considered to provide energy 
security. This elaborated understanding of niche technologies provides a “more 
networked and discursively argued way” (Smith & Raven, 2012, p. 1031) to 
empower a niche technology, which is “far from an orderly, singularly rational 
management task” (Smith & Raven, 2012, p. 1034)  According to Smith and Raven, 
in-depth empirical work is required to determine whether their proposed framework 
captures these processes. The approach to understanding how niche advocates 
mobilize evidence and construct narratives represents a significant advancement 
compared to previous approaches, but is still very broadly defined.  
Their focus on the “mobilization of material and nonmaterial resources” (Smith & 
Raven, 2012, p. 1031) to shape norms and standards also reveals an awareness of the 
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interplay between human and material actors. Especially during attempts to stretch 
and transform, coalitions must “create capabilities and attract resources that 
empower participation in political debates” (Smith & Raven, 2012, p. 1031). 
Nevertheless, the three narratives fail to address the role of mobilizing actors and 
calculating value.  
Although these significant contributions from Geels (2011, 2014) and Smith and 
Raven (2012), have provided valuable tools that recognize the political struggles 
involved in energy transitions, it is necessary to obtain an even deeper understanding 
of the exact power struggles between incumbents and challengers, and how 
interactions between incumbents and policymakers are central in defining the rules 
of the game and maintaining stability in the field. But these interactions also need to 
account for the instruments that are at play when value is calculated, for example 
when future performance is framed to justify political action. It is necessary to know 
more about the role of calculative devices and methods and how they impact the 
robustness of a given framing. It is thus important to explore how these frameworks 
can be “theoretically enriched by mobilizing insights from other theories” (Geels, 
2011, p. 31).  
 
2.3. STRATEGIC ACTION FIELD THEORY 
Strategic action field theory (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012) and Fligstein’s (1996, 
2001, 2008, 2013, 2014) corresponding work on markets as fields is suitable for 
analyzing how actors maintain stability in a socially constructed arena such as an 
energy market. Since it especially facilitates extensive consideration of the interplay 
between state and market fields, this framework is suitable for a study of wind 
power7.  
Fligstein and McAdam characterized fields as “constructed social orders that define 
an area within which a set of consensually defined and mutually attuned actors vie 
for advantage” (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p. 64), wherein strategic action fields 
are “the constructed mesolevel social orders” wherein actors interact with each other 
on the basis of shared understandings about purpose, relationships and governing 
rules (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p. 9). In strategic action field theory, value is 
determined within a field when actors fight over how to split resources, which 
affects the rules of the game. This can be exemplified by current capitalist markets, 
which only exist because nation-states “create the institutional conditions for 
                                                          
7
 I will hereafter refer to Fligstein’s body of work as Strategic Action Field Theory, although I am 
aware that the major piece on this is written with Doug McAdam and some text on market 
architecture are also written in collaboration with other authors. This is not too take anything away 
from these other authors, but it is needed to have some sort of common reference point for the large 
theoretical framework, which mainly draws on Fligstein’s papers.  
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markets to be stable,” so that these markets can “create and maintain stable worlds” 
for market actors (Fligstein, 1996, pp. 657–658). A market is just one of many ways 
for a society to allocate resources as there is no “single set of social and political 
institutions that produce the most efficient allocation of resources” (Fligstein, 2001, 
p. 23). The difficulty in this is especially apparent when it comes to natural 
resources or pollution, as exemplified by carbon markets (Callon, 2009; MacKenzie, 
2009a), the value of nature in a market arrangement (Fourcade, 2011), and climate 
change mitigation as a collective concern (Pallesen, 2013). 
 
2.3.1 Incumbents and Challengers Determine Stability in a Field 
As in other sustainable transition theories, Fligstein distinguished two groups of 
market actors: incumbents and challengers  (Fligstein, 1996, p. 663). As the 
dominant actors in a given market, incumbents frame their actions to create or 
negotiate stability in the market amongst themselves and government entities. 
Challengers try to gain a foothold in a market, and experience market institutions as 
factors beyond their control. As long as the market remains stable, they must frame 
their actions according to the rules established by incumbents. However, when a 
crisis emerges, the roles of incumbents and challengers can change significantly. 
This perspective challenges static views of lock-ins, as market fields may be 
characterized by cracks and heterogeneity, as opposed to a single dominant 
understanding. Both challenger and incumbent actors thus can be viewed as 
“constantly making adjustments” in a field that is “continuously contested and 
constantly oscillating between greater or lesser stability and order” (Fligstein & 
McAdam, 2012, p. 12). Ensuring the success of markets as institutional projects is 
inherently a political endeavor (Fligstein, 1996, p. 664). The valuation of goods 
depends on a number of constructed assessment methods that have been shaped and 
accepted by dominant players in industry and society over time (Fligstein & Dauter, 
2007; Fligstein & McAdam, 2011). A dispute over the value of a given good 
constitutes a struggle for market control (e.g., which actors should deliver 
electricity)8. State actors typically do not change the rules governing interactions 
unless dominant actors are under pressure.  
                                                          
8
 The energy market has an additional layer of complexity, as indirect and direct subsidies from 
state budgets play a significant role in shaping the market. If the valuation struggles of wind power 
are to be analyzed, interactions between incumbent firms and policymakers are important. 
Fligstein’s theory on markets and their enabling institutions is therefore highly relevant. One 
example of how costs become a target in itself is the alleged “Energy Trilemma:” affordability, 
energy security and decarbonization.  The Energy Trilemma had been proposed in 2008 by UK 
branch of the German utility EON back in 2008 (Boston, 2013). But it was not highly salient as a 
device until it was re-introduced at a 2013 conference as an ‘old’ way of seeing things by a British 
industry lobbyist. It depicts three energy system qualities, decarbonization, energy security and 
affordability, wherein a step in one direction could not be done without losing something on 
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2.3.2 Conceptions of Control and relation between State- and Incumbent Actors 
Fligstein identified four types of rules which produce market stability: property 
rights, governance structures, rules of exchange, and conceptions of control 
(Fligstein, 2001, p. 32). Property rights distinguish where risks and rewards are 
allocated, and thus make firms in a market distinguishable from one another. 
Governance structures constitute the laws and practices which define how firms 
compete and cooperate. Rules of exchange also regulate the market by governing 
how transactions are performed (i.e., legally constituted health and safety 
obligations). Conceptions of control is the fourth and most interesting rule to study, 
as it relates to hierarchies in the internal organization of a given market that 
constitute a shared worldview among incumbent actors, which enables them to 
interpret others’ actions relative to “how things work” in their market.  
 
“Market structures involve both cognitive understandings and concrete 
social relations...specific understandings about the way a particular 
market works. These specific understandings structure the interactions 
between competitors but also allow actors to make sense of their 
competitors' actions”. (Fligstein, 2001, p. 32)      
  
Fligstein emphasized that the laws and rules governing such political projects as 
markets are never neutral; rather, they favor certain groups of actors. States do not 
seek to change such rules unless dominant groups or the state experience an 
economic crisis, which precipitates demands for change (Fligstein, 2001). For 
example, the oil crisis of 1973 sparked demands for change and played a role in 
enabling the emergence of wind power. Although Fligstein and McAdam suggested 
that challengers who act independently encounter great difficulties in changing 
current market arrangements during periods of stability, they recognized the ongoing 
contestations during these periods and the skills deployed by “agents of change” to 
“resist other actors’ power” (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p. 7).  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                        
another parameter (CB, 2013). The World Energy Council (WEC) would then a few years later 
start producing Trilemma reports based on almost the same phrasing, namely Environmental impact 
mitigation, energy security and social equity (WEC, 2016). To bring “affordability” up to as high a 
status as sustainability and energy security limits the discussion about what it is worth to solve or 
mitigate the two large challenges in the trilemma. If “affordability” is mentioned as a goal in itself, 
the goal of having “cheap” energy becomes a purpose on its own. But “cheap” coal power is only 
cheap because we are not pricing the climate change damages it does. 
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2.3.3 The Work of Actors is Ongoing   
Fligstein’s theories show the importance of bridging the gap between what used to 
be divided into the two spheres of “rational” economics and “intimate” sociology 
(Zelizer, 2007). Fligstein generally rejected such a division, as well as the idea of 
dividing the world into macro- and micro-levels; instead, he described society as 
consisting of millions of “densely interconnected” fields (Fligstein, 2014, p. 2). 
These fields are defined by ongoing changes (Fligstein, 2013, p. 43), and order can 
only be achieved through “interaction with other actors where something is at stake” 
(Fligstein, 2014, p. 1). Fligstein distanced himself from what he described as the 
sociological version of new institutional theory, which “tends to underestimate 
power, conflict and the degree to which there exists hierarchy within fields 
(Fligstein, 2014, p. 2). As such, even when a field appears stable, it is not due to 
some inherited script from history that powerless actors must follow, but because 
incumbent actors constantly make adjustments to maintain a stable world (Fligstein, 
2013, p. 43). All fields are “embedded in complex webs” of other proximate fields 
(with strong ties where actions routinely impact each other) and distant fields (with 
weak ties or virtually no ties) (Fligstein, 2013, p. 44). Although Fligstein recognized 
intra-field hierarchies, no macro-order field exists in the traditional institutionalist 
sense. Societies interpret new crises from “the current dominant perspective” 
(Fligstein, 2001, p. 36), but such a dominant perspective is just another network, 
which represents a source of information (Fligstein, 2013, p. 48). 
 
2.3.4 Incumbents Determine the Value of Products and Realistic Pathways 
Fligstein and Calder (2015) considered the qualities of a given product, but only in 
the context of initial market creation. Before a product enters the market, market and 
state actors define what qualities to ascribe, and the rules governing exchange:  
 
“For example, in the early stage of a market’s development, a product’s 
qualities need to be defined. Governments, firms, and customers have 
input into the question of what count as safe food products, useful 
telecommunications standards, or tradable financial securities. 
...Institutional theory stresses not only how states set rules and enforce 
sanctions, but also how they define what types of products are 
appropriate for exchange”. (Fligstein & Calder, 2015, p. 3) 
 
Moreover, market actors rely on “institutional architecture, formal and informal rule 
systems” to mediate problems related to the exchange of goods (Fligstein & Dioun, 
2015, p. 71). Therefore, this framework accounts for how interactions between state 
and private actors determine a given product’s qualities in order to define the rules 
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governing its exchange. Although Fligstein did not engage further with ongoing 
valuation work, the above quote reveals an awareness that valuation work occurs.  
Apart from its compatibility with valuation studies, this theoretical framework is 
useful for mapping how incumbents can influence what is considered a realistic 
technological pathway. Stirling used Fligstein’s framework to analyze how 
incumbent actors in European energy markets influence which technological 
pathways are considered realistic (Stirling, 2014, p. 86).  This is critical to examine, 
since the various technological pathways for creating a low-carbon energy system 
are so disparate that they cannot be optimized simultaneously (Awerbuch, Stirling, 
Jansen, & Beurskens, 2006, pp. 202–222). Since any discussion of future energy 
pathways occurs in a context characterized by system lock-ins creating entrenched 
vested interests (Unruh, 2000, 2009), there is a need to understand the actors who 
get to frame the value of energy sources (Stirling, 2014, p. 85) 9. One example of 
powerful actors working to re-categorize the energy source they support, is the work 
of the nuclear lobby to categorize nuclear power as emission-free so it could be 
associated as part of the same group as the renewable energy sources of wind and 
solar power in ‘low-carbon energy policy frameworks’ (Garud, Gehman, & Karnøe, 
2010). Professor Anna-Marie Mol has also developed relevant considerations of 
power in relation to healthcare. But if one imagines the words “patient” and 
“healthcare” replaced with “energy” in the following quotes, it has some relevance 
for the analysis to come. Mol asks whether an administrator decides between options 
on behalf of a “patient-customer making choices between discrete goods on a 
market, or should it be a patient-citizen trying to organize the healthcare system for 
the benefit of all” (Mol, 1999, p. 86). Mol’s point about how powerful actors frame 
those they claim to speak on behalf of, is something I also think can be applied to 
the energy market.    
Fligstein’s field theory is well-suited to studying transitions in contested fields, 
particularly due to its strong focus on agency. I use Fligstein’s conceptualization of 
incumbents and challengers, and of how incumbents and state actors collectively 
establish the rules of the game. I also highlight which technological pathways are 
deemed “realistic” by incumbents in the analysis.  In the next section, I shift my 
focus to valuation studies, which can reveal how qualities come to form framings of 
value.  
                                                          
9
 One could, of course, argue that a locked-in infrastructure that favors a certain technology has a 
type of power; importantly, material conditions could also serve as beneficial reference points for a 
given coalition, even though they are not viewed as a controlled power resource. Fligstein (2013, p. 
43) recognized networks as representing sources of information, resource dependence and trust, 
since power is exercised through access to knowledge.  He discussed how “material resources” can 
be used as a “powerful weapon” to shape “contours of the emerging field” (Fligstein, 2013, p. 45), 
herein understood in the sense of Bourdieu’s (1986) types of capital, which can be exchanged for 
power. Just as Fligstein mainly interpreted materials as resources which are leveraged for power to 
enforce a given framing, scholars in the field of valuation studies view materiality (e.g., 
infrastructure) as a quality to be leveraged in a proposed frame. 
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2.4. VALUATION STUDIES 
Like sustainable transition studies, the field of valuation studies is rooted in the 
science and technology studies tradition, but compared to sustainable transition 
studies valuation studies is occupied with how value is calculated and framed. 
Valuation studies breaks down Parson’s Pact, which had set up a barrier between 
economic calculations and societal values and priorities (Çalışkan & Callon, 2010).10 
Value is not seen as something that is determined in some unobservable equilibrium, 
but rather as something that can be studied within sociology. When calculations 
frame the world, some elements become visible while others are unconsciously or 
consciously neglected. The editorial board of the Valuation Studies journal  
therefore deemed it worthwhile to pursue more studies that make “the social 
practices of valuation discussable and, possibly, thereby also accountable” 
(Doganova et al., 2014, p. 88).   
Valuation studies scholars such as Kjellberg et. al. (2013) follow Dewey’s (1939) 
pragmatic perspective that objects do not have pre-determined qualities, but become 
valued as an outcome of active and ongoing effort (Muniesa, 2011, 2014; Stark, 
2009). Valuation is a fundamental mechanism by which economic reality is 
“actionized” through various instruments (Çalışkan & Callon, 2009), and valuation 
studies focus on these instruments and the situated work involved in valuation 
(Heuts & Mol, 2013; Sjögren & Helgesson, 2007). Valuation is understood as an 
ongoing process, and an object’s valuation is thus never determined once and for all. 
Antal et al. (2015)  aptly described how valuation can be understood as a 
configuration of sites and moments:  
 
“The sites of valuation are often spatially marked: the dining hall, the 
court room, and spaces for professional meetings all have their material 
characteristics. They are sites for collective gatherings. Each one is 
equipped with certain technologies and devices…Moments of valuation 
are also temporally marked. In most of the case studies they have a 
recognizable beginning and end. They are identified as sessions, or trials, 
or experiments. They could consist of a sequence of meetings or of an 
era of changing evaluation standards, only recognized in hindsight”. 
(Antal et al., 2015, p. 4)   
 
Examples of valuation processes may be found in all areas of production, use and 
consumption, regulation, public management, as well as by food and art critics 
(Heuts & Mol, 2013; Sjögren & Helgesson, 2007). While scholars have explored 
                                                          
10
 Parson’s Pact was the informal agreement made between sociologist Talcott Parson and his 
economist colleagues at Columbia University in the 1960s that economists would study value, and 
sociologists would study values (Stark, 2009).   
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how actors develop capacities to evaluate economic and non-economic 
characteristics of objects (Beckert & Aspers, 2011; Çalışkan & Callon, 2009, 2010; 
Callon, Méadel, & Rabeharisoa, 2002; Stark, 2009), so far, few have focused on 
how new valuations are proposed by actors.  
When analyzing the different devices that constitute a given market, it is critical to 
pay attention to material and discursive assemblages which shape understandings 
over time (Muniesa et al., 2007, p. 2). For an entity to be “economic” and calculable 
in monetary terms, it must have been formulated during a series of events and 
trajectories that qualify it as a product in a given market arrangement (Muniesa et 
al., 2007, pp. 4–5).   
 
“Calculation is neither a universally homogeneous attribute of 
humankind nor an anthropological fiction. It is the concrete result of 
social and technical arrangements. Likewise, the qualities of goods and 
services are the output of complex operations of qualification, of framing 
and reframing, or attachment and detachment”. (Muniesa et al., 2007, p. 
5)  
 
As Muniesa explained, value is framed through complex operations whereby actors 
attach and detach certain qualities to a good. Likewise, Callon et al. (2002)  
described how a good’s qualities emerge within a system of “differences and 
similarities” of “distinct yet connected categories” (Callon et al., 2002, p. 198), 
which are revealed through trials:  
 
“First, these properties are not observed; they are ‘revealed’ through tests 
or trials which involve interactions between agents (teams) and the goods 
to be qualified….The characteristics of a good are not properties which 
already exist and on which information simply has to be produced so that 
everyone can be aware of them. Their definition or, in other words, their 
objectification, implies specific metrological work and heavy 
investments in measuring equipment. The consequence is that agreement 
on the characteristics is sometimes, in fact often, difficult to achieve. Not 
only may the list of characteristics be controversial (which characteristics 
ought to be taken into consideration?) but so also, above all, is the value 
to be given to each of them”. (Callon et al., 2002, pp. 198–199) 
 
The notion that trials frame value based on various qualities11 is a key idea within 
valuation studies. When a good is qualified, it is revealed. But this is not understood 
                                                          
11
 As shown in the quotes, Callon also referred to qualities as “properties” and “characteristics;” in 
this thesis, the term “quality” encompasses both of the other two terms. 
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as a discovery process, whereby a scientist lifts a rock and discovers more 
information about hidden value. It is an “objectification”, which requires “heavy 
investment in measuring equipment”. The work of qualifying an object can be 
difficult; the prioritization and value ascribed to an object’s qualities can be 
controversial because qualification trials depend greatly on the devices used and the 
actors using them.  
 
“All quality is obtained at the end of a process of qualification, and all 
qualification aims to establish a constellation of characteristics, stabilized 
at least for a while, which are attached to the product and transform it 
temporarily into a tradable good in the market. A good is defined by the 
qualities attributed to it during qualification trials. These qualities are 
therefore twofold. They are intrinsic: the good is engaged in the 
qualification trial and the result obviously depends on the good in 
question. But they are also extrinsic: not only are the qualities shaped by 
the device used to frame the good (and therefore depend on the choice 
and characteristics of that device) but their formulation and explanation 
also generate evaluations and judgements which vary from one agent to 
the next”. (Callon et al., 2002, p. 199) 
 
Callon et al. emphasized that a quality of a given object depends on both the 
materiality of the object and the device used to frame its value. A quality is 
understood as something that is inscribed into an entity to give it meaning as either 
valuable or not valuable.  
Empirically, scholars in the field of valuation studies continue to focus on 
identifying similarities across studies to create a more coherent framework 
(Kjellberg et al., 2013, p. 15; Lamont, 2012, p. 21.4). One of the more relevant cases 
to this study is Sjögren and Helgesson’s (2007), analysis of the Swedish 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Board, responsible for determining which medicines 
qualify for the public pharmaceutical benefits scheme. The board enacted “a space 
of calculability”, wherein economic calculation became the overshadowing form of 
qualification of medicine (Sjögren & Helgesson, 2007, p. 216). Board members 
argued that goods are considered part of the same market if buyers regard them as 
possible substitutes for each other. Therefore, they had to assign monetary values to 
various health benefits and side effects to qualify certain medicines for public 
funding (Sjögren & Helgesson, 2007, p. 219). Their paper shows how a calculative 
center plays a critical role in qualifying widely different goods. 
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In another interesting study, Heuts and Mol (2013) demonstrated that the qualities 
which make a given good (tomatoes) valuable, differ based on the site of valuation.  
 
“That qualities are not fixed characteristics of the object qualified does 
not imply that they depend on the eyes of the beholder. Instead they 
rather depend on the active contributions of the experts, be they 
developers, growers, processers, buyers, cooks or eaters”. (Heuts & Mol, 
2013, p. 136) 
 
The tomato case is a good example of valuation viewed from the perspective of 
methodological situationalism. According to Heuts and Mol, a tomato’s value is not 
just a matter of taste, unique to each new “beholder;” neither is it completely 
determined by structures that the actors are powerless to change. Instead, value is 
performed in sites of active groups of experts specific to a given field, in this case, 
tomato experts.  
 
2.4.1 Valuation Studies and Power 
Çalışkan and Callon (2010)  revealed confrontations between the “things” to be 
valued and the “agencies” capable of calculating and prioritizing their value.  In 
such confrontations, asymmetries in calculative competencies exist; due to these 
asymmetries, the most powerful agencies are “able to impose their valuations on 
others,” and establish a frame wherein they determine the terms of the exchange 
(Çalışkan & Callon, 2010, p. 13). A network then forms around a particular 
configuration that makes an object exchangeable:  
 
“The meaning of what it is to be “economic” is precisely the outcome of 
a process of “economization,” a process that is historical, contingent and 
disputable. It seems undeniable that, in so-called advanced liberal 
societies, “economic” often refers to the establishing of valuation 
networks that is, to pricing and to the construction of circuits of 
commerce that render things economically commensurable and 
exchangeable; but “economic” can also be said of a particular 
configuration that aims at “economizing” in the sense of saving or 
rationing. The fact that an institution, an action, an actor or an object can 
be considered as being economic is precisely the result of this process of 
economization. And the historical contingency of this process does not 
call its reality into question. The reality of this process is as hard as the 
trials it imposes and the resistance that it triggers”. (Muniesa et al., 2007, 
p. 3)  
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Muniesa et al. (2007) established an important link between a commensurated and 
exchangeable object, and a specific valuation network. This network upholds the 
object’s value, which is never final but only as solidified as the “trial it imposes” 
(Muniesa et al., 2007, p. 3). When something has been exchanged at a given value 
for a long period of time, it is easy to think that this is an undisputed fact, but as 
Muniesa et al. (2007, p. 3) pointed out, all valuations are “contingent and 
disputable.” Valuation networks are formed to produce frames through various 
valuation devices, and new connections to reference points can be drawn to re-
categorize an object as valuable or not valuable.  
To understand how a given configuration such as a calculation maintains or changes, 
scholars in the field of valuation studies view a calculation as a literary inscription 
within a network which is linked to political claims about an object’s value to 
society (Callon, 1991, p. 135). If enough micro-actors subscribe to a given 
calculation, this can become a black box which no longer needs to be reconsidered 
(Callon, 1986, p. 284). Black boxing also occurs through materiality, and is a 
prerequisite for eliminating the need for human society to renegotiate everything all 
the time. This is shown through the effects of material devices on human society in 
Callon and Latour’s (1981) groundbreaking piece, “Unscrewing the big Leviathan”. 
By comparing baboon society to human society, they illustrated how material 
devices shape power relations. Researchers who studied baboons found that the 
primates maintain and fortify alliances through hierarchies, which are constantly 
negotiated through verbal and non-verbal signs. Callon and Latour (Callon & 
Latour, 1981, p. 283) argued that baboon societies teach us what a human society 
would look like if a number of “human instruments” such as walls, contracts and 
uniforms were not available as signals of power, which can extend further than the 
interactions initially involved in forming them. They used the term translation to 
refer to how actors can grow powerful by acting and speaking on behalf of other 
actors. Calculations are one of the ways to gain authority through translation:  
 
“By translation, we understand all the negotiations, intrigues, 
calculations, acts of persuasion and violence, thanks to which an actor or 
force takes, or causes to be conferred on itself, authority to speak or act 
on behalf of another actor or force”. (Callon & Latour, 1981, p. 279) 
 
Calculations, buildings and laws are examples of how human societies enable 
translations to last longer than the interactions that formed them: This is different 
than the baboons who only have their bodies acting upon other bodies. This is 
explained in the quote on the next page.  
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“But they [baboons] are social too, in that they can maintain and fortify 
their alliances, links and partitions only with the tools and procedures 
that ethnomethodologists grant us to repair indexicality. They are 
constantly stabilizing the links between bodies by acting on other 
bodies....Although in order to stabilize society, everyone—monkeys as 
well as men—need to bring into play associations that last longer than the 
interactions that formed them, the strategies and resources may vary 
between societies of baboons or of men”. (Callon & Latour, 1981, p. 
283) 
 
A large, unbroken chain of heterogeneous material and non-material actors thus 
becomes a Leviathan of “greatness and longevity” (Callon & Latour, 1981, p. 284)12. 
The focus on materiality in valuation is important, because although the materiality 
of a given object does not solely determine the assumptions of its value, it exercises 
a number of constraints on how its value can be calculated (Çalışkan & Callon, 
2009, p. 384;388)13. For the most part, these constraints are needed to ensure the 
coordination of human societies, as actors “would be incapable of coordination if 
they shared nothing more than judgments or (cognitive) calculative capacities” 
(Çalışkan & Callon, 2009, p. 379).  
 
2.4.2 Valuation Studies with the other theoretical literatures  
Valuation studies scholars are occupied with the specific practice of valuing 
“things”, and with the agencies capable of calculating and prioritizing their value. 
The practice of valuing is not understood as something inherent to an object; rather, 
it is understood as an active framing process. By definition, framing is “incomplete 
and imperfect,” since it involves selection and exclusion (Helgesson & Muniesa, 
2013, p. 8). Valuation studies scholars thus do not focus on determining the most 
objective framing or calculation, but on critically analyzing a given frame to expose 
the assumptions behind it. Once assumptions and points of reference are made 
                                                          
12
 Full quote: “But if you transform the state of nature, replacing unsettled alliances as much as you 
can with walls and written contracts, the ranks with uniforms and tattoos and reversible friendships 
with names and signs, then you will obtain a Leviathan….A difference in relative size is obtained 
when a micro-actor can, in addition to enlisting bodies, also enlist the greatest number of durable 
materials. He or she thus creates greatness and longevity, making the others small and provisional 
in comparison. The secret of the difference between micro-actors and macro-actors lies precisely in 
what analysis often neglects to consider. The primatologists omit to say that to stabilize their world, 
the baboons do not have at their disposal any of the human instruments manipulated by the 
observer.” 
13
 For example, it is impossible for humans to cognitively calculate that wind turbines will produce 
energy when the wind does not blow, because their materiality rejects this translation.   
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transparent, it is possible to have a political discussion about the envisioned world 
emerging from such assumptions. 
 
“The study of valuation is, at its core, about making the social practices 
of valuation discussable and, possibly, thereby also accountable. It is 
about turning the establishment, assessment, and negotiation of values 
into topics for conversation”. (Doganova et al., 2014, p. 88) 
 
Only by revealing how an object’s inscribed qualities were selected and prioritized, 
and how their values were calculated, can the valuation network behind it be held 
accountable. Valuation studies should thus help reveal the social practices of 
valuation, and thereby reveal the assumptions of a given valuation network.    
Moments of valuation often involve a struggle over assumptions in the assembled 
framing, but in the cases where key assumptions remain black-boxed, it is 
acceptable for a scholar of valuation to highlight limits or problematic consequences 
for a given framing: 
 
“It is a perfectly acceptable academic (and not just political) point to say 
that a specific metric has strong limits and problematic 
consequences…What would happen to our humanness if we imagined 
that we could completely leave our hearts and morals behind us? 
Objectivity? Nihilism? Amorality?...Thus, the positions that 1) it could 
have been otherwise, 2) it is otherwise, or 3) it should be otherwise, are 
positions that are merely different in terms of analytic strategy. For all 
positions, it is (always) a question of how and where we do the valuation 
work—and what gets shown”. (Doganova et al., 2014, pp. 90–91) 
  
This “missing link,” what Doganova et al. (2014, p. 91) described as “how and 
where we do the valuation work—and what gets shown”, is what valuation studies 
can help illuminate.  Valuation studies reveal the sites and instruments that enable 
valuation from the perspective of methodological situationalism. 
Collectively, sustainable transition studies, the MLP framework and strategic action 
field theory reveal the existence of struggles over value in a given field. Clearly, 
power is at play, and actors have access to different resources. Yet the devices 
involved in framing value and produce meanings about a given object have not been 
analyzed. Valuation studies provide this needed framework for questioning whether 
the valuation of an object “could have been otherwise.”  
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2.5. VALUATION FRAMES AND VALUATION NETWORKS 
In this section, I define the two terms used to map my analysis of the valuation 
struggle of wind power in Denmark. First, I explain the origins of the term valuation 
frame, which I use to visualize the selected and prioritized qualities that make wind 
power valuable or non-valuable as a societal investment.  Second, I define the term 
valuation network, which was briefly mentioned in section 2.4 and refers to a 
network of actors which maintain, challenge or exercise power through a given 
valuation frame.  
 
2.5.1 From Calculative Frame to Valuation Frame 
My definition of a frame originates from Michel Callon’s (1998, p. 4) understanding 
of a frame as something that “establishes a boundary” which enables actors to 
determine the significance and content of the interactions within the framing. The 
frame determines what counts and how it is counted (Bruszt & Stark, 2003), and is a 
necessary, yet often unnoticed exercise when the values of new and unknown 
objects are calculated.  
Beunza and Garud (2007) identified the challenge of ascribing value to an unknown 
good before valuation studies formed as an independent field of study. Since the 
emergence of the so-called Knightian challenge (named after economist Frank 
Knight), economists have divided themselves into two opposite positions. One 
position is based on the claim that calculations are straightforward, while the other 
position is based on the claim that a high level of uncertainty causes analysts to act 
like lemmings who merely follow colleagues’ predictions (Beunza & Garud, 2007). 
Beunza and Garud challenged this division when they illustrated the valuation 
process of internet retailer Amazon. They argued that financial analysts should be 
viewed neither as passive information processors nor as imitators, but as critics who 
value objects by establishing calculative frames (Beunza & Garud, 2007, pp. 15–
17). 
 
“We denote by calculative frame the internally consistent network of 
association, including (among others) categories, metrics and analogies, 
that yield the necessary estimates which go into the valuation of a 
company”. (Beunza & Garud, 2007, p. 27)  
 
Beunza and Garud (2007, p. 27) used the framework shown in Figure 4 to analyze 
how financial analysts ascribed value to an unknown entity (in this case, the internet 
THE VALUATION HISTORY OF DANISH WIND POWER 
38
 
retailer Amazon in December 1998). Two highly competent analysts issued very 
different valuations of Amazon: Jonathan Cohen assigned a value of USD 50, while 
Henry Blodget valued it eight times higher at USD 400 (Beunza & Garud, 2007, p. 
22). The dramatic difference in the estimated stock value can be explained by 
differences in the metrics (profits vs. revenue growth), categorization (Book seller 
vs. Internet retailer) and comparators (Barnes and Noble vs. Dell). These elements 
were used to perform the valuation work, which yielded two widely divergent 
framings of Amazon’s value. Figure 4 is a remake of Beunza and Garud’s 
calculative frames (2007, p. 27) with the text added by the author. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Beunza and Garud’s Calculative Frames 
 
The calculative frames presented by Beunza and Garud show how entities are valued 
using different metrics, while residing in the same domain. The authors concluded 
that “analysts tend to persist in their positions due to perseverance in their frames” in 
what they referred to as “framing controversies”  (Beunza & Garud, 2007, p. 29). 
This is similar to the previously described “moments of valuation” (Antal et al., 
2015) whereby assumptions are challenged and emerging new frames and overflows 
become observable within otherwise black-boxed frames.  
The concept of calculative frames is useful, as it shows the connection between how 
a given entity is characterized and the key metric that frames its value. Calculative 
frames produce the valuation of an object; in framing controversies, there is a 
struggle over which framing will dominate. However, scholars have not yet 
examined how economic and technical analysts ascribe value to different energy 
source choices for a society.  
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This study is about how valuation of wind power occurs at the sites where active 
work is performed to produce knowledge about the societal value of wind power. 
But the valuation work also enacts qualities in wind power which are not always 
calculated into a monetary value, but still affect its final framing. The calculative 
frame concept therefore needs to be expanded to the notion of a valuation frame, 
drawing inspiration from Doganova and Karnøe’s (2012) initial use of the term: 
 
“The notion of “valuation frame” helps to understand how market actors 
qualify goods and calculate their worth. It refers to the boundary 
established between the qualities of a product or service that will be 
taken into account in the calculation of its worth, and those that will be 
left unconsidered (Callon, 1998). This boundary is taken for granted and 
hardly noticed in everyday economic exchanges, but it becomes visible 
when “market rebels” (Rao, 2009) shed new light on qualities that lie 
within or beyond it. The mobilization of “concerned groups” (Callon & 
Rabeharisoa, 2008)  can reveal “externalities”—that is, qualities external 
to the dominant valuation frame—and shift the ranking of qualities that 
induce market participants to take them into account”. (Doganova & 
Karnøe, 2012, p. 18) 
 
A valuation frame is equivalent to the calculative frame in that it tracks the network 
of associations among categories, metrics and analogies, but also includes 
associations of non-economic elements by prioritizing qualities in matter of 
importance (Callon et al., 2002, pp. 197–198). A framing can be likened to a 
formula that enacts an object’s description by combining and ranking both economic 
and non-economic qualities:  
 
“Combining and ranking “economic value” and “social values” is not an 
easy task (Stark, 2009). Not only do they have idiosyncratic logics of 
valuation, but their management has generally been delegated to different 
actors: economic value falls into the realm of companies and markets, 
while social values pertain to norms, government, and regulation. This 
separation left social values and disutilities outside markets, and the 
boundary was seen as “natural state of markets”. (Doganova & Karnøe, 
2012, p. 17) 
 
By substituting the words “value” and “values” with “quality” and “qualities,” it 
becomes possible to analyze how a given framing came to produce the result it did. I 
propose to expand the notion of calculative frame to include non-counted, but 
prioritized qualities. In line with Doganova and Karnøe’s (2012) initial use of the 
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term, I propose that a valuation frame is a mixture of more or less crystallized claims 
evidenced by qualities which have positive or negative impacts on the framed value 
of an object (Callon, 1991, p. 135). These qualities are attached to the object while 
stabilized and are understood as both intrinsic and extrinsic. They depend on the 
materiality of the given object, but are also “shaped by the device” used in the given 
framing (Callon et al., 2002, p. 199).  
 The ranking and possible quantification of qualities form valuation frames 
(Doganova & Karnøe, 2012, 2015), which in this thesis are understood as “material 
and discursive assemblages that intervene in the construction of markets” (Muniesa 
et al., 2007, p. 2). A valuation frame’s qualities draw on points of reference to 
produce meanings about wind power’s value to society. Those meanings can then be 
mobilized via political action, which in turn affects not only the expansion of wind 
power capacity, but also helps constitute the very market architecture into which 
wind power is incorporated.  
Valuation frames enable researchers to reveal the qualities that count, thereby 
enabling debate. The combination and prioritization of qualities can be visualized 
and connected to a valuation network. Different networks frame value in different 
ways, and their calculations enable alliances to form around a given valuation frame. 
I employ the previously described notion of qualities to describe how wind power’s 
value is determined through framings that render certain qualities highly salient and 
deprioritize or neglect others.  
 
2.5.2 Relationship between Valuation Frames and Valuation Networks 
In this section, I discuss the relationship between valuation frames and valuation 
networks. A valuation frame is constructed through the active use of devices by 
experts who have obtained authority to make statements about a given entity. Such 
groups join with other material and non-material actors to form a valuation network, 
as described in a previously used quote by Muniesa, Millo and Callon: 
 
“The meaning of what it is to be “economic” is precisely the outcome of 
a process of “economization,” a process that is historical, contingent and 
disputable. It seems undeniable that, in so-called advanced liberal 
societies, “economic” often refers to the establishing of valuation 
networks, that is, to pricing and to the construction of circuits of 
commerce that render things economically commensurable and 
exchangeable…the historical contingency of this process does not call its 
reality into question. The reality of this process is as hard as the trials it 
imposes and the resistance that it triggers”. (Muniesa et al., 2007, p. 3) 
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I build on Muniesa, Millo and Callon’s (2007) understanding of this relationship by 
viewing valuation frames and valuation networks as intrinsically linked. The 
valuation frames formed by valuation networks do not occur at random, but are 
developed through active contributions at sites of valuation, which I aim to identify 
and study. A given framing is “as hard as the trials it imposes and the resistance that 
it triggers,” and valuation frames that appear highly stabilized and irreversible, are 
so because a valuation network upholds a specific framing of qualities to make the 
object in question “commensurable and exchangeable.” 
Figure 5 (GBA) is visualization of typical differences between strong and weak 
valuation networks. Strong networks usually are comprised of several heterogeneous 
actors with privileged access to make authoritative claims about value. Weaker 
networks usually are more homogenous and dependent on one or few actors, of 
which just one or two detachments can weaken the network significantly. 
  
 
Figure 5: Strong and weak Valuation Networks. 
 
A valuation network is understood as the network of actors who either maintain an 
existing valuation frame or construct new frames to challenge dominant 
conceptions. In addition to the usually studied coalitions of human actors, such 
network also comprises the materiality of laws and physical structures. This concept 
is thus understood as the enabling network of humans, materials and texts involved 
in shaping the framings in the field. It is important to keep in mind that these actors 
do not have to be consciously coordinated to support or contribute to a shared 
valuation frame. The groups of actors in a valuation network can pursue different 
goals while holding roughly equivalent views of the value of an object.  
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2.5.3 Frames and Networks in Relation to Political Power 
Before moving to the analysis, I will draw some reference points to how framing of 
value is related to understanding political power. In the context of knowledge 
controversies, calculations and framings of value are understood as “instruments 
used to generate evidence” about a given matter of concern (Barry, 2013, p. 8,12). If 
a given framing makes sense to a number of significantly powerful actors, it can be 
black-boxed, whereas weaker framings can be turned into political matters of 
concern, by actors pursuing “advantages in a longer-term struggle for power” 
(Barry, 2013, p. 10). Objects can become subject to political contestation (Marres & 
Lezaun, 2011, p. 491) once their value is performed through a given frame, wherein 
problematized issues are pre-set. Sub-politics can be inscribed in objects and 
disappear from the public eye, to later reappear in a changed and generalized form 
(Beck, 1992, 1997, p. 52). One example of this is how fossil fuel energy sources 
have become materially anchored in modern Western societies, and through lock-in 
effects have dominated conceptions of value (Mitchell, 2009; Unruh, 2000).  
During some controversies, political actors draw a line between what needs to be 
solved legislatively, and what can be delegated to the current market arrangement 
(Callon, 2010, p. 164). From this perspective, a market is framed to work 
satisfactorily as long as it complies with the preferences of the actors upholding it 
(Callon, 2010, p. 166). Thus, when the framing of an object’s value is altered, it is 
considered a political activity. It is, however, also a political activity to delegate to 
the current market architecture, which essentially amounts to delegating to the 
incumbent actors. One way to impose a current valuation frame is to state that a 
given concern should be “left to the market to solve”. An actor making this 
statement is either satisfied with the current dominant framing of value or views the 
price in a given market architecture as “naturally created”. Such an actor may 
perceive himself as staying out of a struggle, when in fact he is actively upholding 
the current dominant framing in that market architecture. Valuation frames reflect 
tradeoffs and priorities with societal implications, and therefore also reflect 
judgments of who something should be valuable for (Corvellec & Hultman, 2014, p. 
354). 
In relation to power, it is important to stress that there will always exist asymmetries 
in calculative competencies. Such asymmetries enable the most powerful agencies 
“to impose their valuations on others”, and establish frames wherein they determine 
the “distribution of value” (Çalışkan & Callon, 2010, p. 11). Power is most 
effectively applied when key decisions are shifted to sites where they do not seem 
like decisions, but facts (Mol, 1999, p. 80).  All markets are constructed 
architectures that act as boundaries to determine which interests should be included 
and which should be excluded: 
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“They (Regulatory institutions) establish mandatory rules about which 
diverse interests and values should count within a given domain of 
activity; often implicitly more than explicitly, they also rule on what 
interests and value frameworks should or can be excluded”. (Bruszt & 
Stark, 2003, p. 75) 
 
 
Once something is left to the market, the market arrangement is what Beck (1992, 
1997, p. 52) defined as “sub-politics” that have disappeared from the public eye and 
reappeared in a changed and generalized form. Beck (1997, p. 52) specifically used 
the example of ecological transition as an element which challenges fundamental 
convictions: “technocracy ends when alternatives erupt in the techno-economic 
process and polarize it”. He went on to explain how “the environmental issue 
penetrates into all occupational fields and becomes concrete and manifest in 
substantive controversies regarding methods, orientations, calculation procedures, 
objectives, standards, plans, routines and so on” (Beck, 1997, p. 58). According to 
Beck (1997, p. 60), these controversies eventually lead to significant changes in 
today’s markets, as “losers generate winners. As industry loses its ecological 
innocence, other business sectors build up their ‘greening’ livelihood”. 
A given set of sub-politics can appear as a ‘definition of reality’ whereby the level 
of dominance is not determined by its legitimators’ theoretical genius, but rather by 
their power (Beck, 1997, p. 58; Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p. 116)14. The actors in 
power thus can exercise indirect influence, which is not easily observable: 
 
 
“Of course, power is exercised when A participates in the making of 
decisions that affect B. But power is also exercised when A devotes his 
energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and 
institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to 
public consideration of only those issues, which are comparatively 
innocuous to A”. (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962; R. A. Dahl, 1961, p. 59;  in 
Lowery, 2013, p. 7)   
 
Successfully exercised power can be ingrained in values and practices, which 
constitute the status quo and over time become taken for granted. This is what 
Callon (1991)   would refer to as actors being ‘completely translated’ to follow the 
interest of the translator and thus not aware that power is being exercised through 
                                                          
14
 MacKenzie (2009a) revealed this element of sub-politics in relation to EU carbon markets. 
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them. Incumbent interest can then “condition wider social expectations” of what 
counts as realistic and unrealistic pathways or speeds for technological change 
(Stirling, 2014, p. 86). A dispute over the value of a given good constitutes a power 
struggle for control of a market, and state actors do usually not change the rules 
governing interactions between actors, unless dominant groups are under pressure 
(Fligstein & Dauter, 2007; Fligstein & McAdam, 2011).  
In my study, it is especially interesting to follow the actors who are able to make 
calculations and statements about whether wind power is a worthwhile investment 
or not. Power is exercised when certain interests and values are accommodated, and 
over time these can seem to be “naturally given” facts. A valuation frame is, 
however, still the outcome of numerous decisions on the distribution of value and 
the inclusion and exclusion of particular qualities. I will seek out the ongoing work 
of creating meanings about wind power’s value in the moments of valuation 
happening in the struggles between dominant frames and challenger frames.  
 
2.5.4 My Tool for Mapping Valuation Frames 
My theoretical foundation is based primarily on a combination of Strategic Action 
field theory and the emerging theory-field of valuation studies. I use this framework 
to investigate my original problem statement:  
 
What has been the historical role of valuation devices in producing wind power as a 
worthwhile investment for the Danish society?  
 
In the empirical analysis, I focus on how challengers representing wind power 
attempt to stabilize their world and challenge the dominant incumbent framings of 
wind power. I analyze these framings by examining which qualities historically have 
been inscribed into the object of wind power, and how they impact the meaning of 
its value. In figure 6 (GBA) I depict the mapping machinery, I use to visualize the 
most dominant qualities that make up a valuation frame in each period.  
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Figure 6: The Valuation Frame methodology 
 
I study the relationships between the qualities of a given valuation frame, and the 
valuation network which constructs or maintains the given framing. Shifting 
qualities can lead to changes in actors’ network positions and vice versa. At the end 
of each empirical chapter, I will introduce the qualities that emerged. When I 
thereafter point to a quality during the analysis it will be marked with a Capital 
starting letter and written in italic15.  
The understood relationship between valuation frames and valuation networks is 
visualized by the author in Figure 7 (GBA). This visualization is not used in the 
empirical chapters, but is included here to put an image to the connections I aim to 
follow. The realities of the empirical field are, of course, significantly messier; 
hopefully my synthesis of the literature and accompanying visualizations helps 
explain the lens I have used to analyze the field.   
 
                                                          
15
 There are three Valuation Frames and corresponding periods, which will be named after a quality 
which highly defines these frames and periods. The names of the periods and frames will however 
not be in italic. I know there is a risk this overlap can become confusing, but I estimated that it still 
worked better that the names of the frames and periods closely correspond to the central qualities. It 
is my hope that the connection between the frames and their qualities become more intuitive and 
easier to remember this way.   
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Figure 7: Valuation Frames and Valuation Networks. 
In the end of each chapter will also be an overview of the valuation networks at 
plays, herein both the human actor coalition and the material build-out and the 
regulatory framework.   
Throughout the five empirical chapters that are coming I have identified more than 
40 different types of actors. These can roughly be divided into political parties, 
private or public actors that are not political parties, calculative agencies (which 
practice the various calculative methods) and media outlets. These actors will be 
presented as they appear in the analysis. There is however a focus on the political 
negotiation of the value of investing in wind power. I therefore have a special focus 
on the four political parties that all serve in governments at some point in time 
during these chapters16. These four parties are Radikale Venstre / The Danish Social 
Liberal Party, Socialdemokratiet / The Social Democrats, Venstre / Left – 
Denmark’s Liberal Party and Det Konservative Folkeparti or commonly known as 
De Konservative / The Conservative Party. Because most of my readers will likely 
be Danish I will in the text refer to these parties by the shortest version of their 
Danish names. This also allows me to use a short abbreviation that corresponds to 
their Danish initials or their party letter in the parliamentary system. Radikale 
Venstre (RV), Socialdemokratiet (S), Venstre (V) and De Konservative (C). 
In addition to these four political parties there is one private actor organisations 
which will also be mentioned frequently throughout the analysis. This is the Danske 
Elværkers Forening / Danish Utilities Organization, which is the organization 
representing the interests of the Danish utilities. In 2001, the organization changed 
its name to Dansk Energi / Danish Energy. It will therefore be referred to as the 
Danish Utilities Organization (DEF) in the first two empirical chapters, where after 
it will be referred to as Danish Energy (DE). The empirical analysis will follow 
hereafter.
                                                          
16
 I will especially be analyzing the statements and actions of energy ministers. I have therefore 
placed an overview of who served in these ministries in Appendix A7.  
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3. EARLY VALUATION VISIONS OF A 
UNIQUE SUPPLEMENT 
In this chapter, I will cover the early developments in Danish wind turbine history. 
This chapter will thus span from the first Danish turbine, Gedsermoellen, in 1957 
and up to the 1973 oil crisis. Prior to this crisis, energy was not something 
considered to be within the political regime, but instead a matter left to the utilities 
who operated steam-power plants, mainly burning coal and oil for power (80% oil 
by the early 1970’s) (DKGOV, 1990, p. 28). Denmark’s first energy law was made 
in 1907 (Staerkstroemsloven), and among other things it prohibited the 
establishment of any new utility companies in an area which already had one. For 
the more than six decades up to the oil crisis, the Danish energy system was dictated 
by these local utilities that had monopoly in each their area. They set the price of 
production for their local customers, which in turn owned the utility through the 
municipality or local cooperatives (Frederiksen, 2012). The limited political 
interaction with this sector was in terms of setting up research programs and the few 
laws to set the rules of interactions, Apart from that the utilities were left to purchase 
the cheapest possible fuel and import this to run in the plants. The first dominant 
coalition within matters of energy policy and therein wind power valuation will 
therefore be referred to as the Fuel-coalition. It had the utilities at the center and the 
major political parties in agreement with the direction taken.   
 
3.1. DENMARKS FIRST SMALL ELECTRICITY PRODUCING 
TURBINES (1891-1957) 
Poul La Cour was a physicist by trade and today known as Denmark’s first great 
inventor of wind power. He was known as Denmarks Edison, and had a dream to 
build wind turbines that eventually could mechanize the numerous manual labor 
hours involved in farming (Karnøe, 1991, p. 161). He had seen the first conventional 
steam-power plants come to Denmark in 1891, and he was worried by the risk that 
Denmark had to import large amounts of fuel for these plants. In January 1891, he 
applied for a grant to build a wind turbine and turn the electricity into hydrogen 
through electrolysis. As La Cour was known as a competent inventor, he was 
awarded 4000 DKK (Roughly 250.000 DKK/34.000 Euros in 2016), to build his 
first turbine, which would be erected already in May 1891 (PLCMV, 2004, p. 1). 
His work would continue with several constructions and inventions, and six years 
later (1897) he would receive funding to build a larger turbine. Towards 1910, La 
Cour would sell hundreds of small wind turbines (3-30 KW) to danish farms, 
mechanical shops and small villages (Karnøe, 1991, p. 162). La Cour would also 
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start training Denmark’s first wind-engineers from his positions at one of Denmark 
highest respected boarding schools, Askov Hoejskole (Wittrup, 2016a).  In 1904, a 
young pupil named Johannes Juul started in Poul La Cour’s school of wind-turbine 
engineers at the age of 17 although the application limit was 18. Below is to the left 
a picture of Poul La Cour’s 1904 class of wind turbine engineers. The third person in 
the back row from the right is the young Johannes Juul. To the right is a picture of 
Johannes Juul many years later as an experienced wind power engineer17.  
 
Figure 8: Left: Poul La Cour’s 1904 class & Right: Johannes Juul. 
There were other early inventors of electricity producing wind turbines around the 
time of Poul La Cour, most notably James Blyth (1888) and Charles Brush (1888).  
 
Figure 9: The first known wind turbine designs. 
 
                                                          
17
 The picture to left in Figure 8 is used with permission from the Poul La Cour Museum, while the 
picture on the right of Johannes Juul is used with permission from EnergiMuseet. 
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Danish wind power was despite La Cour’s efforts still in limited to a few self-built 
wind turbines on local farms, which were still not incorporated to the grid. The 
impact that La Cour had on the technological development of modern wind power 
would however come to be seen everywhere in Danish society and cannot be 
overstated. Part of his legacy would be seen several decades later (1957), as his 
student Johannes Juul build the turbine that is today known as the father of ‘the 
Danish concept’ (Elmuseet, 1998, p. 9; EnerginetDK, 2009, p. 8). 
 
3.2. GEDSER TURBINE OPENING SETS EARLY 
CATEGORIZATION (1957-1967) 
The second large step in the early history of Danish wind power was a government-
funded, but this time utility-led research program, the 200 KW Gedser Turbine from 
1957 (DEA, 2016b). This turbine exhibits what is today known as the Danish 
concept (three-bladed horizontal-axis rotor), and is widely regarded as one of the 
major technical milestones for the later developments in wind turbines technology 
such as the Riisager, Tvind and Herborg turbines. After a long career in the energy 
sector, Johannes Juul demanded of his employer SEAS (Sydsjællands Elektricitets 
Aktieselskab / Southern-Zealand's Electricity Shareholders Company), to be allowed 
to develop a number of large prototype wind turbines (Meyer, 2000, p. 82; K. H. 
Nielsen, 2010, p. 192). Juul had worked as an electrical engineer in SEAS since 
1928, and in 1947 he would be set in charge of a research program into wind 
turbines. This was immediately after the Second World War and the prospect of 
developing an energy source, which left the country less exposed to disruptions in 
fuel imports, was worth exploring. As the head of this project Juul was looking into 
a world where the energy system was predominately based on oil and coal, as the 
“atoms for peace” notion, which would introduce nuclear energy as an energy 
source, was not initiated until 1953. Juul was thus encouraged by SEAS in the onset 
of the project, as he would try out several different models, hereamong two and 
four-bladed turbines, before he in the mid-1950’s found his optimal design (Karnøe, 
1991, p. 168). This resulted in a 1954 exploration project on wind power, which was 
funded by the ministry of Public works, and supported by the Marshall aid, for a 
total of 0.3 mio DKK (~4.6 mio. DKK in 2017-Real) (Arhenkiel, 2015, pp. 8–12; 
Karnøe, 1991, p. 170). 
One of the conditions for the public funding was that the project was conducted 
under supervision of the Danish utilities organization (DEF). Their president Robert 
Henriksen, who since 1955 had served as vice-president of the Danish governments 
“nuclear energy commission”, led by Niels Bohr, gave the probably first recorded 
speech on Danish wind power at the inauguration of the Gedser Turbine on the 26
th
 
of July 1957. In this speech he gave the utilities view of what this new energy source 
was and what could be expected of it. This would initiate the first public traces of a 
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framing contest, as Henriksen would qualify what type of an object wind power was 
to be considered as.  
 
“Today, we are not inaugurating a Calder Hall Plant (Britain’s first 
nuclear power plant – later named Sellafield, ed.). This test plant 
represents no new sensational way of utilizing a sensational hitherto 
unknown source of energy…The wind power plant can only be used as a 
supplement to other energy sources, which are independent of the 
weather and the wind….In order for a wind power plant to be 
competitive, its maintenance costs, interests and repayment must not 
exceed the savings on fuel expenses on the power plant with which it is 
cooperating…today nobody can predict with certainty the future 
importance of wind power utilization for Danish households and Danish 
trade, perhaps in the form of wind power plant exports”. (ET, 1957 in; K. 
H. Nielsen, 2001, pp. 2–3) 
 
At the inauguration of the Gedser Turbine, nuclear energy was by many experts 
within the energy field framed as the new obvious energy alternative to oil, and it 
was thus not an uncommon statement Robert Henriksen made18. This opinion was 
shared by the Minister of Public Works, Kai Lindberg (S), who later during the 
inauguration dinner, announced that he sympathized with Henriksen’s framing that 
wind power should at most play a supplementary role in the electricity system (ET, 
1957, p. 305).  
Wind power was framed as “a supplement”, because it is dependent on the wind and 
thus unreliable. Continuing along this logic, Henriksen defines the wind power 
plants as unconventional to the existing electricity system by comparing them to 
nuclear power plants, which are centralized, like the existing coal and oil plants at 
the time. Henriksen configured the metric which wind power was to be framed by, 
as to how much fuel it can save from the power plant it supports. Robert Henriksen 
mentioned one potential benefit to pursuing an exploratory research project within 
wind power. Namely, the economic benefits to the Danish economy in terms of the 
Industrial quality of higher exports of wind power technology. As wind power could 
help replace some of the jobs that were lost in other sectors, it did have the quality of 
being an Industrial advantage, through the possible venue for exports and job 
creation in Denmark. Wind power is thus in this early qualification defined by its 
                                                          
18
 It should however be noted that Robert Henriksen had concerns about whether the government 
would create a big publicly funded nuclear plant, which would push DEF out of their hold. In 1963, 
DEF stated in an editorial that it at the current time was not economically beneficial to build a test 
nuclear facility in Denmark, but instead wait for nuclear to become price-competitive and then 
build a full-scale nuclear plant (K. H. Nielsen, Nielsen, Nielsen, & Jensen, 2015, p. 59). 
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ability to be a Fuel Supplement to a conventional power plant, and to a minor extent 
create some exports for Denmark.   
Included in the funding to build the Gedser turbine was funding for an assessment 
report to judge whether wind power was competitive with existing steam power 
plants and thus valuable to society as a Fuel Supplement. This is the more solidified 
calculative device, which was used to qualify wind power based on Juul’s Gedser 
turbine. The committee who wrote this report was headed by the CEO of the major 
utility company SEAS, S.M. Buhl and had Per Poulsen-Hansen, an employee in 
Danish Energy, as secretary and main writer (K. H. Nielsen, 2001, p. 14; 
Vindkraftudvalget, 1962b, pp. 72–73). The framing compared the cost of steam 
power to wind power. The committee added 4% transmission losses to wind power 
and a grid costs to supplement worth 15 DKK/MWh (152 DKK/MWh in 2017-R). 
DEFU ended at an equation that concluded wind power would only be competitive 
if steam power generated electricity would cost 17-19DKK/gigacalorie. Since 
current fuel prices at the time were around 8-9 DKK/gigacalorie, the framing led to 
the conclusion that building new wind turbines would cost approximately double of 
the fuel savings in the supplemented the steam plants (K. H. Nielsen, 2001, p. 10; 
14; Vindkraftudvalget, 1962b, pp. 72–73). The value of wind power was calculated 
on the basis of whether fuel savings exceed the system costs of adding an energy 
source that was ‘not available’ as electricity demand needed it, as seen in the report 
quote below.  
 
“If there is only built wind turbines to a limited extent to supply steam 
power plants, there will be no savings to be had on the steam power 
plants in terms of capital costs, maintenance or salaries. The Wind Power 
electricity can therefore only be paid with the savings in fuel, with an 
added cost for transmission losses…That wind power is not available ‘at 
the same pace’ as the electricity demand does hardly need any further 
evidence, as long as one remembers, that the weather can be completely 
calm for days in a row”. (Vindkraftudvalget, 1962b, p. 72) 
   
The report’s conclusion was summarized in an article in the engineer’s magazine, 
wherein the wind power Committee explains their reasoning. The committee 
employs the Fuel Supplement quality to categorize wind power as too expensive to 
deploy on a large scale, just as was done in Robert Henriksen’s 1957 Inauguration 
remarks, as seen in the below quote from the article. 
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“Very substantial price movements are necessary before wind power can 
be fitted profitably into the economy of Danish utilities. However, 
Danish industry stands a good chance of building upon the experiences 
acquired. There is a very large and well known demand for wind power 
plants in a number of developing countries”. (Vindkraftudvalget, 1962a, 
p. 213) 
 
This conclusion was supported by all members of the Wind power Committee with 
the exception of Johannes Juul, who would challenge this framing with his own 
alternative calculation only a month later. Johannes Juuls challenged the Wind 
Power Committee’s framing on the point of technological advancement possibilities 
and current integration costs. The first point was related to the fact that Juul believed 
the Gedser turbine design could be optimized much more than assumed in the 
committees report. Secondly, Juul envisioned wind power in a larger energy system, 
where production was spread out over more wind farms and combined with 
hydropower in Norway and Sweden. Juul argued that the Danish energy system 
could be adapted to wind power, instead of wind power having to adapt to the 
system. Juuls third challenge concerned the fact that the Committee had not included 
any grid system expenses for the current steam power electricity in their 
calculations. Juul argued that if they only considered the electricity supply system as 
a way to transport steam powered electricity, they also had to include the substation 
and transmission line costs (K. H. Nielsen, 2001, p. 19). Juul’s  alternative 
calculation reached the conclusion that the cost price of wind power was 3.8 
Oere/Kwh (45 Oere/KWh in R-2017), which was about half of what the Committee 
had reached at 6.4 Oere/Kwh (75 Oere/kwh in R-2017) (Juul, 1962, pp. 326–330; K. 
H. Nielsen, 2001, p. 19). The Wind Power Committees framing omitted system 
integration matters, and this led Juul to argue that the utilities only saw wind power 
as an export item, and therefore would not consider adapting the system to integrate 
wind power.  
 
“It looks as if the utilities and, perhaps the places in which future nuclear 
power plants are being projected think of wind power plants as 
competitors instead of collaborators and would prefer to see wind power 
plants exported to the developing countries. But this is hardly feasible 
unless there is a domestic utilization to refer to…I believe that we cannot 
afford not to build and utilize wind power plants as mediator of our only 
significant domestic source of power, i.e., the wind”. (Juul, 1962, p. 329 
in; K. H. Nielsen, 2001, p. 20) 
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If one was to pinpoint a birth of the wind power framing contest, it could be this 
framing competition. On one side, the government-established and utility-led 
Committee saw wind power as a Fuel Supplement, which might pose an export 
opportunity, but could not be a viable alternative energy source in Denmark. Juul 
challenges this framing and especially argued that two world wars should have 
shown Denmark, that relying on imported oil and coal would leave the country 
vulnerable to external forces. Juul advocated this point in his contribution to the 
1961 UN Conference on alternative energy sources (B. Sørensen, 1977, p. 65), and 
on several other occasions (I. K. Jensen, 2015, p. 45). Juul was as well as his teacher 
Poul Lad Cour motivated by the quality Energy Independence, of which wind power 
could contribute to the Danish energy system. 
The impact that the Danish Electricity Foundation (DEF) had in the early 
categorization of wind power cannot be understated. It is first seen in Robert 
Henriksen’s inaugural statements and 5 years later re-confirmed in the 1962 Wind 
Power Committee report. Wind power is framed an expensive and non-conventional 
addition to the existing Danish energy system, but could have potential as an export 
good. When Johannes Juul designed the Gedser turbine in 1957, he was breaking 
new ground. In 1962, he tried to make sense of how this new entity was a 
worthwhile investment to Denmark, and his perception differed from the rest of the 
Wind power Committee’s. Their metric for success was whether or not this new 
entity, wind power, could displace the cost of fuel to a steam power plant. In their 
calculation of whether a wind turbine would be valuable, the system cost for adding 
the turbine was added to the turbines costs, while transmission grid costs were not 
added when calculating the cost of current infrastructure, in the form of the steam 
power plants.  
As successful as Juul was within his technical endeavors, he was not able to break 
the dominant framing established in 1962, namely that wind power could only be a 
supplement to the conventional power plants. Although Juul laid the critically 
important material bricks for future wind turbine developments, he was not able to 
mobilize sufficiently strong allies to his framing. The fuel shortages in the 1940s and 
50s that had caused the initiation of the Gedser turbine research project had in the 
1960’s been replaced by record low levels of coal and oil prices. So within the Fuel-
coalitions Valuation Frame “Expensive Supplement” the value of wind power was 
to be framed by the fuel it could displace. When seen through this frame, it became 
true that “substantial price movements” would be necessary for wind power to be a 
viable energy alternative in Denmark. Wind power research was not only deemed 
invaluable due to its high cost compared to low oil and coal prices. It was also an 
unfitting match for the energy system compared to another emerging energy source, 
Nuclear Energy. Nuclear Energy represented centralized power plants which fitted 
the current system set-up, and research was supported in Denmark through the Risoe 
nuclear institute, headed by Niels Bohr. The Risoe centre received 140 mn. DKK 
(1.5 bn. DKK in 2017) between 1955-1963, and built up to employ more than 700 
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people by 1955-1963 (H. Nielsen & Nielsen, 2006, pp. 29–30). Over the same 
period, research spending for wind power was at 0.5 mn. DKK (5.9 mn. DKK in 
2017) less than 0.25% of that of nuclear (Arhenkiel, 2015, pp. 8–12). So after a 
modest examination of wind power through the Gedser Turbine project, Denmark 
turned it research focus to nuclear in the 1960’s. The Danish government’s council 
on the topic would in 1963 conclude that “the production of wind turbines was 
probably best left to private initiatives” and to a large extent set public exploration 
and discussion of wind power on hold. After running without maintenance for 10 
years, the Gedser turbine suffered a malfunction in 1967, and was stopped with no 
immediate plan for reparation. Two years later, Johannes Juul passed away at an age 
of 82. With Denmark’s leading pioneer on wind power gone, the framing contest of 
wind would fall silent (Schultz & Dahlberg, 2013). Before we move on to the start 
of a larger valuation network, which would work for the re-emergence of wind 
power, I will just summarize the first three qualities we have observed so far.  
 
3.3. THE FIRST THREE QUALITIES TO DEFINE WIND POWER 
This overture will not include valuation frames or actor overviews, but before 
moving on to the first of the five analyzed periods, I will outline the first qualities 
that were invoked in the categorization of wind power. 
 
Quality: Fuel Supplement (Technical) 
The quality of Fuel Supplement represents the quality that a given object has in 
supplementing an already established energy source. This is especially seen through 
the metric of a break-even price, wherein wind power is considered valuable when it 
is a cheaper supplement to build than to purchase the equivalent amount of energy 
through imported oil, coal or gas. The difference between Technology Cost and Fuel 
Supplement is that Technology Cost has a metric measuring wind power as a stand-
alone energy source, whereas Fuel Supplement is a quality that rates the value of an 
object based on how it supplements incumbent energy sources. This is how wind 
power is introduced at the inauguration of the Gedser turbine, and it is not examined 
in detail how much potential wind has or how it can function as a stand-alone energy 
source. It is instead considered a minor supplement to existing fossil fuel capacity.  
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Quality: Industrial (Societal) 
Industrial is the value of having a wind turbine industry in the country, and 
represents the economic value of getting exports and taxes from both the domestic 
companies and their employees. Simply put, if Denmark bought its turbines from 
Germany and had no local content, this quality would not exist in the valuation of 
wind power. This is mentioned by both DEF and Juul as a salient quality, that wind 
power can create jobs and be something that Denmark might be able to export to 
less developed countries later on.  
 
Quality: Energy Independence (Societal) 
The quality of Energy Independence refers to the value of being independent of 
foreign fossil fuel imports. This quality thus both refers to perceived savings of 
importing fossil fuels, but also to the value of being less exposed to geopolitical 
tensions and the risk of being cut-off from supplies. Additionally, it covers the value 
of not funding potentially dangerous states by buying fuel from them. It was already 
first conceived in the thoughts of Poul La Cour as he feared the many steam plants 
being built would lead to huge imports of fuel. His student, Johannes Juul, would 
also keep this focus as one of the key reasons for supporting wind power, as the only 
domestic source of fuel that Denmark had in abundance was the wind19. Johannes 
Juul was alone with seeing the value of Energy Independence at the time, and must 
be said to have been quite ahead of his time. As a quality it will prove hard to 
calculate into a monetary value, but is still central in several of the coming energy 
reports and plans.  
 
3.4. WIND POWER RE-EMERGES AFTER OIL CRISIS (1968-1979) 
It is beneficial to summarize the situation following the first valuation struggle 
between Johannes Juul and the Fuel-coalition. The default option for electricity, 
transportation and heating in Denmark is at this point oil, with some coal in the 
system as well. Denmark has no official energy policy and the sitting governments 
have all left the utilities to manage their separate parts of the grid, and to purchase 
oil and coal at the cheapest possible price. The negotiation over what price Maersk-
Mckinney Moeller should be allowed to buy the extraction rights to the north sea oil 
and gas fields occupy the trade ministry and the utilities were discussing if, when 
and how Denmark should build nuclear plants (T. B. Olesen, 2017, pp. 182–184).  
                                                          
19
 This is stated in the 1960’s while North Sea oil and gas exploration was still at very early stages 
and Denmark imported practically all of its fuels.  
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The dominant valuation frame of wind power is the one proposed by the Fuel-
coalition in 1957 and 1962, namely that it is a supplement which may be useful for 
some export purposes, but which is still too expensive to be an alternative to the 
existing oil and coal power plants. This fuel-coalition is made up of the utilities as 
represented by DEF and have general acceptance from all of the major political 
parties in parliament. Energy is something that is left to the utilities to handle as long 
as they buy the fuel for good cheap prices and keep a stable supply.  But in the late 
1960’s a unique coalition of actors would begin to gather and come to challenge the 
dominant incumbent framing of wind power.    
 
3.4.1 Anti-nuclear grassroots 
Although the wind power valuation struggle was not as visible in the late 1960’s, 
there was a rise of a highly interconnected network of environmental and anti-
nuclear groups. The environmental group “Naturhistoriske Onsdag Aftener / Nature 
historic Wednesday nights” (NOAH) was formed in 1969 by students and teachers, 
who held political discussion nights at Copenhagen University (NOAH, 2016). The 
first NOAH gatherings on Avernakø were enabled by the Minister of Culture in 
1970, Kristen Helveg Petersen (RV), and the following gatherings would also serve 
as a vehicle for collaboration and showcasing of small-scale constructions wind 
turbines and solar panels (Grove-Nielsen, 2016; Skardhamar, 2010), with 
participation from Danish politicians from the left wing, but also the centre-right 
party Radikale Venstre (Beuse, 2000, p. 14). The unity around protecting the 
environment is evident in one of the NOAH organization’s first published books 
from 1970:  
 
“We are not fond of organizations. Yet, we work together, because we 
can learn from each other’s experiences. Because we are stronger, the 
more we are…The only thing we agree on in NOAH is that the pollution 
must be stopped. The individual groups may have different political 
views and ways of working. Difference in rhetoric is not as important as 
cooperation towards common goals in practice”. (Grove-Nielsen, 2016; 
NOAH, 1970, p. 130). 
 
The NOAH Group and the Aeroe (Ærø) camps would grow their network 
considerably following the 1973 oil crisis, wherein oil prices would rise from a level 
of 22$ in December 1973 to 51$ in January 1974 (Macrotrends, 2017). This sudden 
132% increase in prices led to substantial heating- and electricity price increases, 
and a rationing of gasoline resulting in car-free Sundays. Energy became a central 
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concern and the Fuel-coalition interpreted the crisis as a need to construct nuclear 
power plant. But the members of the NOAH network were adamant that nuclear 
energy should not be the default choice of the government. In 1974, NOAH 
expanded to an anti-nuclear organization called “Oplysning Om Atomkraft / 
Information about Nuclear Power (OOA)”, which in February 1975 would span into 
a sister organization promoting renewable energy, “Organisation for Vedvarende 
Energi / Organization for renewable energy” (OVE).  
These three organizations, NOAH, OOA and OVE, were throughout the late 70’s 
strongly intertwined through many camps and gatherings (Beuse, 2000, p. 55;111). 
Their cooperation would also sustain an extensive network of energy offices around 
the country, which would hold courses and trainings on building renewable energy 
technologies such as wind turbines (Beuse, 2000, pp. 59–60). OOA member Ole 
Terney was together with Lars Albertsen a main driving force in building the new 
OVE organization. He collected addresses of manufacturers and technicians relevant 
to renewable energy and published this important networking information in two 
books in 1975 and 197720. The book also included information from Economist 
Frede Hvelplund and Professor Bent Soerensen, who were part of an academic 
group that would construct the first alternative to DEF’s view of valuation frame of 
wind power.  
 
3.4.2 The ATV Academics 
In addition to the academics Hvelplund and Soerensen, the young physics professor 
Niels I. Meyer would also play an important role in the new valuation network. 
Niels I. Meyer was an openly declared opponent to nuclear energy, who had spoken 
actively against it at the Rebild conference in 1974 an authored the pro-renewables 
side of a major state-funded information campaign that was meant to compare 
nuclear energy and the alternatives in 1975 (Meyer, 2000, p. 87, 2004, p. 108,149). 
Meyer was highly occupied with environmental concerns, through his involvement 
with the researchers behind the 1972 Club of Rome Report “Limits to Growth” 
(Meyer, 2004, p. 142). In the service of that research community, Meyer had in 1973 
arranged a seminar in Denmark, where Dennis Meadows, Co-author of the 1972 
Limits to Growth report, would speak for a crowd of 500, here among a number of 
leading Radikale Venstre politicians (Meyer, 2004, p. 145)21. Meyer’s strong 
academic record and his network within academics and the politics meant that he 
was put in charge of forming “The Wind power Council of the Academy of 
                                                          
20
 Several publications which enabled knowledge sharing and agreement on common goals would 
come out in this period, including monthly magazines from OVE, contact lists for manufacturers, 
and technical safety manuals for small-scale turbine construction (Grove-Nielsen, 2016). 
21
 Kristen Helveg Petersen was a personal friend of Niels I. Meyer, and the two would later go on 
to write two political books, in 1978 and 1982.  
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Technical Sciences” (ATV) in October 1974, with the declared task of 
“investigating the opportunities and needs for increased exploration of wind power 
in Denmark” (Meyer, 2000, p. 82). Meyer was at the time President of the Academy 
of the Technical Sciences, which hosted the Wind Power Committee. This formation 
of a wind power committee, by a declared nuclear opponent was not 
uncontroversial, and several attempts to remove Meyer as president of ATV were 
made up to the formation of the Wind power committee22. Meyer persisted with his 
beliefs intact, and saw the need for a different way of calculating from the 1962 and 
1974 Danish Energy reports, as explained below23.  
 
“The official Denmark wanted to bet on coal and nuclear, and that was 
industry, utilities and political parties, almost everyone. The idea of 
suggesting to bet on renewable energy was pretty original in the public 
debate. But because it was ATV that did it together with the grassroots, 
the grassroots could draw an advantage from our prestige”. (Interview 2: 
Meyer, quote 1). 
 
The composition of the ATV wind power committee and the prestige that it could 
lend to the grassroots movement is important to highlight. The ATV wind power 
committee saw themselves as representing a challenger view against the ‘official 
Denmark’ comprising not only the utilities, but also industry and most political 
parties in parliament, what I earlier have dubbed the Fuel-coalition. Niels Meyer, the 
ATV lead author, explains below how there initially was significant opposition to 
him leading the ATV, especially due to his interest in wind power. 
 
“I did not have the entire ATV behind me, as they tried to have me 
removed as president of ATV. They did not believe you could have an 
ATV president who was "anti-technology". But I did however succeed in 
convincing them that there also was much technology in wind power”. 
(Interview 2: Meyer, quote 2) 
                                                          
22
 Elsam, which was among the largest Energy utilities at the time, advocated for the removal of 
Meyer on the grounds that it was not possible to have an “anti-technology” president of the ATV 
(Interview 2: Meyer quote 2), whereas Conglomerate Magnate, Maersk McKinney Moeller, made 
efforts to convince Meyer of the role of nuclear power in Danish energy policy (Meyer, 2004, pp. 
108–109). 
23
 Niels I. Meyer also contributed to the energy ministry under both Jens Bilgrav Nielsen, the 
liberal Anne-Birgitte Lundholt and under the socialdemocratic Svend Auken (K. H. Nielsen, 2001, 
p. 305). 
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When Meyer can be considered “anti-technology” due to his outspoken preference 
for wind power, it appears that wind power was still considered a peripheral energy 
supplement in a possible future mix. But despite this opposition, there was now a 
strong enough network to challenge the dominant framing. Where Johannes Juul did 
not have strong allies in his alternative calculations, the ATV Wind Power 
Committee consisted of a highly aligned and yet diversified group of engineers and 
economics from businesses, universities and the grassroots movements24. Their 
alternative valuation frame would first be presented in the 1975 report “Wind 
Power”, which was a response to the Fuel-coalitions way of calculating. The new 
framing would be continued through a more elaborate 1976 follow-up report “Wind-
Power 2”, and a series of alternative energy plans during the early 1980’s. I will 
hereafter refer to this set of actors challenging the incumbents as the “Unique-
coalition”. It was a uniquely broad collection of new actors to the energy-field who 
all shared the view that wind power represented a unique future opportunity.  Before 
going into the Unique-coalitions’ challenger frame, I will briefly summarize a 1974 
report, authored by another DEF-led committee. This report followed the same Fuel-
coalition logic from 1962 and enforced the still dominant framing of wind power as 
an expensive supplement to existing coal plants.  
 
3.4.3 DEFU 1974 report on Wind Power 
The challenges that Denmark faced following the 1973 oil crisis, resulted in a re-
evaluation of the earlier lack of energy policy. The Danish government and the 
utilities would initiate a substantial overhaul of the current supply picture25. The first 
time DEF re-visited wind power valuation since 1962, was in the 1974 taken report 
“the utilization of wind power for electricity production” (Johansson, 1974). This 
report was written in collaboration between the sitting Danish government and 
DEF’s research unit, led by DEF’s lead engineer on renewables, Mogens Johansson. 
The report built on the framing established in the 1962 DEFU report, as wind power 
was qualified by how much fuel it could displace from a conventional power plant. 
Fuel prices were in 1974 quoted as 30 DKK per gigacalorie, and wind power was 
                                                          
24
 The head of the council was Jean Fischer, the CEO of Cement production- and engineering 
company, F.L. Schmidt, which in 1974 had created a technical business-report wherein they 
declared wind power as a viable alternative (Beuse, 2000, p. 115;116). Frede Hvelplund, Economist 
who in the early 1970’s was among the first to calculate the economics of wind power in Denmark 
(Moeller, 1978, p. 8). Bent Soerensen, lector at the Niels Bohr Institute, who prior to the 1975 
report had predicted that Denmark could have a 100% renewable energy society by 2050 (Terney & 
Maegaard, 2000, p. 28) . Niels O. Gram, was the official Government representative in the trade 
ministry, and would in 1990’s go on to serve as head of Danish Industry, one of the most powerful 
lobby organization in Denmark (Bang & Hjoellund, 2015).  
25
 Firstly through a conversion of the many combined heat/power plants from oil to coal, and 
secondly a preparation for a comprehensive government-funded build-out of gas-pipes for heating 
(DEA, 2016b, p. 13). Denmark thus reduced its use of oil in the electricity and heating sector with 
92% in the 18 years from 1972-1990 (DE, 2015). 
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calculated to be competitive only at 44-50 DKK per gigacalorie.  Thus, the report 
repeated the dominant framing that the cost of building wind turbines overtook the 
benefits by 60%, but did acknowledge that some export potential existed 
(Johansson, 1974; K. H. Nielsen, 2001, pp. 85–86). Although the Industrial quality 
was still mentioned and one line was dedicated to the Environment quality through 
possible air quality benefits, it was the quality Fuel Supplement that determined that 
wind power was still not valuable to society.  
 
3.4.4 ATV 1975 report 
The Unique-Coalitions first report was simply called “Wind Power” and was 
released in May 1975.  It continued the core methodology of the incumbent Fuel 
Coalitions 1962 and 1974 reports of calculating wind power as a Fuel Supplement 
through a break-even price. This standard way of quantifying the price of where 
wind becomes valuable against the price of coal is used throughout the report and 
has a major role in the categorization of wind as a supplement. It can however be 
seen that the authors note that wind power is not “ascribed any effect value, as long 
as it is only calculated as a supplement” (ATV, 1975, p. 16), thereby indicating a 
reflection that it could have been calculated as something more26.   
While the Unique-coalition shared the same metric as the Fuel-coalition, fuel 
savings, it was their focus on the Future Potential of wind turbines which made the 
report stand out from DEF 1974. There are four central points of reference about 
Future Potential quality that allow the Unique-coalition to frame wind power as a 
worthwhile investment.  
1. The first is the uses of wind measurements at sites that do not currently 
have wind turbines erected, but would theoretically be optimal are used. 
The authors themselves state a clear emphasis for “open landscapes and 
good wind conditions in all directions” (ATV, 1975, p. 11)27. 
                                                          
26
 The value of wind power is expressed in the percentage-wise savings compared to importing 
fossil fuels (ATV, 1975, p. 29), something which the ATV authors explicitly reflected on: “The 
plant-price for the coal/oil based plants is on the contrary not part of the calculations, as the wind 
power production as mentioned is only considered a supplement to the conventional production 
(ATV, 1975, p. 17).” The authors have thus been aware that a comparison of a new-build cost of a 
coal-plant would have been a different calculation. They do however still calculate towards a break-
even price in order to have a document that can be compared to Danish Energy’s 1974 report.   
27
 When it comes to wind resources, Denmark is among the absolute top tier countries in Europe 
(EEA, 2009, p. 22) due to high average wind speeds of 5.8 meters per second (M/S) (DMI, 2016), 
and the near-absence of low-wind areas (EEA, 2009, p. 51)
27
. The good onshore wind resources are 
especially found on the western coast, wherefrom the western wind belt generates more than 25% 
of the winds over Denmark (TV2, 2004). The largest potential for offshore wind power deployment 
in Europe is also found in the two major seas surrounding Denmark, namely the Northern and the 
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2. The ATV authors combine the good wind condition with unnamed sources 
stating that 35 % efficiency (understood as capacity factor, ed.) can be 
achieved with “simple construction improvements without substantial 
changes in price”. This is a very substantial assumption which appears 
several places in the report (ATV, 1975, p. 18,20,26). It is however stated 
that the efficiency of their reference turbine, the Gedser Turbine, was only 
24 %. The “simple construction improvements” that the ATV authors cite 
as proof that 35% can be expected in the future, is explained as something 
that has been “pointed out from different sides” (ATV, 1975, p. 26). The 
ATV has had close contact with many of the individual builders of wind 
turbines at the time, so it has likely been estimates from people with 
experience in building wind turbines that have led to the 35% estimate. It 
would however be many years before onshore wind turbines would come 
near 35% capacity factor performance. The average European onshore fleet 
had a capacity factor of 24% in 2015, but modern turbines installed in 2017 
and 2018 are sold with an expected capacity factor around 35 %28. The fact 
that the value of this quality was overestimated was a large factor in 
enabling the number that they reached.  
3. The third assumption is that turbines will have a lifetime of 25 years, which 
is 5 years more than what was assumed in the DEFU 1974 report. This is 
not an overestimate as the capacity factor, since onshore wind turbines 
fairly quickly became sold with lifetime of 25 years. It was however still 
higher than the Fuel-coalitions assumptions and also made wind power be 
calculated as more valuable29.  
4. The fourth assumption is the discount rate, which is set at 3%. The lower 
the discount rate is set, the more valuable long-term investments such as 
wind turbines will be. The ATV discount rate was significantly lower than 
                                                                                                                                        
Baltic Sea (EEA, 2009, p. 27). The reference point of Denmark as an optimum site for wind power 
has since the 1975 report become well-established, and Denmark is by some foreign scholars today 
referred to as the wind capital of the world (DR, 2016).  
28
 The average capacity factor for onshore wind as reported by the European wind industry is today 
exactly 24%, Denmark coming in slightly higher than this (VE, 2014, p. 2; WindEurope, 2016a). In 
the US, where they have better wind resources, they are closer to ATV’s estimate, with an the 
average installed fleet capacity factor of 32% in 2015 (EIA, 2016, p. 159). Denmark has good wind 
resources and it is expected that newly constructed turbines in 2017 are expected to be able to 
deliver a 35% capacity factor over their lifetime (Energinet.dk, 2015, p. 10). Therefore it is 
reasonable to assume that the average capacity factor of the fleet installed in Denmark will in 2030, 
55 years later, have reached the goal set out by the ATV authors. To this it must be noted, that the 
ATV authors did not state when they expected the level of 35% to be reached. 
29
 Most wind turbines today are certified to last 20 years and the most common assumption is that 
they can last all the way up to 25 -30 years with the right maintenance (IEA, 2016a). Many of the 
smaller wind turbines that were erected in the late 1970’s and 1980’s were taken down during the 
1990’s. This was however not because they were broken, but primarily because it made more 
economic sense to replace them with larger and more efficient turbines. 
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in the Danish Energy report, and also lower than the rate used by the 
Danish government, which in 2013 was lowered to its historic lowest point 
at 4% (DKGOV, 2016).   
The above four assumptions about the Future Potential of wind power are decisive 
for reaching an estimated break-even price for a turbine of 2150 DKK/M2 for a 
coastal position and 1400 DKK/M2 for an inland turbine30. They estimate a ‘larger 
electricity producing plant’ by the coast to be within the somewhat broad price-
range of 1000-2500 DKK/M2 (4800-12000 DKK/M2 in 2017-Real), which is then 
compared to the Gedser Turbine price-range of 1700 DKK/M2 (8100 DKK/M2 in 
2017-Real), to argue that the range is not unrealistic (ATV, 1975, p. 20). In a graph 
the authors would show wind power’s “annual costs”31 at 8.5 Oere/KWh (40 
oere/KWh in 2017-Real), and thus below their estimate for fossil fuels at 11 
Oere/KWh (52 Oere/KWh in 2017-Real) (ATV, 1975, p. 27). These specific cost 
estimates were then calculated into an estimate of how much cost and fuel savings 
Denmark as a society would have if 5% of the electricity was to be supplied by wind 
power.  
The ATV report would in addition to this also cover qualities such as Energy 
Independence and Industrial, while it briefly touched upon the qualities 
Environment and Aesthetics. On Energy Independence, wind power was framed as 
being able to improve on the current situation where energy production ‘practically 
is completely dependent on fuel supplies from abroad’. The authors argue that wind 
power on the other hand would be “almost completely independent” of supplies 
from abroad (ATV, 1975, p. 14). They also combine this with an advantage of not 
having inflation rise once the price of extractable resources such as coal, oil and 
uranium would go up in the future (ATV, 1975, p. 15).  
Secondly, the Unique-coalition drew on knowledge from Juul’s construction and 
own calculations to conclude that at least 70% of investments in wind turbines go to 
wages, which correlated to 8-12 man-years (jobs for a year) per million DKK 
invested (ATV, 1975, p. 13). Hereof “tower production, foundation and erection” 
was highlighted as being a likely source of employment in the less populated areas 
of Denmark (ATV, 1975, p. 15). Although these numbers did not go into the final 
conclusion of 1% fuel imports savings, they provided concrete figures on the 
Industrial effects of building wind turbines. This was an element, which had only 
been briefly mentioned in the DEFU 1974 report, but not calculated.   
                                                          
30
 The term DKK/M2 is Danish kroner per square meter of swept area of the rotor. The number 
quoted is the average of the low and high point of the two ranges quoted in the report (ATV, 1975, 
p. 20). 
31
 The term Levelized Cost of energy was not as such officially coined and known until the NREL 
and IEA started using it in the 1980’s, but this “annual cost” part of the calculation bears the early 
marks of the methodology. 
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The ATV authors do also discuss that wind power will help avoid a “number of 
environmental disadvantages” that would have followed from the power being 
produced by coal and oil, exemplified through having reduced air pollution (ATV, 
1975, p. 14). Although the ATV-academics were aware of the early works of how 
CO2 emissions constituted a problem at the time of writing, it is still only the quality 
Environment that is inscribed into wind power valuation, and the concurrent 
example of mitigating air pollution is not quantified into a number. In the same 
bearing, the authors touch upon Aesthetics concerns of wind power. The authors 
concluded that the problem of noise from the turbines was “expected to be 
technically solvable”, while visual pollution is a disadvantage that could arise from 
wind power deployment (ATV, 1975, p. 14). The visual pollution element is not 
discussed further, and it thus is an example of a mention to ensure that it wasn’t 
forgotten. The Environment and Aesthetics qualities are not part of the conclusion or 
used in any calculations.  
The main takeaway was that Denmark could integrate wind power to cover 5-10% 
of Denmark’s electricity use in the future, and if Denmark reached 5% it would save 
1 bn. DKK in fuel imports (4.2 bn. DKK in 2014 prices) (ATV, 1975, pp. 28–29). 
The impact of producing a number like 5-10 % for possible wind power build-out 
turned out to have a large impact, as will be seen in comparison to the energy plants. 
To summarize, the ATV report used the same quality of Fuel Supplement to make a 
comparable number to the DEFU report, but reflected on whether it could be 
calculated differently. They then calculated a strong positive impact from the quality 
of Future Potential. Herein two points of reference are especially important to this 
quality’s impact. The first is the assumption that “simple construction improvement” 
would make onshore wind turbines reach a capacity factor of 35% in the near future, 
something which would not happen until the 2010’s. Secondly, the discount rate 
which was set at 3%, significantly below both DEF’s and the Danish governments 
assumptions. This meant that in ATV’s calculations long-term investments were 
move favorable than they were in official government calculations of infrastructure 
investments.    
 
3.4.5 Follow-up Publication in 1976 and Alternative Energy Plans 
In 1976, the ATV would publish a second report, “Wind Power 2”, which served to 
lay out a research and development plan that the Danish government could follow. 
In the second report ATV increased their claim of Future Potential to be that 
Denmark could have 10% of its electricity come from wind power (ATV, 1976, p. 5; 
Beuse, 2000, p. 82; K. H. Nielsen, 2001, p. 111). This was unprecedented at a time 
where the many small wind turbines across the land still only constituted less than 
0.1% of capacity, and none of them were connected to the grid. The Future 
Potential is still the most important salient quality together with delivering Energy 
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Independence, wherein wind power is shown as a solution to the still recent 1973 oil 
crisis. Although they do individual calculations, The ATV still uses the incumbent 
Fuel-coalitions method of calculation for the final framing for wind powers value, 
the Break-even price. The ATV authors also only mention the Environment effects 
but without calculating them. It can thus be seen that this challenger coalition still 
tried to influence through the “rules of the game” set forth by the Incumbents in the 
1962 and 1974 reports.  
The 1976 Energy Plan “Dansk Energipolitik” would only mention wind power as an 
option with other peripheral energy source which could possibly provide 3% of 
Denmark’s energy demand in 1995 (DKGOV, 1976, p. 58). The plan was highly 
focused on the major ongoing shift from oil to coal in the current fleet of steam-
power plants (1976, p. 28), a recently passed law expanding the use of natural gas 
(1976, p. 8)32, and a comprehensive 20-year nuclear build-out plan to have nuclear 
energy supply two-thirds of Denmark’s electricity by 1995 (1976, p. 39)33. But 
although wind power was peripheral it was mentioned as contributing to the one of 
the main goals of the plan, namely to decrease vulnerability of supply security 
(DKGOV, 1976, p. 17). The 1975 ATV report have in historical accounts of the time 
been connected as inspiration point for the Danish government’s decision to at least 
include the option of wind power in the first Danish Energy plan (Meyer, 2000, p. 
78).  The Unique-coalition would respond to the government 1976 energy plan with 
an “Alternative Energy plan”, which envisioned the possibility of having 12% wind 
power in the Danish energy mix by 1995, which was four times more than the 
government’s projections (Beuse, 2000, pp. 79–80). This Alternative Energy Plan 
was not supported by a public institution but created media attention and showed 
that there was a clear countermovement to the nuclear option34.  
 
 
                                                          
32
 The plan also outlined a needed public “capital injection” of 3-4 bn. DKK (13-17 bn. DKK in 
2015) to build out “production facilities, offshore-pipes, transmission- and distribution-grid” to 
enable extraction of natural gas in the North Sea and potential other later sites (DKGOV, 1976, pp. 
110–111). In comparison, the 1976 plan dedicated no more than 25 mn. DKK (108 mn. DKK) over 
5 years to wind power research (DKGOV, 1976, p. 102).  
33
 The nuclear power deployment plan entailed having the first commercial nuclear power plant in 
operation by 1985, and having a total of five nuclear plants (4,9 GW of capacity delivering 25 
TWh) producing two-thirds of all Denmark’s electricity by 1995 (DKGOV, 1976, p. 39). This was 
thus clearly the main road taken, while wind power was envisioned a peripheral role with 3% of the 
energy supply in 1995.  
34
 A second alternative energy plan would be created in 1983 (Illum, 1983), and these plans would 
come to function as rallying devices for the grassroots movements. The alternative Energiplan 1983 
called “Energy for the future” was two years underway as a reaction to the governments’ 
“energyplan81” (Beuse, 2000, pp. 79–80) 
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3.4.6 An important overlapping actor between DEF and ATV  
Even more interesting than the qualities prevalent in the 1974 report, was the author 
responsible for compiling the report, DEF’s lead engineer on renewable energy, 
Mogens Johansson. He would also be appointed as a member of the wind power 
committee that would write the ATV 1975 report. Johansson was a pragmatic 
representative for the utilities, the incumbents, in the group. As such the ATV 
committee’s report gained a high level of credibility from the diversity of the actors 
it comprised. Johansson noted that there was a significantly different motivation 
between the two groups of authors and especially highlights the discount rate, 
notably how the future development should be valued, as a main point of difference.  
 
“This was different people. You had Bent Soerensen who pulled very 
much in the direction that it should be doable, and Niels Meyer as 
well...Where we (DEF) probably used 4-5% (Discount rate), he (Bent 
Soerensen, ed.), was arguing that it should be down to almost zero. In 
that way he skewed it.”. (Interview 1:  Johansson, quote 1) 
 
Despite the difference between the two groups, Johansson was among those within 
the utilities who saw export potential in researching wind power. He had 
participated in a 1977 delegation to the U.S. to raise awareness of Danish wind 
power, and the government committed funds to reestablish and showcase the  
Gedser turbine in 1977 (Arhenkiel, 2015, p. 14; Johansson, 1974).  The three quotes 
below show how the collaboration between the Unique-coalition and Johansson led 
to a funding success for the wind-power program.  
 
“But then the ATV and Niels Meyer took initiative for “Wind Power 1”, 
which I was a part of… it lead to the wind power 2 committee, which 
was about the question 'what should we do, because there might be 
something in this'. And that turned into a program (the proposed program 
in “Wind Power 2” report, ed.), which there was no money for”. 
(Interview 1: Johansson, quote 2). 
“I proposed to the utilities, ELSAM and Power import, that we should set 
something up and make a plan, but they did not want to do this. ...But 
then sometime during the summer of 1976, the government set aside 
money for energy research in connection with the employment-
stimulating efforts, 42 mn. DKK i believe. Niels Gram had been 
secretary in Wind Power 1 (the first ATV report, ed.), and had studied 
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together with me, so I knew him quite well. He was in the trade ministry, 
and then he called and asked us, if we had any suggestions about what 
could be done to improve employment. We had such a thing right there 
in the drawer. That suggestion did not become reality, it was actually a 
bit larger. They (the government) would give us 11 mn. DKK and the 
utilities would then also come with 3 mn. DKK, so we had 14 mn. DKK 
in total”. (61 mn. DKK in 2017-Real, ed.). (Interview 1: Johansson, 
quote 3) 
“I actually got in touch with a Dane who worked in a utility in one of the 
New England area states. He had read the report (DEFU 1974) and wrote 
me...Travelling to the U.S. At that time was expensive and troublesome, 
so there had to be something to travel for...It came to four visits for a 
combined 8-10 days I was over there. DEFU was always well-
consolidated, so it was not an economic limitation. It was more a matter 
of how much it was considered reasonable to spend on it”. (Interview 1, 
Johansson, quote 3) 
 
Johansson’s network and one of committee members, Niels O. Gram, would help 
secure government funding for a research program, which would help the many 
local turbine-builders around the country. These builders were closely intertwined 
with the previously described grassroots organization, and had in the mid and late 
1970’s yet to form an industry. I will hereafter briefly cover this part of the 
challenger coalition.  
 
3.4.7 Local turbine-builders begin to form industry in late 1970’s 
Although the turbine-builders were not as directly involved in producing valuation 
devices, such as the examined reports and energy plants, they were still intertwined 
with the country-wide network of knowledge-sharing happening in the OVE 
organization. While the anti-nuclear movement and the local turbine-builders are not 
a homogenous group, historical accounts show a high degree of consensus between 
anti-nuclear groups and the wind turbines builders. One early example of the 
bottom-up organization was the collection of wind turbines output numbers for all of 
Denmark. This task was performed by way of all wind turbine owners sending their 
power output data by post-card to two turbine-builders in Western Jutland, as 
explained by wind power entrepreneur Henrik Stiesdal in the quote hereafter.  
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“At one point (during the early 1980’s), we came up to 0.1% of 
Denmark’s electricity consumption, and we thought that was fantastic. It 
was a motivation to people that it could now be compared, and you could 
compete a little”. (Interview 3: Stiesdal, Quote 1) 
 
There was a strong overlap between the grassroots movements and the turbine-
builders who would come to organize and build the Danish wind turbine industry 
throughout the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. The local builders started from very 
simple construction and moved to industrialization. Below is a narration of how one 
of the country’s early wind entrepreneurs Henrik Stiesdal constructed his first 
turbines in the late 1970’s:  
 
“Even though I still had money left from my work months the years 
before, there was not enough to build a turbine with an adequate 
performance from new components, and as many other turbine-builders I 
had to turn to recycled components….I found most components at local 
junkyards and one could get excited upon standing in a corner among all 
sorts of scrap and spotting a suitable object which could serve as a part of 
one of the turbines many part-systems – Brakes, Yaw-system and such. 
The price at the junkyard was almost always steady at 1 DKK per kg, so 
the price of a turbine-builders turbine could usually be established with 
good accuracy, by merely weighing it”. (Beuse, 2000, p. 168) 
 
The early turbine-builders, who worked with what they could find, would come to 
form the core of the emerging industry. They would bring their entrepreneurship to 
the companies, but would also with time professionalize their operations. Figure 10 
is a selection of pictures showing what wind turbine construction was like in the 
1970s. The two pictures on the left depict the construction of a 15 kW turbine in 
1978 by H. Stiesdal, while the middle and right picture is the Herborg Vindkraft 22 
kW turbine (1978) by K. E. Joergensen and H. Stiesdal. Both pictures are used with 
permission by Henrik Stiesdal.   
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Figure 10: Wind turbine construction in 1978.  
 
One of the first entrepreneurs to establish a company was Christian Riisager, who in 
1975 decided to connect a self-built turbine to the electric grid before receiving 
permission. Apart from Riisager’s own electric meter suddenly running backwards, 
the neighbors reported no problems and Riisager had shown that wind turbines could 
be part of the electricity grid (Garud, Kumaraswamy, & Karnøe, 2010). Where the 
Tvind-collective turbine is often mentioned as showing that wind power could be 
large-scale, the Riisager turbine is in historical accounts considered as the turbine 
which showed that the technology could be economically sound (Beuse, 2000)35. 
Shortly after the grid-connection maneuver, Riisager started production and sold his 
first commercial turbine to Torgny Moeller, a journalist from the newspaper 
Information (Grove-Nielsen, 2016). Torgny Moeller used the turbine to run his 
house, from which he could write two sustainable-energy powered Magazines about 
wind power, Naturlig Energy (in Danish), and Wind Power Monthly (NE, 2016)36. 
In 1978, Torgny Moeller called for the first general assembly for the Danish wind 
turbine owners association (Danmarks vindmølleforening) to all owners or 
shareholders of wind turbines, which were mainly the Riisager turbines at this time. 
The opposition and difference of interests to the Danish utilities were explicitly 
stated in the invitation which Torgny Moeller sent out: 
                                                          
35
 Christian Riisager was quite possibly the first Danish entrepreneur to go into series production as 
he sold more than 50 turbines between the sizes of 10-45 KW, before selling the production rights 
to WindMatic in 1979 (Grove-Nielsen, 2016). He was strongly influenced by Johannes Juul’s 
design and translated this from a prototype design to a grid connected electricity device, that could 
be ordered and installed for any land-owner with 50.000DKK (~200.000 DKK in 2017-Real).  
36
 Both of these magazines are in 2018 still in existence and Naturlig Energi is still run by Torgny 
Moeller. 
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“The invitation applies, as it will be known to some of you, all people 
who today have a grid-connected wind turbines or is about to have one. It 
does not apply to the utilities among us, as they will have pay-off 
interests which are in conflict with ours. The purpose of the association is 
a certain joint maintenance of our interests with regards to the utilities, 
authorities etc., as well as a more unified appearance externally, to secure 
a more serious information on the real opportunities of wind power”. 
(Grove-Nielsen, 2016)  
 
The invitation-text shows that Torgny saw wind power through the same framing as 
the Unique-coalition and sought it necessary that wind turbine owners organized, if 
they were to challenge the dominant valuation network of DEF. The need to 
persuade politicians to perceive wind power as a unique future possibility can also 
be seen in Torgny Moellers 1978 book, “Vinden Vender”: 
 
“How can a small turbine, as this book is about, have a greater societal 
significance? It can so because it expresses something which in reality 
has very little to do with energy….It is indirectly about unemployment, 
trade balance, pollution, scarce resources and our society’s dependence 
on foreign nations”. (Moeller, 1978, p. 47)37 
   
Torgny Moeller and the Wind turbine Owners association managed to organize 
themselves in the late 1970’s before Vestas or Bonus were founded as companies. 
As with Torgny Moellers magazine, the Wind turbine Owners organization 
(DWOA) is still in existence and represents 32.000 wind turbine stakeholders (DVF, 
2016).  
In the five years between 1979 and 1983 the turbine-builders turned into a regular 
industry (Karnøe, 1991). The need for a public framework and certifying body to 
ensure the buyers’ safety was met with the decision to make Risoe into Denmark’s 
official wind power test center. It became an official certifying body, which 
approved projects for a 30 % establishment subsidy agreed to in the 1979 law “Lov 
                                                          
37
 Torgny Moeller elaborated on his broad view of wind power later in the same book: “The 
Operational economy will likely still be disputable….Nonetheless when it comes to macro-
economics, there are problems that are as big as the economics. Unemployment is one of 
them…wind power is not just a way of retrieving energy, it is way to reduce unemployment. Trade 
balance is no less interesting. One point is that wind power can save money on purchase of oil and 
uranium. Another is that Danish produced wind turbines can become an export item in a time where 
falling exports is one of the major societal problems (Moeller, 1978, p. 49). 
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om fremme af vedvarende energy” (Beuse, 2000). Following this was the entrance 
of today’s defining manufacturers for the Danish wind industry, Vestas, Nordtank 
and Bonus, who in 1981 organized themselves in what is today known as The 
Danish Wind Turbines Manufacturers, known today as “the Danish Wind Industry 
Association (DWIA)38. In historical accounts of the Danish wind turbine industry, 
the importance of the Californian demand for Danish wind turbines must not be 
underestimated as a significant factor in ensuring revenue, while  generating 
technical and commercial experience for the industry (Karnøe, 1991, p. 20). Below 
is a graph of the installed capacity in each year throughout the 1980’s in the Danish 
and the U.S. market, combined with a pie-chart showing a split of where the worlds 
wind power capacity was installed at the end of 1990. Thereafter follows a picture of 
the Tehachapi Valley, wherein many Danish turbines were installed and still stand 
today. The marked turbine is the first 30 kW Bonus turbine installed in the U.S. in 
1982. Figure 11 is by the author (GBA), while the Tehachapi valley picture in 
Figure 12 is used with permission from H. Stiesdal.  
                                                          
38
 As the industry grew, some people within the grassroots and turbine-builders would begin to 
differ on the approach taken, as Henrik Stiesdal notes hereafter:  
“The people I came to know in the environment, where for the most part driven by this opposition 
to nuclear power,..(some) objected to the first onshore wind farm Vestas was set to build in 
Ringkoebing. Wind power was supposed to be implemented through craftsmanship and not based 
on an industrial approach….From thereon I noticed that we differed too much on this topic 
(Interview 3: Stiesdal, Quote 2).”  
Although differences emerged throughout the 1980’s, the turbine-builders and grassroots were still 
combined a network, which were able to get attention to the topic. 
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Figure 11: DK and U.S. capacity build-out in 1980-1990. 
 
Figure 12: Tehachapi Valley and the first Bonus 30 kW turbine. 
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The recognition that Danish wind turbine design received abroad helped the wind 
turbine industry position itself as an industry which created jobs and improved the 
trade balance39.  The emerging industry was an important part of the challenger 
coalition, as they were the source that the Alternative energy plan could reference to 
as proof that wind power created jobs and provided exports.   
 
3.5. WIND POWER BECOMES A VALUABLE INDUSTRIAL 
SUPPLEMENT (1980-1989) 
By the mid-1980’s, the U.S. market for wind turbines was booming and as the 
Unique-coalition had grown since its emergence in 1974, DEF sought to rid an 
image of being against wind power. The export push was paying off and by 1984-
1985 it was clear that Denmark was not going to build nuclear, DEF started to 
consider a future where wind power had to be integrated in a smart way. DEF would 
in 1984 sign a 10 year agreement on grid-usage terms with The Danish Wind 
Turbines Owners’ organization. New DEF CEO, Jacob L. Hansen, labelled the 
agreement as an “electricity-historical occasion” DEF spokeswoman Ulla Röttger, 
urged that the agreement would change “the widespread opinion of the press and 
many politicians” that the utilities were against renewable energy (K. H. Nielsen, 
2001, p. 275) . This change towards a more accepting stance of domestic wind 
power did however come slowly and started with the emergence of small renewable 
organizational units within the utilities, who worked on demonstration projects such 
as the Nibe and Tjaereborg turbines. How this slowly would cause a change, is 
explained in the below quote from Bent Christensen, Project- and General Manager 
in Elsam Projects from 1986-2000. 
 
“There is a transition from when you are forced to do something, to when 
you have an organization in which it is a fun work-day which gives 
purpose. At that point, other forces start to push within the company”.  
(Interview 4: Christensen, quote 1) 
                                                          
39
 On an international scale it also showed the international banks that there was money to be made 
on wind power when applied in the scale, and that the robust turbines from Denmark were able to 
withstand even harsh weather conditions. An example of such an endorsement of Danish wind 
turbine manufacturers was given by CEO of Calwind
39
, Douglas Lewitt, at an announced frame-
agreement purchase of 138 Nordtank wind turbines: “The Danish machines are more reliable and 
technically ahead of the American ones. In Denmark you have done your research and development 
in wind turbines for a longer period of time than we in the USA have because, right after the oil 
crisis, the Danish government funded the development of renewable energy (K. H. Nielsen, 2001, p. 
255)”. 
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Although there were engineers in the utilities who were interested in wind power, 
the top management of the utilities still mostly saw wind power as a disturbance to 
the system. DEF’s position to the system-challenges was communicated in a 1983 
Utility newsletter by then DEF-CEO Kresten Leth Jarnoe.   
 
“It is not the task of the utilities to support the Danish wind turbine 
owners….If the utilities shall benefit from wind turbines, we have to 
develop them, to make them better. Besides, there are fine export 
possibilities within this industry”. (DEFU, 1983a; K. H. Nielsen, 2001, p. 
274) 
 
But between the disputes such as how to count generated electricity, or who could 
own wind-turbines, the utilities had to engage more with the turbine-builders. Below 
is a combination of quotes, which form the recollection of one such meeting 
between these local builders and the utilities leadership, as seen through the eyes of 
wind power entrepreneur Henrik Stiesdal.  
 
“I had long hair and wooden clogs, and met these older men, a bit set in 
their ways. At meetings, there would be this characteristic cigar-plate, 
wherefrom you could get cigars, cheroots, cigarettes, often accompanied 
by a shot of fine spirits. When I visited ELSAM during the 1980’s, it 
would always start with a “Gammel Dansk” (A Danish Schnapps-like 
spirit, ed.). They often saw us as noise, and seem to think ‘why should 
we take these people seriously, what is the logic of it’…It had been 
hinted at the utilities that they should engage…I do not think they cared 
much about the economics of it (wind turbines, ed.). It was a completely 
regulated system….They did not politicize on the employee-level, but 
they politicized a lot on the managerial level. They wanted nuclear 
power, it should be central, it should be big. We started as noise and then 
we became a threat”. (Interview 3, Stiesdal, Quote 3) 
   
The above quote shows that the turbine-builders and the numerous small turbines 
they were erecting around the country-side were seen as a peripheral supplement 
which ‘stole’ away at the utilities’ business model, leading some managers to 
informally refer to wind-turbines as “three-armed thieves” (Bülow, 2009). The 
electricity system was a ‘rest in itself’ system, where costs would be priced into the 
consumer, and added reinforcement costs would thus not be paid by the utilities, but 
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instead be borne by the consumers. There were some challenges to the many 
decentralized wind turbines coming on the grid as they were not very flexible. This 
is explained below by Bent Christensen, Project- and General Manager in Elsam 
Projects from 1986-2000. 
 
“At that time, a wind turbine was a bit "dumb" compared to today. Today 
a turbine can be expected to actively help in keeping grid-stability, which 
they could not do earlier...the toughest challenge was that all distribution-
grids and local-grids were designed and dimensioned from the idea that 
the power only ran one way (From central power stations to users, ed.). 
Now the power started to run the other way, and it required a lot to 
upgrade the grid to handle that unpredictability”. (Interview 4, 
Christensen, Quote 2) 
 
The electricity system had however also prior to the introduction of wind power, 
experienced several break-downs. Long-time engineer at ELSAM, Paul-Frederik 
Bach, refer to the 1960’s as a time where the build-out of power plants happened so 
fast that it at times could be “pure lottery to run the 1960’s thermal system”. This 
period posed “large and unpredictable demands towards the grid” as the utilities 
experienced “many failures, which could occur in the most unreasonable 
combinations” (P.-F. Bach, 2007, p. 14). This highlight the point that Black-out Risk 
and challenges in energy system management also existed before wind power 
entered the system. The energy system already needed back-up capacity and the 
ability to react quickly to changes. It was a different change that the emerging wind 
turbine brought that was troubling to ELSAM’s management, namely from central 
to decentral. It was through this ‘noise’ that the wind turbines were a diversion away 
from the DEF-managements’ preferred direction towards simply exchanging large 
centralized oil plants, with large centralized nuclear plants. When one sees how the 
1960’s energy system was defined by “many failures” that would occur at the “most 
unreasonable combinations” it is not surprising that the utilities had some initial 
concerns about Black-out Risk as the new technology was possibly being introduced 
to the system at large scale.    
 
3.5.1 Two reports from the Fuel-coalition frame wind power as a supplement 
The Fuel-coalition would frame wind power as something that could not be 
imagined to a large degree, as it was framed that its variability made it function as a 
Fuel Supplement and nothing more. But it was also the point of reference to an 
argument that too much wind power could cause electricity overrun, which would be 
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costly in terms of lost revenue and technological costs to secure against Black-out 
Risk.  
 
World Energy Council Committee report on Renewables 1983 
The 1983 publication of “Renewable energy – Economics and opportunities” was 
Denmark’s contribution to the 12th World Energy Conference in New Delhi and 
thus an important document describing Denmark’s position on wind power. DEF 
were part of the leadership writing the report, with the purpose to give a “realistic 
evaluation of the economics of renewable energy sources”, with a focus on “the 
macro-economic aspects of replacing conventional energy from fuel with renewable 
energy” (DNC-WEC, 1983, p. 6). This report concludes that since any conventional 
plant that wind turbines supplemented would “to a large extent be fully maintained 
for when the wind is not blowing”, the price for comparison would be “very close to 
the share of fuel saved” (DNC-WEC, 1983, p. 7). Having framed wind power 
solidly as only a Fuel Supplement, the report went on to highlight wind power’s lack 
of Future Potential, as seen below.  
 
“The conclusion is that most renewable types of installations from a 
macro-economic evaluation are not economically viable….A natural first 
question is whether future technical developments can change these 
assumptions adequately to make one or more of the renewable types of 
installations economically viable….Generally it can be said that even for 
the most promising options, it would require a doubling of energy output 
for a given installation. This must be considered very difficult. In 
example, both solar and wind power has today reached a stage of 
development, where you are close to the theoretically calculated yields, 
which reflect fundamental physical-technical limitations”. (DNC-WEC, 
1983, p. 61) 
 
As can be seen from the quote above, the report did not see much potential in wind 
power. It even states that wind power is at the “fundamental physical-technical 
limitations” at a time where 0.6 MW turbines are being explored. The report does 
touch upon possible environmental qualities (DNC-WEC, 1983, p. 9,10) and 
Industrial qualities (DNC-WEC, 1983, p. 10,18,66), but dismisses these as neither 
sufficiently quantifiable, nor large enough to make wind power a viable energy 
alternative.  Although the report recognized that larger turbines, such as the Tvind-
turbine or the Nibe (630 KV) and Kolby (255 KV) built by the utilities, could see 
“considerable development in coming years” (DNC-WEC, 1983, p. 12), the overall 
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recommendation to the UN was that “the macro-economic profitability” was so bad 
that “there neither should be expected nor aimed for any larger deployment” of wind 
installations in the coming years (DNC-WEC, 1983, p. 66). The Unique coalition’s 
calculations had however had a small effect, as the report did state that wind power 
could theoretically supply 10% of Denmark’s electricity (DNC-WEC, 1983, p. 16). 
A month later the DEF’s research unit, would publish a report which discussed the 
technical, but also very much the economic risks of installing too much wind power.  
 
DEF Electricity Overrun report 1983 
The report “Wind power in the electricity system” was concerned with the problems 
that wind power could cause to the power-grid, and had been ordered from the 
energy ministry in EnergyPlan81. In the introduction, the authors of the DEF report 
recognize that the Unique-coalition had written on the possible 10% wind, but noted 
that this 1983 report was more extensive, thus asserting their authority as a site of 
valuation (DEFU, 1983b, p. 6).  
The report concluded that “calculations show that the value of electricity production 
of a wind power system” was “equivalent to the average fuel and maintenance costs 
of a coal-fired condensation unit” (DEFU, 1983b, p. 8). But integration of wind 
power would entail “certain operational problems, the solution of which will lead to 
expenses” (DEFU, 1983b, p. 7), the reason being that centralized steam power plants 
could not get full usage of their combined heat and power production (DEFU, 
1983b, p. 8). This conclusion is based on the results of simulation wherein a wind 
power capacity of a 1000 MW would be equivalent to a 22% “electricity overrun” 
(DEFU, 1983b, p. 8). By those calculations, 1000 MW installed wind power would 
only be equivalent in effect to 175-200 MW of fuel-powered energy (DEFU, 1983b, 
p. 10), because 22% of the generated energy would be lost. The conclusion that it 
was overrun electricity and thus lost is that it did not produce according to the peak 
hours, but varied with the wind.  
The report cautioned that further wind utilization could lead to regulation issues, 
which could results in large significant expenses that could reduce wind powers 
value, and stated that since electricity use was determined by the users, “the 
production units must have characteristic which enables this” (DEFU, 1983b, p. 11). 
Here it is assumed that measures could not be taken on demand-side response and 
therefore a needed characteristic is ascribed to a production unit, namely that it can 
turn on and off as demand requires it. This again frames wind power as something 
that can only be a supplement, as wind turbines cannot turn on and off as demand 
requires it. DEF briefly state that this system problem possibly could be mitigated by 
either an increased grid connection to Sweden and Norway, or by asking users to 
regulate their electricity use according to supply. These possibilities are however 
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ended with a statement that both options would require extra investments, without 
any further calculating being done (DEFU, 1983b, p. 13). Wind Power is thus still 
seen as a supplement to the centralized power plants and a risk to the systems 
stability.   
 
3.5.2 The mid-1980’s sees wind power grow thanks to Industrial quality 
In 1985, Unique-coalition economist, Frede Hvelplund, joined two Aalborg 
University engineers in publishing a report on jobs and exports of the wind turbines 
industry.  This report calculated that the wind turbine industry would have exports 
for 1.6 bn. DKK (3.1 bn. DKK in 2015) and employ 3000 people in 1985. It would 
go on to state that even when state subsidies were subtracted, the wind turbine 
industry had generated a net state-profit of 500 mn. DKK (990 mn. DKK in 2017) 
(Pol, 1985a). This caused the centre-left newspaper Politiken to write the following 
in an august 1985 editorial. 
.  
“From being considered a toy for the left-wings biodynamic collectives, 
the wind turbine industry has become a real success. According to the 
report from Aalborg University Center, the turbine exports will this year 
amount to 1.6 bn. DKK – the equivalent of last year’s exports of butter or 
fish. It is also interesting, that the 3000 jobs the industry has created, 
account for one eight of the highly praised added industry-employment”. 
(Pol, 1985b) 
 
The Industrial quality is highly salient here, as the wind turbine industry is 
considered a success which creates jobs in industry, something which was politically 
important during the unemployment crisis of the mid-1980’s. This is a quality which 
starts to move the wind turbines away from the early 1970’s categorization as being 
a ‘left-wing toy’ and not a real industry. So far wind power had not seen a large role 
in the first energy plans, but this would improve in the mid-1980’s.  
Even more progress than from the previously described energy plan from 1976 was 
seen in Denmark’s second official energy plan, Plan81, which would include a high 
renewables scenario (7% Renewables in 2000) (DKGOV, 1981, p. 125). Wind 
power had received 70 mn. DKK since 1974, and would with a new Plan81 law 
“Law of State subsidies to renewable energy sources”, receive another 120 mn. 
DKK going forward (DKGOV, 1981, pp. 17–18). Included in this was an 
‘establishment subsidy’ which covered 30% of a builder’s documented capex cost to 
build a new wind turbine. This subsidy would in the following eight years be 
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adjusted down to 10% and then back up several times, until it was completely 
removed in 1989. It is in several historical accounts one of the key factors of the 
rapid growth in Danish installations throughout the 1980’s  (Beuse, 2000; Karnøe, 
1991). The socialdemocratic government was still focused on nuclear, but although 
more positive towards the future of wind power ascribed the quality of Future 
Potential to wind power as they concluded that “through continued technological 
developments it can be expected that the renewable energy sources are made 
cheaper and become more efficient”  (DKGOV, 1981, p. 146). As fuel prices would 
increase, the government saw renewables take on an increased importance. The 1981 
plan also had high salience on the Industrial quality of energy investments in 
general, emphasizing that ‘energy investments’ gave direct employment to 35.000 in 
the energy sector and another 28.000 in other related sectors (DKGOV, 1981, p. 21). 
Herein wind power was also included, but of course between several larger energy 
sources. The report would go on to draw a direct link between government 
investments and the newly emerged energy industry as they would state “a new 
export industry had emerged”, and its competitiveness was “tightly connected to the 
composition of energy investments” (DKGOV, 1981, p. 25).  
It was not only the utilities which saw wind power as a supplement, which should 
not stand in the way of the overall goal to build nuclear energy. The first energy 
minister Poul Nielson (S) was initially a strong proponent of nuclear energy, but also 
supportive of wind power as a supplement (Beuse, 2000). This was seen in the 
previous analysis, wherein the 1976 Energy plan had a plan to put a nuclear plant 
into operation in 1985, and how the subsequent energy plan, Plan81, had to 
reconfigure this goal to 1993, as an investment decision had not been made since 
1976 (DKGOV, 1976, 1981). In addition to this change, the 1981 energy plan 
included a high renewables scenario.  Both Denmark’s first energy minister Poul 
Nielson (S) and his successor Knud Enggaard (V), were supportive of nuclear 
energy, but had both supported wind power to some extent. Nielson had helped 
provide the establishment subsidies in 1981, and Enggaard had overseen 
compromises between DEF and the wind-turbine owners in the mid-1980’s. A 
compromise between Fuel- and the Unique-coalition came in the form of 10 year 
agreement in May 1984 between the Danish Wind Turbines owners’ organization 
and DEF. DEF was happy with the agreement as it maintained some requirements 
towards how far you could live from a wind turbine you had ownership in, while 
DWOA got some assurances that they could still sell their power to the grid at a 
guaranteed price. The sitting DEF CEO labelled the agreement an “electricity-
historical occasion”, and an organizational spokesman expressed hope that the move 
should end “the widespread opinion of the press and many politicians” that the 
utilities were against renewable energy (K. H. Nielsen, 2001, p. 275). DEF would 
also open up to an increased role in wind power, and would in December 1985 agree 
with energy-minister Enggaard to build 100 MW wind power by 1990, twice the 
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installed capacity at the end of 1985 (DEA, 2016b, p. 25)40. The build-out program 
received EU-funding to pave the way for what was then considered large 20-25 MW 
wind farms. It would however not achieve this goal, as the large test-turbines which 
should have paved the way for the large parks, did not achieve the efficiency as the 
smaller ones placed around the country41. This law did however severely limit 
private citizens’ and communities’ ability to build more wind power than for their 
own consumption (Karnøe, 1991, p. 231). So Although it achieved some stability, 
the deal would later on be criticized from the Unique-coalition side, as it hampered 
the grassroots ability to build wind power, while the utilities never managed to build 
the 100 MW wind turbines in time (B. T. Madsen, 2000, p. 161). Despite the large 
documented project-losses the 1984-1985 deal caused (Karnøe, 1991, p. 231), it was  
however a slight first move towards wind turbines no longer being exclusively a 
grassroots endeavor. 
But the largest step towards wind power stability of the mid-1980’s, was when the 
party Radikale Venstre again utilized the alternative red-green majority with the left 
wing parties, to enact a ban against nuclear energy42. The Unique-coalition had ties 
to influential politicians in the political party Radikale Venstre, who early on were 
adamantly anti-nuclear. The party’s effort was led first by Kristen Helveg Petersen 
and later by Lone Dybkjaer. Due to its position in the center of Danish politics, 
Radikale Venstre was during the 1980’s able to function as part of a conservative-
led government, while forming this red-green majority with the opposition on 
certain issues, one of these was the important 1985 decision to abandon nuclear 
power in future energy planning43 (Beuse, 2000; DEA, 2016b, p. 24).  
                                                          
40
 This is the most significant mark that Venstre as a party had on the period, since Enggard’s 
successor, Svend Erik Hovmand (V) did not enact major legislation on wind power from 1986-
1988 (DEA, 2016b, p. 163).   
41
 Especially the 2 MW Tjaereborg turbine is today considered an expensive and poorly designed 
construction. The tabloid newspaper Ekstra Bladet could under the spectacular headline of “70 Mn. 
DKK Wind turbine cannot rotate its blades” write about how the Tjaereborg turbine was so poorly 
built, that grassroots and turbine-builders suspected the utilities of consciously portraying wind 
power as an economically unattractive technology (EB, 1988). The utilities Nibe turbines were 
slightly better, but were also decommissioned earlier than originally planned. Despite the poor 
performance of the prototypes, the projects did serve the purpose of creating excitement and 
knowledge around wind power within the utilities as mentioned elsewhere in this chapter.   
42
 This red-green majority had also prior to the nuclear decision forced the sitting right-wing 
government to take actions in the energy sector. In 1983, Socialdemokratiet and Radikale Venstre 
had voted with the left-wing parties to enact a phase-out of South African coal imports in a protest 
to the Apartheid. Venstre and De Konservative abstained from the vote (EFKM, 1984, p. 9).  
43
 The vote fell in March 1985, where Radikale Venstre, Socialdemokratiet, and the left-wing 
parties, SF and the left-socialists, today known as Enhedslisten, won the vote 79-63. Venstre and 
De Konservative voted against the ban on nuclear energy Socialdemokratiet came to also be against 
nuclear energy. One of the pivotal moments in that process came in the mid-1980’swhen 
Socialdemokratiet were no longer in Government and former Prime minister, Anker Joergensen 
(S), was asked about nuclear energy at a Party conference. That moment is explained below by 
Steen Gade from the left-wing party SF.  
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Before going into showing the valuation frames of the two coalitions, I will sum up 
with a few interview quotes, to show how the two dominant qualities Energy 
Independence and Industrial are the once that there were shared focus on. Below is 
the lead engineer for DEF, giving his take on the main qualities that defined the 
period.   
 
“In 1976 it was unemployment which caused wind energy research to get 
funding. Then you started talking about wanting to become independent 
of the Arab states, the oil-nations. This was also something you wanted 
in 1985. Before CO2 became salient, it did not appear until in the 
1990's....The whole supply security question was important”. (Interview 
1, Johansson, Quote 5) 
 
As seen from the Unique-coalitions side, it was clear that it was the Industrial 
element that drove the limited engagement from the Fuel-coalitions side. The Fuel-
coalition did however not see wind power as something that should have a large role 
in the system. This is seen in the below quote from wind power entrepreneur Birger 
T. Madsen. 
 
“Historically, the judgment must be that the utilities didn’t build wind 
turbines without getting something in return in the form of permits to 
erect new coal plants and limitations on competition from private 
suppliers of electricity. Wind power was up until the mid-1990’s 
considered to be something one (the utilities, ed.) wanted to promote for 
exports and employment, but seen as absolutely unfit and uneconomic in 
our electricity system”. (B. T. Madsen, 2000, p. 162) 
 
Apart from this a defining quality is the Fuel Supplement, as it is the metric which 
makes wind power’s value be framed by a break-even price to fuel costs. Although 
this supplement grew during the 1980’s, it would still only constitute just below 2% 
of the electricity supply in 1990 (Appendix A).  
                                                                                                                                        
“It was a tough discussion in Socialdemokratiet. They had a large party-gathering in 
Silkeborg…their position was ‘we are against nuclear power, if you do not handle waste properly’. 
There was about 1000 people in that room, and they all knew what this was about…When Anker 
(Joergensen, ed.) then starts to say: ‘The Socialdemocrats are against nuclear,…’ he was 
interrupted. A minute long interruption (of cheers and applauds, ed.), …it was a symbolic 
description of the shift within the Socialdemocrats” (Interview 5: Gade, Quote 1).  
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3.6. UNIQUE SUPPLEMENT: VALUATION FRAME SUMMARY 
In this section, I summarize the qualities, frames and networks observed throughout 
the Unique Supplement period. The summary sections for each of the five periods 
follow the same structure to ensure consistency across the analysis. In the first sub-
section, I describe the new qualities that were used to frame the value of wind power 
during the analyzed period. In the second sub-section, I analyze the period’s 
dominant valuation before describing the corresponding valuation network in the 
third sub-section.  The only exception to this structure is that the first sub-section on 
new qualities is only present in the first three summaries, as the last two valuation 
frames do not incorporate any new qualities; instead, they recombine existing 
qualities. The first sub-section is a bit longer in this chapter, as I present the first 
seven qualities that were used to frame wind power’s value. Three additional 
qualities were added during the Climate Solution period, and the last two qualities 
were added during the Market Distortion period. The qualities can be categorized 
into three domains: technological, societal and environmental. 
 
As explained in the theory, moments of valuation can be anything from a single 
meeting to an era; the emphasis is on the sites and methodologies used in valuation 
work. The valuation frames I have assembled represent my attempts to capture the 
dominant conception of the value of wind power in each of the five periods. Each 
valuation frame is based not a single report, but on a synthesis of several documents 
and statements that represent how the dominant valuation network of that period 
framed the value of wind power. 
 
 
3.6.1 The First Seven Qualities Used to Frame the Value of Wind power  
The first valuation struggle between Juul and DEF revealed the first three central 
qualities used to frame the value of wind power: Fuel Supplement, industrial, and 
Energy Independence.  
 
Fuel Supplement (Technological) 
The Fuel Supplement quality represents how wind power is valued by its ability to 
supplement an existing fossil fuel based energy source. This is seen through the 
metric of a break-even price, wherein wind power is considered valuable when it is 
cheaper to build wind power capacity than to purchase the equivalent amount of 
energy by importing oil, coal or gas.  
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Industrial (Societal) 
The Industrial quality represents the societal value of the domestic wind turbine 
industry in terms of job creation, exports and tax revenues. Simply put, if Denmark 
bought all of its turbines from Germany and had no local production, this quality 
would only exist to the extent of installation jobs.  
 
Energy Independence (Societal) 
The quality of Energy Independence refers to the value of not needing to rely on 
fossil fuel imports from foreign countries. It is thus primarily the value of being less 
exposed to geopolitical tensions and the risk of major price-hikes or being 
completely cut off from supplies. Additionally, it covers the value of not funding 
potentially dangerous states by buying fuel from them.  
These first three qualities remained important in the valuation struggles that 
followed the 1973 oil crisis.44 Four new qualities appeared after the 1973 oil crisis: 
Future Potential, Black-out Risk, Environment and Aesthetics.  
 
Future Potential (Technological) 
The Future Potential quality represents the possibilities for development that will 
increase value, for instance, by lowering Technology Cost or improving technical 
performance of the turbine. This quality was mentioned briefly in the Fuel-
coalition’s reports on the topic of large-scale utility wind turbines, yet the 1983 
World Council report reveals it only had a small positive impact on their final 
valuation. However, in the Unique-coalition’s valuation frame, Future Potential had 
a strong positive impact, as evidenced by their use of a lower discount rate, their 
future expectations regarding cost reductions and capacity factors, as well as their 
envisioned shares of wind electricity in the Danish grid.  
 
 
                                                          
44 Both the Fuel- and Unique-coalitions used the Fuel Supplement quality in their valuation of 
wind power, as evidenced by their use of break-even prices as the key metric to measure the 
value of wind power. It is the Energy Independence quality which triggers the focus on 
energy after the disruption of oil supplies in the 1970s. In the 1980s, the prospect of creating 
jobs and generating exports became especially salient, which led to a number of favorable 
legislative decisions in favor of wind power.  
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Black-out Risk (Technological) 
The Black-out Risk quality refers to the value loss ascribed to the possibility that 
wind power would cause the energy system to break down temporarily or 
completely. It is the technical risk that wind power could not be integrated and 
would cause black-outs due to a lack of wind or the system’s inability to handle 
large amounts of wind power at a given moment in time. This quality was not 
discussed by the Unique-coalition, but the concerns raised by the Fuel-coalition in 
the electricity overrun report from 1983 show that it had a negative impact. The 
coalition did not frame black-outs as something that would necessarily break the 
system, but as a risk that would need to be mitigated at high expense to the system.  
 
Environment (Environmental) 
The Environment quality covers the value ascribed to local benefits from using wind 
power as opposed to conventional sources of energy. This covers air quality as well 
as reduced depletion of resources, such as timber for biomass or water for coal or 
nuclear plants. It also relates to the avoidance of nuclear waste. Some readers may 
object to the notion that climate change mitigation is not included in the 
Environment quality. However, the quality related to climate change did not appear 
in the framing during the Unique Supplement period. In the early years of the wind 
turbine history, climate change was not an established fact within the scientific 
community, and even less so among the general public. This became more 
prominent with the 1987 Brundtland report (Brundtland, 1987), and the following 
first report from the UN’s International Panel on Climate Change in the early 1990s 
(IPCC, 1992). Although a few actors within the Unique-coalition were aware of 
climate change as a phenomenon in the 1970s and 1980s45, it was not an independent 
quality used in pre-1990 valuation frames.  
 
Aesthetics (Environmental) 
The Aesthetics quality covers perceived negative impacts on neighbors or other 
proximate actors when wind turbines alter the landscape. This quality is rarely 
calculated into a monetary value, but often is emphasized as an argument that wind 
turbines (especially onshore turbines) are not valuable. Therefore, although it is 
difficult to commensurate, it is necessary to include it as a quality in valuation 
frames. This quality also covers any perceived health issues from living close to 
                                                          
45
 One example is Niels Meyer, the president of the ATV, who wrote about it in the 1978 book, 
“Oprør fra midten”  (K. H. Petersen, Meyer, & Soerensen, 1978). Therefore, in pre-1990 valuation 
frames climate change mitigation is considered to be included in the Environment quality. 
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wind turbines, although there to date has been found no solid proof that living in 
proximity to wind turbines cause illness.    
These seven qualities were used to create the first framings of the societal value of 
wind power. In the next section, I describe how the Unique-coalition managed to 
replace the incumbent Fuel-Coalitions Expensive Supplement frame with their 
challenger frame, Unique Supplement.  
 
3.6.2 The first shift comes with the emergence of the Unique Supplement 
Valuation Frame 
In this first empirical chapter, I map the incumbent Fuel-Coalitions Valuation frame, 
Expensive Supplement, and compare it to the Unique-coalition’s frame, Unique 
Supplement, which became dominant during this period. Doing so reveals the first 
valuation struggle that ultimately resulted in the creation of the Unique Supplement 
Valuation frame shown in Figure 13 (GBA) on the next page. In the empirical 
chapters that follow, I adopt a similar analytical structure by comparing the previous 
period’s valuation frame against the new one.46  
The Fuel-coalition’s incumbent valuation frame, Expensive Supplement, was 
dominant until the oil 1973 crisis, where after it began to destabilize due to 
continuous challenges from the Unique-coalition. To the Fuel-coalition, wind power 
was still a marginalized, low value technology that possibly could serve as Fuel 
Supplement and nothing more. Wind power was calculated as a Fuel Supplement 
that was too expensive and posed a Black-out Risk if deployed on a larger scale. 
Costs and risks outweighed the small positive impacts of the qualities related to the 
Environment and Future Potential. The overall valuation of wind power from the 
Fuel-coalition’s ranking and calculation of qualities was that wind power was not a 
worthwhile investment. However, the Fuel-coalition did recognize some advantages 
to helping the industry in order to export wind turbines and become less dependent 
on foreign fuels. These two qualities were what drove the Fuel- coalition’s limited 
commitment to wind power and facilitated some compromise with the Unique-
coalition. Without these two qualities, there would have been little ground for any 
later compromises with the Unique-coalition.   
                                                          
46
 The Expensive Supplement frame is treated as historic and not mentioned after this chapter, since 
the Unique Supplement frame became the defining frame for the 1974-1989 period of the analysis. 
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Figure 13: The historic (ES: 1891-1973) and the first modern (US: 1974-1989) Valuation 
Frame. 
 
The Unique-coalition’s challenger valuation frame, Unique Supplement, had some 
similarities to the previously dominant Expensive Supplement valuation frame. The 
most notable similarity was that the Unique Supplement frame still measured wind 
power’s value as a Fuel Supplement, as evidenced by the metric of break-even prices 
relative to fuel costs for coal and gas plants. But wind power was not calculated as 
being much more expensive than the fossil fuel it was replacing. The Unique-
coalition estimated the Future Potential of wind power as much higher based on 
high capacity factors, good wind sites and a low discount rate.  The Unique-coalition 
also calculated much larger societal savings from being less dependent on foreign 
fuels. Extending the argument made by Johannes Juul, the Unique-coalition saw 
wind power as a highly necessary part of the energy system to guard against the 
shocks seen in 1973 and 1979. Additionally, they saw a higher Industrial value, 
since Denmark was building unique competences; by the early to mid-1980s, export 
markets began to open up.  Although small concerns over Black-out Risk and 
Aesthetics were recognized, wind power was framed as a unique supplement that 
would prove valuable to Danish society in the future.  
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3.6.3 The Unique Supplement Valuation Networks 
In this section, I map the human actor coalitions and thereafter the materiality of the 
valuation networks during the Unique Supplement period.  
 
Coalitions of Human Actors 
As can be seen in the analysis it is not possible to to draw up sharp lines between the 
various coalitions, as some actors overlapped. Examples of obvious overlaps include 
the renewables engineer within the DEF who also worked with the Unique-coalition, 
or the large internal discussions among the Socialdemokratiet during the debate 
leading up to the nuclear power ban in 1985. Nonetheless, the are enough reference 
points to draw up the rough contours of the two coalitions. Figure 14 (GBA) shows 
actors present at the beginning of the period (solid border) and new actors that 
emerged either at the start of the period or near the end (dotted border). The actors 
are shown on an axis, which indicates their relative dominance in setting the 
valuation frame and are color-coded to indicate membership in a coalition. I list the 
two main coalitions below the figure while gray boxes are neutral.  
 
Figure 14: Key actors in US period; blue: Fuel-coalition; green: Unique-coalition. 
The left side depicts the situation immediately after the first oil crisis. The Fuel-
coalition was dominant in setting the valuation frame for all energy sources in 
Denmark, as there was broad agreement among Socialdemokratiet, Venstre and De 
Konservative to follow the recommendations of DEF research groups. Members of 
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the DEF were at the center of the Fuel-coalition and considered the go-to experts in 
the governmental analysis of wind power during this period.47  
In the mid- to late-1970s, the Unique-coalition formed around three actor-groups 
that had begun to present an alternative calculation focus. These actors were the 
grassroots movements opposing nuclear energy and promoting wind and solar, local 
turbine-builders, and Radikale Venstre, which helped coordinate grassroots 
conventions and drove the 1985 ban on nuclear energy. The grassroots members of 
the coalition were focused on large environmental challenges ahead, partly due to 
connections to the authors of the 1972 publication, Limits to Growth, and therefore 
saw wind power as a centerpiece of future energy supply. To a great extent, they 
were united in a shared search for an alternative to nuclear power, a goal which was 
shared with members of Radikale Venstre, who were the main political drivers 
behind the 1985 ban of nuclear power. They are identified by Niels Meyer as the key 
political drivers in this early period. 
 
“Already by January (1973), I had invited him (Dennis Meadows) to give 
a lecture at Copenhagen University. There was 500 people there to 
discuss....It was rather important because we got many of the younger 
politicians to join, Kristen Helveg Petersen, and some other older and 
experienced one....Lone (Dybkjaer, ed.) and several other became very 
occupied with it. Radikale Venstre fully supported wind power and they 
were luckily the decisive vote in many situations. It was important that 
we had them”. (Interview 2: Meyer, Quote 3)  
 
Although there were many overlaps between participants in grassroots movements 
and turbine-builders, they were not completely aligned. The two actors considered 
different qualities to be most salient, yet both participated in the valuation network 
that challenged the DEF’s initial framing of wind power.    
The right half of Figure 14 shows the positions of the actors at the end of the Unique 
Supplement period. The Unique-coalition had established an alternative center of 
calculation to the otherwise dominant Fuel-coalition. Radikale Venstre had become 
slightly more dominant after uniting with members of Socialdemokratiet and the left 
wing to form the red-green majority while being part of a Conservative-led 
government. This was driven by a growing industry, which apart from 
                                                          
47
 They either led the calculations initiated by the government, or were represented in the group, as 
in the 1975 ATV report. Engineers from DEF also represented the official Danish view of wind 
power, as was seen in the 1983 contribution to the World Energy Conference.  
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environmental benefits, could generate Industrial benefits in the form of jobs and 
exports. What began as loose connections between grassroots movements and 
turbine-builders strengthened throughout the period into an organized Wind turbine 
owners association (DWOA) and a small industry represented by the Wind Turbine 
Industry Association (DWIA). Moreover, the Unique-coalition started to carve in on 
the Fuel-coalitions incumbent position in the energy field, as evidenced by author 
cross-over in reports and the utilities’ construction of test turbines. As actors within 
the utilities began to explore wind power opportunities, some actors within the 
utilities moved towards a pragmatic stance toward accepting wind power as a 
beneficial supplement to the energy system, but not much more than that. Influences 
from abroad mentioned in the analysis, such as academics affiliated with the Club of 
Rome in the 1970s, and actors involved in the California wind rush, had effects 
through actors in Denmark; therefore, they are not mapped separately in the 
valuation frame.  
Part of the framing of wind power as a Fuel Supplement is not solely explained by 
the actor networks, but by limited available knowledge of its technological potential. 
Although the Unique-coalition saw much larger Future Potential than the Fuel-
coalition, members still used the incumbent device of break-even prices, and 
therefore still calculated wind power as a supplement. Although the challenger 
coalition emphasized a wide range of potential benefits to the future expansion of 
wind power, they still had to play by the established rules of the game. The Fuel-
coalition actually built prototype turbines in the 1980s and partially supported the 
development of an industry that could generate future exports. This is a classic 
example of an incumbent accepting a challenger, as long as it does not significantly 
upset current market arrangements (Fligstein, 2001). This acceptance is also evident 
in the next sub-section, in which I uncover the material aspects of the Unique 
Supplement valuation network. Once the Industrial benefits of U.S. exports in the 
mid-1980s demonstrated the potential of the wind turbine industry, installations 
accelerated significantly.  
 
Materiality during the Unique Supplement period 
As with most other emerging technologies, wind turbines were constructed rather 
quickly once knowledge networks began sharing experiences. But as can be seen in 
figure 15 (GBA) of key industry metrics below, the rate of domestic installations 
grew significantly as exports to the United States in the mid-1980s proved to 
politicians that the wind industry could create Industrial benefits for Denmark. 
Although several small wind turbines were built all over the country, no offshore 
wind capacity was built. Figure 15 (GBA) shows installed cumulative capacity 
throughout the period (Appendix A), as well as estimates of exports and wind 
industry employment (FDV, 1988; Karnøe, 1991; K. H. Nielsen, 2001, p. 337). 
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Although I covered events prior to 1979 in this chapter, I use this year is the starting 
point for the x-axis, as it is the first year for which data on employees and exports is 
available48. In addition to the domestic market, effects of the California wind rush 
are evident in the mid-1980s numbers for exports and employees.   
 
 
Figure 15: Capacity expansion during the Unique Supplement period. 
 
The legislative part of the valuation network that enabled this capacity expansion 
consisted of a number of measures that provided incentives for wind turbine builders 
and new entrepreneurs. Early R&D programs created as part of the 1976 energy plan 
supported the network’s formation, followed by the establishment subsidy, which 
provided financial stability for entrepreneurs attempting new designs. Quality was 
ensured through funding for the shared Risoe test center which certified many new 
small turbines. The export markets were helped through state-backed financial 
guarantees to ensure that small Danish companies were trusted by U.S. buyers 
during the California wind rush of the 1980s. The network had a small protected 
space wherein wind power was allowed to grow, as entrepreneurs materialized their 
ideas and formed new companies. Through the valuation struggles described in this 
chapter, entrepreneurs were able to carve out this small corner of the energy system, 
thereby creating the exports and jobs that turned the small wind industry investments 
into justifiable business policy.   
                                                          
48
 Numbers have been triangulated, but should be considered best estimates since slight variations 
exist among sources (FDV, 1988; Karnøe, 1991; K. H. Nielsen, 2001, p. 337).  
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There was a red-green majority in parliament, but also broad agreement over 
providing financial guarantees to ensure exports. Although politicians became 
increasingly open to wind power throughout the period, it remained primarily a 
small business endeavor. In terms of the energy system, the challenger energy 
source had to fit and conform to the terms set up by the DEF incumbents. Two 
important events in the mid-1980s helped establish some stability in the valuation 
network: the 1984 agreement with the utilities and the 1985 decision to ban nuclear 
power from future energy planning. The utility agreement stabilized the near-term 
future for wind power by guaranteeing grid access, while the ban on nuclear secured 
its long-term future by eliminating a competitive technological pathway.  
 
3.6.4 Key Takeaways From the Unique Supplement Period 
During the Unique Supplement period, wind power was valued by two very 
different valuation networks that had some agreement on the qualities to value it by, 
but strongly disagreed on how to prioritize and calculate them. Both networks used 
break-even prices to calculate the relative cost of building a wind turbine versus the 
cost of fuel for a power plant. The main differences between the two frames is that 
the Unique Supplement frame saw a much larger Future Potential in wind power 
and viewed it as the natural choice, in part due to opposition to the environmental 
risks of nuclear power expansion. Three critical events, the 1984 utility wind owners 
agreement, the 1985 100 MW capacity expansion agreement and the 1985 decision 
to ban nuclear energy, signal the point at which the Unique Supplement valuation 
frame became dominant and sufficient stability had been established to enable wind 
power to grow. However, it remained a challenger coalition and the valuation frame 
became dominant only because it was partially accepted by some of the incumbent 
actors.  
Radikale Venstre was the most significant party for wind power during this period, 
as members were closely connected to the academic actors in the Unique-coalition 
and pushed early on for wind power to play a more central role. The other three 
parties were part of the fuel-coalition and initially had a pro-nuclear stance and 
where therefore dismissive of wind power. But Socialdemokratiet began to support 
the Unique-coalition through their late participation in the red-green majority, which 
voted to ban nuclear energy in 1985. Venstre’s impact during the period amounts to 
Minister Enggaard’s 100 MW capacity expansion agreement with the utilities, while 
De Konservative were absent from the wind power framing.  These parties are 
therefore placed as neutral for the end of the period. They cannot be said to have 
been a part of the Unique-coalition, but they did end towards a position where they 
were not completely aligned with the Fuel-Coalitions most central player, DEF.  
Hereafter follows the next moment of valuation. 
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4. NEW FRAMING OF WIND AS A 
NECESSARY CLIMATE SOLUTION 
The previous chapter mapped how a new valuation network of wind-turbine 
builders, anti-nuclear activists, civil servants and pro-wind politicians collaborated 
to form a challenge to the conventional conception of wind power as an expensive 
and unreliable Fuel Supplement. The Unique-coalitions framing produced wind 
power as a supplement, which had a large Future Potential and as the industry grew 
during the 1980’s, the incumbent Fuel-coalition had to give some way for a new 
framing of wind power. It was nonetheless still the break-even price to conventional 
steam power plants, which was used to compare wind power’s value with other 
energy sources. But in the 1990’s this would change, and we would also come to see 
a single valuation frame dominate the build-out and public discussion. This chapter 
takes its start with  the rising international concern about climate change, as first 
seen in the Brundtland-report (Brundtland, 1987) and the planned formation of the 
UN IPCC panel.  
 
4.1. ENERGI 2000 BRINGS CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TO 
SALIENCE (1990) 
The government of De Konservative, Venstre and Radikale Venstre, with energy 
minister Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen (RV) in charge of energy, presented the plan “Energi 
2000” in April 1990, the first energy plan in the world with a CO2 reduction target 
(F. Nielsen, 2016). The report focused on reducing CO2 emissions and thus 
calculated build-out paths for various alternatives. Specifically, the plan had goals of 
a 20% drop in CO2 emissions, and a 15% drop in energy consumption by 2005. 
Wind power supplied around 0.7 Terawatt hours (TWh) in 1990, and the report 
envisioned a build-out to 3 TWh by 2000 (1.35 GW) and 8 TWh by 2030 (2.8 GW) 
(Beuse, 2000, pp. 98–99; DKGov, 1990, p. 54). The intent in this energy plan was 
derived from the very clear goal that one would have to transition away from coal to 
mitigate climate change. Furthermore, wind power was highlighted as valuable due 
to the point of reference that Denmark was “internationally leading within wind 
power” and a development where “more economic designs and larger turbines” had 
led to lower costs. The report concluded that “the price per KWh is today quickly 
approaching the price of the electricity produced on the Danish power plants” 
(DKGov, 1990, p. 54). This is an important calculative difference from the previous 
period. Wind power is now framed as a stand-alone energy source, which has a price 
per KWh of electricity it produces. This is still compared to conventional power 
plants, but its value is not framed as a result of how much fuel it can save. 
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Furthermore, the build-out goal is an independent power generation number, and not 
a small percentage of a total system generation. So the quality of Technology Cost is 
produced and inscribed into wind power instead of it being a Fuel Supplement. In 
addition to this the Industrial quality is highlighted through the mention of 
Denmark’s international position within the wind industry. Most importantly, the 
new quality of Climate Change Mitigation (Hereafter CC Mitigation) is produced 
and takes on a central position throughout the overall purpose of the energy plan.     
Bilgrav-Nielsen came from Radikale Venstre, same as Lone Dybkjaer, and aligned 
roughly with the Unique- coalition. They now utilized the international concern 
about climate change, which made the CC Mitigation quality very salient, as seen 
through the “Our Common Future” report in 1987 (Brundtland, 1987). This was the 
first sign that the Unique-coalition would gain a powerful ally in the government 
through a focus on CC Mitigation. The actors from the old Unique-coalition would 
begin to find new strong allies in government and the framing would be centered on 
this new quality of Climate Change Mitigation. I will therefore hereafter refer to the 
emerging Climate-Coalition.  
Bilgrav-Nielsen believed that an ambitious energy plan would only work if pressure 
was held on the utilities to help integrate wind power. The two large utilities, 
ELSAM and ELKRAFT had not managed to build the 100 MW that was part of the 
agreed deal in 1985, but had as compensation committed to building two small-scale 
offshore wind farms, which would become Vindeby (1991) and Tunø Knob (1995) 
(DEA, 2016b). Bilgrav-Nielsen would with the 1990 energy plan again commit the 
utilities to building 100 MW onshore wind power during the subsequent five years. 
Energi2000 also contained a large build-out of decentral heating gas plants, and if 
both things were to be built, there would now be room for much other electricity 
generating capacity. It was for Bilgrav considered self-evident that any thought of 
new coal-fired power plants were considered incompatible with an energy system 
which should enable CC Mitigation. Bilgrav had therefore rejected a request from 
ELSAM to build a 350 MW coal-fired power plant at Skaerbaek (DEA, 2016b, p. 
31). Coal was by the Climate-coalition framed to be a too pollutant energy source, 
and thus no new coal plant builds could qualify as valuable in a system that had a 
high salience on CC Mitigation49. According to Energi2000 of 1990, any new energy 
source’s value depended on the degree to which it helped Denmark lower CO2 
emissions. I will not outline the valuation frame yet, as it will emerge fully later in 
this period. But as mentioned I will refer to the coalition which places Climate 
mitigation goals at the center of energy valuations as the Climate-coalition. This 
coalition has many of the same actors as the Unique-coalition, but is different in that 
their main site of valuation would not be in academic forums and grassroots 
                                                          
49
 It should be noted that the energy plan was not solely built on a need for CC Mitigation, as one 
of the main drivers for the wind power build-out during the 1980’s, Industrial benefits in jobs and 
export, still played a role. This quality was present in the new valuation frame, but it had taken a 
secondary role to the overarching dominant and necessary quality of CC Mitigation.  
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engineers, but in the calculative center of the environmental and energy-ministries. 
Before this coalition would solidify its dominance, a destabilization attempt would 
be made to it, as the abolishment of coal power went against the current build-out 
plans of the remaining actors of the Fuel-coalition.  
 
4.2. DESTABILIZATION ATTEMPT BY MINISTER AND UTILITIES 
(1991-1992) 
The balance of power between the Unique-coalition, the newly forming Climate-
coalition and the Fuel-coalition valuation networks would momentarily be 
challenged after the election for the Danish parliament in December 1990. 
Following the December 1990 election, Radikale Venstre had to leave the 
government, which then only consisted of De Konservative and Venstre. This 
change where the Climate-coalition main political ally left the government showed 
that the previous government’s favorability towards wind power had primarily been 
borne by Radikale Venstre. Although the previous decades’ compromises had 
positioned wind power as a unique supplement to the energy system, it was still 
confined to being that, a supplement. Wind power supplied less than 2% of Danish 
electricity supply (Appendix A), and its future presence and potential was not 
guaranteed as the government offices changed. The energy ministry would be 
merged into the Ministry of Industry under Conservative Minister Anne Birgitte 
Lundholt. Lundholt had through her extensive lobbying experience for the Danish 
employers association and the textile and furniture industry become  known as “the 
Iron Lady of Industry”, who believed that any political attempt to force or coerce 
businesses to do something was bad policy (Pol, 1991b). As the area of energy 
policy became a subordinate element of the ministry of business, the newly forming 
Climate-coalition lost an important ally as Bilgrav-Nielsen left the position as 
minister of energy. Lundholt governed by a foremost purpose to serve the industry 
with the least amount of interference and her “hands-off approach” gave the Fuel-
coalition Incumbents more autonomy to reassert their Valuation Frame of wind 
power as an Expensive Supplement, and thereby ensure the future utilization of their 
central power plants. On the same day the political leadership changed, the utilities 
announced that they would no longer comply with the 1984 agreement on wind 
power electricity. This specifically concerned priority acceptance of wind turbines 
electricity, and a subsidy payment of 35% to help wind turbines connect to the grid 
(Pol, 1991b). When the first utility,”Thy Hoejspaendingselskab”, refused to adhere 
to the agreement, Lundholt refused to interfere and argued that the utility ‘had good 
economic arguments to break the agreement’ (Pol, 1991c). In what resembled a 
classic David vs. Goliath fight, Lundholt encouraged the Danish wind turbine 
owners to merely negotiate a new deal with the utilities. The coming months would 
see the wind turbine owners association and DEF fall further into the trenches, while 
Lundholt was reluctant to accommodate any proposed solution requests from 
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political colleagues (Kaergaard, 1991). This was a destabilization attempt, as a 
material actor in the former ATV valuation network, namely the priority grid access 
and grid-connection subsidy, is disassembled by an actor, Thy 
Hoejspaendingsselskab, in the incumbent valuation network. The minister in charge 
of energy, Lundholt, decided to disregard the year-long practice in the area, and 
allow the Fuel-coalition to re-write the agreed upon rules. Both Radikale Venstre 
and Socialdemokratiet negotiated to help the wind turbine owners, but Lundholt 
would, in the teasing words of former Socialdemokratiet minister Poul Nielson, feel 
‘sad to be caught cooperating’ (Pol, 1991d). The resolution of this dispute would 
come a year later, as Lundholt became dependent on Socialdemokratiet’s votes in a 
political compromise over a proposed new coal plant.  
 
4.2.1 CO2 taxes and the fight over Denmark’s last coal-plant 
Lundholt was determined to fight the proposed CO2 tax proposed in Energi2000 
with ‘tooth and claw’ (Pol, 1991b), but within the parliamentary measures she had 
little-to-no power as minister. As the De Konservative/Venstre coalition government 
was a minority government, Radikale Venstre could still utilize the red-green 
majority with the left-wing parties to see the legislation come through50. They would 
mandate two important laws for the materiality of the continued wind power build-
out. The first was Law L888 (21 December 1991) to enforce a CO2 tax of 
approximately 13 Euro’s per ton of CO2 emitted, which was calculated into 10 Oere 
per KWh of electricity (L888, 1991). The second was L944 which refunded the 10 
Oere/KWh to providers of renewable electricity and decentral gas power plants, and 
gave an additional 17 Oere/kWh to providers of renewable electricity (L944, 
1991)51. This was how onshore wind power got the 27 Oere/kWh subsidy feed-in 
tariffs for the following decade. This went against Venstre and De Konservative 
who would rather wait for the EU to propose something. They officially opposed 
these laws on the ground that they would have “marginal effects” and lead to a 
“completely unacceptable system pervaded by bureaucracy” (BTB52, 1991). This is 
the material actor of the Climate Valuation Network wherein wind power is enabled 
through CO2 taxes on competing energy sources, and then compensation for its 
carbon-free electricity.   
Although unsuccessful when it came to avoiding the enacted laws on CO2 taxation, 
Lundholt had a second fight in 1991-1992, as she was set on allowing the 
                                                          
50
 This CO2 tax was voted through in parliament by the red-green majority consisting of 
Socialdemokratiet, The Socialistic Peoples party (SF) and Radikale Venstre and thus formed 
without the sitting government, (DEA, 2016b, p. 36). 
51
 The 17 oere/kWh would replace Law 626 from 1983 (Beuse, 2000, p. 361), where renewable 
electricity providers would be compensated for the electricity tax up to a maximum of 20 
oere/KWh. The electricity tax had been introduced at 2 oere/kWh in 1977 and had through several 
legislation been raised to a level of 33 Oere kWh in 1992 (DST, 1993, p. 172).   
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construction of a new coal plant (Pol, 1991b). Lundholt and the Fuel-coalition 
strongly disagreed with the Energi2000 wording that “build-out of new electricity 
capacity should preferably happen through transition of existing heat-power plants, 
to decentral heat-power production” (DKGov, 1990, p. 13). The Fuel-coalition’s 
proposal to build two new large centralized power plants was based on an 
assumption that the energy savings, planned in Energi 2000, would not be 
implemented (H. Lund, 2014, p. Ch. 8.4). But even with assumed higher energy 
consumption, the central power plants were almost certainly guaranteed to create a 
situation of oversupply. This was due to the earlier agreed build-out of small 
decentral district-heating plants in the Energi 2000, which was to be implemented 
throughout the 1990s52. This was where the locked-in David vs. Goliath valuation 
struggle over the wind turbine owners’ conditions became decisive. In March 1992, 
a divided Socialdemokratiet joined the government in approving the build-out of 
two centralized power plant, the 350 MW coal-fired “Nordjyllandsvaerket” and the 
350 MW gas-fired “Skaerbaekvaerket” power plants (which the utilities had tried to 
get approved as a coal-plant back in 1990) (DEA, 2016b, p. 37). The coal-fired 
Nordjyllandsvaerket was a highly controversial decision, as it would jeopardize the 
environmental goals set forth in Energi2000 (H. Lund, 2014). 
In return for supporting the coal-plant construction, Socialdemokratiet demanded 
that the utilities covered all grid connection costs for wind turbines, followed by a 
legislative change that would exempt both private- and utility-owned wind turbines 
from the CO2 tax. This part about exemption utility turbines, was an 
accommodation to the utilities who until now had been ordered to install wind 
turbines without receiving the same compensating subsidies as private owners 
(Hansted, 1992). The Fuel-coalition objected that the agreement was far too 
beneficial for the wind-turbine owners, and re-iterated their framing of wind power 
as a Black-out Risk, stating that it was “impossible” to calculate the cost of the 
needed grid-reinforcements to avoid Black-out Risk (Hansted, 1992).   
 
4.2.2 Municipalities are allowed to block wind turbine projects 
In addition to allowing the utilities to deviate from the previous agreements, 
Lundholt allowed the local municipalities to exercise more autonomy in denying 
build-out permissions and initiated an examination of any annoyances of living close 
to a turbine. By the end of 1992, wind power build-out was significantly behind the 
Energi 2000 targets, but Lundholt refused to take any political actions towards 
                                                          
52
 Such over-capacity in the Danish energy system would have a negative effect on the value of all 
energy sources, but especially fluctuating sources, since they most often produce when there is 
ample supply. Furthermore, the planned wind power build-out in Energi 2000 would later come to 
be seen as unnecessary due to the oversupply caused by the many investment decisions taken in the 
early 1990. 
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neither the municipalities nor the utilities. Instead she attempted to mobilize a 
majority for abandoning the wind turbine build-out goals completely and examine 
other renewable options (RB, 1992). During the years of 1991-1992, the wind power 
industry found itself increasingly framed as more subsidized than other energy 
sources, as seen by the below joint 1992 Op-Ed from The Danish Wind Owners 
Association (DWOA) and The Danish Wind Turbine Industry (DWIA): 
 
“In the period from 1979 to 1989, wind turbines have received an 
establishment subsidy equivalent to 275 mn. DKK (432 mn. DKK in R-
2017), which have resulted in 410 MW installed wind power and the 
establishment of the world’s largest wind power industry. Establishment 
subsidies were removed nearly three years ago. In its comparison 
between wind power and natural gas, the (Berlingske, ed.) article 
concludes that the subsidy per energy-unit is higher for wind-power….It 
is therefore important to also remember that the establishment costs of 
the natural gas grid was approximately 20 bn. DKK (32 bn. DKK in R-
2017), whereof the state payed a considerable amount in to DONG 
(Asbjoern Bjerre & Madsen, 1992).”  
 
As noted in the quote above, wind power was at this point in time seen as expensive 
to society despite several other large energy investments. Anne Birgitte Lundholt did 
not actively speak against wind power, but her policy actions, such as the build-out 
of Nordjyllandsvaerket, the removal of natural gas use restrictions (DEA, 2016b, p. 
31), and the decision not to take action against the utilities and municipalities 
indicate that it was not a priority to enable the challenger technology to emerge.  The 
Energi2000 plan of 1990 did however mark the early start of a shift in valuation 
frames for wind power, as CC Mitigation became a quality which was to be 
considered in energy planning. Lundholt delayed this starting change in framing and 
momentarily gave renewed power to the incumbent Fuel-coalition’s historic 
valuation frame “Expensive Supplement”.  
The divide between private wind turbine owners and utilities was still present and 
the climate-coalition was on some issues left outside of political influence with a 
practical build-out stand-still, high uncertainty in the legislative frameworks. But the 
Fuel-coalitions stall of wind power build-out would not last as the Tamil-case would 
force the Conservative-Venstre Schlüter-government to resign in January 1993 
(DEA, 2016b). This change saw a new set of political actors take charge of the 
energy policy as the Climate-coalition would move to dominance.  
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4.3. CLIMATE-COALITION CHANGES THE RULES OF THE 
GAME (1993-2001) 
The following chapter uncovers how the Climate-coalition solidifies its presence and 
a new valuation frame emerged. I will first dedicate a brief segment to a 1-year 
interim period, wherein energy minister from the small party “The Christian-
Democrats”, Jan Sjursen, would collaborate with socialdemocratic environmental 
minister Svend Auken to re-engage the municipalities in wind power build-out. 
Thereafter follows a more elaborate segment on Environment and Energy minister 
Svend Auken and how he built on Energi2000 to establish the dominant valuation 
frame of the 1990’s, Climate Solution. The empirical walkthrough will conclude 
with a number of contestations to the dominant framing. At the end of the chapter is 
an overall Valuation Frame summary, where the Climate Solution Valuation frame, 
its qualities and the network around it are analyzed.  
 
4.3.1 Environment and Energy ministries are joined to form new powerful 
actor 
As the Tamil-case caused Poul Schlüter’s Conservative-led Government to step 
down, Socialdemocrat Poul Nyrup Rasmussen became the new Prime Minister. In 
the following constituted government, Jann Sjursen, a 29 year-old leader of the 
small party “The Christian Democrats”, would serve as minister of Energy from 
January 1993 to September 1994. Sjursen agreed with the valuation frame set forth 
in the Energi2000 plan (Nørgaard, 1993a), and worked with the Socialdemocratic 
Minister of Environment Svend Auken, to get the municipalities to appoint sites for 
new onshore wind farms (Skaaning, 1993a)53. In one environmental journalist’s 
words the civil servants of the energy ministry now went from working in the ‘game 
of the free market forces’ to ‘green planning and active control’ (Nørgaard, 1993a). 
Nyrup Rasmussen would start his second term following a successful 1994 election 
with a centre-left government consisting of Socialdemokratiet, Radikale Venstre and 
a smaller party called CentrumDemokraterne (AU, 2015)54. In 1992, prior to his 
government period, Nyrup Rasmussen had gained leadership over the party in an 
internal vote won over then-presiding leader Svend Auken. From 1988-1992, Auken 
                                                          
53
 This was something which both Lundholt and the previous environmental minister, Per Stig 
Moeller, had refused to do as they argued it should be left to the municipalities and not be solved 
centrally (Skaaning, 1992). 
54
 CentrumDemokraterne were a small party who only gained 2.8% of the vote in 1994 and thus 
constituted 5 seats in the government. They left the government in 1996. They failed to gain seats 
in parliament after the 2001 election and were disbanded completely in 2008. Therefore they are 
not part of this chapter and the government will be referred to as the S-RV government going 
forward.  
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was vice chair of “Socialists Internationale” and represented the left-wing of 
Socialdemokratiet. Radikale Venstre declared they were ready to form a government 
with Socialdemokratiet, but only if a more center-seeking leader was elected, Nyrup 
became the new leader of Socialdemokratiet. But Svend Auken was at the time still 
a very powerful figure in Socialdemokratiet and to mend the wounds, Nyrup offered 
to Auken that he could have the environmental ministry, which would be expanded 
to include energy after the 1994 election (H. Mortensen, 2009)55.   
Auken was the initiator of most joint efforts between the environmental- and the 
energy ministry, and had in 1994 proposed to Nyrup that he should bring 
environment and energy under the same ministry (Cordsen, 1994) 56. This was done 
with some very clear goals in mind, as explained below by Auken’s close political 
ally Steen Gade, Energy spokesman for the Socialists Peoples Party (SPP) during 
the 1990s.  
 
“The moment you became minister of something with as much money in 
it as oil, you became more important when you walked into the financial 
ministry, and could then negotiate more. It was also to be able to push 
the electricity sector (utilities, ed.) more” (Interview 4: Gade, quote 2). 
 
A coalition made up of some of the Unique-coalition and new entrants started to 
rally around this new Climate-coalition with a goal to first and foremost increase the 
focus on CC Mitigation, but also to highlight Industrial benefits of wind power. The 
key to taking large steps in the development was to grow the bargaining power when 
it came to climate and environmental topics, and to get the utilities more closely 
involved. The Climate-coalition knew that being in the ministry which handled the 
income from the North Sea oil resources would give them more bargaining power 
when advocating for green policies.  
The Climate-coalition expected that the utilities might oppose larger grid 
reinforcement costs, as wind turbines grew in size and increased their share of the 
electricity mix. This would be more challenging if the future growth consisted of 
many small wind turbines, than if the turbines were built in larger clusters, more 
typical for a utility-led build-out. Therefore it became a central goal for the Climate-
                                                          
55
 The power dynamics within the Social-Democratic party are important to keep in mind 
throughout the chapter, as Svend Auken to a high degree shaped the green profile of the Social-
Democrats in the years 1994-2001. 
56
 From 1993 to 1994, Jann Sjursen of the small party “The Christian Peoples Party had 
responsibility for energy policy. When” the Christian Peoples Party” failed to get any seats elected 
by the 1994 election, Nyrup agreed with Auken to move environment and energy together in one 
ministry for the first time in Danish history (DEA, 2016b, p. 40,46). 
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coalition to get the utilities involved as a much more active actor in the wind power 
build-out, as explained by Steen Gade.  
 
“The aim was that the overall environmental concerns should direct more 
than the energy sector’s own interests. That was the intent. The other 
thing was that Svend and the rest of us were concerned with jobs. It was 
a little bit down-prioritized (by others, ed.) in the general public 
discussions” (Interview 4: Gade, quote 3). 
 
The ministry had a high focus on the renewable build-out as a means to mitigate 
CO2 emissions. Although the climate agenda is often attributed to have gained 
traction in the mid-2000 on a global scale, it was in the 1990’s already a part of the 
environmental concerns for the Climate-coalition. 
 
“When we said ’environment’ in the 1990’s, it was also the climate. But 
then it happened around the 2000’s that the division really took 
on….That was the way it (the environmental discussion, ed.) was 
resurrected, through climate” (Interview 4: Gade, quote 4). 
 
The Climate-coalition saw wind power as something that should be developed 
through a long-term effort, and would advocate have salience on the Future 
Potential quality of wind turbines. In a 2002 article reflecting on the 1990’s, Auken 
outlined his approach to deploying wind power as dependent “on both a firm policy 
sustained over the longer term, as well as sufficient government support to 
overcome the extra cost of the first installations” (Auken, 2002a, p. 1). This firm 
belief in the Future Potential of wind power and the conviction that it required 
government involvement is salient in the government’s 1996 energy plan, “Energi 
21”. This plan set out the Climate-coalitions plans to capture the Future Potential 
and continued the Energi 2000 plan’s salience of the CC Mitigation quality.  
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4.3.2 Climate Coalition Energy-plan sets out to stabilize long-term outlook for 
wind power 
The Climate-coalition’s major energy plan of the 1990’s was the 77-page document 
“Energi 21”, published in March 1996. It maintained the goal of 20% CO2 reduction 
by 2005, originally set out in the 1990 Plan Energi 2000 (DKGOV, 1996, p. 3), and 
would increase and specify the original build-out goal of 1300 MW of wind power. 
This was done by outlining a goal to increase onshore wind capacity from the 600 
MW installed by end 1995 to 1500 MW by 2005, a goal which would be reached in 
half that time less than 4 years later (Beuse, 2000, p. 104).  An ambitious long-term 
goal was set for offshore wind power, where it was envisioned that 4000 MW of 
offshore wind power should be installed by 2030. This was equal to 400 times 
Denmark’s current fleet of two demonstration projects, totaling 10 MW (Bailey, 
2015, p. 12; DKGOV, 1996, p. 74). True to the Climate-coalition’s goal of involving 
the utilities more, the plan focused on a larger future utility build-out (DKGOV, 
1996, p. 40), and was accompanied by a demand to the utilities to install an 
additional 200 MW onshore wind capacity by 2000 (F. Petersen & Thorndal, 2014, 
p. 98).  
 
CC Mitigation is a central quality in the Energy plans valuation frame 
The Energi 21 plan had several segments that framed the quality of CC Mitigation as 
a key quality in the value of wind power, and the economic framework would be 
adapted to accommodate this need (DKGOV, 1996).  
Energi 21 placed the CC Mitigation as the first and foremost purpose of the plan, as 
it uses the term of an ecological safe space  to designate that energy planning had to 
happen within the planetary boundaries set forth by IPCC and the best available 
science (DKGOV, 1996, p. 18). It is also highlighted that active intervention to 
ensure that environmental costs are reflected in prizes is desirable (DKGOV, 1996, 
p. 30). It goes as far as being so necessary to a degree that the government would 
‘guarantee’ that ongoing build-out of wind power is ensured ‘economic feasibility’ 
(DKGOV, 1996, p. 31). The plan also states that in the case of a coming 
liberalization of the electricity market, it had to be ensured that the instruments that 
enable a continued build-out of wind power were present (DKGOV, 1996, p. 38). 
Between the two plants, “Energi 2000” and “Energi 21”, the Danish Energy Agency 
had calculated on mitigation costs of various ways of mitigating CO2 emission 
(DEA, 1993, p. 14). This was not the damage costs of CO2 emissions, but the 
“shadow-price” calculations of what it would costs to mitigate CO2 in various 
sectors and through various approaches. It was thus not a tool to figure out whether 
or not it was valuable to mitigate CO2 emissions, but instead which measures were 
best utilized to achieve the goal of mitigating CO2 emissions. 
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The high ambition level to mitigate CO2 emissions was justified on a moral 
obligation that Denmark due to its wealth and its high emission per capita level 
should do more than other countries (DKGOV, 1996, p. 15). Auken was during this 
time putting a substantial amount of work in creating the Kyoto-protocol (signed in 
December 1997), to commit the industrialized countries to collectively reduce their 
GHG emissions by 5% from 1990-levels by 2012. Herein Denmark would come to 
get a GHG reduction goal of 21% (Ritzau, 2001; UN, 1998). The framing in the 
energy plan shows that CC Mitigation is a quality which has such a high positive 
value impact that market arrangements must be changed to ensure ‘economic 
feasibility’ (DKGOV, 1996, p. 31).  
In addition to the CC Mitigation quality, the Energi 21 plan lauded the Danish wind 
turbine industry as ”the largest in the world” and pledged an intention of continued 
support (DKGOV, 1996, p. 41). The growing numbers of exports and jobs in the 
sector functioned as a point of reference to the Industrial quality as a key piece of 
the plans valuation of wind power. The quality of Energy Independence was also 
mentioned, but is highlighted as something which has been almost completely 
solved, as the country is no longer as independent on foreign fuel imports (DKGOV, 
1996, p. 14). Furthermore, it is not specifically connected to wind power in the 
energy plan, so it does not appear to play a role in the valuation of wind power in 
this specific plan. 
 
Wind power is framed as an independent technology which the system must learn to 
integrate 
In addition to adapting the economic conditions to achieve CC Mitigation, the 
Climate-coalition saw technical system issues to be related to the system and not 
wind power in particular. Energi 21 prescribed that the large electricity production 
facilities and transmission operators should “to a rising degree be oriented towards 
taking responsibility for a distributed electricity production- and consumption 
pattern” and thereby ensure commitment towards renewable energy (DKGOV, 
1996, p. 29). The concerns that the utilities had raised about electricity overrun 
issues in 1983 were now dismissed in the 1996 plan.  
 
“On a short-term basis the electricity overrun is not estimated to pose a 
real problem. On a long-term basis, the electricity overrun will set higher 
demands for the electricity systems adaptive ability” (DKGOV, 1996, p. 
35). 
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In the segment about electricity overrun issues, it is only once mentioned that wind 
power can be a contributing cause of electricity overrun issues, but wind power is 
nowhere categorized as the main cause of the problem. Electricity overrun is treated 
as a system-wide challenge, and not attributed to one specific energy source 
(DKGOV, 1996, pp. 34–35). 
This concludes the walkthrough of the Energi 21 plan. Only a month after the plan 
was published, a multi-year research project to estimate the societal value of wind 
power would be concluded. This project was not coordinated with the energy plan, 
but would also frame CC Mitigation as a central quality.  
 
4.3.3 AKF 1996 Report on Societal value of Wind Power 
The report “The Societal value of wind power” is among the most comprehensive 
reports on broad societal value of wind power, and was built on numerous analyses 
by the Danish Energy Agency and selected Danish universities in the years 1991-
1995. This was gathered and concluded upon by the public body “Amterne og 
Kommunernes Forskningsafdeling / The Research Unit of the regions and 
municipalities (AKF)”, specifically by economic professor of Roskilde University 
Center Anders Larsen (RUC.dk, 2017), and PhD in economics of Copenhagen 
University, Jesper Munksgaard (J. Munksgaard, 2017). The AKF report was a 
compilation of several small studies, one of which was started by Lundholt in 1991, 
namely to study of how much lost value could be calculated on account of wind 
turbine visual and noise disturbances, the Aesthetics quality (A. Larsen & 
Munksgaard, 1996, p. 51)57. But as the AKF report work expanded to several more 
sub-reports, the possible visual and noise damages became a minor part of the 
overall conclusion. I will now briefly summarize the main findings and then go 
through the enacted qualities in the report58.  
 
AKF frames first individual Technology Cost for wind turbines 
One of the most significant changes between the AKF report and the calculations 
analyzed in the Unique Supplement period is that this report calculates wind power 
costs as an independent levelised cost of energy metric. Wind power is thus 
                                                          
57
 The original task as it was described by Lundholt’s team in 1991 is mentioned as an expectation 
that “wind power build-out in Denmark hardly is profitable on market terms” and that because of 
this expectation, the researchers should answer the main question of whether “there are broad 
societal conditions or considerations…which nonetheless could motivate a wind power build-out 
which was reasonable from a societal viewpoint” (A. Larsen & Munksgaard, 1996, p. 5). 
58
 The full quotes from the report can be found in Appendix D1. They will be marked with a D1 
followed by a # sign to show the number of the quote in the appendix.    
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calculated as an independent energy source, and not as a supplement to a 
conventional power plant. Specifically, the AKF authors calculated the cost for 
building 1000 MW of onshore wind turbines with the technology available in 1995 
(Both 450 kW & 600 kW turbines), and with a future scenario where construction 
was set in the year 2000 (1 MW turbines). These costs were compared with two 
scenarios of a conventional power plant build-out of 420 MW, coal and gas 
respectively59. The authors have calculated a back-up capacity of 220 MW gas-
power into their case scenario, so while wind power is framed as an independent 
quality, it is acknowledged that there is a costs to cover for back-up (D1, #6). The 
authors also mention grid reinforcement costs and the condition that a large degree 
of wind power lowers the price of electricity in the market, something that would 
later come to be known as the merit order effect (Hirth & Müller, 2016). But apart 
from acknowledging that any calculation of these elements would position wind 
power worse, they openly declare that any calculation of such elements has been 
disregarded (D1, #20). This means that the quality of Fuel Supplement is replaced 
with Technology Cost and Back-up Capacity. The quality Back-up Capacity does 
not mean that wind power is a Back-up Capacity, in this analysis refer to how wind 
power needs back-up60. It also covers possible expenses towards grid 
reinforcements, but does not add further costs to wind power on account of 
mitigating against wider risks of black-outs or other revenue losses on the system.   
Technology Cost are framed through the Levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE) 
methodology, which had been adopted by the International Energy Agency (IEA) 
and the U.S. Department of Energy in the late 1980’s, and by the mid-1990’s had 
become a favored way of comparing renewable energy sources with a “standard 
fossil fuel-generating unit” (NREL, 1995, p. 47)61. AKF used this methodology to 
both produce a “System Cost” number, which covered production- and back-up 
costs, and a “Total Cost” number, a broader comparison which also counted 
environmental effects. The report also featured a chapter on jobs created and export 
potential for each scenario, but this was not incorporated into the cost-benefit figure 
for each energy source62. The averages of the key LCOE ranges have been 
visualized in figure 16 (GBA). This graph does not figure in the AKF-report as they 
                                                          
59
 The reason that 1000 MW onshore wind is compared to only 420 MW gas or coal is to account 
for the difference in capacity factor, namely how many hours of a full year (8760) the plant can 
deliver power. In example, a 420 MW coal plant  delivering electricity equal to 60% of the years 
hours gives an output of 2208 MWh, which is comparable to 1000 MW onshore wind delivering 
power for 25% of the years hours equaling 2190 MWh.  
60
 It is however possible that it in the near future will be that Back-up Capacity becomes a positive 
impact quality, as wind power can provide back-up to other facilities better than the usual methods 
used today. 
61
 This was because LCOE divides the total costs of a unit with the annual energy output and 
thereby gives a cost per KWh metric. This is useful if the compared energy sources do not have the 
same capacity factor, production hours in a year, or if they have significantly different lifetimes.   
62
 The employment was represented by average annual full-time jobs, and Balance of Payments 
benefits counted in million DKK per year in the period 1996-2015. Capacity rating was set at 20% 
and a discount rate of 5%. 
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report ranges, but the averages have been calculated and visualized here to show 
how AKF roughly compared the energy sources  (A. Larsen & Munksgaard, 1996, 
p. 50). The ranges are of course important because gas had a much more wide range 
than coal, since it was more volatile to fuel price fluctuations. When the report refers 
to a “System Cost” it is the bottom two numbers reproduced in the figure below 
(production and System costs), while the term “Total Costs” include the 
environmental costs segment. All numbers in figure 16 below are sourced from page 
50 in the AKF report (A. Larsen & Munksgaard, 1996, p. 50).    
  
 
Figure 16: Depiction of the average value of the AKF’s cost ranges. 
 
As can be seen the averages of the ranges that the AKF report had reached showed 
wind power to be competitive with coal and gas in 1995 if environmental costs were 
included, and close to competitive to coal even without environmental costs in 2000.  
The authors thus considered future costs improvements to wind power, while any 
technological improvements to coal or gas power would be offset by rising fuel 
prices. The environmental costs were calculated as the same number for both the 
1995 and 2000 number63. The AKF authors summarize as their main finding as 
being that when environmental advantages, which are mainly constituted by CO2 
costs, are considered, it is “socio-economically reasonable” to build out 1000 MW 
of wind power in Denmark. If the environmental advantages in the form of CC 
Mitigation are not considered, wind power becomes “not quite as beneficial as the 
                                                          
63
 For those interested in comparing the numbers, the Expectation total cost numbers (2000) is 
equal to the following in 2017-Real: Wind: 48 oere/kWh, Coal: 75 oere/kWh, Gas: 54 oere/KWh. 
The pure production costs for the three energy sources was in 1995 equal to 45 (Wind), 35 (Coal), 
35 (Gas), while it in 2000 was 40 (Wind), 38 (Coal), 34 (Gas) Oere/KWh in 2017-Real. 
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traditional power plants” (A. Larsen & Munksgaard, 1996, p. 7). The high impact of 
the CO2 emissions costs, can especially be read from the difference between 1995 
total costs and system costs for coal (102% higher) and gas (54% higher).  As can 
also be seen from the table, there are no significant added Environmental costs to 
wind power. This is because the comprehensive walkthrough of potential negative 
effect of visual and noise disturbances came to a number so low that it had 
“practically no influence” on the value of the wind turbines (D1, #8)64. When it 
came to employment and balance of payments, wind power had a small advantage 
over the other scenario. The AKF report calculated wind power build-out as 
producing 774 jobs per year, while a coal build-out would produce 550 jobs per year 
(A. Larsen & Munksgaard, 1996, p. 50). This number was however separately listed 
and not include in the final LCOE number. Apart from noting Denmark’s unique 
position in the world market, the AKF authors did not highlight this as a significant 
difference between the scenarios.  The overall takeaway from the conclusion was the 
total cost comparison, as seen from the first line of the author’s results chapter:  
 
“The main result of our investigation is that the environmental 
advantages of wind power are so considerable, that from a broad societal 
valuation, it  is competitive with natural gas production and more 
competitive than electricity produced on coal power plants” (A. Larsen & 
Munksgaard, 1996, p. 8).  
 
Although the pure production and back-up costs indicated that wind power was 
more expensive than coal and gas, the authors decided to highlight the total societal 
costs as their main conclusion. The total cost number was reached through a strong 
focus on the quality CC Mitigation and to a lesser extent Future Potential and 
Industrial.  
CC Mitigation is central to the conclusion in the AKF report, as it is the advantage 
of curbing CO2 emissions which makes wind power come out on top (A. Larsen & 
Munksgaard, 1996, p. 50). It is mentioned as the foremost reason that a wind power 
build-out is “socio-economically reasonable” in quote 5, and is seen in the 
calculated added CO2 cost ranges for coal and gas. It is thus correct when the 
authors state it must be “strongly underlined” that “especially the CO2 aspect” has a 
                                                          
64
 The quality Aesthetics was calculated by method of surveying neighbors to wind turbines, and 
concluded that the neighbors were not willing to pay very much to avoid the wind turbines and the 
Aesthetics quality was thus calculated into a diminishingly small cost of 0.04 Oere/kWh (quote 13). 
The Aesthetics effects were judged to have “practically no influence” (Quote 8), and any impact of 
it “diminishes in relation to the other valued effects” (Quote 13). The negative impact for the 
quality Aesthetics was here for the first time analytically calculated to have practically no impact on 
the overall societal value of wind power.  
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decisive effect on the results (D1, #11 & 18)65. The report reflects the new rules of 
the game set forth by the Climate-coalition, namely that CO2 emission reduction 
targets has to be fulfilled. This makes wind power a valuable energy source, as it 
mitigates climate change, which Denmark needs to do. This is according to the AKF 
authors something an obligation of which there is “necessary costs” (D1, #14), 
which must be incurred.   
The AKF authors also brought salience to the Future Potential quality as they 
compare future build-out scenarios estimated both if construction were to start 
today, and if it was to start around the year 2000 (D1: #10).  The authors recognize 
that if future constructions were to start today, wind power would be more 
expensive, but the authors estimate up to 25% cost reductions by the year 2000 (D1: 
#15 & 21). Although the industry at this time had announced that they would launch 
the larger 1 MW turbines, it was by any standard an ambitious goal to expect an 
industry to deliver a 25% cost reduction on a five year timeframe66.  
The quality Industrial is calculated in a separate chapter of the report and was not 
included in the overall valuation of wind power (D1: #4). Industrial benefits to wind 
power are considered only slightly higher than a coal or gas plant in the report, and 
the authors conclude that these elements are “not affected significantly” if wind 
power is chosen over the alternatives (D1: #7 & 16). But although the Industrial 
quality is not incorporated in the final valuation, it is still mentioned in the report 
(D1: #4,7,16 & 17), and the key numbers show a slightly higher estimated 
employment effect for wind (A. Larsen & Munksgaard, 1996, p. 50).  
 
Reactions to AKF Report 
The AKF report received some coverage in the press, wherein the debates about  
assumptions and effects on employment took up the headlines (Bola, 1996; 
Tornbjerg, 1996b; Vestergaard, 1996).  
 
                                                          
65
 The quality Environment is also calculated in the report in the form of reduced SO2 and NOX, 
but it is estimated at a very low cost effect of 1-2 oere/KWh (D1: #12). The authors mention it, but 
empathize that this quality has no significant effect on the final results. 
66
 Simultaneously, the authors estimate that any potential future coal and gas plants would be more 
expensive than today, but combined with fuel-efficiency, would end at roughly the same cost (D1, 
#21). This assumption enforces that wind power has a quality of Future Potential, compared to the 
listed alternatives, which show no cost-improvements. 
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Table 2: Headline reactions to AKF report 
Date Newspaper Headline 
17.04 B.T. Only low impact of wind 
19.04 Weekendavisen Airy policy 
20.04 Politiken New fight over wind turbine economics 
 
Among critics of the report were on one side researchers from Aalborg University, 
who argued that the Industrial and Environment qualities value had been 
underestimated. The wind turbine industry association also criticized the reports take 
on the Industrial quality, as it had neglected to account for the large exports of 
Danish wind power technology, that investments in gas or coal-plants could not 
provide. Furthermore, the Wind turbine Industry Association (DWIA) claimed that 
the financial ministry’s model of calculation, ADAM, was not suitable to compare a 
huge one-time investment in a coal-plant to the many smaller investments in wind 
turbines spread across a longer period of time. The Fuel-coalition’s central actor 
DEF agreed with the AKF results on the technical and industrial parameters, but 
pointed to the value set on the quality CC Mitigation, as something that could be 
discussed further (Tornbjerg, 1996b).  
Long-time critic of wind power Frede Vestergaard of the weekly magazine 
“Weekendavisen” argued that since there was no need for new capacity; wind 
turbine build-out should be compared with the cost of running existing fossil fuel 
plants and not with building new capacity. Additionally, he agreed with the Fuel-
coalitions point that the central salience of the quality “CC Mitigation”, through the 
high CO2 emission costs, reflected a political prioritization.  
 
“Because of the over-capacity, the build-out of wind turbine capacity on 
land should be compared to the variable costs of producing a kWh on 
existing coal- and gas fired plants, and not with the total costs of 
producing electricity on new gas- or coal-fired power plants….the 
relatively high value of wind power’s CO2-free production is a result of 
the assumption that the CO2 reduction of 20 percent must be realized in 
Denmark. All in all, the otherwise sober calculations, which undoubtedly 
will be used to justify new billion-investments in wind turbines, are an 
expression of political prioritizations hidden in the chosen calculative 
assumptions”. (Vestergaard, 1996)  
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It is interesting to note that both the DEF and Vestergaard acknowledge the 
Technology Cost quality, as Vestergaard even calls it “sober calculations”. But they 
disregard the high value ascribed to the “CC Mitigation” quality. Furthermore, 
Vestergaard does not think that wind power should be individually compared to gas 
and coal, but instead should be measured by the cost it adds when it is supplemented 
to the already built capacity. To understand Fredegaard’s reference to 
“overcapacity”, it is worth returning to the 1992 approval of the construction of 
Nordjyllandsvaerket and Skaerbaekvaerket, which by 1996 were under construction. 
As wind power build-out was also picking up along with a large build-out of 
decentral heat- and power-plants, Denmark was looking towards a future with 
excess supply of power capacity. Vestergaard uses this oversupply situation to argue 
that wind power should not be measured solely by its own LCOE costs, but instead 
measured on the notion that it is added to an energy system, which has adequate 
supply. It is as such a kind of new way of going back to seeing wind power as a Fuel 
Supplement. The seeds to a new framing, where the quality Fuel Supplement might 
return are being sown.  
 
AKF Report Summary 
The AKF report follows in line with the markedly different Valuation Frame that 
emerged with the new policy coalition in office during the mid and late 1990s. The 
main difference between this report and Unique Supplement period calculations is 
how the “CC Mitigation” quality of wind turbines functions as the key metric of 
their value, the CO2 costs. The AKF report does also not calculate wind power to a 
break-even price but instead as a stand-alone energy source, with attached Back-up 
Capacity costs. The Industrial quality is not as salient a quality, as in the ATV and 
DEF reports, wherein the effects of employment and export to a wind-power built-
out were highlighted. Another difference, I will highlight that The AKF authors 
calculate wind power independently of such system costs, and do not consider these 
as attached to wind power as a technology.  
The AKF report does however also have some similarities to the Unique-coalitions 
way of calculating when it comes to the quality Future Potential. Both reports 
project a Future Potential for cost reductions in wind power and in the case of AKF, 
this amounts to an assumed 25% cost reduction in five years.  
The AKF report assembles a Valuation Frame where wind power is calculated as a 
stand-alone energy source, which was highly valuable when the full costs of CO2 
emissions were considered. One of the AKF report’s authors, Peter Karnøe, would 
in relation to the launch explain an important distinction between the establishment 
subsidies of the 1970’s and 1980’s and what wind turbines received in the 1990’s. 
Wind power was, after the establishment subsidies were phased out, no longer 
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primarily funded through direct subsidies, but were instead receiving a tax-refund 
(afgiftsrefusion in Danish) of the taxes on production of electricity. Since wind 
power produced pollution-free electricity, it was compensated for the electricity tax 
applied to power fed into the grid. In this way, the main prosthetic device that 
enabled wind power was a compensation of a tax and not a direct subsidy such as 
the establishment subsidy was (Tornbjerg, 1996a)67. This distinction shows that in 
this Climate Solution period, the market frameworks were being adapted to the type 
of electricity that was wanted in the grid. Whereas wind turbines before received 
direct subsidies in a corner in an isolated corner of the market, the new market 
frameworks were constructed around accommodating CO2 emission free electricity. 
This concludes the analysis of the AKF report, the most thorough analysis of wind 
power at the time, and a report which have been credited as part of foundation that 
formed the mid-late 1990’s wind power policies (Meyer, 2000, p. 200). 
 
4.3.4 The Fuel-coalition is split on wind power 
Wind power was still rarely discussed in comparison with other alternatives, but the 
utilities had noticed the drop in new-build costs. Faced with the coming 
technological advancements and a valuation network which through CO2 taxes 
necessitated CC Mitigation, the formerly powerful Fuel-coalition would become 
more split on the value of wind power. There were tough requirements towards the 
utilities, where ELSAM and Elkraft had each built a small offshore wind demo-
project as compensation for the non-completion of the original 100 MW, agreed in 
1986. The new 100 MW agreed in 1990, was to be built during a high-investment 
period for both wind power and gas-infrastructure for heating, as explained by Bent 
Christensen, Project- and General Manager in Elsam Projects  from 1986-2000.  
 
“In a parallel track, you had all of these decentral heat-power plants that 
were emerging everywhere. In those you had the same challenges, who 
would pay for grid-costs etc.” (Interview 4: Christensen, quote 3)  
 
The technological advances of wind turbines during the 1990’s meant that the 
utilities could start counting on the output of the wind turbines and to some degree 
                                                          
67
 I draw inspiration of the term “prosthetic device” from valuation sociologist Trine Pallesen, who 
define it in her thesis on French wind power in 2013 (Pallesen, 2013, p. 179). It is understood as a 
device that allows the good, wind power, to survive in the market that is currently there. Prosthetic 
devices can thus both be isolated direct payments such as the establishment subsidy in the 1980’s, 
but it can also be CO2 taxes, grid priority, loan guarantees etc., which change the current market 
framework.  
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the wind turbines to help balance the system, something that was impossible in the 
1980s.  
“When you planned new build-out, wind power had traditionally been 
given a capacity factor of 0%. At some point (during the mid-1990, ed.) 
you raised it to 10%, and that was kind of a Eureka moment that you 
could now ascribe wind power a capacity factor of 10%”. (Interview 4: 
Christensen, quote 4) 
 
The utilities’ starting acceptance of wind power was partly driven by interest and 
partly by necessity, as the wind power share grew and they themselves were 
mandated to build the 100 MW by 1994. By the mid-1990’s, more than 100.000 
Danish families were part of one of the 2100 wind turbine cooperatives, which had 
erected 86% of the installed base of wind power in Denmark (IRENA-GWEC, 2013, 
p. 60). So wind power build-out was apart from the few demonstration projects still 
mostly a local community activity. Some of the old Fuel-coalition actors saw this as 
some sort of distortion of the market, and argued that the local wind turbine owners 
were making too much money on their investments.  
In 1997, DEF encouraged its members to raise fees for net-services, with resulting 
cases where fees would rise from 400 DKK to 9000 DKK in one year. DEF saw it as 
a necessary correction of an unfair distortion of the market, as explained by 
Flemming Bay-Jensen, head of DEF, below. 
 
“The wind turbines which are spinning now are little power plants. They 
have become an industry, and we are merely asking them to pay the same 
fees as everyone else….We are not out to remove the foundation for the 
private wind turbines, but we do believe, that there has been a distortion 
of the electricity market”. (Fugl, 1997) 
 
Prior to the 1990’s, Wind power had not occupied a large enough role to threaten the 
business case of conventional power plants. But some of the utilities were beginning 
to fear that the rules of the game were being changed too much for their assets to 
survive, as stated by DEF spokesman Knud Mosekjaer hereafter.  
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“Even though the Danish energy policy in many ways is a success story, 
it is slowly distorting the condition away from a free market. Every time 
a utility is forced to buy power at a guaranteed price, there is a subsidy in 
the agreement. It is obvious that we cannot pursue such a policy in the 
long run. It will end in all of the Danish environmental policies being on 
subsidies, and not participating in the market that is there to ensure 
efficiency”. (Andreassen, 1998a) 
 
To these utilities, the large wind power build-out generated a risk, that all policies 
are “on subsidies” and that energy sources resulting from these policies are not 
participating “in the market”. DEF’s concern corresponds to wind power losing its 
value to society due to the system damaging effects it can have if it is allowed to fill 
up too much of the energy system. It is not Black-out Risk that is being raised as a 
concern, but instead the risk of some distortion of another part of the “free market” 
which Mosekjaer defines as areas of the energy system where subsidies are not 
present. These growing seeds of contestation would be tapped into by the valuation 
network that would emerge in the chapter 5.  
But it was not all Fuel-coalition actors who were worried about the how the 
technology and the energy system were developing. Wind power was reaching a 
scale that foreign investors might be interested in building, and a huge untapped 
potential in offshore wind power was starting to emerge. At a board-meeting in 
September 1995, the CEO of Elsam, Georg Styrbo, would acknowledge that wind 
power was among the best ways to reduce CO2 in Denmark, and that the utilities 
needed more involvement. He expressed the opinion that if the utilities did not 
establish the wind turbines, they would risk that private investors would beat them to 
it (F. Petersen & Thorndal, 2014, p. 102). So the utilities adapted to the changed 
rules of the game and strengthened the small renewable energy units that had been 
established in the organizations only a few years earlier.  The urgency about the 
need to mitigate climate change had affected what qualities the utilities were 
expected to prioritize.  So although the utilities only received 10 oere in subsidies 
per kWh, unlike the private turbine owners who received 27 oere,  (O. Andersen & 
Groennegaard, 1998), wind power was by the late 1990’s considered a better new-
build option than the alternatives, as explained below by a SEAS Utility engineer.  
 
“It is absolutely not a loss-making business. The alternative is that we 
should establish power plants with air cleansing equipment, and possible 
other environmental effects, which you cannot put a price on”. (O. 
Andersen & Groennegaard, 1998) 
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The comment from the SEAS engineer shows that costs of building wind turbines 
was not considered high by all  the utilities, where among some were beginning to 
accept the Climate-coalition’s central salience of the new quality CC Mitigation. 
The SEAS engineer compares the cost of wind power to the cost of delivering 
electricity by a power plant which must account for Environment through “air 
cleansing equipment” and other environmental effects that to the engineer are 
incommensurable, such as CC Mitigation. The question of whether or not the system 
could handle substantial amounts of wind power had also slowly faded away during 
this period, as explained by wind entrepreneur Henrik Stiesdal. 
 
“When we got to 2000 we were at 14%, which just happened. That thing 
about "what could the system take" was brought up from time to time, 
but anyone could see that it (the grid, ed.) could easily handle this level 
and that we were nowhere near any limit...From where I observed it that 
problem faded away”. (Interview 3: Stiesdal, quote 4) 
 
By the end of the 1990’s, the risk of wind power “breaking the grid” thus appeared 
to have faded away as wind power took on a larger role in the energy system.  
 
4.3.5 The launch of offshore wind Power for climate change mitigation 
When seen across the Climate Solution period, the need to mitigate CO2 emission 
and the future promise of wind power stands out. This focus on the qualities CC 
Mitigation and Future Potential are also recurring in Aukens statements as minister. 
His logic appeared to be that once mitigation of CO2 emissions was considered 
necessary, it should be done through active investments that generated jobs and 
developed the technology.  Auken considered wind power to be ‘the most profitable’ 
source for environmental energy production, but also a source that was ‘fully 
competitive’ and ‘no more expensive’ than other new generation capacity, however 
usually when considered a few years into the future. This is exemplified in table 3 
on the following page which shows three quotes from Auken in two Op-Eds and an 
interview (Auken, 1997, 1998; Voigt, 1998). 
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Table 3: Svend Auken quotes about wind power 
Year Context Text 
1997 
Op-ed   
Jyllandsposten 
It is as if JP aims to maintain its readers in a past, 
where wind turbines were still at an experimental 
stage.  That is far from the reality today, where 
electricity from wind turbines in good locations is 
competitive…. we are speaking of investments in 
new capacity, which seen over a span of years is no 
more expensive than other new generating 
capacity. 
1998 Op-ed Politiken 
Wind turbines are today the most profitable 
technology for environmental electricity 
production. 
1998 
Interview  
Berlingske 
We are talking about turbines of 2 MW and above, 
and it is estimated that costs of electricity from 
wind turbines can be brought down 20% compared 
to today. We are thereby speaking about fully 
competitive prices and that is in it of itself exciting. 
 
The central focus on CC Mitigation can be further confirmed from my interview 
with Auken’s political ally, Steen Gade, who explained that “environmental 
concerns should steer” the energy policy to create jobs (Interview 5: Gade, quote 2).  
Although the wind power build-out was primarily framed as valuable due to CC 
Mitigation and Future Potential, the Industrial quality also played a role to the 
coalition, although it does not appear quite as salient as the CC Mitigation quality. In 
the words of CEO of Wind Manufacturer “Bonus”, Palle Soerensen, he had 
experienced that the industry had during the 1990’s experienced a change in how it 
was no longer fossil fuels which were in scarcity, but rather “the atmosphere, seas 
and rivers” (DWIA, 2006). So the climate coalition was very much gathering around 
the new rules of the game, namely that new energy capacity had to be able to 
mitigate CO2 emissions. This required that wind power took the next step and 
moved to large-scale offshore wind power. 
Auken had in 1997 pushed hard for other countries to honor their Kyoto-agreements, 
and would in 1997 for the first time announce a planned large-scale build-out of 
offshore wind power. This plan would in February 1998 be materialized into a 
specific demand for the two main utility-organizations, ELSAM and ELKRAFT, to 
build 750 MW offshore wind power (DEA, 2016b, p. 59). This move by the 
Climate-coalition marked a large-scale exploration into offshore wind, which until 
then had only been built as demonstration projects (F. Petersen & Thorndal, 2014, 
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pp. 97–98)68.  Offshore wind power was important to the Auken-administration, who 
in an extension-report to the Energi 21 plan had calculated that it was both 
economically and technically realistic to have 4000 MW offshore wind in Denmark 
by 2030. In order to drive down costs and enable technological advances through 
scale, it was recommended that future offshore wind farms should be built in the 
range of approximately 160 MW, a huge step from the two existing 5 MW parks 
(DEA, 1997; F. Petersen & Thorndal, 2014, p. 98). Only one month after the report 
was published, Auken had contacted the two main utilities ELSAM and ELKRAFT 
with a notice that authorities and utilities together should prepare to build 750 MW 
offshore wind power through five major new wind farms (F. Petersen & Thorndal, 
2014, p. 99). That same year, DEF principally decided that offshore wind could be 
an endeavor worth pursuing, and especially Elkraft, who had built the first park 
Vindeby, argued that although the first two demonstration projects had been heavily 
contested, they had proven how offshore wind was “cheaper to build and maintain” 
than previously assumed (Abild, 1997).  Auken would push the offshore wind build-
out plan with support from the left-wing parties, and the first two offshore wind  
farms, Horns Rev 1 (160 MW by Elsam in 2002) and Roedsand 1 (165 MW by 
Elkraft in 2003), began construction in 2000 and 2001 (Bailey, 2015, pp. 11–12). 
These two projects broke new ground in technological development, through what 
the Horns Rev 1 project manager described as ‘Cowboy Engineering’ (DONG, 
2015)69. This was however done without any noticeable profits for the developers, as 
retroactively explained by Program Manager for Horns Rev I, Flemming Thomsen.  
 
“In the first projects of Horns Rev and Roedsand, we were forced to 
complete the projects without any profits, and our suppliers probably did 
not earn anything big either….It (Offshore wind, ed.) has today become a 
business, it was not so with the first parks, where it was an idealistic 
endeavor”. (F. Petersen & Thorndal, 2014, pp. 117–118)   
 
                                                          
68
 The two small offshore wind farms, Vindeby and Tunoe Knob (both 5 MW), had both been 
delivered as compensations for other commitments, and were by 1999 still the only offshore wind-
farms in the world. Vindeby was delivered by Elkraft (Eastern DK) as compensation when it was 
clear that the utilities could not deliver the 1985-agreed 100 MW onshore wind by 1990. This 
failure of delivery was however not only the fault of the utilities, as many local municipalities had 
also fought the erection of onshore wind farms (F. Petersen & Thorndal, 2014, p. 97). The Tunoe 
Knob farm was built by Elsam (Western DK), as a compensation for the 1991 deal wherein Elsam 
received planning permits for the Northern Jutland Coal plant build-out and the Skaerbaek Plant 
Gas build-out (F. Petersen & Thorndal, 2014, p. 98).Vindeby is officially recognized as the world’s 
first offshore wind farm with its 11 turbines of 450 KV each. The world’s first “offshore” turbine was a 
220 KV model erected 300 meters from Nogersund, Sweden in 1990.  
69
 A local development project Middelgrunden (40MW in Denmark) was built before Horns Rev 1 
and Roedsand 1.   
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The first two offshore wind farms were not completely “non-profit” builds, as 
Elkraft and Elsam received subsidies from the state, and thus were not paying 
everything themselves. But building such large wind farms on the sea was 
unchartered territory and Horns Rev 1 would later run into significant retro-fit 
costs70. The opposition parties, Venstre and De Konservative, were inactive on wind 
power valuation, but the move to invest in large offshore wind farms was however 
heavily contested by especially Venstre. Below is a quote from Peter Hansen-Nord, 
Energy Spokesman for Venstre, on Venstre’s position regarding both offshore and 
onshore wind. 
 
“We can definitely not guarantee, that the subsidy for wind-turbines will 
continue at the current levels of 27 oere per produced kWh. If it is up to 
me and my party, offshore wind should not have subsidies at all”. 
(Ritzau, 1999) 
 
Venstre’s concern that the proposed offshore wind farms were too big to subsidize 
was shared by wind power critic Frede Vestergaard of weekly magazine 
“Weekendavisen”. He highlighted that offshore wind was “noticeably more 
expensive” than the onshore wind costs shown in the 1996 AKF report (Vestergaard, 
1996). But despite this opposition, the world’s first large-scale offshore wind farms 
began construction.  
 
4.3.6 Market liberalization and the PSO-tax 
In addition to the CO2 taxation, the goals set out in the Energi 21 plan stabilized 
wind power investments and built-out was correspondingly increasing. But the 
Climate-Coalition did not have complete control over the electricity market 
framework. Until now the electricity market had been divided into zones where the 
utilities had monopoly on the customers and set the prices after a “rest-in-itself” 
principle. This would change in the late 1990’s as the EU had initiated a procedure 
that mandated member states to liberalize their electricity sectors. The task to 
liberalize the Danish electricity sector resulted in a 1999 law package, which was 
among the Auken-administrations hardest tasks. Some utilities saw the liberalization 
                                                          
70 In 2004, the turbine supplier Vestas, was forced to replace all of the nacelles of the park, at 
costs that would almost run up to the total project order they had received from Elsam. This 
was an experience which caused Vestas to announce a temporary withdrawal from the 
offshore market (F. Petersen & Thorndal, 2014, p. 114). 
 
THE VALUATION HISTORY OF DANISH WIND POWER 
116
 
as a risk that the central heat-power plants would be “squeezed out” of the market 
either intentionally, or as a result from the build-out goals of decentral district 
heating and wind power (Andreassen, 1999).  On the other hand, the liberalization 
would do away with the “rest-in-itself” principle, which could lead to utilities taking 
more risks in new business areas such as wind power. Auken would actively force a 
consolidation of the utilities with the liberalization-package, which led the utilities to 
look towards business opportunities in wind power71.  
Auken worried that once the market was liberalized, the value that had been built up 
in consumer-owned utilities would be spent on shareholder dividens, and not in 
investments that ensured Denmark’s CO2 emission goals were met (Christoffersen, 
1998)72. The Climate-coalition saw the Danish mitigation of CO2 emission as 
critically important, regardless of what other countries did. To ensure that what in 
Energi 21 was referred to as the ‘economic feasibility’ of wind power projects, the 
Auken-administration made sure that the broad agreement around a market 
liberalization in 1999 included a tax on electricity use, called the Public Service 
Obligation (PSO) (DEA, 2016b, p. 61). This tax was designed to avoid that 
electricity prices became too low to reflect externalities of fossil fuel production, so 
that if the price of electricity dropped by 2 DKK, the PSO would rise by 1 DKK. 
The revenue from the PSO-tax, would then go to paying for the subsidies to wind 
power and other renewables (EnerginetDK, 2016b). The Auken-administration 
consciously connected the funding for renewable subsidies to the price of electricity, 
so that the users of energy would also be the ones paying for the effort to make the 
future energy supply sustainable. But more importantly, it was done to ensure 
stability and long-term visibility around renewable energy investments, as they 
should not be negotiated on the annual budget every year (Klimarådet, 2016).  
The various taxes that were either raised (Electricity-tax) or introduced to electricity 
use (CO2-tax, PSO-tax), did not please the interest organization of general 
production industries, Danish Industry, which by the end of the 1990’s had 
established a separate unit to deal with energy matters. In 2000, Head of Energy in 
Danish Industry, Anders Stouge, would write a harsh critique of Svend Auken’s 
                                                          
71
 While the consolidation was a benefit to the liberalization, Auken was also conscious of the risk 
that large utilities would dictate the energy systems development, and disregard the consumers’ 
need, as shown in the two quotes below.  
”I want to democratize the electricity sector, because if it taken over by international 
conglomerates like EDF, Preussen Elektra (today called E-on, Ed.) and Vattenfall, then the chance 
has passed.” (Tornbjerg, 1998)  
“We are a peaceful people. If we do not protect the consumers’ interests, we risk a gigantic 
robbery. But as long as some of us can still shake our head, that will not happen in Denmark” 
(Andreassen, 1998b). 
72
 Auken Quote:”There is no doubt that our CO2-quota is the most controversial. It will limit our 
energy exports and cost us money. But the entire Kyoto agreement would be wasted, if the 
individual country did not take on its responsibility” (JP, 1998).  
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policies. Danish Industry argued that energy intensive companies were suffering 
under the new tax regimes and would echo a calculation performed by DEF, which 
hinted that between the CO2 and the new PSO-tax, the electricity consumers would 
come to pay twice for the CO2 pollution of their electricity (Stouge, 2000). This 
calculation was based on an interpretation of how you treat the PSO-tax. If it is an 
obligation for developing the future energy system, it is not a double pollution tax. 
This was however how the industry saw it and their concern with the tax level was 
steadily increasing.   
 
4.3.7 Right-wing newspapers give voice to small local opposition groups 
As wind power grew in size, several national newspapers would start to criticize 
wind power in editorials and give media-coverage to local opposition groups. One 
topic of the critique was related to the subsidies, as seen in the below editorial from 
the Danish Tabloid newspaper B.T.  
 
“All Danish tax-payers actually pay large amounts in direct and indirect 
subsidies to renewable energy. It is a sweet deal for the Danes, who have 
the opportunity to erect wind turbines or get heat through solar energy. 
They get cheap energy, which others have paid for in large sums....We 
simply cannot afford to continue to enrich wind-turbine owners….The 
environmental area is ruled by a certain green logic, which blows away 
all common sense”. (Notkin, 1996) 
 
In addition to the concern that wind turbines owners were enriching themselves on 
subsidies that the rest of society could “simply not afford”, the Aesthetics quality 
was also present in the contestations. These two concerns would on several 
occasions be combined to build the narrative that tax-payer money was wasted on 
building “scary ugly” turbines, as seen in the two editorials of newspapers 
Jyllandsposten (JP) and Berlingske below (Berlingske, 2000; JP, 1999).   
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Table 4: Newspaper Editorials about wind power 
Year Title Quote 
1999 
JP Editorial: 
“Wind-
Madness” 
The 5200 turbines which today are ruining the 
landscape, only produce nine percent of our 
electricity….It is about time we stop the wind-turbine 
massacre on the Danish landscape.  
2000 
Berlingske 
Editorial: 
Tvang mod 
tvang 
The problem is that wind power can still not stand on 
its own without public subsidies....The sum of the 
story is that a couple of decades attempt to replace 
polluting energy may have given considerable results, 
not least because of natural gas and cleaner cars, but 
it has also costs billions of kroners and lead to 
destruction of large areas of the open landscape with 
large, scary ugly wind turbines and a massive 
subsidy-bureaucracy.  
 
The Aesthetics quality would increase in salience among various opponents to the 
Climate Solution Valuation frame near the end of the century, where yearly 
complaints about wind turbines went from 100 to 240 cases in three years (Pihl-
Andersen, 2000a). A newly formed organization called “Neighbors to wind 
turbines” opposed local projects and took it further than Aesthetics, as they began to 
actively accuse local politicians of heralding private interests, as seen from a 
spokesman’s statement below.  
 
“The big wind turbines are a goldmine, and to get a hold of one of those 
is better than winning the lottery. It is not about alternative energy at all, 
but instead about racking money for oneself and getting the big 
subsidies. That is why we also see examples of nepotism, where local 
politicians help each other get wind turbine projects approved”. (Pihl-
Andersen, 2000a) 
 
What had happened was that the electricity price dropped significantly during the 
1990’s, and by 1998 the subsidy level was approximately double the electricity price 
(Groennegaard & Andersen, 1998). Since Technology Cost fell dramatically during 
the same period, the legislation was not changed fast enough to accommodate the 
new conditions. The Auken-administration  would insert a ceiling for wind power 
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subsidies, in order to limit any runaway profits in 1999 (DEA, 2016b, p. 54,55), but 
the reputation of the industry had already been hurt by a number of cases where 
private owners had capitalized on the combination of cutting edge new technology 
and not yet adjusted subsidies (Pihl-Andersen, 2000b) 73. But although some turbine 
owners had benefited from this quick fall in Technology Cost, the estimated profits 
appeared to be exaggerated in the media. In May 2000, the right-wing newspaper 
Berlingske published an article titled “Gold for wind turbine owners”, featuring a 
calculation by the anti-wind organization, “The Association of power-heat users”. 
The calculation used Vestas’ new 660 kW wind-turbine specifications to calculate 
how much Danish wind turbine owners had received in subsidies. This calculation 
resulted in each owner allegedly having received ‘a free’ wind turbine for 4.7 mn. 
DKK, and additionally getting 2 mn. DKK in the bank (Andreassen, 2000). The 
DEF spokesman, Knud Mosekjaer used the calculation to reinforce his argument 
that more competition should be encouraged so that wind turbine owners instead 
would “fiercely compete with each other” (Andreassen, 2000). The calculation was 
however outdated and applied to very few owners. The subsidy-level used in the 
calculation had been phased out in 1999, and the Vestas 660 kW turbine had not 
been available to purchase until late in 1997 (Appendix A).  The Wind Turbine 
Owners Association (DWOA) argued that although the profit margins probably 
should be adjusted, the total annual subsidy cost of 2 bn. DKK was not a high 
societal cost, compared to the amount of capacity that it enabled. This was however 
not enough to satisfy the critics, as the argument was not about how valuable the 
subsidies were for Denmark as a society, but instead related to a framed unfair gold-
rush to wind turbine owners.  
It is however important to note that the antipathy was not a general opinion among 
the population. The Danish population was in the Climate Solution period very 
positive towards wind power as shown by several studies. Three separate polls from 
1993, 1994 and 1995 (of which two were ordered by utilities) found that 
respectively 77 %, 68 % and 67 % of Danes were willing to pay more to have their 
power come from wind power (DKvind, 2014b, pp. 1–2), and even after the 
increased build-out of the late 1990’s, a similar 2001 survey showed 68% of the 
population supported a further build-out of wind power (DKvind, 2014a, p. 7).  
This chapter has now covered the major moments of valuation in the Climate 
Solution period. The chapter has also touched upon the contestations that laid the 
seeds to the valuation frame that will come to follow the Climate Solution valuation 
frame.  But before going into this coming shift in valuation, I will hereafter map the 
dominant valuation frame and valuation network of the Climate Solution period. 
                                                          
73
 These cases were also related to build-outs being done by groups that were not local to the area. 
In 2000, the state revision authority would conclude that the Danish Energy Authorities had not 
maintained adequate oversight over whether the people who received the subsidies lived in the 
municipalities where they received them. Aukens political allies in SF called the cases “damaging 
for wind power” and “unsatisfying”. 
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4.4. CLIMATE SOLUTION: VALUATION FRAME SUMMARY  
During the Climate Solution period, three new qualities were enacted in the 
Valuation Frame and Network. First, I describe the three new qualities revealed in 
this chapter, before I present the new valuation frame and explain how it differs 
from the Unique Supplement valuation frame. Finally, I map out the valuation 
networks and highlight the key takeaways from the chapter.  
 
4.4.1. Three New Qualities: A Technology to Mitigate Climate Change 
Three more qualities were incorporated into the valuation frame during the Climate 
Solution period. Two of these qualities, Technology Cost and Back-up Capacity, 
replaced the Fuel Supplement quality, while the Black-out Risk quality faded away. 
The CC Mitigation quality had not been salient in previous frames or had been part 
of the Environment frame. During these first two periods of the analysis (i.e., 
Unique Supplement and Climate Solution), ten different qualities have now been 
used in the valuation of wind power.  
 
CC Mitigation (Environmental) 
Although climate change has many local effects in a closely-connected eco-system, 
it is beneficial to separate the CC Mitigation quality from the Environment quality 
due to the debate about the practicality of Denmark attempting to mitigate global 
climate change. There were no similar debates over whether or not it makes sense to 
improve air quality in Denmark. Since climate change is a global problem that 
unfolds over a long period of time (i.e., multiple generations), the value of 
mitigating it is significantly more difficult to calculate. When it is calculated, it is 
usually in the form of a CO2 price, which should equal the damages of emissions. 
But the quality also encompasses the debate over which energy source(s) wind 
power should replace. This is more easily traceable in the Environment quality, 
which is more locally anchored74.  
 
 
 
                                                          
74
 As explained earlier, in pre-1990 valuation frames, climate change was encompassed by the 
Environment quality, but after 1990, it emerged as an independent quality that was included in the 
Climate Solution valuation frame and all subsequent frames throughout the analysis period.  
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Technology Cost (Technological) 
The Technology Cost quality represents current costs to build wind turbines as an 
independent technology. These costs are calculated as LCOE, which is the cost to 
build and operate an energy source divided by the annual energy output element 
(i.e., the amount of energy a wind turbine can produce each year). Although the 
methods for calculating the technical costs of building a wind turbine change over 
time, this quality refers to how actors calculate this cost and how they frame it as 
signifying value compared to the available alternative technologies.   
I would like to highlight an important distinction between the Technology Cost and 
Fuel Supplement qualities. When framed through the Technology Cost quality, wind 
power is considered a standalone energy source, whereas for the Fuel Supplement 
quality, the value of wind power is based on its ability to supplement incumbent 
energy sources. The Fuel Supplement quality thus falls somewhere between 
Technology Cost and Back-up Capacity, since back-up costs are considered 
embedded in the Fuel Supplement quality when used, as wind power is then 
considered supplemental. 
 
Back-up Capacity (Technological) 
The Back-up Capacity quality of wind power is an independently deducted from a 
total value usually derived through metrics associated with the Technology Cost 
quality. This technical quality must be listed separately, since the costs of Back-up 
Capacity are calculated differently, and in some cases are considered to be system 
costs that are not included in the categorization of the object being valued.  In 
current energy systems, a minimum level of Back-up Capacity is still required; 
however, it applies to the entire grid, as it is used not only when the wind does not 
blow, but also when a power plant goes offline.  
 
4.4.2 The Climate Solution Valuation Frame 
Figure 17 (GBA) is the visualization of the dominant Climate Solution valuation 
frame, the name of which is derived from the key quality that had a positive impact 
on the valuation of wind power during this period: CC Mitigation.  
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Figure 17: The first (US: 1974-1989) and second (CS: 1990-2001) Valuation Frame. 
 
The other two qualities that had a positive impact on the value of wind power during 
this period were the Future Potential quality in terms of turbine size and cost 
reductions, and the Industrial quality, through the Climate-coalition’s involvement 
with the utilities, and the expansion of offshore capacity to grow the scope and size 
of the domestic industry. In addition to the new and decisively salient CC Mitigation 
quality, the new valuation frame reflected two significant differences from the 
previous frame. In the Climate Solution frame, the Technology Cost and Back-up 
Capacity qualities of wind power are included as separate qualities which replaced 
the Fuel Supplement quality in the Unique Supplement frame. In addition, the Black-
out Risk quality was not included in the Climate Solution frame, since both wind 
turbines and the grid had evolved to the point where these risks were no longer a 
concern.  Technology Cost of wind power continued to be calculated as higher than 
conventional energy sources, but wind power was now seen as its own energy 
source with individual energy costs.  
Moreover, the quality that was highly salient in both the Fuel- and Unique-
coalitions’ framings, Energy Independence, was surprisingly practically absent 
during the 1990s. Although these elements were mentioned in the energy plans, it 
was not part of the segments that framed the value of wind power. Lastly, it can be 
mentioned that the Climate Solution frame also included the first calculation of the 
Aesthetics quality, the negative impacts of which were determined to be negligible. 
As is evident in the visualization, the Climate Solution frame included several 
positive impact qualities and only a few marginal negative impact qualities. In 
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particular, the new CC Mitigation quality was considered indispensably valuable as 
a societal investment.  
 
4.4.3 The Climate Solution Valuation Networks 
Several previous actors continued to participate in the valuation struggle during the 
Climate Solution period. Despite the overlap, I refer to the coalition in the 1990s as 
the Climate-coalition, because the Unique-Coalition actors had expanded to fully 
include Socialdemokratiet, the powerful calculative center of the Environment and 
Energy Ministry, as well as part of the utilities. In the sub-sections that follow, I map 
this dominant coalition and the few dispersed actors who opposed it before 
describing the materiality of the valuation network.  
Figure 18 (GBA) shows the actors that were dominant (top of the y-axis) and more 
peripheral (bottom of the y-axis) at the beginning and end of the Climate Solution 
period. The colors reflect the actors’ general valuations of wind power. Green is the 
climate-coalition, Blue is a dispersed group of opposing actors to this coalition. The 
grey actors are as usual neutral or unassignable.  
 
 
Figure 18: Key actors during the CS period; green: Climate-coalition; blue: Opposing 
actors. 
The central position of CC Mitigation was made possible by the work started by 
members of Radikale Venstre and energy minister Bilgrav-Nielsen, who seized upon 
the international momentum of the 1987 Brundtland report and the 1990 formation 
of the IPCC, which brought attention to the issue of climate change. CC Mitigation 
became a central quality in the valuation of energy sources, and was used to justify 
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an active energy policy (i.e., investments to improve performance and reduce costs) 
made salient through the Future Potential quality. The Auken administration 
continued to build on Energi 2000 and legislation to tax CO2, which had been 
enacted in 1992 against the former government’s will.  The Auken administration 
pushed utilities and municipalities to expand wind power capacity to realize the 
Future Potential of cheaper and more efficient turbines. The Climate-coalition’s 
most powerful calculative center was the Environment and Energy Ministry and the 
many councils and boards under its governance.  
To some extent, the Climate-coalition and the Unique-coalition viewed wind power 
similarly, in that both focused on the salience of issues related to the quality 
Environment (i.e., air quality). In another sense, the Climate-coalition was focused 
on large scale expansion to mitigate climate change and this expansion should 
happen through the utilities cooperation and a general maturing of the industry. 
During the 1990s, dominant actors focused on constructing an energy market that 
valued CC Mitigation highly and ensuring the economic feasibility of continued 
expansion of wind power capacity by establishing a stable framework.75 This differs 
from the Unique Supplement period, when efforts were aimed at establishing a 
“protected space” within the energy market to ensure sufficient stability for small-
scale entrepreneurs to construct turbines.  
The actors that were not part of the Climate-coalition include the DEF, which 
adopted a somewhat mixed position and retained some power during the period. 
This is seen through the collaboration between the utilities and the Climate-
coalition, especially on offshore wind power. Even less influential were dispersed 
actors, namely De Konservative and Venstre parties and local anti-wind opposition 
groups, as well as the JP and Berlingske newspapers. They were beginning to form a 
coalition which was not occupied with the old Fuel-coalitions priorities. This 
coalition had slowly been dispersed throughout the Climate Solution period as some 
utilities highly opposed wind power, while others were embracing it. The political 
parties, Venstre and De Konservative grew increasingly anonymous with the 
exception of the 1999 liberalization agreement. But as little those two parties had 
been involvement in creating the materiality of the Climate solution valuation 
network, the more fiercely they were preparing to disassembled the Climate Solution 
frame during the next period of analysis.  
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 It is worth noting that Plan 21 included a sentence that frameworks must be set up to enable the 
“economic feasibility” of wind power. It also could have been phrased that the current market 
framework had enabled the economic feasibility of centralized fossil fuel power plants, and that this 
had to change.  
4. NEW FRAMING OF WIND AS A NECESSARY CLIMATE SOLUTION 
125 
Materiality during the Climate Solution Period 
The high build-out rates from the Unique Supplement period were maintained 
throughout the Climate Solution period, even as the installed fleet grew. A 
significant change in the valuation of electricity in the system enabled wind power 
to grow significantly, even after rapid expansion in the 1980s. Moreover, the first 
offshore demonstration projects became operational during this period. As shown in 
Figure 19 (GBA), the first 5 MW of offshore capacity was connected to the grid in 
1991 at Vindeby (450 kW Bonus onshore turbines), and another 5 MW (500 kW 
Vestas onshore turbines) was connected in 1995 at Tunø Knob. The next major 
addition was in 2000, when Middelgrunden, the world’s first offshore wind farm 
with multi-MW turbines (2 MW Bonus), was connected to the grid76. All of the 
numbers in figure 19 are listed in Appendix A.   
 
Figure 19: Capacity expansion during the Climate Solution period. 
 
The only slow-down in this rapid expansion occurred in 1992–1993, as per the 
politics of drift77 from Minister Lundholt. Yet from 1994 on, domestic capacity, 
exports and employment rose substantially, in what was the largest growth period in 
                                                          
76
 The DEA reports the 40 MW capacity for the Middelgrunden wind farm as coming online in 
2000, but the formal inauguration occurred in May 2001. I decided to use the DEA’s data for the 
graph, but listed the official inauguration year as 2001 in the table.  
77
 The ”politics of drift” is a term used by political scientists Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson in 
their 2011 book “winner takes all politics” (Hacker & Pierson, 2011).Herein they refer to how 
politicians can let entities they do not favor disappear by ignoring emerging problems with that 
specific entity.  
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the history of the Danish wind turbine industry. Wind industry exports grew 10-fold 
(DWIA, 2003, p. 4), comprising 4.6% of total Danish exports (DWIA, 2010, p. 16). 
Danish companies entered the new millennium with a 50% global market share, led 
by the big three manufacturers, Vestas, Bonus (which became Siemens Wind Power 
in 2004) and NEG Micon (which merged with Vestas in 2004) (DEC, 2002a, p. 230; 
DWIA, 1999, p. 2). In the 6 years between 1995 and 2001, the compound annual 
growth rate (CAGR) for wind turbine installations was 25% in Denmark, while 
exports and sector employment doubled (DEA, 2011b, p. 4) to 20 billion DKK and 
more than 20,000 employees (Appendix A).    
This extensive capacity expansion was enabled by a number of of laws and 
initiatives which fundamentally changed the rules of the game. The two 1991 laws 
that enacted CO2 taxation and then correspondingly compensated renewable 
electricity are the first material results of the Energi2000 plan. During the latter part 
of the period, the PSO-tax was enacted, which ensures that the device which funded 
the framework for wind power would not be connected to the annual budget. 
Furthermore, the utilities were asked to build more wind power capacity: 100 MW 
in 1990 and then 750 MW of offshore wind power mandated by Auken. These 
framework changes were combined with the visibility that comes when CO2 
emission reduction and wind power capacity expansion targets are established. The 
establishment subsidy expired during the last period, which is very indicative of the 
change that occurred. Wind power was no longer a supplement on the periphery of 
the energy system, where it could create some exports and jobs. It was becoming a 
central piece of the energy system and thus began to function in a “stretch and 
transform” mode. CO2 taxes, along with increased electricity taxes changed the 
rules of the game for the other energy sources on the grid.  These material changes 
to the framework meant that wind turbine investors had some revenue visibility and 
were willing to invest. Furthermore, the technology enabled larger turbines to be 
deployed at continually lowered costs.  
 
4.4.4 Key Takeaways from the Climate Solution Period 
The climate coalition of the 1990s was heterogeneous; several dominant actors 
supported the expansion of wind power. Unique-coalition actors continued to be 
strongly represented on the Renewable Energy Council, which was run by former 
ATV-head, Niels Meyer (Beuse, 2000, p. 103;105). Both the Danish Wind Turbine 
Industry Association and the Danish Wind Turbine Owners Association saw large 
growth in membership as wind turbine installations and exports grew.  At the center 
of the Climate-Coalition  was Aukens Environment and Energy Ministry which had 
momentum to create a strong link between energy and the environment, and place 
wind power at the center of energy policy as evidenced by a ~25% compound 
annual growth rate in installations, a quadrupling of turbine size, and the initial 
implementation of offshore wind technology. By the end of the century, the Danish 
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wind turbine industry accounted for 60% of the world market (DEC, 2002a), and the 
industry grew so fast, organizations struggled to expand quickly enough to keep 
pace with demand.78  Members of the wind turbine industry also saw that they could 
cooperate more with the large utilities. The former incumbent Fuel-coalition that had 
opposed the expansion wind power during most of the Unique Supplement period 
began to disperse during the Climate Solution period. Especially during the late 
1990s, coalition members were beginning to consider wind power as a viable option. 
In 1995, the CEO of ELSAM acknowledged that wind power was one the best ways 
to reduce CO2 emissions, and therefore it could be a good idea to invest in the 
technology before others. This notion builds on the idea that CO2 emissions must be 
reduced, thus an energy source with this quality is valuable. 
This growth was driven by changes to the rules of the game. Wind power delivered 
an indispensably valuable quality to the energy system, CC Mitigation. The Climate-
coalition had an imperative need to mitigate CO2 emissions, and the framing 
appeared to be that although it was more expensive to build wind power capacity 
than to buy coal or gas, it was worth it to reduce CO2 emissions. The Climate-
coalition also knew that the challenge of climate change would only become more 
salient, so expanding wind power capacity would also support an industry that 
would help solve this monumental challenge. The Climate-coalition knew that wind 
power was still technically expensive to build, but had a future vision that a strong 
industry would prove to be a global advantage for Denmark.  
Everything appeared to be on track. But this change of the rules to make CC 
Mitigation the central focus would become a rallying point for a number of 
dispersed actors. Whereas the main opposition to wind power came from owners of 
existing electricity infrastructure, it was during the Climate Solution period, within 
the walls of the Danish parliament that opposition was at its highest. Members of the 
Venstre party, who in the 1980s had been neutral to slightly positive about the 
export potential of wind power, now considered the subsidies to impose a much too 
high burden on Danish society. Extensive wind power capacity expansion also had 
sparked growing opposition from anti-wind groups and the two right-wing 
newspapers, Berlingske and Jyllandsposten, based on the unfairness of subsidies as 
well as Aesthetics concerns. Actors in these isolated pockets laid the groundwork for 
a coming organized destabilization to the expansion of wind power, which was 
intertwined with an opposition to Svend Auken and environmental policies in 
general. The next period, 2002–2007, signaled a significant shift in valuation and the 
emergence of new centers of calculation. After the election in the fall of 2001, a new 
government took control of the energy policy, and by 2002, a new dominant 
valuation frame had begun to form.  
                                                          
78 Palle Noergaard, the CEO of Bonus (Holm, 2004), described the mid- to late-1990s as a 
period wherein the industry grew so fast that he at times had to “press the brake and not the 
accelerator” (B.dk, 2003).   
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5. RE-FRAMING OF WIND AS A VALUE-
DESTROYING MARKET DISTORTION 
Immediately following the Climate-coalitions build-out of the 1990’s, the valuation 
drama of wind power would see its most significant moment of valuation. Following 
the November 2001 election, the Danish parliament would be led by a new 
government consisting of Venstre and De Konservative with parliamentary support 
by right-wing party DF. This new party coalition destabilized the Climate Solution 
frame and would ally with newly established actors to construct a completely 
different framing of wind power. In a dramatic shift of devices, wind power went 
from being framed as an indispensably valuable solution to climate change, to being 
framed as a disturbing factor to a certain market conception.  
 
5.1. PREVIOUS FRAMING IS REMOVED (2002-2005) 
It would not be the old Incumbent Fuel-coalition, who would establish a different 
valuation network, but instead a new set of actors to the field of wind power, the 
Market-coalition. This new coalition moved quickly from 2002 and forward to 
establish the Market Distortion Valuation Network, wherein the regulatory 
framework for wind power was defined by great uncertainties and build-out was 
almost stopped completely. A natural place to start is with one of the Market-
coalition’s most powerful actors, the incoming Prime Minister Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen (AFR). AFR had prior to the 2001 election had criticized the former 
Climate Solution Valuation Network, and stated that the wind power subsidies 
equaled to how “the money was blowing out of the state coffers” (Fogh, 2008). AFR 
knew that he would have to change the balance of calculative power to disassemble 
the Climate Solution Valuation Network. This would be a central theme in his first 
New Year’s speech as Prime Minister, only 40 days after taking office. Herein he 
issued a critical stance towards the role of experts and public institutions.  
 
“We do not need experts and judges of taste to decide on our 
behalf….state-authorized judges of taste, who determine what is good 
and right in different areas….There are tendencies towards a tyranny of 
experts, which risk suppressing the free popular debate….The 
Government will remove surplus councils and boards and institutions. It 
will be a very comprehensive redevelopment”. (Rasmussen, 2002)    
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AFR-s administration was a central actor in this newly forming Market-Coalition 
and was quick to take action against the Climate Coalition’s calculative centers. It 
thus terminated 17 councils and work-groups in the energy and environmental 
ministry and supporting public functions (Termansen, 2002). This equaled more 
than 400 job-cuts (Nørgaard & Tornbjerg, 2002) and what was calculated by the 
outside observer Center for Alternative societal analysis, as environmental cuts of 
more than 16 bn. DKK (21 bn. DKK in 2017 currency) over the following years 
budgets (CASA, 2002; Rothenborg & Andersen, 2002; Tornbjerg, 2002b)79. The 
Market-coalition viewed the many calculative centers established under the Auken-
administration, as potential critics of the new directions in energy policy. The budget 
cuts drew stark criticism from the ministries civil servants (Reuters, 2002). In early 
2003, Steen Gade the director of the Danish Environmental Agency quit his job in 
protest, stating that the new government was no longer ‘cutting to the bone, but into 
the bone’ (Kroeyer & Elmose, 2003). Hans Christian Schmidt (V), the new minister 
of Environment and long-time critic of the Auken administration’s policies80, 
dismissed this critique and argued that the Climate-coalition actors were still free to 
criticize the new valuation practices to come. Such critique would “just not get paid 
for” anymore (Termansen, 2002). The drastic cuts shows how crucial it was to 
control the positions in the legislative branch which produce calculations on 
legislative changes (Bruszt & Stark, 2003). The Market-coalition removed central 
agencies and councils, ensuring that critiques will not come from the officially 
recognized and established councils that emerged under the Climate Solution period. 
Critiques will not bear the same weight when it comes from outside, and 
simultaneously it will be met with counter-framings from inside the administration. 
The high salience of environmental matters and climate change from the previous 
valuation frame would disappear in the following years led on by leading ministers 
in the new government. Minister of Finance, Thor Pedersen (V), would ridicule the 
climate change science as being “a question of faith”, and “the emperor’s new 
clothes” (Meilstrup, 2010, p. 37), while prime Minister AFR (V) compared Climate 
Change concerns to when people in the 1600’s feared a coming ice age (Dahlager & 
Rothenborg, 2007, p. 126)81. The Minister of Economy and Business, Bendt 
                                                          
79
 The immediate cuts in 2002 were equal to 2 bn. (2.5bn. DKK in 2015), but when counted over 
the following years, the CASA consultancy group calculated that the total cuts to environmental 
programs were in the range 16-21 bn. DKK (21-25 bn. DKK in 2015). The newly appointed 
Minister of Environment Hans Christian Schmidt (V), did not agree to the NGO’s way of 
calculating environmental cuts, as it included environmental programs in other ministries, but he 
never produced any counter-calculations or specified his critique (Rothenborg & Andersen, 2002).   
80
 The new environmental minister, Hans Christian Schmidt, had on several occasions in the 1990’s 
been scorned by Svend Auken in environmental debates, and was in 2002 eager to limit Aukens old 
ministry (Dahlager & Rothenborg, 2007, p. 80). 
81
 AFR’s full statement was said in response to a question about Climate Change during a town-hall 
like event in 2005: “In the 1600’s, people believed that we were facing a new ice age. If you go 
around expecting a flood every day, you can expect a sad life for the next many years” (Dahlager & 
Rothenborg, 2007, p. 126). This was a position Anders Fogh had held since the 1990’s, in example 
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Bendtsen (C), would also downplay the risk of climate change, as he argued that 
since CO2 could be used to grow tomatoes in his green-house, he did not consider it 
to be “pollution”82. It became taboo for civil servants to publish or talk of Denmark’s 
pioneering position in wind power or the beneficial effect of environmental taxes 
(Meilstrup, 2010, p. 131).  Inside the ministerial offices, environmental publications 
would be edited to downplay the dangers of climate change, and highlight areas of 
uncertainty (Dahlager & Rothenborg, 2007, pp. 93–94).  The first annual budget 
would also include double-digit million funding to research alternative sun-spot 
theories in order to cast doubt on the existing climate change science. This very 
strong politization of climate change science also had the effect that some scientists 
at Danish universities and the Danish Meteorological Institute became cautious of 
speaking up in the media, in fear of being dragged into a political game (Dahlager & 
Rothenborg, 2007, pp. 97–98). 
 
5.1.1 New Valuation Network quickly takes action to lighten Subsidy Burden 
As shown above, the Market-coalition’s first move was to turn the focus away from 
discussing climate change and hereafter shift the focus to a concern about the 
societal costs of a wind power build-out, and the following distortive effects on 
competitiveness (Dahlager & Rothenborg, 2007, p. 84). This would give rise to the 
conceptualization of the concerns that some local groups and Venstre’s political 
party had begun to voice at the end of the 1990’s. Namely that the quality Subsidy 
Burden of wind power equaled a cost to society that was simply too high for wind 
power build-out to continue as it did.    
In January 2002, Minister of Economy and Business, Bendt Bendtsen (C), would 
initiate the first major legislative action that would form the new valuation network. 
This would come in the form of an announced cancellation of three of the five 
offshore wind farms, which the utilities had been mandated to build by the Auken-
administration in 1998 (DEA, 2016b, p. 59). Two of the offshore wind farms, Horns 
Rev 1 and Roedsand 1, had already begun construction for an agreed subsidy 
scheme equaling 43 oere/KWh for the first 10-12 years of production, and could 
thus not be cancelled (P. S. Benson & Tornbjerg, 2002). The Nord-pool electricity 
price resided at a low level of 20 oere/KWh, so once the two parks were finished, 
they would receive a strike price at around double the 2002 electricity price 
(Tornbjerg, 2002a). Bendtsen immediately initiated the cancellation of the 
remaining three 150 MW offshore wind farms (proposed to be at the sites of Laesoe, 
                                                                                                                                        
he would in a 1998 Op-Ed argue that climate change was just one among many “doomsday 
theories” (Meilstrup, 2010, p. 142). 
82
 This is commonly known simplification-spin on a complex issue. CO2 in and off itself is not 
pollution, but when large amounts of CO2 are released into the atmosphere it causes warming as 
more heat is trapped in the atmosphere, this is why it is called the “Drivhus-effect”.  
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Omoe, Gedser Rev), as he was “deeply worried about the societal costs and our 
competitiveness” if the renewables build-out was continued (J. S. Nielsen, 2002a). 
The high Subsidy Burden that would come from building the wind farms would 
allegedly hurt both the “industry’s and the consumers’ competitiveness”  (Meyer, 
2002)83. The Market-coalition thus followed in the tracks of Venstre’s energy 
spokesman, Peter Hansen-Nord (V), who in the late 1990’s had promised that 
offshore wind power would not receive subsidies if it was up to Venstre. Bendtsen 
would reiterate that the Government’s position was that the wind industry should not 
need any more subsidies (From, 2002a)84.  
As the Market-coalition now had control over the government agencies, Bendtsen 
had the Danish Energy Agency perform a calculation on the low electricity price and 
the expected subsidy gap to the strike price.  This calculation was presented by 
Bendtsen as proof that cancelling the remaining three OWFs would save 900 mn. 
DKK annually (J. S. Nielsen, 2002a). This number would on the same day be cited 
by the right-wing newspaper Jyllandsposten as an annual saving from cancelling the 
three planned OWF (Corneliussen & Rasmussen, 2002). However, the 900 mn. 
DKK saved came from a different calculation, which represented how much 
Denmark would save, if it had only had 20% renewables in it electricity mix instead 
of the projected 27% by 2003. The 900 mn. DKK was thus the result of a 
counterfactual calculation where the ‘not yet built’ additional seven percent 
renewables were cancelled, thus covering both potential future offshore and onshore 
wind subsidies. The three offshore wind farms that were proposed to be cancelled 
would actually equal 300 mn. DKK annual saving, and not before 2008 (Laursen, 
2002; J. S. Nielsen, 2002a; Tornbjerg, 2002a). This large difference between the 
presented number and the actual calculation was later explained by a spokesperson 
from Bendtsen’s ministry as “a misunderstanding” (Tornbjerg, 2002a). The 300 mn. 
DKK of savings from 2008 would later be used to frame a new quality of wind 
power, namely the Subsidy Burden from building wind power. The narrative was 
that the Subsidy Burden that followed from investing in wind power had been 
allowed to grow too large under the Auken-administration. The Market-coalition 
framed itself as the responsible coalition that reduced the negative impacts to society 
of the prosthetic devices enabling wind power build-out. One of these devices is the 
taxes on electricity, which funded the wind power build-out. In a time of historically 
                                                          
83
 This is not a typo but an actual statement said in a radio-interview by the minister. The author 
also does not know what was meant by “consumers’ competitiveness”. 
84
 Bendt Bendtsen said that the wind turbine industry had now been given a head-start, and it 
should not need any more subsidies now, comparing it to the German car industry, as an example 
of an unsubsidized industry. The German Car industry has however been historically subsidized, 
such as the London Agreement on German External Debts of 1953 following WWII, which in 
addition to many other things, functioned as an export incentive to the car industry (Dodman, 
2015). This was of course a good decision, as Germany had to be rebuilt after the WWII, but it 
nonetheless shows that the German car industry did not grow without government intervention. In a 
more recent example from 2009, which of course was not available in 2002, the German 
government spent €5 bn. to subsidize domestic car sales following the 2008-crisis (White, 2009). 
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low electricity prices, the Market-coalition made it a matter of concern to ensure that 
wind power build-out did not lead to rising electricity prices, as seen in the Bent 
Bendtsen Op-Ed below.  
 
“We have a responsibility to ensure that the bet on renewable energy 
does not lead to rising electricity prices, which will hit both consumers 
and businesses. In the three year old electricity reform, the Nyrup 
government expected that 20% of the electricity consumption would be 
covered by renewables by the end of 2003. Instead it looks as though the 
subsidy-schemes for renewable energy will bring the number up to 
around 27 percent. The price to electricity consumers and Danish 
companies is annually at 900 mn. DKK for the extra seven percent…It is 
unhealthy that the wind turbine build-out is artificially driven by 
politically decided prices, financed by the consumers. Contrary to this, 
competitive wind turbines, which can function without subsidies, would 
seriously be able to increase interest for wind turbines on the export 
markets”. (Bendtsen, 2002)     
 
In addition to the concern of subsidies burdening society, another quality was 
emerging. In the quote above, Bendtsen brings salience to a conceived risk that an 
“unhealthy” and “artificially driven” build-out could hurt the attractiveness of wind 
turbines abroad. A wind turbine build-out can according to this framing happen 
“artificially” in a way that is “unhealthy” for both the Danish economy and the wind 
turbine industry. The undergoing build-out was compared to some other notion of 
“competitive wind turbines”. These “competitive” turbines are only defined by 
being “without subsidies”, but it is not stated what they are competing with. It could 
have been the electricity price or coal plant construction prices, but this is not clear 
in the statement. The notion that a subsidized industry was artificial and therefore 
not valuable was shared by Thor Pedersen, who would compare wind power 
subsidies to subsidizing a banana industry in Denmark (Dahlager & Rothenborg, 
2007, p. 82). In his view, the subsidies led to activity within the subsidized field, but 
this activity was taken from elsewhere in the economy and therefore the Industrial 
benefits of wind power was as artificial as growing bananas in Denmark. The 
Market-coalition brings another negative impact quality to the framing of Danish 
wind power that is separate from being a Subsidy Burden. It is also defined by the 
quality Market Distortion, as wind power investments are not valuable when 
subsidized, and should instead emerge in some imagined undefined “naturally 
occurring market”. Behind this quality was the notion that electricity taxes should 
not fund wind turbine subsidies, and this notion brought a large private actor into the 
Market-coalition, namely Danish Industry.  They welcomed the Fogh-government’s 
actions, as spokesperson Anders Stouge stated that it was now okay to ask the 
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technology to “manage on market terms, with a compensation for the CO2 reduction 
it provides ”(L. W. Jensen, 2002).  
But there was an even more important new actor who also placed this new Market 
Distortion quality centrally to the valuation frame of wind power. The Danish 
Economic Council was an independent and highly respected group of economists 
who gave advice to changing governments. They did not have energy policy or 
climate change as their core area but in 2002 they would produce a calculation that 
would define the Market Distortion quality in much more concrete terms than 
Bendtsen could. This new calculative center would deliver an important piece in the 
valuation frame that would come to dominate this moment of valuation as they 
calculated the distortive effects of wind power investments and subjected the need to 
mitigate Climate Change to carbon markets.   
 
5.2. THE DANISH ECONOMIC COUNCIL QUESTION VALUE OF 
WIND BUILD-OUT (2002) 
De Oekonomiske raad / The Danish Economic Councils (DEC), an advisory body to 
the sitting government, would in March 2002 publish a report which specifically 
focused on whether or not the Danish wind power build-out had been a valuable 
societal investment.  
 
5.2.1 Actor Profile: The Danish Economic Councils 
The following segment will provide a short actor profile of the DEC and go into 
depth on their stated motivation for writing the report, as it is important to 
understand what the DEC’s arguments were for examining the value of Denmark’s 
wind power investments.  
The Danish Economic Councils (DEC) define themselves as an independent 
advisory body to the government and consists of four economists, unofficially 
referred to as “Wise-men” or “Sages”, who have a 30-35 employee secretariat at 
their disposal. The DEC has existed as a sub-department of the Danish Financial 
Ministry since 1962, wherefrom they make recommendations to the sitting 
government through three annual reports. The economists who sit in the councils are 
picked among the most influential in the country, albeit with an overweight of 
connections to private enterprise (Henriksen & Stahl, 2015). They use the same 
economic modelling tools, such as the Annual Danish Aggregate model (ADAM), 
as the Financial Ministry and in this way they are regarded as authoritative on 
economic matters. They have however stirred controversy in the past, as they 
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sometime go further in using the Finance ministry’s modelling tools and neoclassic 
economic models to evaluate and advice on various societal policy-issues 
(Henriksen, 2013).  
In 2007, the original Danish Economic Council was expanded to two councils as 
Institut for Miljoevurdering / the Institute of Environmental evaluation (IMV)85, was 
closed down and the employees were moved to the original Danish Economic 
Council’s secretariat, wherefrom the environmental-economic council was formed 
as a sub-branch. The institution is today called the economic councils in plural, 
although they still publish reports together (Henriksen & Stahl, 2015).   
 
5.2.2 The DEC misrepresent OECD report to justify making wind power 
subsidies a matter of concern 
The DEC motivated their 2002 report on a suspicion that tax-financed subsidies 
during the 1990’s could have resulted in lowered employment, as it likely had an 
impact on ‘private consumption opportunities’ (DEC, 2002a, p. 185). The DEC 
listed an OECD evaluation of Danish environmental policies from 1999, as the 
authoritative justification that Danish environmental efforts were producing below-
medium results with above-medium cost. 
 
“Different studies, in example OECD (1999), indicate that the effort in 
Denmark on the environmental area is above average, but the result is 
below average in international comparison. Such an assessment gives 
cause to discuss the following questions: How can the relationship 
between benefits and costs be improved?” (DEC, 2002a, p. 185) 
 
The DEC cites OECD as an authoritative source which allegedly indicates that 
Denmark has achieved “below average” results for its environmental efforts. The 
1999 OECD report does, however, not point to results indicating that Danish 
environmental efforts have resulted in below average effects. On the contrary, the 
OECD described Danish measures to address environmental issues as both 
“innovative” and “effective” (OECD, 1999, p. 19;21). The green taxes which were a 
central part of the Climate Solution valuation network were specifically highlighted 
as creating “fiscal incentives to protect the environment”, which led to “important 
results” (OECD, 1999, p. 19;20). In addition to having tripled the share of renewable 
                                                          
85
 I will in this chapter return to the actor IMV, which was a calculative center established by the 
Market-Coalition. 
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energy, Denmark was applauded for having become leaders of “environmentally 
favorable energy technologies such as wind turbines, which are now considered as a 
viable alternative to coal based power plants” (OECD, 1999, pp. 23–24)86.  
So although the DEC used this report as an argument to examine the green taxes and 
wind power subsidies, it was actually not the environmental policies which caused 
Denmark to be “below average” (OECD, 1999, p. 32). The reason that the OECD 
labelled Denmark as “below average” was Denmark’s significant growth in the 
1990’s, especially in the energy, agriculture and transportation sector, which had 
resulted in pressure on Denmark’s environmental commitments (OECD, 1999, p. 
21)87. But this is not the same as to say that the efforts that were enacted in the 
1990’s were “below average”, or should be limited88. In summary, the OECD results 
did not indicate that environmental policies had been “below average”, which is one 
of the DEC arguments for initiating the examination that led to the 2002 report. The 
OECD did however make recommendations regarding analysis showing cost-benefit 
relationships (OECD, 1999, p. 24,29), but did not single out wind power or conclude 
that Danish environmental efforts were “below average”. On the contrary, the 
OECD explicitly highlighted the success of the Danish wind turbine industry, and 
did not find that environmental subsidies had limited Denmark’s growth or 
competitiveness.   
 
“There is no evidence that environmental measures and expenditure in 
Denmark have to date adversely affected its economic growth or 
international competitiveness. On the contrary, environmental protection 
has become an important selling point for Danish industry. The Danish 
eco-industry has a combined annual turnover of DKr 2 billion (50 
percent for export), and the Danish wind turbine industry has an annual 
turnover of over DKr 5.7 billion (70 percent for export)” (OECD, 1999, 
p. 29).    
 
                                                          
86
 Full quote OECD, p. 23: “Over the last two decades, Denmark has almost stabilized energy use 
during a period of continued economic growth. It has almost tripled the contribution made by 
renewable energy sources to the country’s energy needs, and Danish industries have become 
leaders in environmentally favorable energy technologies such as wind turbines, which are now 
considered as a viable alternative to coal based power plants.” 
87
 Full Quote, OECD, p. 21: “On the other hand, trends in waste generation and CO2 emissions are 
not favorable. As the Danish economy continues to grow in the 1990s, environmental pressures 
from energy, agriculture and transport in particular are still strong.” 
88
 On the contrary, the OECD recommended that Denmark considered ‘additional measures needed 
to meet CO2 reduction, particularly in the energy and transport sectors’ (OECD, 1999, p. 33). The 
OECD additionally marked more analysis of efforts the agricultural sector as especially important 
in decision (OECD, 1999, p. 21,29). 
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The quote shows that the OECD report, which the DEC cite as reason to investigate 
the cost-effectiveness of environmental efforts, reached a contrary conclusion to 
what the DEC stated. The argument for starting the DEC 2002 investigation, that 
Denmark’s environmental results were ‘below average’, must thus have come from 
other sources than the OECD 1999 review. The DEC is thus highly selective in the 
reading of the OECD report’s conclusions regarding the costs of environmental 
measures and expenditure in Denmark. DEC as a calculative agency highlights 
Danish environmental policies as a matter of concern. But the OECD report which 
they cite as support for the need for their inquiry into Denmark’s below average 
performance actually highlights Danish environmental policies as effective and 
innovative.  
 
5.2.3 The DEC 2002 report frame wind power as a Fuel Supplement and 
commensurate CC Mitigation 
The 2002 DEC report had the stated goal of evaluating Denmark’s environmental- 
and energy policies of the 1990’s89, herein wind power through its subsidies and 
enabling taxes. This would be done through the device of a cost-benefit analysis of 
calculating all the direct and indirect costs, and then adding the environmental 
benefits calculated into a monetary value for the period of 1992-200190.This 
calculation brought them to the conclusion that the wind power build-out in 
Denmark during 1992-1999 resulted in a societal loss of 3 bn. DKK (DEC, 2002a, p. 
210,211). The calculation would enact subsidies and taxes as the central object of 
the valuation for wind powers worth. It would furthermore bring salience to the new 
quality Market Distortion, which was decisive in the new dominant valuation frame 
for wind power as a societal investment. Hereafter follows a break-down of the 
major changes to the framing of wind power in the report. The device used was a 
cost-benefit analysis, in which every aspect of a wind power investment is 
calculated into monetary costs and weighed against each other. I will begin by 
analyzing how the DEC calculated the benefits of wind power, and thereafter dive 
into their estimates on costs.  
 
 
                                                          
89
 The DEC report placed itself in direct opposition to a previous calculation from a set of 
calculations the Financial Ministry under the previous government had made in 2001 (DEC, 2002a, 
p. 214; DKGOV, 2001). 
90
 The cost-benefit calculation would not address any existing price discrepancies, such as the 
various carbon lock-in effects that would benefit existing generation (Unruh, 2000). The existing 
prices for electricity on the Danish market were thus treated as the “efficient” prices, which 
determine whether subsidies were valuable to Denmark or not. 
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DEC re-categorize wind power as a Fuel Supplement due to overcapacity 
A determining assumption in the DEC report calculation is that since Denmark had 
enough incumbent power generation capacity over the analyzed period, the wind 
power build-out had resulted in a “surplus capacity” and only saved fuel costs on the 
power plants (DEC, 2002a, p. 210). The DEC inscribes wind power with the same 
quality that DEFU did during the 1970’s and 1980’s, and that ATV actually also did 
in their first calculations in 1975. This quality entails that the electricity produced by 
wind power does not on its own have any value, apart from saved fuel costs on 
conventional coal and gas plants. The DEC very clearly stated that wind power build 
out is “surplus capacity” (D2: #3) 91, and sees the “abundant electricity production 
capacity in Denmark” as the “first and foremost” cause of the societal loss that the 
wind power build-out caused (D2: #12). The DEC also argue that both satisfaction 
of the utilization of wind power for electricity use and the environmental benefits it 
has, could have been reached in a cheaper way by importing it from Norway or 
Sweden (D2: #8)92.  
Consequently, the only utilization value from the added electricity generation by the 
use of wind turbines was calculated as saved fuel costs, namely 14.3 bn. DKK. This 
number is not present in the report itself, but is represented in a subsequently 
released back-ground report called “Cost benefit Analysis, Energy Policy and Taxes 
on Energy and Transport” (Soebygaard, 2002, p. 15). In the 2002 DEC report, it is 
collated into a total cost figure which consists of the total costs of wind turbines 
minus fuel savings (DEC, 2002a, pp. 208–209)93. As was the case in earlier instance 
of the quality Fuel Supplement, the value of wind power is determined by fuel price 
assumptions which again are reflected in electricity price assumptions. But where 
the favored device during the Unique Supplement period, the break-even price 
calculation, showed the assumed fuel prices, fuel prices are now hidden in a 
background report.  If one dives into the assumptions of the background report to the 
main DEC calculation, it becomes clear that the DEC selected a fuel price estimate 
instead of electricity price benchmarks used by the Danish Energy Agency at the 
time. This is shown in Figure 20 (GBA) below. If the produced kWh of wind power 
had been regarded as electricity they would have had a higher value for the final 
calculation, than if they are merely counted as fuel savings. Note that it is not the 
fuel savings vs. electricity price alone which forms the calculation of -4.7 bn. DKK. 
                                                          
91
 The full quotes from the report can be found in Appendix D2, The quotes are listed as D2, 
followed by a # sign and the numbered quote. 
92
 The DEC authors did go on to calculate a value for the quality of CC Mitigation, so this point is 
included to highlight that in the framing of the DEC, the cost of building the wind turbines could 
have been avoided, thereby empathizing the quality of wind power as a Fuel Supplement to the 
energy system. 
93
 As the DEC assumes that the only value of the electricity generated by wind turbines is the saved 
fuel on conventional power plants, and benefits related to CC Mitigation and Environment from 
displacing that fuel (discussed later), they have subtracted an estimate of the saved fuel costs from 
the total cost number presented in the report.  
HBM: Skal rettes til, så 
“Future Potential” også 
reflekterer deres 
Diskonteringsrente 
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It is a sensitivity analysis, which shows what the final result would instead have 
been, if an electricity price of either 23 Oere/KWh or 32 Oere/KWh had been chosen 
instead. This is also noted specifically in the background report, as it is stated that 
the final report would have shown a “societal plus” for wind turbines if the high 
electricity price estimate had been chosen (Soebygaard, 2002, p. 28). If they had 
chosen the low estimate for electricity prices, it would still have resulted in the 
surplus of wind power being halved. So this choice of regarding the wind turbine 
electricity as an entity which was not sold as electricity but merely saved fuel is 
decisive for the final outcome of the DEC report. Figure 20 (GBA) is the authors 
attempt to visualize the above-described sensitivity of the fuel and electricity price 
assumptions.   
 
Figure 20: Visualization of the DEC fuel and electricity assumptions. 
 
To summarize, the background report has a spans of high and low electricity price 
estimates as well as a fuel saving estimate. Furthermore, it is mentioned that a higher 
estimated fuel price would result in a higher value of wind power (Soebygaard, 
2002, p. 28). But the high sensitivity of these assumptions is not elaborated in the 
main report, and the alternative values at higher or lower prices are not presented.  
When the Auken-administration had been cooperating with the financial ministry in 
the 1990’s, it had been calculated that the produced wind turbine electricity was 
sold, so equivalent to the alternatives mentioned in the background report. In the 
2002 DEC report, they only counted saved fuel and thus reached a lower value for 
wind power. This change in assumption has a decisive impact as the societal loss of 
wind turbines increases with 80% (from 2.6 bn. to 4.7 Bn.) between the lowest 
electricity price alternative and the fuel savings benchmark. This sensitivity is 
briefly explained in the background-report (Soebygaard, 2002, p. 14), but not 
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mentioned in the main report. The value of wind power in the main DEC report was 
however also impacted by calculations on the value of mitigating CO2, which will 
be analyzed next.    
 
CC Mitigation Quality is commensurated 
As shown above, the DEC only counted fuel savings on central plants, as the value 
of the electricity output of wind turbines. They would however also set out to assign 
a value to the broader environmental benefits of wind power94. To account for the 
CC Mitigation value, they needed to calculate a benefit for every ton of CO2 that 
would be displaced by the previous decades’ wind power investments. They used 
this estimate to figure out whether or not the monetary representation of fewer CO2 
emissions exceeded the societal costs of wind power. Before diving into the 
calculation, it is worth mentioning that the DEC authors hypothesized that CC 
Mitigation could be achieved more cheaply through flexible mechanism options 
mentioned in the Kyoto-protocol. This would be achieved through a theoretical 
quota market (DEC, 2002a, p. 217). However, as the EU Emission Trading System 
would not come into force until 2005, so at the time of writing the trading of 
emission quotas within the EU was still a theoretical option. The EU-quota market 
would in later reports become the cornerstone of the DEC’s reason to ascribe a low 
value to the quality of CC Mitigation for wind power.   
To estimate the benefit of CO2 emissions avoided, the DEC calculated a monetary 
estimate of the damage done by emitting one ton of CO2. The DEC presented an 
upper bound of 270 DKK/ton and a lower bound number 47 DKK/ton95 for 
calculating the damage effect of emitting CO2 (DEC, 2002a, p. 205). By not 
presenting a middle bound figure, the DEC leaves it to the readers’ interpretation to 
determine what he considers to be closest to the right price for emitting CO2. In 
their calculation, the DEC uses the upper bound number in their case example for 
the value of wind power. However, the sources that they used to find this number 
did not consider it to be their highest estimate, as will be explained hereafter. 
The upper bound CO2 cost estimate of 270 DKK originated from the Danish 
adaption of an extensive EU project called ExternE. In the ExternE project, which 
was one of the highest credited calculations of CO2 damage estimates at the time, 
two ranges of monetary CO2 estimates were presented (DKGOV, 2001; Schleisner 
                                                          
94
 The DEC changed also changed how much air quality would be improved by wind power, as 
they updated the assumptions on how much pollution was assumed to come from Danish power 
plants. The DEC calculated that due to smoke-cleaning and other initiatives, the displaced power 
centralized power plants did not emit as much CO2 as in the 1980’s (DEC, 2002a, pp. 216, 266; 
Soebygaard, 2002, pp. 7–8). This lowered the amount of displaced CO2, but it also had a minimal 
impact on the environmental quality, which relates to air quality.  
95
 The upper bound is equal to 36 EUR/tonne in Real-2002, equivalent to 343 DKK / 46 EUR in 
Real-2017. The lower bound number equals 6 EUR/tonne in Real-2002, equivalent to 60 DKK / 8 
EUR in Real-2017. 
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& Sieverts Nielsen, 1997). The CO2 damage estimate ranges in the ExternE project 
were closely related to the used discount rate96. The ExternE authors did not 
recommend one specific discount rate, but carefully explained their considerations 
of the difficulty in setting it97. Due to the difficulty in setting one final discount rate, 
the ExternE authors recommended two ranges for estimating climate change costs. 
The first was a called a “conservative” outer range, as the authors considered even 
this broad range to likely “underestimate the true uncertainty” (Schleisner & 
Sieverts Nielsen, 1997, p. 90).   The ExternE authors also presented an inner range 
called the “Illustrative Restrictive Range”, which did not stretch as far in both 
directions. This meant that the inner range had a slightly higher low-bound, but also 
a significantly lower high bound. This ranges high estimate covered an estimate with 
a discount rate ranging between 1% with a  (388 DKK/tCO2) and 3% (152 
DKK/tCO2) (Schleisner & Sieverts Nielsen, 1997, pp. 88–90). A lot of calculations 
went into the ExternE ranges in terms of both discount rates and confidence 
intervals, but what is key to notice is illustrated in figure 21 (GBA). Namely that the 
mid-point in the ExternE’s “Illustrative range” would come to make the upper bound 
estimate of CO2 damage costs in the DEC report  (DEC, 2002a, p. 205).  
 
 
Figure 21: Visualization of how the DEC selected their high CO2 price. 
 
                                                          
96
 A discount rate relates to how one values something now as opposed to having it in the future, as 
quoted by the US EPA:  “The value of $1 billion in 100 years is $85 million, $52 million, and $8 
million, for discount rates of 2.5 percent, 3 percent, and 5 percent, respectively” (EPA, 2013) . 
97
 To exemplify how the discount rate relates to climate change mitigation, the ExternE authors 
explained that a 3% discount rate was equal to judging the damages caused by emitting CO2 today, 
to fall to “negligible levels” (Defined as costs of less than 10% of original damages) after 77 years. 
A discount rate of 1% would in comparison mean the CO2 emission damages would not become 
negligible until 230 years later (Schleisner & Sieverts Nielsen, 1997, p. 85). 
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The DEC high CO2 price is thus the middle estimate of the narrow middle-range in 
the ExternE project. As can be seen from figure 21, it had been a higher number had 
the DEC taken the middle estimate of ExternE’s broader range (602 DKK/tonne), or 
even if they had taken the high estimate for the narrow range (388 DKK/tonne). As 
the CC Mitigation value of wind power increases in correlation to how high the 
damage estimate cost of emitting carbon is, the choice of what the DEC considers a 
high CO2 cost estimate is important to the value of wind power. While the ExternE 
authors recognize the political nature of the discount rate and its “significant 
implications for sustainability” (Schleisner & Sieverts Nielsen, 1997, p. 85), the 
DEC authors do not appear explicate these considerations when they sourced the 
number from the ExternE material.   
The DEC’s choice would however create a discrepancy between the costs of wind 
power build-out, which was estimated with a 6% discount rate, and the 
environmental benefits calculated at roughly a 2% discount rate (Soebygaard, 2002, 
p. 5). To account for this discrepancy, the DEC included a lower-bound damage 
estimate, which would be quoted from a 1994 paper by professor Samuel 
Fankhauser (1994) to achieve an estimate of 47 DKK/tCO2 (2002 currency). But 
Fankhauser had only reached the 47 DKK number by setting his model to discount 
the future as heavily as possible. At a discount rate of 3 %, Fankhauser reached 47 
DKK, but this would mean valuing the benefit of being able to emit CO2 today as 
significantly higher than the cost of those emissions damaging impacts in the future 
(Fankhauser, 1994, p. 179). The number of 47 DKK was the converted and adjusted 
for inflation 5.5 $/tCO2, which was cited from the high-discounting end of 
Fankhauser’s range of estimates. Fankhausers range had 20.3 $/tCO2 as the mean of 
the range and recommended estimate. I have visualized this choice by the DEC in 
Figure 22 (GBA) on the next page. 
 
 
Figure 22: Visualization of how the DEC chose the low CO2 price. 
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The DEC label the 47 DKK as a low estimate choosing the equivalent low estimate 
from Fankhausers range98. It is however worth a deep-dive to examine what 
Fankhauser stated about his own initial low estimate. In his 1994 article, Fankhauser 
emphasizes the need to consider the ethical implications of the level of the chosen 
discount rate (Fankhauser, 1994, p. 178)99. Fankhauser especially pointed out that 
his results indicated that ‘the probability of an extremely disastrous outcome is 
higher than that of an extremely modest result’ (Fankhauser, 1994, p. 174) . In the 
conclusion of his paper, Fankhauser therefore recommended a significantly higher 
cost of CO2, than the one used by DEC, as seen in the quote below. 
 
“Although the parameter values underlying the above results broadly 
reflect the current understanding of global warming, there is still an 
element of subjectivity inherent in them. In particular, by assuming a 
triangular distribution for random parameters they neglect the possibility 
of a climate catastrophe….As a rough benchmark figure we suggest a 
value of 20 $/tC for emissions between 1991 and 2000. In subsequent 
decades the value rises to 23 $/tC”. (Fankhauser, 1994, pp. 179–180) 
 
Fankhauser was concerned that even his mean number of 20$/tC, neglected the risk 
of a climate catastrophe, and would follow up his initial paper two years later. In his 
follow-up paper, Fankhauser and co-author Richard Tol explained that as the 
increased scientific understanding of future climate change impacts, such as rapidly 
increased health risk in the form of the spread of disease, had strengthened 
Fankhauser in his original suspicion that the benchmark estimate of 20 $/tCO2 was 
set too low (Fankhauser & Tol, 1996, pp. 668, 669). The DEC does however not 
mention Fankhauser’s initial concerns, nor his later 1996 paper, wherein he deemed 
his original estimates too low to account for climate catastrophes.   
Based on the two above-mentioned sources, combined with minor positive impacts 
for air quality,  the DEC calculated the benefits of wind power to be 7.9 bn. DKK 
for the low CO2 cost estimate (47 DKK/tCO2) and 20.8 bn. for the high cost 
                                                          
98
 The DEC do not specify from where in Fankhausers 26-page article they have drawn the 
numbers from, or how they converted to Danish currency and accounted for inflation from 1994 to 
2002. The author has therefore located Fankhausers mean numbers for his three scenarios, high 
discounting, central and low discounting. At a conversion rate from USD to DKK of 8.2 in 2002 
and when corrected for inflation, Fankhausers high discount mean number of 5.5 USD matches 
roughly with 47 DKK (USFOREX, 2016). The same conversion has then been applied to 
Fankhausers central estimate (called Random), and the low discount case.  This is done to make the 
numbers comparable in DKK.  
99
 Full quote: “The high sensitivity of the results with respect to discounting should come as no 
surprise….The results clearly underline the importance of the discounting question and the crucial 
role ethical issues ought to play in the future debate on global warming”. (Fankhauser, 1994, p. 
178) 
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estimate (270 DKK/tCO2) (DEC, 2002a, p. 209). The 20.8 bn. in environmental 
benefits gets offset by societal cost of 25.5 Bn. DKK to reach a surplus of 4.7 bn. 
DKK. Oddly enough this cost had already had the fuel savings benefit of 14.4 Bn. 
DKK taken out of it. The specific number of fuel savings (14.4 bn. DKK) could thus 
only be found in the background-report. Likewise the specific number of what the 
benefit of having the same amount of electricity sold, as by the alternative kWh 
prices shown in figure 20 could not be found even in the background report 
(Soebygaard, 2002, p. 15)100. I will hereafter open the black-box of the 25.5 bn. that 
make up the cost-side of the cost-benefit calculation.   
 
5.2.4 The DEC 2002 report commensurate the market distorting Costs of Wind 
Power 
It is on the cost-side of the cost-benefit analysis that we can see how the DEC’s use 
of the Market Distortion quality makes the DEC 2002 report such a significant break 
from prior methods of calculations. The DEC took the direct subsidies paid out to 
wind turbines in the analyzed period and combined it with a number of indirect cost 
to signify costs of the new Market Distortion quality.  
The DEC 2002 calculation of the registered subsidies and research grant awarded to 
wind power from 1976-1999 is an uncontroversial Subsidy Burden quality 
calculation, which came to a total of 5.3 bn. DKK (DEC, 2002a, p. 194). This figure 
is however not the decisive one, as the DEC used a total cost figure which drew 
heavily on the Market Distortion quality in their framing.  After revealing the table 
which counted all direct subsidies registered, the DEC authors presented a different 
table wherein their own estimated total cost of wind turbines was calculated to be 
25.5 bn. DKK101. The 25.5 Bn. DKK cost figure consisted of an “Investment, 
Operation and Maintenance” cost of 37.9 Bn. DKK to which direct and indirect 
distortive tax effects (0.7 bn. DKK), and distortive consumption effects (1.2 bn. 
DKK) were added while the fuel savings of 14.4 bn. DKK were subtracted.   
The “Investment, Operation and Maintenance” cost of 37.9 bn. consists of both the 
direct subsidies paid by the government, as well as the construction costs incurred 
by wind turbine owners. The DEC explain this cross-calculation of public sector 
                                                          
100
 This is also why I have not been able to show a specific “electricity price sold value” in Figure 
20, as the background report I analyzed only showed a sensitivity analysis of how the parameters of 
fuel savings vs. low or high electricity price would have impacted the final results of the cost-
benefit analysis. 
101
 It is important to note that like all of the tables in the DEC report, the table III.8 splits the wind 
power costs between private wind turbines and utility turbines. In all of my calculations I have 
combined the two numbers to simplify these already complex calculations. Table III.8 shows total 
costs for privately owned turbines to be 18.8 bn. DKK and for utility owned turbines to be 6.7 bn. 
DKK, so 25.5 bn. DKK combined (DEC, 2002a, p. 209).  
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costs with private sector costs by stating that it is “reasoned that investment costs are 
paid by electricity consumers” (Soebygaard, 2002, p. 14). So society’s cost in this 
calculation is not only the direct subsidies, but also the private funds spent by an 
individual who builds the turbine.  
The indirect tax and consumption distortion costs are not explained in detail, 
although it is noted that they are derived from distortive effects of the taxes used to 
fund the subsidies, and that it is calculated through the Financial Ministry’s model 
called “Danish Rational Economic Agents Model” (DREAM). This model calculates 
the indirect costs, namely distortion effects of having to tax in order to subsidize, 
and derived effects of having higher electricity prices compared to energy produced 
on central power plants (DEC, 2002a, p. 209) . Taxes and subsidies are treated as 
distorting because according to the DREAM model, they caused a lower supply of 
jobs, than in a supposed efficient market with lower taxes and no subsidies (DEC, 
2002a, p. 206)102. The calculation of these indirect costs is argued on the grounds 
that “taxes are distorting” as they “reduce labor supply” leading to a loss in welfare 
(D2, #2).  
 
The Market Distortion quality negates the Industrial benefits and Future Potentials 
The DEC framing of wind power as defined by the quality Market Distortion also 
has the impact that the value of the wind turbine industry and the Future Potential of 
wind power as a technology to a large extent is disregarded. The DEC did not count 
any value from the jobs in the wind industry sector, as it was “assumed that the 
growth of wind industry employment, does not affect the overall employment level” 
(DEC, 2002a, pp. 224, 233) 103. Thus, according to the DEC’s calculations, the 
people employed in the wind turbine industry would have been employed elsewhere, 
if the Danish wind turbine industry had not existed (DEC, 2002a, p. 236)104. Wind 
turbine exports were not counted, as similar exports could have been achieved 
through any alternatively created goods (DEC, 2002a, pp. 224, 236). According to 
the DEC, these jobs would have appeared in other industries had there not been 
taxes to collect revenue for wind power subsidies (D2: #7). The DEC concluded that 
although the Danish wind turbine industry has done “especially well”, it could just 
                                                          
102
 The DEC do not provide further details on how the indirect costs come to be calculated as 21.2 
bn. DKK, and they are not represented separately in the report. Instead the DEC writes in a footnote 
that the numbers are based on own calculations, and cite the published background report by 
economist from the DEC secretariat Jacob Krog Soebygaard (Soebygaard, 2002).  
103
 Full quote: It is assumed that the growth in the wind turbines industry employment does not 
affect the total employment level...The potentially positive employment effects must also be held 
against the costs of supporting the industry, there among distortions by collecting a tax revenue. 
(D2: #7)  
104
 The DEC authors note to this point that any minor effects would have to be held against the 
distortive impacts of the taxes required to deliver the subsidies (DEC, 2002a, p. 233).  
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as well have been caused by “luck” (D2: #16). This is a significant change away 
from both the Unique Supplement and the Climate Solution Valuation Frame, which 
had both included some positive impact from the Industrial quality to wind power.  
The assumption that energy taxes distort markets is based on the assumption that 
electricity would be priced efficiently in a market without subsidies to wind power. 
There is thus an absence of fossil fuel externalities and no consideration of the 
historic subsidies that are sunk into the energy system in the DEC framing. But 
although the current prices cannot be considered “efficient” in signaling value of 
energy investments, the DEC use them to claim that wind power subsidies and the 
taxes enabling them are distorting the market.  
In addition to the Industrial quality, the DEC also discounted the future in a way that 
would disfavor wind power investments. With regards to the discount rate, the DEC 
decided to follow the current discount rate for societal projects used in the financial 
ministry at the time, namely 6%105(Soebygaard, 2002, p. 5). The DEC would then 
conduct a sensitivity analysis with a 3% discount rate and a 270 DKK/tCO2 price 
(DEC, 2002a, p. 208), which the DEC at one point in the report acknowledge would 
have cause the wind power investments to be societally profitable (DEC, 2002a, p. 
213).  
The DEC also discusses whether or not the investments in wind power could have 
caused more exports through faster learning curves. They concluded that there is 
“nothing which indicates that domestic market sales should have contributed with 
substantial experience gains”  (DEC, 2002a, p. 252). Specifically DEC calculated 
that production subsidies given from 1992-1999 only caused a 1.8% decrease in 
wind turbine production costs, compared to a counterfactual “no subsidy” scenario 
(DEC, 2002a, p. 259). But despite this dismissal of wind power investments, the 
DEC include an learning curve benefit of 2 bn. DKK due to domestic sales causing 
an increase in learning effects (DEC, 2002a, p. 266).  This number does not appear 
in the table of the background report and appears to have been added to the main 
report without an explanation of the motivation behind106. The number is however so 
low that the total cost-benefit analysis of wind power still comes to a surplus. The 
DEC authors recognize that future turbines may be “expected to become more 
profitable” due to technological developments (D2: #15). But nonetheless the many 
black-boxed calculations frame wind power as a value-destroying investment for 
Denmark and not something that has been worthwhile. I have attempted to gather 
the many assumptions of the calculation in figure 23 (GBA) below. Note that the 
                                                          
105
 The lower the discount rate is, the more profitable long term projects such as wind farm would 
become. In 2009, the Financial Ministry would lower its discount rate to 5% and again in 2013 it 
would be lowered to 4% (DKGOV, 2016). 
106
 The authors do however state that there is a potential that Danish wind power companies might 
have a position to create export benefits through their market position in the future (DEC, 2002a, p. 
245), which could be in relation to this benefit. 
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surplus of 4.7 Bn. DKK showed in the sensitivity analysis in figure 20, was the final 
number for the calculation before the black-boxed number of 2 bn. DKK for 
learning curve benefits to the industry (bottom-left corner of the below graph) was 
added. As one can see the surplus of 2.6 bn. is the 4.7 bn. after the learning curve 
benefits have been added. The difference of 0.1 is due to rounding of between the 
many calculations. 
    
 
Figure 23: Overview of the DEC cost-benefit analysis assumptions. 
 
The DEC’s value framing concluded that the wind power build-out during the 
1990’s has only given surplus capacity, had not created any jobs, but have had a 
minor effect on increasing domestic sales which enabled marginally faster learning 
curves. This resulted in a welfare loss of roughly 3 bn. DKK to the Danish society 
due to the wind power build-out (DEC, 2002a, pp. 210, 265). The wind power 
investments were categorized as “social-economically unprofitable” and something 
which “should not have been enacted” had the politicians of the 1990’s known better 
(DEC, 2002a, p. 263,264)107.  Ultimately, the DEC framing is based on several 
black-boxed assumptions, which under a minor adjustment would have caused a 
significantly different outcome. 
                                                          
107
 Full quote in English: “The wind power build-out in the 1990’s is an example of a policy that 
has been social-economically unprofitable, even when the business-economic advantages of the 
wind turbines industry is accounted for…. These policies should not have been enacted with the 
knowledge which exists today. ” 
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 5.2.5 Reflections on the DEC 2002 framing of wind power 
The first assumption which is decisive for the socio-economic loss, comes from the 
“surplus” argument, that there was enough generating capacity in Denmark (DEC, 
2002a, p. 265).  This raises the issue of why wind powered electricity is the ‘surplus 
capacity’ and not the already built coal power capacity. This reintroduction of the 
Fuel Supplement quality is decisive to the outcome as is openly shown in the 
alternative calculations of the background report. This calculations show that if wind 
power electricity had been assumed sold at a price of 32 Oere/kWh and not only 
counted by a 17 oere/kWh fuel saving, the calculation would have showed a societal 
plus.  
The second assumption is that once it is accepted that the prosthetic devices of wind 
power are distortive, there is no value calculated to the industry. There is then again 
at the end produced a black-boxed low number of 2 mn. DKK, which is largely 
offset by the 1.9 bn. DKK of distortive effects of the taxes that enable the wind 
turbine subsidies. But the logic here goes well along with the framing that the 
political actors of the Market-coalition used.  
The third assumption to have a decisive impact is the calculation of cost of CO2 
emissions. In the DEC’s main report, the benefits of mitigating CO2 Emissions are 
calculated in two rows , where the  highest number (270 DKK) is the middle of the 
ExternE’s most narrow of two CO2 ranges. But the high number that the DEC lists 
is in reality the middle-range number of the most restrictive of the ranges in the 
ExternE project. If the DEC had selected either the highest number of the cautious 
range (388 DKK) or the middle of the broad range (602 DKK), there would have 
been a significantly higher benefit to displacing CO2, and had thereby a higher value 
of CC Mitigation value of wind turbines. Furthermore, the DEC does not adjust their 
discount rate to reflect the 2% which would match the number for the high CO2 
price (270 DKK). Instead, they include a lower price on CO2 (47 DKK) and hold on 
to a discount rate of 6% to evaluate the cost of building wind turbines. The estimate 
of 47 DKK was so low that even the source author, Samuel Fankhauser, warned 
against using it for calculations both in the 1994 and again in 1996.  
The cumulative effects of the DEC’s calculative assumptions are important because 
it is the fact that the DEC present 270 DKK as their highest price of CO2, which 
makes their argument of wind power being expensive so potent in the media. It thus 
reinforces the period’s beginning narrative that wind power is too expensive, 
although it may have some CC Mitigation effects. When the same report discusses 
the benefits of purchasing CO2 quotas on a market, it is framed that the CC 
Mitigation quality of wind power can be gained elsewhere cheaper and therefore this 
is not a justification for valuing wind power positively. The wind power investments 
can in the DEC framing be seen as an inefficient and therefore a not advisable way 
to mitigate climate change. This is one of the elements where the CC Mitigations 
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high positive impact quality of wind power is questioned, which is seen in other 
areas of the Market-coalitions framing.   
The DEC categorizes wind power through the reintroduction of the Fuel Supplement 
quality, so that the value of the produced electricity only is counted through saved 
fuel and environmental benefits. Additionally, the DEC brings forward the notion 
that wind power distorts the energy market and proximate markets through the taxes 
that enable it. Both of these notions build on a categorization that wind power is a 
disturbance to an established energy system and a coherent market. But unlike the 
Fuel-coalition that saw wind power as both a technical grid-disturbance and a 
business-model disturbance, the DEC see wind power as a disturbance to growth 
and competition in Denmark as a whole. A very powerful narrative is created which 
goes something like “If wind power is not a societally economically attractive, even 
at the highest listed CO2 price, when will it ever be”. It plays into a long established 
public understanding that “wind is expensive”. The “Climate Solution” Valuation 
Network was highly based on the decisive positive impact of CC Mitigation, to 
justify that although Technology Cost might be high right now, the CC Mitigation 
benefits made investment in wind power valuable. The DEC’s valuation 
disassembles the positive impact of this quality, as it (on the surface) frames CC 
Mitigation as something that can be bought on a carbon market cheaper than the cost 
of building wind power. The DEC finishes their report with the following 
recommendation. 
 
“There should however not be kept a narrow focus on developing 
environmental- and energy policies, which have economic advantages, as 
one can overlook alternatives, which have economic costs, but 
nonetheless give a higher net value of society due to environmental 
advantages”. (DEC, 2002a, p. 268) 
 
The segment separates itself in that it generally recommends away from the DEC’s 
own economic calculations and overall conclusion that they were socially-
economically unprofitable and should not have been built with the knowledge 
society has today (DEC, 2002a, p. 263). This is an interesting way of portraying the 
DEC results as being purely about getting the numbers on the table and absent of 
political priorities. The underlying logic appears to be that a politician could want to 
invest in wind power from a politically motivation, while the DEC valuation is the 
neutral economic portrayal of the world. But the many choices of assumption of the 
DEC; pricing CO2 emission, disregarding all wind power jobs and exports, 
discounting the future at 6%, and categorizing wind power as a Fuel Supplement, 
makes their numbers political. These numbers would be discussed vividly in the 
following months, as will be covered next.  
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5.2.6 Reactions to the DEC 2002 report 
The major newspapers all focused on the key point that wind power and the policies 
that had enabled it has been “expensive for society” and was being criticized by the 
government body (Pe. S. Benson & Josevski, 2002; JP, 2002a; Olsen & Hansen, 
2002; Soenderriis, 2002). 
   
Table 5: Newspaper headlines to DEC report 
Date Newssource Headline 
25.05.2002 Information 
Wise men: Wind turbines have been 
expensive 
25.05.2002 Politiken 
Wise men: Wind turbines are expensive 
for society 
25.05.2002 Jyllands-Posten 
Wind power: Wise men criticize the 
energy policy 
28.05.2002 Berlingske 
Wise men: Expensive and bad 
environmental policy 
 
Apart from the initial coverage, the major newspaper editorial pages were also 
discussing the report, and here the division of opinion was clear. The left-wing 
newspaper “Information” stated that the analysis may be correct, but questioned how 
the costs of wind power compare up to other large infrastructure investments 
(Saietz, 2002). Jyllands-Posten, a right-wing newspaper, was on the other hand glad 
to be confirmed in what they had always known to be true, namely that the wind 
power build-out was exclusively driven by ‘faith, lies and distortions’ (JP, 2002b)108. 
In the framing contest that followed, the DEC would exchange written arguments 
with several critics, who did not agree with their assumptions and results. The critics 
counted Svend Auken (Auken, 2002b), Asbjoern Bjerre, director of the wind turbine 
owners association (Asbjørn Bjerre, 2002), Soeren Krohn, director of the DWIA 
(Krohn, 2002), Christian Ege, director of the NGO, The Ecological Council, and a 
combined letter from Niels Meyer, now retired professor of DTU, Henrik Lund and 
                                                          
108
 Full quote from JP OpEd: Rotating Madness: “The landscape-polluting wind turbines that were 
set up during the 90’s have combined resulted in a loss in the billions…Denmark’s energy- and 
environmental policy (has) exclusively been driven by faith, lies and distortions.” 
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Frede Hvelplund, both professors at Aalborg University (Hvelplund, Lund, & 
Meyer, 2003).  The discussions concerned several assumptions, but what drew the 
most critique was the assumption that wind power was only excess energy. In this 
regard Asbjoern Bjerre brought up older examples of public spending, which had 
not been mentioned in the DEC report. 
 
“The economists have taken the clear political choice of considering 
wind power in the period of the later 1990's to be excess capacity. They 
themselves write that it was decisive for their results....As one will 
remember, the necessity of building the Northern Jutland plant and other 
coal-powered blocs was heavily debated (in 1992, ed.). With market-
terms and privatization in sight, one (the Government and the social-
democrats in 1992, ed.) chose to build excess power plant capacity to a 
sum of 10 bn. DKK…..The wise men could just as well have written, that 
the field did not pay off until the corn had been harvested”. (Asbjørn 
Bjerre, 2002) 
 
Asbjoern Bjerre refers to the 1992 decision to build the Nordjyllandsvaerket, the last 
built 410 MW coal plant in Denmark. As described earlier, there had been heavy 
debate about whether or not Denmark should have built the coal plant, as it would 
jeopardize the environmental goals set forth in Energi2000 (H. Lund, 2014). 
Asbjoern Bjerre argued that since none of the existing infrastructure, which DEC 
consider the ‘non-excess’ supply of power, appeared on free market terms, then it 
could just as easily be the coal plant, Nordjyllandsvaerket, which was a bad societal-
economic decision (Asbjørn Bjerre, 2002).  
To this argument, the DEC would reply that they were not trying to justify the 
decision to build the Nordjyllandsvaerk, but were focusing on the cost of wind 
power (DEC, 2002b). Since the coal plant was there first, it is not the DEC’s task to 
calculate whether this was a good investment decision or not. Niels Meyer and the 
two Aalborg University academics, Frede Hvelplund and Henrik Lund, picked up on 
this notion and responded with a calculative comparison, explained in the following 
quote109. 
 
                                                          
109
 Note that in Hvelplund, Meyer and Lunds quote, they cite a societal loss of 10 bn. DKK This is 
because the DEC had also calculated their way to show that the decentral heating investments were 
a loss-making endeavor. The reply of the academics was thus related to the full calculation and not 
only the part about wind power.  
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“Capacity costs (of the existing coal and gas fleet, ed.) are not included, 
and the wisemen apparently overlook operation and maintenance costs. 
Hereby, the wisemen change the calculative assumptions compared to 
the Danish energy agency or the financial ministry, without any form of 
analysis as justification for this change. This way of calculating is 
completely essential to the wisemen’s arrival at the societal-economic 
loss of approximately 10 bn. DKK for wind power and decentral 
heating....practically all new facilities would come badly out of such a 
calculation…with the same assumptions the two central power plants 
(Nordjyllandsvaerket and Skaerbaekvaerket, ed.) would show a 
combined loss of roughly 13 bn. DKK”. (Hvelplund et al., 2003) 
“It can be hard to understand how the Wisemen have been able to make 
such fundamental mistakes, but maybe  it is caused by the recent years 
development, where the Wisemen-institution have moved into new areas, 
which are far away from the expertise the institution possess…It is also a 
large problem, that the Wisemen-institutions prestige is so large, and 
press coverage of their conclusions is so comprehensive, that it is 
practically impossible for the Wisemen to admit to fundamental 
mistakes”. (Hvelplund et al., 2003)  
 
By opening the black box of the calculations for the existing energy infrastructure, 
which the DEC authors had left closed throughout their calculations, Meyer, 
Hvelplund and Lund further warned of the implications of DEC moving into the 
field of energy planning and calculations. As Meyer, Hvelplund and Lund argued, 
the DEC 2002 report represented a fundamental break as economists from the field 
of public Finance, now moved into energy system calculations. These discussions 
went on for several months until January 2003, where the DEC authors concluded 
the discussion and maintained their conclusions. 
 
“Electricity production from wind turbines is unpredictable and varies 
considerably across the year. Out of concern to supply security, the 
system-responsible companies can therefore not account any effect-value 
of significance to wind turbines…It therefore seems reasonable to 
assume, that wind power only saves fuel costs on the central power 
plants. (DEC, 2003, p. 4) 
…We maintain the report’s recommendations and conclusions. We 
hereby consider the debate as ended as far as we are concerned, and 
leave it to others to take it further”(DEC, 2003, p. 7).  
5. RE-FRAMING OF WIND AS A VALUE-DESTROYING MARKET DISTORTION 
153 
With this article, the half year of discussions back and forth between DEC and their 
critics would end. The 2002 report represents the introduction of cost-benefit 
analysis as a device for valuation of societal cost of wind power. The DEC’s 
conclusions made it into the IEA’s first country review report for Denmark in 2006. 
The DEC 2002 calculation was in connection with this highlighted as part of the 
proof that support policies came with ‘additional costs’ in the form of “interference 
with the competitive dynamics of the electricity market”, and decreased ‘market 
efficiency’ (IEA, 2006, p. 10)110.   
The 2002 DEC report has also in recent years been cited by right-wing newspapers 
such as Berlingske (P. Andersen, 2012) and politicians. One recent example of the 
latter is head of Liberal Alliance, Anders Samuelsen, who in 2013 quoted the DEC 
2002 paper as proof that the wind power investments of the 1990’s were “a colossal 
societal waste of resources” (Samuelsen, 2013). In addition to the 2002 report, the 
DEC would in the years from 2008-2016, especially reiterate the part of their 
framing revolved around the EU ETS carbon quota Market. This became one of the 
most resilient arguments against wind power. I go into a further analysis of the 
DEC’s framings of wind power in the reports from 2008-2016 in Appendix C.   
 
5.3. NEW CALCULATIVE CENTERS ARE ESTABLISHED (2002-
2004) 
In addition to the Danish Economic Council (DEC) entering the scene of energy as a 
calculative centre, completely new calculative centers also emerged in the first few 
years of the Market Distortion period. The first one, “Institut for Miljøvurdering / 
Institute for Environmental Assessment (IMV)”, would create reports specifically 
related to wind power shortly after its conception, whereas the second, Center for 
Politiske Studier / Center for Political Studies (CEPOS), took on a broader 
ideological scope and would not produce its first report on wind power until 2009. 
The conception of both centers will hereafter be covered in this chapter, while the 
2009 CEPOS report will be covered in chapter 6. 
 
5.3.1 New center established as platform for climate mitigation delay 
The IMV center originates from the Fogh-government manifesto, which included an 
intention to establish a center to ensure environmental goals were ‘reached in the 
most economically effective way’ and that pollution was mitigated where you ‘get 
                                                          
110
 . In this report, the IEA’s own analysis concluded that Danish industry and the country as a 
whole benefitted from a large share of renewables which was ‘a direct result of policy action’(IEA, 
2006, p. 119). 
THE VALUATION HISTORY OF DANISH WIND POWER 
154
 
most for the effort’ (STM.dk, 2001). In line with the Market-coalition’s stance 
against a “tyranny of experts’ (Rasmussen, 2002),  the new IMV was not required to 
have a professor or similar academic expert as its director (FT, 2001) . Rumours 
emerged that the controversial choice of Bjoern Lomborg as director for the IMV 
was decided early on, and the left-wing opposition parties would strongly oppose the 
process around this choice. This is seen in the opposition’s comments to why they 
opposed the law which set up funding for the institute. 
 
“These parties (S, R, SF, ed.) share the view of the collected evidence 
answers, that the institute (IMV, ed.) should apply a broader approach to 
the field than solely an economic view… This act has been handled in a 
deeply unsatisfying and deeply biased manner, but this is due to a fully 
conscious choice from the government’s side”. (FT, 2001)111 
 
Anders Fogh Rasmussen (AFR) had met personally with Lomborg shortly after 
having won the election (Dahlager & Rothenborg, 2007),  and Ole P. Kristensen, 
Lomborg’ s former political science professor, was appointed as head of the 
governing board responsible for choosing the director (Kjoelby, 2003; J. S. Nielsen, 
2002b; Ritzau, 2003)112.  Lomborg had in 1999 drawn significant attention for four 
opinion pieces in the centre-left newspaper Politiken, in which he argued that 
climate change problems were highly exaggerated, and that money was being 
wasted on mitigating it (Hoyer, 2015). The majority of Lomborg’s IMV team 
primarily consisted of political scientists and economists, as Lomborg emphasized 
that the nature of the employees’ professional background was not as important as 
their ability to argue for a given viewpoint (From, 2002b). The Market-coalition had 
thus by the spring of 2002 established a new calculative center, which would help 
establish the new framing of wind power as value-destroying. In the words of energy 
and climate journalist at Politiken, Jesper Tornbjerg, the new government had 
wanted a significant shift in how the quality of CC Mitigation was framed or left out 
completely. 
 
                                                          
111
 The opposition parties had on their own arranged hearings with the ecological Council, DTU, 
Aalborg University and other climate-coalition actors, wherefrom the evidence they mention stems 
from. The opposition’s objection had no effect on the act, which was not subject to a public 
hearing. 
112
 Ole P. Kristensen would go on to join the board of CEPOS, a rightwing think tank, and become 
an editorial writer at Boersen, an influential rightwing newspaper. The only member of parliament 
who was part of the initial board was Anders Samuelsen (R), who 7 years later would go on to form 
the right-wing party Liberal Alliance.   
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“From 2001 and some years onwards, the (Venstre-Conservative, ed.) 
government seriously questioned the issue of climate change. There were 
some sceptical researchers that were a lot more active. There was the 
whole controversy around Lomborg and Svensmark. There was a 
different psychological climate in Denmark”. (Interview 6: Tornbjerg, 
Quote 1) 
 
The IMV would over its five year lifetime publish several reports with the purpose 
of creating debate and shaping public understanding in comparing climate change 
mitigation costs to other global development issues.  This work helped shape the 
Market Distortion Valuation Frame, as explained by environmental spokesman for 
Venstre, Eyvind Vesselbo.   
 
“The purpose of the institute (IMV, ed.) was that it should spur debate 
and create reports, which we could design politics from,….you should be 
able to demand that an institute which was created to place the topic of 
“most environment for the money” at center, also deliver some material, 
as they used to be good at”. (R. B. Petersen, 2005) 
 
The IMV was from the start designed to create devices of assembly for the new 
framing of environmental policies and herein wind power. The specific logic was 
that the environment should be protected for the minimum possible cost and only to 
the extent that a limited pot of money would allow. This is evident in the IMV’s 
fifth report “Denmark’s costs of reducing CO2” which calculated different 
approaches to meeting Denmark’s 2012 commitments under the Kyoto protocol 
(IMV, 2002). In this report, the IMV compared an initiative of closing Denmark’s 
electricity exports while enacting a domestic CO2 price with an alternative of 
constructing 5.3 GW of offshore wind power. The IMV reached the conclusion that 
Denmark could fulfill its Kyoto protocol ambitions by the above-described exports 
maneuver between 2005-2012 at a price of 1.6 bn. DKK (2002 Currency). The 
authors did however foresee complications with neighboring countries, so they 
argued that Denmark’s CO2 emission reductions could also be reached by utilizing 
flexible CO2 quota trading (IMV, 2002, p. 49).  The cost of 1.6 bn. DKK was then 
compared to what it would cost to solve the Kyoto commitment only by building 
offshore wind farms. For numbers on this, the IMV used the DEA’s estimates on the 
five proposed offshore wind farms of the 1998 SR agreement (IMV, 2002, p. 25). In 
that calculation, the DEA estimated that the 750 MW offshore wind power could 
displace 2.1 mio. t/CO2 per year. The IMV then took this number and scaled up the 
investment by a factor of six to get enough offshore wind farms to displace 15 mn. 
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t/CO2 annually. This corresponds to a build-out of 5.3 GW of offshore wind farms 
at a scaled-up cost of 33 bn. DKK between 2005-2030113. The 8 year maneuver of 
closing Denmark’s borders for electricity export from 2005-2012, combined with a 
domestic CO2 price from 2008-2012, is then compared to the total direct societal 
cost of having 5.3 GW of offshore wind built in 3 years (2003-2005) and operate for 
25 years (IMV, 2002, p. 25; 49). The IMV admitted that the wind turbines would 
generate CO2 reductions far beyond the timeframe of Denmark’s Kyoto 
commitments, but argued that it still was “fair” to disregard the later CO2 reductions 
and compare the two substantially different timeframes. The basis for this 
conclusion was that “only the total investment of 33 bn. DKK, would entail 
reductions in a size equivalent to the totaled shortfall’ (IMV, 2002, p. 26). The IMV 
authors thus concluded that “it is approximately 20 times more expensive to build 
wind turbines than it is to stop electricity exports” (IMV, 2002, p. 25). This report 
would immediately go into the news cycle, as the IMV wrote a large OpEd in 
Jyllandsposten about the framed high subsidy cost of offshore wind turbines. 
 
“IMV’s calculations show that if wind turbines for example should save 
Denmark for the same amount of CO2, that a stop to exports would do, 
the price would be 33 bn. DKK. Even though the wind turbines would 
produce power and reduce CO2 emissions over the next decades, it 
would nonetheless still be very expensive to construct them to live up to 
Kyoto in the period 2008-2012”. (Lomborg & Kristoffersen, 2002) 
 
 
The calculation that is explained above is an example of how the Market Distortion 
quality can impact the CC Mitigation quality of wind power. This is manifested 
through how the materiality of the power derived from the wind rotating the blades, 
is compared to a commodity that could be bought cheaper through emission trading 
certificates.   
The IMV would under Lomborg’s management continue to write reports like the 
one examined above, mainly based on external sources and focused on isolating 
elements of environmental policy to highlight the costs. In 2003, a group of six 
Scandinavian professors within economics and environmental studies assessed the 
IMV’s first eight reports on a set of parameters, among them scientific quality.  On 
the examined report “Denmark’s cost of reducing CO2”, the group of professors 
                                                          
113
 If this sounds unrealistic to the reader, she is correct. As the IMV’s analyzed period is 2005-
2012, and the 2,1 mn. ton/CO2 is when all parks are up and running at full capacity, this would 
require Denmark to build the parks in 2.5 years, equivalent to more than 2 GW of build-out per 
year. At the end of 2002, Denmarks total wind power capacity was at 2.9 GW, hereof 0.2 GW 
offshore wind (EnerginetDK, 2016a).  
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concluded that the comparison was “misleading” and presented a “very un-nuanced 
perspective”, as the conclusions were built on the “completely unrealistic 
assumption” that CO2 emissions would seize to be a problem after 2012 (Hjorth-
Andersen, 2003, p. 9).  
Following the stark critique, Lomborg resigned as director of the IMV, but 
continued to be connected as a consultant. The IMV would over five years receive a 
total funding of more than 88 mn. DKK (93 mn. DKK in 2017-real), until a 
prolonged period of critique and errors (Tang & Aagaard, 2006) led to its closure 
(Ritzau, 2011). The 2007 financial budget split the planned IMV funding between 
Lomborg’s newly established Copenhagen Consensus Center and the Danish 
economic Council, which established an “environmental economic council” branch 
to host the former IMV employees (Ritzau, 2006).  This Copenhagen Consensus 
Center carried on Lomborg work and received a total funding of 49.5 mn. DKK (52 
mn. DKK in 2017-Real) up to 2012 (Ritzau, 2011)114.  
The IMV reports were not used directly in any legislation, but nevertheless Lomborg 
used the IMV as a platform get exposure as a global speaker (Jerking, 2008)115. His 
exposure peaked in 2004, when he was listed among the world’s 100 most 
influential people by Time Magazine (TIME, 2004), and he had continued to stay 
engaged as a global opinion-maker, frequently advocating against the build-out of 
wind power (Oreskes & Conway, 2010). This message has made him a favored 
voice in debates on public energy-policy for some right-wing politicians in 
Denmark, which will also be mentioned in Chapter 7: Subsidy Burden (2015-2017).  
 
5.3.2 CEPOS is formed to uphold Market Distortion quality over the long-term  
In addition to creating the IMV-centre, AFR would in a October 2003 parliament 
speech encourage private companies to fund a think-tank, which could promote 
liberal ideas and make it easier for him to pass liberal policies (O. B. Olesen, 2003). 
The two liberal newspapers, Jyllandsposten and Berlingske, would shortly thereafter 
reiterate AFR’s encouragement in their editorial pages. Jyllandsposten called for a 
think-tank modelled after American examples and sponsored by organizations like 
Danish Industry and the Danish Employers Association. This think-tank should not 
engage in academic research but instead deliver ‘a product, which is immediately 
                                                          
114
 Once a new centre-left government took office it cancelled all funding for the centre. Lomborg 
moved his Copenhagen Consensus Centre out of Denmark and thereafter used private donations for 
funding. There is little transparency over the donors, but it is known that roughly one third of the 
centers total reported donations in 2013 (621.057 USD) was a 200.000 USD donation from the 
billionaire hedge-fund manager Paul Singer’s Foundation (Readfern, 2015).   
115
 Steen Gade, Energy spokesman for SF: ”Lomborg had significant political importance. But 
professionally it (the IMV’s work) was a fluke”. Eyvind Vesselbo, environmental spokesman 
Venstre: “The specific reports were never used for anything.” (Jerking, 2008).  
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useable for politicians”, and help Fogh Rasmussen fight against the “Social-
democratic worldview, which lays as a heavy blanket over the public debate” (JP, 
2004a). Berlingske called for an end to “a leftist orientation”, which had become so 
“taken for granted” that it had “dulled everyone’s political orientation” and led to an 
“amputated dialog” in society (Berlingske, 2004). In March 2004, the new think-
tank CEPOS would be formed in an effort initially led by PhD-fellow in medieval 
political history David Gress, who a few months earlier had returned from the 
conservative and privately-funded American Hoover institution (O. B. Olesen, 
2003). Among other notable founders were Christopher Arzrouni, former strategic 
advisor  to AFR, and Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, economist and Mont Pelerin Society 
member (Kronsted, 2004b). CEPOS would list conservative American think-tanks 
such as American Enterprise Institute, Heritage Foundation and the Cato Institute as 
an inspiration for “Important laboratories for developing new ideas”, and would 
initiate a fund-raising campaign (Elbjørn, 2004). They were very quickly denied by 
Danish Industry and the Danish Employers Association, who supported the idea, but 
would not sponsor it (Kronsted, 2004a). But seven months would pass and when 
CEPOS called for their first annual gathering in October 2004, they had suddenly 
raised 15 mn. DKK (18 mn. DKK in Real-2017). CEPOS would not disclose their 
donors, but highlighted that it was primarily from privately owned “beneficiary 
foundations” (Busch, 2004), which according to CEPOS ensured that they would not 
be “in anyone’s pocket” (Rose, 2004).  A new calculative center was born and in the 
next period, we will see how CEPOS specifically targeted wind power in a 2009 
report on the Market Distortion effect of wind’s prosthetic devices.      
 
5.4. THE INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATES DURING POLITICAL 
STANDSTILL (2004-2006) 
Once the Climate Solution valuation network had been destabilized and the 
domestic market had come to a stand-still, the wind turbine industry turned its focus 
abroad. There was however a short re-opening of wind power build-out plans in 
2004, as the utilities pushed the government to negotiate a broad agreement on the 
electricity market. This would see a revival to some of the formerly cancelled 
offshore wind power farms.   
 
5.4.1 The political compromise of 2004 
The first years of the Market Distortion period was a time where new calculative 
centers were established and little new legislation was made. But in 2004, DEF and 
ELSAM had begun to put pressure on the Fogh-government to solve two specific 
issues that followed after the 1999 liberalization of the electricity market. The first 
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issue was a request for full access to a part of the companies’ equity, which since the 
1999 liberalization was not accessible. In the 1999 liberalization agreement, certain 
parts of the utilities equity was designated as “bound”,  and should be used to lower 
electricity taxes for consumers (Tingkær, 2012). The municipalities and 
shareholders of the various utilities wanted access to the equity, which by 2004 
amounted to a total of 20 bn. DKK (Tornbjerg, 2004).  
The second issue revolved specifically around ELSAM, the largest utility-coalition 
in Denmark, owner of 36% of Danish electricity production and 49% of district 
heating (DR, 2004). Elsam was planning to buy a majority share in the large 
electricity seller NESA for 10.5 bn. DKK, an illegal move since 1999 as a utility 
provider was not allowed to own a seller (I. H. Andersen, 2004; Bjerge & Kaufholz, 
2004)116. 
The left-wing opposition, led by Socialdemokratiet and Radikale Venstre, knew that 
the government had to include them in an agreement as they were part of the 
original broad political agreement in 1999. These remaining Climate-coalition actors 
demanded that some of the cancelled offshore wind capacity was restored in the 
form of three new offshore wind farms, as well as a kick-start to the onshore wind 
build-out (Pihl-Andersen, 2004)117. The Market-Coalition did somewhat recognize 
that the wind turbine technology had evolved (Ritzau, 2004), but worried that new 
offshore wind farms would be too heavily subsidized, and would prefer to wait until 
offshore wind could be built on market terms (Pihl-Andersen, 2004). In March 2004, 
the negotiations were close to a complete breakdown and Venstre’s energy 
spokesman, Kim Andersen threatened that if no deal was reached, then “energy 
would no longer be a theme in this election cycle” (Tornbjerg, 2004). A compromise 
was reached on the 29
th
 of March 2004. The Market-coalition secured the necessary 
votes to solve the two above-mentioned issues, and the Climate-coalition got plans 
for two 200 MW offshore wind farms, assigned to the sites Horns Rev 2 and Omoe, 
and a repowering subsidy scheme aimed for a net increase of 175 MW onshore wind 
(Bjerge & Kaufholz, 2004)118.  
The agreement is likely among the most difficult to land in the history of Danish 
energy policy, and consisted of three separate agreements. Svend Auken led the 
negotiations for Socialdemokratiet, and noted that although the VK-government had 
                                                          
116
 The deal would also give ELSAM a 36% share in E2 Energi, a large utility in Eastern Denmark, 
thereby creating a monopoly-like position in the Danish electricity market. 
117
 SocialDemokratiet and Radikale Venstre were not happy about releasing the equity in the 
utilities, as they feared it would be used for areas outside of energy. Additionally, they feared the 
monopoly-position that ELSAM could gain from buying NESA. 
118
 Notable other mentions of the agreement is a decision to liberalise the decentral heat-power 
plants, so that they would only receive a fixed subsidy (grundbeloebet) and therefrom would 
operate on the NordPool market when it came to electricity (Sandoe, 2004b). The agreement also 
saw common ground on the creation of a state grid operator, EnerginetDK, which would own the 
transmissionlines, to ensure they never came off Danish hands(I. H. Andersen, 2004).  
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not mentioned “environment” once in the final 12-page energy agreement, the 
opposition had managed to secure some wind build-out (I. H. Andersen, 2004)119. 
CEO of Elsam, Peter Hoestgaard Jensen, was pleased with the liberalization part of 
the agreement, but criticized the decision to build more wind power stating that “this 
is not the way to get more environment for the money” (I. H. Andersen, 2004). 
Economics and Business minister, Bendt Bendtsen ensured his critics that the money 
spent on wind power, would be saved on the liberalization, and that he had no 
further plans “to make more deals, which costs the consumers money” (Sandoe, 
2004a). The Fogh-government also had to make a separate agreement exclusively 
between themselves and the Danish People’s party, giving the right-wing supporting 
party veto-right to block any further increases in PSO-costs during the next 10 years 
(Sandoe, 2004d). This veto right did however only apply to the sitting VK 
government and was nullified with the 2012 energy agreement.   
 
5.4.2 Market-coalition try to maintain unity as material build-out goes into 
complete standstill 
The 2004 agreement was clearly a difficult political compromise on both sides of the 
isle, and did not significantly change the Market-coalitions dominant framing of 
wind power. The planned onshore build-out stayed flat in the coming years, as only 
4 out of 16 regions designated suitable build-out areas within the deadline. In 
November 2004, half a year after the regions should have designated areas, the 
newly appointed Conservative minister of Environment, Connie Hedegaard, was 
tasked with the uphill battle of getting the regions to comply. Although she would 
call the regions in for a “friendly conversation” on the importance of building wind 
power, she could not guarantee that the areas would be designated. Hedegaard was, 
unlike her predecessor Lundholt, motivated towards solving the stalled local build-
out (H. Munksgaard, 2004),  but she was unable to coerce the regions to comply. 
Combined with the still very uncertain framework conditions, the onshore wind 
power build-out remained at a stand-still for years to come. 
The year 2005 would see the first small signs that not all actors in the Market-
coalition still agreed on the framings of wind power. Venstre’s environmental 
spokesman, Eyvind Vesselbo, would in May 2005 attempt to justify the 
government’s dramatic 2002 cuts as a necessary move away from a “far too 
religious” environmental policy. Vesselbo reminded the journalist that Venstre had 
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 Although it may appear as a victory for the Climate-Coalition actors that they got two offshore 
wind farms negotiated into the deal, the final agreement this was a small part of the total agreement. 
The far-left party Enhedslisten decided to abstain from the move to liberalize the energy sector 
further, and was therefore left outside of the whole agreement. On the other far side of the political 
spectrum, the Danish Peoples Party was so adamantly against the build-out of wind power that they 
only voted for the liberalization sub-part of the agreement (Sandoe, 2004c). 
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roots as a farmer’s party, and that the environment had not historically been a core 
value of theirs. But he now believed to have experienced a “more and more open 
attitude to wind-turbines” in the population and even in Venstre’ s political base 
(Rehling, 2005). But despite Vesselbo’s experiences, the government did not change 
policy. In July 2005, a government energy strategy for 2025 was published which 
only contained the already agreed build-out from 2004, combined with an ambition 
to phase out renewable subsidies (DKGOV, 2005)120. Flemming Hansen, 
Conservative Minister of Transportation and Energy, defended the plan by arguing 
that “we are not running a planned economy, we let the market decide”121 (J. S. 
Nielsen, 2006a). The right-wing newspaper Berlingske would continue to cite the 
DEC 2002 report as documentation that wind power caused societal losses due to 
the Market Distortion quality (B, 2005). Minister of taxation, Kristian Jensen (V), 
would also echo the DEC’s praise of quota markets (K. Jensen, 2005). In a 2005 Op-
ed, he would voice his suspicion towards the “planners and bureaucrats” who tried 
to “save the world” with wind power investments, as seen below.   
 
“In a planned economy, reality must submit to the plan…Those who can 
get their hands on the states’ revenue thinks this is good policy. There is 
thus many who have an interest in a (energy, ed.) plan....Planners and 
bureaucrats in the state and in the semi-public “rest-in-themselves” 
companies are ensured occupation and career. The fact that many stand 
to gain something on a plan, is not necessarily an endorsement. On the 
contrary, it is ordinary citizens and companies that lose much more than 
the proponents of the plan gain….The government is with the new 
strategy and tax-stop particularly active in the fight for the ordinary 
citizens and companies’ interests. That is achieved by saying no to those, 
who temptingly state that they can save the world through a ‘targeted’, 
‘ambitious’, ‘progressive’ public plan-regulation”. (K. Jensen, 2005) 
 
The description of “planners and bureaucrats” draws parallels to AFR’s 2002 speech 
about “taste-judges” and implies the notion that if these people were not arguing 
                                                          
120
 The 2005 Energy plan also came with a task to re-evaluate the possible offshore sites that were 
identified in the 1997 survey of the seabed to identify where the two agreed 200 MW offshore wind 
farms should be. Horns Rev 2 was ok, but local inhabitants had voiced concerns that the Omoe 
location might endanger wildlife or buried cultural sites. The survey would end up delaying the 
construction of both offshore wind farms and one of the farms, Roedsand 2, would not have its 
tender decided until 2007 (Ritzau, 2007c). Apart from the two wind farms agreed in 2004, the 2005 
Energy Plan stated that any future offshore wind power should only be built at the pace of the 
energy-system.    
121
 In the same interview, Flemming Hansen ridiculed a recently published energy plan from 
Radikale Venstre, which looked towards 2050, stating that it was “embarrassing”, that Radikale 
Venstre thought they could predict what the future energy system would look like.    
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about externalities and market failures, there would be a ‘natural’ result produced by 
the energy market. Kristian Jensen also frames some citizens as the “ordinary 
citizens and companies”, who would suffer from the value-destroying investments in 
market-distorting subsidies.  He thus implicitly argues that he would prefer to have 
no plan, instead of risking that “reality must submit to the plan”.  
It was the highly salient Market Distortion quality which held together the dominant 
frame of this period. The Aesthetics quality was also present but mainly confined to 
the editorial pages of newspapers Berlingske and JP. They would describe how wind 
turbines cause “aesthetic” and “physical” pollution through their size, and through 
claims of low-frequent noise and flashing sunlight annoyances (B, 2005; JP, 2004b). 
Together with these two newspapers, the political actors of the Market-coalition 
were, apart from outliers like Eyvind Vesselbo and Connie Hedegaard, still strongly 
assembled around the framing of wind power as a value-destroying distortion of 
markets. But the actors who had been at the boundary of the Market-coalition were 
Danish Energy (Formerly DEF) and their utility members. They were undergoing a 
larger consolidation in these years and would begin to break away from the Market-
coalition’s framing of wind power.   
 
5.4.3 Industry consolidation creates Danish offshore wind power-house   
While politicians and media railed against wind power’s distortive effects at the 
home market, the wind power industry had focused on developing export markets, 
and was towards 2005-2006 growing its exports considerably. The manufacturers 
were consolidating, as suppliers NEG MICON and Vestas merged (Godske, 2004) 
merged in 2004 while the third large manufacturer, Bonus Energy, was bought by 
German industrial giant Siemens AG shortly thereafter (Holm, 2004).   
In addition to growing a consolidated and stronger Industrial footprint the turbine 
manufacturers would also gain an important ally. In March 2006, the EU 
commission approved the merger of DONG, Elsam, E2, NESA, Københavns Energi 
and Frederiksberg Forsyning to form the utility giant of DONG Energy (DR, 2006). 
This would give the industry a strong voice led by Anders Eldrup, long-time head of 
department at the influential Ministry of Finance that Svend Auken had collaborated 
with during the Nyrup-administration in the 1990’s. But although Eldup had worked 
with Svend Auken in the 1990’s, he was not only focused on CC Mitigation, as he 
considered Energy Independence to be as salient a quality. This is seen in the 
following 2006 statement from Eldrup.  
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“We are facing two considerable problems – a climate problem, which is 
larger than in any other European country and an energy supply security 
problem in connection with the transition from being an energy exporter 
to becoming an energy importer…If we can utilize the strong 
competences we have in the area of energy, we have the opportunity to 
solve the challenges of the Danish energy supply and contribute to 
solving the climate problems simultaneously. It requires large resources 
for research and transition. It requires cooperation between energy 
companies, knowledge institutions and the public sector.” (Eldrup, 2006)   
 
The new DONG Energy was a company, which had a unique knowledge-base on 
offshore wind power compared to its global competitors. There were opportunities 
going forward, but the new large industrial actor did not share the assuredness that 
there was no room for coal, which had defined the Climate-coalition. To Anders 
Eldrup, there was still some way to go in terms of Technology Cost and integration, 
as seen in the below two quotes from January 2007. 
 
“We need to do a lot more about renewable Energy, but it cannot cover 
our needs in the foreseeable future and therefore needs ‘a partner’: 
coal…the perfect partnership, as I see it”. (Ritzau, 2007a) 
“Wind power cannot solve the energy problem in the foreseeable future 
because wind power is too unstable and perhaps too expensive”. 
(Stenvei, 2007) 
 
Although Dong Energy was a global powerhouse within offshore wind power 
competences, it owned major coal assets in Denmark. So there was a new coalition 
forming which included a larger group of actors, wherein some of them still 
operated coal. However, the Industrial potential of offshore wind power was 
growing and this was also leading to a change in valuation devices. The first sign of 
this change was a small calculation that Danish Energy ordered from the 
consultancy EA Energy-Analysis in 2006. The task was to make an LCOE 
comparison of build-out options for Denmark. Danish Energy wanted to highlight 
what costs would look like for 10 different energy sources Denmark could build in 
2015. The newsletter, in which Danish Energy published the results, would refer to 
wind power as a generic source, but the costs that had been calculated were on new 
offshore wind farms, with the word “offshore” only occurring in the graph that 
compared the sources (Energi-Agenda, 2006). In the background report that EA 
Energy Analysis delivered to Dansk Energi, the consultants explained that offshore 
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wind had been chosen, as it “was expected to have the greatest build-out potential in 
Denmark (EA, 2006, p. 48)”122. Onshore wind was at this point in time considered 
such an unlikely build-out option, that it was absent in a comparative calculation on 
the various energy sources.  
The Climate-coalition’s device of LCOE was returning, but it appeared that the new 
framing would be slightly different than in the 1990’s. The utilities were starting to 
actively frame wind power as valuable, although they left out onshore wind. But 
although these new actors did not see a future without fossil fuels as clearly as the 
Climate-coalition had done, there was an international momentum gathering around 
the urgency of solving the climate crisis. These many new developments would 
usher in the Global Advantage frame that would slowly come to form from 2007 and 
onwards. But before we move on to this period, I will summarize the Market 
Distortion valuation frame and the valuation network that upheld it for the five years 
from 2002-2006.  
 
5.5. MARKET DISTORTION: VALUATION FRAME SUMMARY 
In this section, I summarize the third period of the analysis, Market Distortion. I 
describe two new qualities that influenced the framing of wind power during the 
period before providing an overview of the new dominant valuation frame. I 
conclude this section by mapping changes in the valuation networks and discussing 
key takeaways regarding this period.   
 
5.5.1 Two New Qualities: Subsidy Burden and Market Distortion   
Two connected, yet distinct societal qualities emerged during the Market Distortion 
period. Whereas the Subsidy Burden quality reflects general concerns about subsidy 
costs and their impacts on society, the Market Distortion quality embeds wind 
power valuation in a complex calculation of lost value due to certain beliefs about 
how markets work. This is one of the more peculiar qualities as it interferes with the 
value ascribed to other qualities (e.g., CC Mitigation, Industrial).  
 
                                                          
122
 The EA Energy-analysis report found that offshore wind had costs in the range of 40 Oere/kWh 
and that if onshore wind had been calculated it would probably be around 35 Oere/kWh (EA, 2006, 
p. 48). They calculated a 200 MW wind farm in 2015 to see Technology Cost reduction of 10 
oere/kWh by 2015, and a system integration cost of 7-8 Oere kWh. In comparison, a 1000 MW 
nuclear was estimated as having 3 oere/KWh system integration costs and Gas and coal were 
estimated as having no integration costs (EA, 2006, p. 46) . 
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Subsidy Burden (Societal) 
The Subsidy Burden quality refers to the costs incurred by companies and citizens 
who pay the taxes that fund wind power subsidies. These investments to support 
wind power are collected through taxes such as the CO2 tax, Electricity tax and the 
PSO-tax. This quality refers to the investments paid out through subsidies or grid 
connections costs covered by the state. This does not include alleged indirect 
distortion costs of prosthetic devices, which are covered by the Market Distortion 
quality. A further calculation of direct subsidy costs and societal investments in 
wind power can be found in Appendix A4.   
 
Market Distortion (Societal) 
The Market Distortion quality is the negative value of the prosthetic devices that 
enable wind power. The calculation is based on a perceived equilibrium state in 
which all necessary technologies would emerge from the “free market” if 
government did not intervene. As such, all interventions (i.e., both taxes and 
subsidies) can be argued to distort the market. This causes a socio-economic loss 
relative to “what could have been” if those prosthetic devices had not existed.  
 
5.5.2 The Market Distortion Valuation Frame 
The valuation frame that emerged in 2002 reflected a perspective that was almost the 
complete opposite of the perspective reflected in the Climate Solution valuation 
frame. The shift shown in figure 24 (GBA), marks the most abrupt moment of 
valuation of the analysis.  
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Figure 24: The second (CS: 1990-2001) and third (MD: 2002-2006) Valuation Frame. 
 
The year 2002 marked a distinctive shift in the dominant valuation frame for wind 
power. The Climate Solution Valuation Frame saw wind power as indispensably 
valuable based the high positive impacts of the CC Mitigation and to a lesser degree 
Future Potential and Industrial qualities.  
 
Wind Power is not framed as valuable based on a high impact from the CC 
Mitigation quality 
The most dramatic change was the decrease in the value of the CC Mitigation 
quality from a high positive impact to a low positive and even slightly negative 
impact. First, the focus on climate change and the link between energy and 
environmental matters was disassembled. Mentions of climate change were 
consciously eliminated from government documents and communications, while 
councils and advisory bodies related to climate change and the environment were 
downsized as much as possible. The environmental ministry became part of the 
ministry dealing with food and agriculture, while the transportation ministry 
assumed responsibility for matters involving energy. Both the DEC and the newly 
established IMV argued that more CC Mitigation could be achieved by trading 
carbon offsets on the market than by expanding wind power capacity. This framing 
was made possible by a very selective set of calculations to commensurate the 
damage costs of CO2 emissions. Once this framing was applied, expanding wind 
power capacity appeared less cost-effective, and the strong positive impact of CC 
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Mitigation on value weakened significantly, even to a slightly negative impact at 
times. It was still recognized that wind turbines could mitigate climate change, but 
since building them was more expensive than carbon quota trading, capacity 
expansion was framed as an expensive an inefficient way to mitigate climate change. 
Wind power was therefore no longer framed as valuable through its ability to 
mitigate climate change through emission-free electricity. The Market Distortion 
quality thus changes the CC Mitigation quality, as it becomes implied that the 
market could deliver better mitigation solutions. Wind power build-out can in this 
framing carry a risk as exemplified by Minister for Taxation, Kristian Jensen’s 
statement that too many subsidies carried the risk that “planners and bureaucrats” 
pushed for market-distorting solutions to climate change.  
 
Wind Power Once Again Measured as a Supplement 
The DEC and IMV calculations also heralded a new era in which assessments of the 
value of wind power related not to Technology Cost, but to subsidy costs. The DEC 
report revived the old notion that the electricity from wind power has no effective 
value; due to overcapacity in the 1990s, the DEC only counted the value of saved 
fuel. Although wind power penetration grew significantly during this period, the 
Fuel Supplement quality was reintroduced into the valuation frame. The DEC’s 
responses to critiques reveal how they viewed existing coal plants (even the recently 
built Nordjyllandsvaerket) to be part of the black-boxed infrastructure. The DEC did 
not consider the plant to be a supplementary energy source, and thus did not apply 
the same metrics it used for wind power to assess its construction costs and value. 
The individual Technology Cost or Back-up Capacity cost for wind power was not 
calculated in this framing, as it had been in the 1990s, since the entire wind power 
fleet was considered supplementary. For the entire 5-year period it was neither the 
CC Mitigation quality or the individual Technology Cost of wind turbines 
determined their societal value.  
 
Wind Power Framed as a Burden to Society and a Distortion of Free Markets  
Instead, wind power was judged by the impacts of the subsidy and tax devices that 
enabled its existence in the energy system. These impacts were directly calculated 
through the Subsidy Burden quality. Direct and indirect subsidies were calculated 
and evaluated in both the DEC and IMV reports, and Economics and Business 
Minister Bendtsen expressed that he was “deeply worried” about subsidy costs 
hurting Danish competitiveness. Likewise, in the early 2000s, Prime Minister Fogh 
Rasmussen alluded to wind power subsidies with expressions such as “the money is 
blowing out of the state coffers.” The industrial association Danish Industry 
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welcomed subsidy cuts, as the benefits of lower tax payments outweighed the 
benefits of the capacity expansion and research activities the taxes were funding. 
More complicated than rising subsidies enabled by industry-burdening taxes was the 
other new quality, Market Distortion. According to the DEC’s calculation, 
prosthetic devices, such as the PSO tax and the CO2 tax, were not only burdensome, 
but actually distorted general growth more than other taxes. Additionally, the jobs 
that were created in the wind industry sector were framed as jobs that would have 
been created in other sectors if wind power infrastructure had not been built. This 
notion that the wind industry is an unnatural and thereby distortive creation was 
echoed by leading politicians during the period. Examples of this include Minister of 
Economics and Business, Bendt Bendtsen, who in 2002 labeled the expansion of 
wind power capacity “unhealthy” and “artificially driven.” Likewise, in 2005, 
Minister for Taxation, Kristian Jensen, compared Danish wind power expansion 
plans to a “planned economy, (where) reality submits to the plan” which causes 
“ordinary citizens and companies” to “lose much more” than “planners and 
bureaucrats” stand to gain. Inherent in the Market Distortion quality is the expressed 
notion that someone in society gains by placing a large distortive burden on the 
majority of citizens and companies.  
The Market Distortion valuation frame was built around the highly negative impact 
of these two qualities, thereby construing the goals of the wind turbine industry and 
societal interests to be contradictory. In addition to changing the value of CC 
Mitigation by injecting the notion that CO2 emissions should more effectively be 
traded in a carbon markets, the Market Distortion quality diminished the value of the 
industry quality, and thus the Future Potential quality.   
 
Industrial Benefits and Future Potential fade to the background 
According to the DEC, the potential small industrial benefit of wind power in the 
form of exports was outweighed by the negative distortive impact of the devices 
enabling wind power, thereby creating a context in which the industry was 
artificially created. Impacts for the Industrial and Future Potential qualities were 
valued in a context wherein the objects embodying them (i.e., wind turbines) cause 
societal losses. Industrial benefits and increased potential were recognized, but 
simultaneously calculated to have emerged at the expense of growth that would have 
“naturally” occurred in other industries.  
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Aesthetics still present but with limited impact 
The impact of the Aesthetics quality is continually bolstered by the editorial pages of 
the Jyllandsposten and Berlingske newspapers. Nevertheless, the stagnation in build-
out is not so much due to the regions not appointing possible sites, as it is to the 
uncertainty surrounding the future framework conditions. Aesthetics thus had a 
small negative impact on the overall valuation of wind power but was not decisive 
or highly impactful to the developments.    
 
5.5.3 The Market Distortion Valuation Network 
In this section, I map the new dominant market coalition and analyze their impact on 
the materiality of the valuation network.  
  
Market-coalition Injects Politics of Drift 
The market-coalition was comprised of members of the two governing parties, 
Venstre and De Konservative, and new calculative centers that either created or 
entered the field of wind power valuation, the DEC and the IMV. They framed wind 
power through the Subsidy Burden and Market Distortion qualities to spark debate 
over whether or not Denmark could afford to build wind power capacity in light of 
other non-energy budget priorities. From a climate change mitigation perspective, 
wind power was judged as equivalent to buying CO2 offsets on a market. Actual 
CO2 emission reductions were expected to occur somehow, regardless of whether 
wind turbines were built in Denmark. Although wind turbines reduce CO2 
emissions, the coalition anticipated that similar CO2 reductions could be bought less 
expensively on the market in the form of carbon offsets. The focus of attention was 
whether Denmark was paying too high a price by allowing value-destroying wind 
power subsidies and taxes to distort its growth potential. Once this notion was 
established, a large number of non-energy related investments became comparable 
to wind power, and the Technology Cost quality disappeared from the framing.  The 
actors that formed the Market-coalition in opposition to wind power were a group of 
economists and politicians, as energy policy discussions extended to a forum of non-
energy experts.  
The market-coalition focused on subsidy costs to both state and private stakeholders.  
The strong negative impacts of the Subsidy Burden and Market Distortion qualities 
outweighed the small positive impacts of the Industrial quality. This coalition thus 
diverged from the view that a strong domestic wind industry has a fairly high 
positive impact, which up until that point had been an assembling device for the 
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Fuel-, Unique- and Climate-coalitions. The wind turbine industry and the utilities 
involved with wind power, however, remained active on export markets and 
continued to grow during this period. Green is the dispersed Climate-coalition, while 
the Blue is the new dominant Market-coalition. 
 
 
Figure 25: Key actors during the MD period; green: Climate-coalition; blue: Market-
coalition. 
   
There were two notable shifts among key actors during the period: De Konservative 
began to soften its stance towards wind power as Connie Hedegaard took over the 
Ministry of Environment in 2004, and secondly the formation of DONG energy 
creatds a new strong actor.  
 
Materiality during the Market Distortion Period 
Having grown nearly tenfold during the previous decade, onshore wind power build-
out came to a near-complete halt between 2002 and 2006, and only two of the 
original five offshore wind farms approved in 1998 were built. It is also worth 
noting that exports and employees increased significantly from 2005 to 2006, as 
foreign markets began to invest heavily in wind power. This is one of the early 
developments that laid the foundation for change in the next period. All numbers in 
figure 26 (GBA) are available in Appendix A.  
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Figure 26: Capacity expansion during the Market Distortion period. 
 
There was not much legislation during this period. As the 1999 liberalization act had 
been forced to include a failing green certificate scheme for wind power subsidies 
onshore wind had stalled and the Market-coalition decided not to act. It was not until 
the government needed a larger scope transformation of the electricity market in 
2004 that the opposition managed to negotiate some changes into the onshore 
subsidies. This was not sufficient to kick-start the market, but two of the canceled 
offshore wind farm projects were reinstated. This process was severely delayed, and 
the offshore wind farms were not built until the next period.  
 
5.5.4 Key Takeaways from the Market Distortion Period 
Between 2002 and 2006, a new coalition enacted a highly critical framing of wind 
power by focusing on the costs of the subsidies and taxes that supported capacity 
expansion. The specific Technology Cost of wind turbines faded from the public 
debate and the framing of wind power’s value focused on the societal costs of 
subsidies and taxes. Once again, wind power was framed as a supplemental energy 
source within a functioning system of coal and gas plants, reflecting the perspective 
animated in the Fuel-coalition’s reports published between the 1960s and the 1980s. 
In their 2002 report which documented a loss from building wind turbines, the DEC 
framed the value of wind-power electricity to only equal the cost of fuel for existing 
conventional power plants. The DEC thus re-embraced the original logic of the 
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Fuel-coalitions first report in 1962, when the value of electricity generated by wind 
turbines was evaluated relative to fuel costs for the original steam power plants.  
The Market Distortion valuation frame stood in stark contrast to the previous 
Climate Solution frame, and in the mid-2000s. As much as the Climate Solution 
valuation network dominated during the mid- to late-1990s, the Market Distortion 
valuation network and its corresponding calculative centers dominated the five years 
between 2002 and 2006. But as shown at the end of this chapter, growth and 
consolidation were underway in the wind industry by the end of this period. The 
Market Distortion valuation frame began to destabilize after 2006 and a new broad 
coalition would form its own new valuation network.  In the next chapter, I explain 
how these new actors formed a near-consensus agreement about a new valuation 
frame that was built on the future envisioned in the 1990s.     
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6. WIND AS A GLOBAL ADVANTAGE 
ON CLIMATE, INDEPENDENCE AND 
JOBS 
A strong consolidated wind power industry and a growing world market were 
starting to show at the end of the Market Distortion period. This development would 
become central to the Danish valuation struggle of wind power as international 
climate negotiations and growing export markets became harder and harder to 
ignore. This would bring salience to the Industrial quality as Denmark was a central 
player in what was projected to become a large market for wind power.  
 
6.1. OFFSHORE WIND IS MADE VALUABLE AGAIN (2007-2011) 
The period starts with the emergence of new actor Connie Hedegaard and her 
increased mandate, which came from a changed perception of wind power within an 
already powerful actor in the Market-coalition, the Danish Prime Minister Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen. These two actors are central in some of the changes that lead to a 
new valuation of wind power.  
 
6.1.1 Hedegaard re-ignites climate change mitigation salience 
Connie Hedegaard was one of the major transformative forces in De Konservative 
and is a central actor in the shift to a new valuation frame. Fogh Rasmussen 
appointed her to Minister of Environment in 2004 to strengthen the governments 
green profile after some tough years. Hedegaard had previously been a member of 
parliament for De Konservative from 1984 to 1990123, and had between 1990 and 
2004 been writing for newspaper Berlingske, the Danish Public Broadcast station 
DR1, and centre-left newspaper Politiken. Hedegaard was well-versed within 
climate change matters, through her journalistic work (Dahlager & Rothenborg, 
2007, p. 106;110), and had developed a personal friendship with Thomas Becker, a 
former energy advisor to Svend Auken (Meilstrup, 2010, p. 123). Becker was, 
similar to Svend Auken, a strong advocate for wind power124, and followed 
                                                          
123
 She left in protest over the De Konservative’s line in the Tamil-case (FT.dk, 2010; Meilstrup, 
2010, p. 33). 
124
 Becker would later go on to become the head of the European Wind Energy Association 
(EWEA) from 2012-2015 (DWIA, 2015a).  
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Hedegaard into the Ministry of Environment and later into the Ministry of Climate 
and Energy (Dahlager & Rothenborg, 2007, p. 106),. 
As minister of the Environment, Connie Hedegaard was highly involved in the fight 
against climate change, although the energy department was initially still a sub-
department under the Ministry of Transportation, limiting her influence. One area 
where Hedegaard had an impact was in attending the COP-meetings for Denmark, 
and in arranging a 2005 pre-COP12 trip for 25 Environmental Ministers to the arctic 
(Rothenborg, 2005). Hedegaard and Becker turned their focus on growing 
Denmark’s influence in international climate negotiations while advocating for 
Denmark to host a major climate summit. In March 2006, Fogh gave Hedegaard 
approval to pursue the ambitious plan at an informal Government workshop talk 
(Meilstrup, 2010, pp. 32–33), and one year later, she and Fogh could jointly 
announced that the 15
th
 UN Conference of Parties Summit (COP15) would come to 
Copenhagen in 2009 (Keiding, 2007)125. As was seen during the Market Distortion 
period, Hedegaard faced some difficulties in exercising her mandate in Denmark126. 
She knew this and would attempt to leverage the international attention in domestic 
issues. A few days after the COP15 announcement, Hedegaard met with five mayors 
to ensure that locations were found for new wind turbine test sites. After the meeting 
Hedegaard emphasized that the whole world was coming to Denmark for the 
COP15, and that “Denmark is completely in the lead on wind power, and we need to 
stay there” (P. Andersen, 2007a).    
The positive results would pay off and following the 2007 re-election of the Fogh-
government, Connie Hedegaard was appointed as minister of climate and energy, 
but was to the disappointment to her and the opposition not allowed to have 
transportation or environment under her ministry. Observers at the time argued that 
this was because both a large segment of Venstre’s parliamentary group, as well as 
supporting party DF, saw Hedegaard almost as a clone of Svend Auken, and worried 
that she would become too powerful (Meilstrup, 2010, p. 34,37; Rothenborg & 
                                                          
125
 The announcement immediately revealed tensions inside the government, as reports emerged, 
that the Financial Ministry, headed by Lars Loekke Rasmussen, pushed for the 200-300 mn. 
estimated costs of COP15 to be taken from the environmental ministry’s budget (Keiding, 2007). 
The whole COP15 project ended up costing 1 bn. DKK (Meilstrup, 2010, p. 19). Hedegaard’s 
achievement had caused great admiration among the opposition lead by Svend Auken and Martin 
Lidegaard, wherein the former declared their willingness to help Hedegaard find the funding for the 
COP19 meeting separately (Keiding, 2007). Although the funds were not taken from the 
environmental budget the Financial ministry would however end up deciding that part of funds for 
the meeting would be taken from the foreign aid budget (Information, 2008). 
126
 As will be seen, Hedegaard achieved impressive results on the stage of the international climate 
negotiations, but the many members in Venstre and DF, who disagreed with her would make it hard 
to create large national results (P. Andersen, 2007d).  During the time Hedegaard was minister 
(2004-2010), Denmark’s coal-use and CO2 emissions increased, while the growth in share of 
renewables mainly came from increased biomass-burning  (Vogt-Nielsen, 2010).  
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Mygind, 2007)127. These actors still held on to the Market Distortion valuation frame 
of wind power and their concerns about Hedegaard’s potential influence were well-
founded. She would play an important role in destabilizing the Market Distortion 
valuation network, as she moved her party out of the Market-coalition, and brought 
international attention on climate change to Denmark’s door-step. Her success on 
the international stage had not gone unnoticed and another important actor would 
also change his position in these years. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who had been 
central in establishing the Market Distortion Valuation frame, would also come to 
reject it and support something new.   
 
6.1.2 Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s sudden green transition 
There have been many speculations as to the factors that caused Prime Minister 
Anders Fogh Rasmussen (AFR) to have a sudden turnaround on green energy. The 
most commonly described is the large pressure for action, rising from an increased 
salience of the CC Mitigation quality. The VK-government faced increasing 
criticism for its cuts to energy research from leading businesses in Denmark, and the 
opposition parties tried to expose AFR’s inactions, by presenting their fully 
developed proposals for energy plans at the start of this period (J. S. Nielsen, 
2006d)128.  There was indeed a large international momentum around CC Mitigation, 
as exemplified through such publications as the Stern Report (2006), the IPCC’s 
fourth Report (2007), Al Gore’s documentary “An Inconvenient Truth” (2006), and 
other governments’ actions, such as Sweden’s declaration to be oil-free (Dahlager & 
Rothenborg, 2007, p. 114; J. S. Nielsen, 2006b).  
One of the less covered factors in AFR’s transition was a renewed focus on Energy 
Independence. AFR would shortly after the Danish Cartoon Crisis state he found it 
“quite nice that we were not dependent on oil from the middle-east” (Dahlager & 
Rothenborg, 2007, p. 128). In a 2018 retrospective interview on his whole 
transformation, AFR again named this crisis as “decisive” for his green awakening. 
Hedegaard did play a central role in this process, but she also argued to AFR that an 
international Climate Summit was just the type of international event of high 
prestige, that could make the world forget the 2005-2006 Danish Cartoon crisis, 
which at the time still hurt Danish exports  (Dahlager & Rothenborg, 2007, p. 
                                                          
127
 The feud over Climate Change mitigation efforts had grown between the administrations of the 
financial ministry and the environmental ministry, since Thor Pedersen had significantly downsized 
the environmental ministry in the 2002-2003 years. In one seasoned observers view, the remaining 
environmental civil servants saw the financial ministry as cynical, while the financial ministry 
servants considered their environmental colleagues to be “idealistic, soft and removed from reality” 
(Meilstrup, 2010, p. 64). 
128
 Socialdemokratiet had proposed to reduce energy consumption by 28% towards 2025. Of the 
remaining energy demand 50% should be covered by renewable energy. This should be achieved 
by a build-out of 3 GW offshore wind and 1 GW onshore wind towards 2025 (J. S. Nielsen, 2006e).   
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119,127; Meilstrup, 2010, p. 19). The Energy Independence quality was in AFR’s 
judgment something that made it easier for other Venstre party members to accept 
his political turn (Oeyen, 2018). 
The third contributing factor was the immense business opportunity that was 
emerging in the global wind power market. While wind power build-out had been at 
a standstill during Fogh Rasmussen’s first five years in office (Appendix A), global 
wind capacity had tripled from 24 to 74 GW (GWEC, 2018). Wind power was thus 
expanding together with growing global energy consumption. During a visit to the 
U.S. in June 2006, AFR was proud to tell President Bush about Denmark’s previous 
achievements in the energy sector, as the U.S. president was worried about the 
U.S.’s increasing dependence on foreign fuels (Dahlager & Rothenborg, 2007, p. 
123).  Three days after the meeting with Bush, AFR visited Stanford University and 
a student asked AFR how Denmark had achieved a high BNP-growth while holding 
energy consumption flat.  After a short pause, the prime minister answered that it 
had come through “a mix of government-investments and taxes, I’m sorry to say”, 
recognizing that Denmark’s unique energy system, and position of low dependence 
on foreign fossil fuels had not emerged from market forces alone (Dahlager & 
Rothenborg, 2007, p. 129).  Denmark was in a good position to capitalize on this 
growing demand for wind power solutions, as the newly merged DONG Energy 
represented the largest portfolio of offshore wind power experience in the world (F. 
Petersen & Thorndal, 2014, p. 119).  
The first time AFR would mention his newly found green ambitions in a major 
speech was at a September 2006 meeting for Venstre. Without mentioning specifics, 
AFR stated that being “independent of fossil fuels” was a long-term goal, and stated 
that Denmark had a good position to build out renewable energy (J. S. Nielsen, 
2006c). AFR would however make sure to outline that his “type of 
environmentalism” was much more focused on keeping costs down and therefore 
different from the opposition.  
 
“The most ambitious goal is that we shall be completely independent of 
fossil fuels….But it is important that we do it in a way which is also 
economically profitable. We must be sure that investments happen where 
we get the most environment and energy for the money. The goal for the 
modern environmental-liberalism is better environment and renewable 
energy. We say no to environmental-socialism, which strangles initiative 
and entrepreneurship”. (J. S. Nielsen, 2006d) 
 
AFR had to fight hard internally with his own party as well as the supporting party 
DF. As can be seen from the above quote, he was not specific in the first mentions 
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of this new direction and kept a strong focus on independence of fossil fuels. 
Additionally, he made sure to highlight an, unspecified, ideological difference 
between his approach and Svend Auken’s approach. AFR was faced with questions 
about the sharp contrast between what he said today, and the actions of the last 5 
years. This was understandable, as it was less than two years earlier that AFR 
jokingly had compared modern scientific concerns about climate change to concerns 
about a coming ice age in the 1600’s (Dahlager & Rothenborg, 2007, p. 126)129. At 
the 2008 Venstre national meeting, he would address this discrepancy in what would 
become known as AFR’s “green” speech.   
 
“I have for a long time belonged to those who were in doubt about 
climate change….and that was maybe wrong. Because if I am completely 
honest, there are probably many of us, which have been a bit cautious, if 
not too say been dragging our feet,…We have not been the energy-
political avant-garde”. (Fogh, 2008) 
 
There is a clear and self-acknowledged turn here from AFR and his political party. 
Along with this newfound acknowledgement of the need to mitigate Climate 
Change, a change in AFR’s framing of wind power would follow. But AFR knew 
that CC Mitigation was still a contested quality within his own party Venstre, and 
went on to emphasize the quality of Energy Independence as a strong motivation for 
building renewable energy.  
“But we have to acknowledge, that it may be that in 20 years’ time, we 
are no longer self-sufficient and thereby no longer free and independent, 
as we are today. It is therefore today that we should take the first steps to 
secure, that we within that period have built alternative energy sources, 
so that we are still free and independent when 20 years have 
passed….The choice must never be between oil and freedom of speech. 
We must strengthen the free world by weakening the dependence on oil 
and gas. We must increase our security by lowering the transfer to those 
that threaten our freedom…. I can tell you that exactly in that period 
during the beginning of 2006, I was deeply, deeply thankful that we in 
Denmark had lead an energy policy, which meant that we did not have to 
buy oil in the Middle-east at that time. That is what this is about”. (Fogh, 
2008) 
                                                          
129
 Fogh Rasmussen’s comment was at a voters meeting up to the 2005 election at Holstebro 
Commercial College on the 28
th
 of January: “In the 1600’s people thought that we were facing a 
new ice age. If you spend every day believing that a flood will happen, you can look forward to a 
sad existence for many years to come” (Dahlager & Rothenborg, 2007, p. 126).    
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AFR dedicated significant time to the geopolitical aspects of energy and coupled 
wind power to freedom of speech, through its ability to lower oil and gas imports 
and thereby achieve energy security. He particularly emphasized the 2006 Danish 
Cartoon Crisis, and how seeing “Danish embassies on fire, burning of the Danish 
flag” as well as target shooting after picture of him, had made a “large impression” 
and considerably contributed to his new attention to Energy Independence (Fogh, 
2008). This speech confirms the reports that the Danish Cartoon crisis played a role 
in bringing salience to the quality of Energy Independence, and creating the moment 
where AFR started seeing the future as green (Lehmann, 2008). While the quality of 
Energy Independence clearly occupied his agenda, it has been harder to discern how 
much the quality of CC Mitigation was salient to him. In  later reports from the state 
ministry’s civil servants, speechwriters noted that the grandiosity of the COP15 
summit excited AFR, but that the civil servants “painted Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
green” by writing a speech which he would then passionately deliver (Meilstrup, 
2010, p. 133). AFR has not occupied himself with CC Mitigation matters since his 
time as Prime Minister, but has since been involved in geopolitics related to Energy 
Independence, most recently in opposing the proposed Russian-German gas pipeline 
Nord-Stream 2 (Just & Tang, 2017). 
As Connie Hedegaard gained control of both the domain of environment and energy 
from 2007, while having secured the COP15 for Copenhagen, there was a renewed 
view of wind power emerging. AFR was aware of the emerging focus on the world 
stage and the advantage of the growing wind industry which created exports and 
jobs. But his renewed green focus was also born out of a salient Energy 
Independence quality, as he had seen the middle-eastern oil states burning Danish 
flags during the Danish Cartoon crisis. Following this momentum, Connie 
Hedegaard was given the mandate to negotiate a new energy agreement, which will 
be covered next.     
 
6.1.3 Contested 2007 Energy Plan leads to 2008 Agreement (2007-2008) 
The change of valuation would lead to the first signs of action in 2007, as Horns Rev 
2, one of the two parks in the 2004 agreement that had been delayed (DKGOV, 
2007), was approved for construction. This year would also see the government 
launch a proposed energy plan in the form of a 7 page note. The energy plan had a 
goal of minimum 30% energy from renewable sources in 2025, and 100% at an 
unspecified point in the future (Dahlager & Rothenborg, 2007, p. 134). There were 
few specifics in the plan but energy-research was to be doubled over three years to 
reach 1 bn. DKK in 2010, with a focus on wind power, low-energy buildings and 
alternative fuels in transportation (Boddum, 2007). The Governments energy plan 
was immediately challenged by the EU commission, who labelled it “insufficient”, 
as the plan lacked transparency about how Denmark would meet their CO2 
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reduction commitments (Ritzau, 2007b)130. Meanwhile at home, the opposition 
called the Government’s plan unambitious in comparison to their 2006 plans, one 
being the Socialdemokratiet plan of 50% renewable energy in 2025 (J. S. Nielsen, 
2006e).  Socialdemokratiet had its assumptions calculated and validated by the 
Danish Engineering Association (IDA) and energy experts at Aalborg University (P. 
Andersen, 2007c). These research communities, who had several ties to the old 
Climate-coalition,  were reluctant to calling the VK governments seven-page note “a 
plan”, but instead awaited more details (J. S. Nielsen, 2007).  The plan was slightly 
better received among Danish Industry who welcomed that energy research was 
back on the agenda, but who also highlighted that the goal of 30 % energy from 
renewables would need further investments (Pol, 2007). Connie Hedegaard would 
spend the remainder of the year struggling with reluctant Venstre-politicians and the 
supporting party DF. She pushed for a greener direction, while forced to defend an 
energy plan that was less specific than she would have wanted. An example of this 
was seen in a 2007 election debate, wherein Hedegaard stated that she wanted 
Denmark to be free of oil, coal and gas in 2075. Although the opposition argued that 
this was way too far in the future compared to what was needed, it was a goal which 
was not mentioned in the Government’s official published energy-plan (P. 
Andersen, 2007c). But her struggles in the Ministry of Environment would end after 
the 2007 election, as she secured higher negotiating power in the Ministry of 
Climate and Energy. She would utilize this power to complete a 2008 energy-
agreement only three months into her new position (J. S. Nielsen, 2008a).   
The 2008 energy agreement included a re-tendering of the delayed 200 MW 
Roedsand 2 offshore wind farm, which was agreed in 2004 and originated as one of 
the original five from 1998 (DKGOV, 2008b, p. 10). The subsidy level agreed in 
2004 had not been able to attract investors, so the wind farm was now to be built 
under new conditions by 2011 at the latest (Ritzau, 2007c). But although Hedegaard 
and her own party De Konservative aimed for a high build-out of wind power, the 
Market-coalition was still strongly represented in the larger government party, 
Venstre131. So when the VK government announced its first proposal for a new 
                                                          
130
 One of the fights was over a request from the Danish government, for a compensation of 25 mn. 
tons worth of CO2 quotas in the period of 2008-2012. This request was due to the fact that 
Denmark’s base-year, 1990, was a very rainy year, and had meant that Denmark had imported large 
degrees of hydro-generated electricity from Norway and Sweden. Since hydro-energy is generated 
in the dams and mountain reservoirs it is carbon-free and as such the government argued that 
compensation was warranted, since as Denmark had unusually low CO2 emissions in its base-year. 
After months of negotiation, the Danish Government had to settle for a compensation of 5 mn. tons 
of CO2 quotas, a fifth of its initial demand (Ritzau, 2007b). 
131
 The VK-Government would also control very carefully how much momentum was building for 
wind power. In 2006, the VK government ordered a report about future energy system build-out 
options by EA Energy Analysis and researchers at the Risoe test-center. The report lay ready in the 
spring of 2007 with the conclusion that a favorable scenario was to expand wind power to supply 
70% of Denmark’s energy use in 2050, and that the transportation sector should be electrified early 
on to accommodate this expansion (Djursing, 2008). This report was hidden from public view for 
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energy agreement, it contained no plans for further wind power build-out, but 
instead new subsidies for biomass and biogas (P. Andersen, 2007b). Only after the 
opposition parties and various energy academics pushed back on the lack of 
ambition, a revised energy proposal was released 20 days later. The proposal now 
included a proposal for new offshore wind capacity and Conservative energy 
spokesman, Per Ørum Jørgensen, stated that the government with the revised 
proposal had “stretched to meet the demands of the opposition to a very high 
degree” (P. F. Larsen, 2007). 
The revised proposal would be negotiated into the 2008 agreement which included a 
tender for another two 200 MW offshore wind farms, which would later become the 
400 MW Anholt offshore wind farm. The deal also included a re-introduction of 25 
oere/kWh subsidy for onshore wind turbines, and a scrap-and-reuse scheme to 
facilitate replacement of aging turbines (DKGOV, 2008b, p. 2,3)132. The 2008 
agreement also delivered an increase in onshore wind subsidies to kick-start the 
stalled onshore build-out, while the 600 MW offshore wind power pipeline, of 
which 207 MW were already underway from the previous 2004 agreement, created 
some future visibility for the offshore wind industry. These 207 MW was the 
Roedsand 2 offshore wind farm, which probably has one of the longest journeys 
from conception to completion in Denmark. It had been agreed in 2004, as the 
compensation for the cuts to the original 1998 build-out plan of five parks. But after 
several more delays, the farm was commissioned by 2010. Figure 27 shows the 
installation of one of the 90 SWT-2.3 MW turbines at the offshore wind farm 
(Source: SGRE).    
                                                                                                                                        
more than a year, and did not surface until the 2008 energy agreement was in its final stage of 
negotiations. 
132
 In addition to the wind power measures, the agreement also included a 50% increase in biomass 
subsidy-levels for decentral power plants, new subsidies for biogas use and an aim to double annual 
energy research funding to 1 bn. DKK by 2010  . The VK Government and its right-wing 
supporting parties would also agree on a side-agreement which allowed two centralized power 
plants to increase their coal use (DKGOV, 2008a).  
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Figure 27: Installation of Roedsand 2 offshore wind farm (2010). 
 
As can be seen the necessary supply chain to install and erect these power plants at 
sea was going through a necessary expansion, and with two offshore wind farms in 
planning following the 2008 agreement (Roedsand 2 and Anholt) and the Horns Rev 
2 ready for inauguration, Denmark was prepared to welcome the many delegations 
for COP15. In September 2009, two months before COP15, new Danish Prime 
Minister Lars Loekke Rasmussen133, would cut the ribbon on the Horns Rev 2 wind 
farm, signaling Denmark’s dedication to wind power. Despite the change of 
leadership in Venstre, the public displays of the newly found faith of wind power 
persisted.  
 
                                                          
133
 AFR had in April 2009 left the leadership to then-Vice Prime Minister Lars Loekke Rasmussen, 
to become General Secretary of Nato. Lars Loekke Rasmussen had until 2009 not publicly 
mentioned climate change by a word in any Op-Ed pieces, interviews or the two biographies about 
him (Meilstrup, 2010, p. 21).  
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6.1.4 COP15 brings salience to CC Mitigation 
Several factors contributed to the renewed investments in offshore wind, but the 
COP15 is likely to have had some impact to bring attention to what Denmark as a 
host-country was doing for the climate.  The exposure related to the COP15 was not 
only beneficial for the wind turbine industry, but also several of Denmark’s other 
large companies such as Novo Nordisk, Danfoss, Grundfos and Novozymes, who 
were working on enhancing sustainability in their business models (Meilstrup, 2010, 
p. 103). The tourism sector also gained from the exposure, as it made close to 400 
mn. DKK in this record-high exposure event for Copenhagen. This served to bring 
salience to the Industrial quality of wind power investments, as fields outside the 
energy sector now also benefited from Denmark’s pioneering position on wind 
power. The tourism organization Wonderful Copenhagen called for even more 
conferences on ecology and wind power, while a Danish Industry spokesman 
proclaimed a “very positive effect” for companies who dealt with lowering CO2 
(Hussain, 2009).     
The heavy industrial conglomerates would also be represented by such actors as 
Peter Löescher, the CEO of Siemens AG, parent company of Siemens Wind Power, 
who underlined that “climate policy is economic policy” (B. H. Sørensen, 2009). So 
although the COP15 in many ways was regarded as a failure with regards to the 
watered down climate commitments (Meilstrup, 2010, p. 248), it did create a CC 
Mitigation salience and a pressure for action from the private sector in Denmark (M. 
Lund, 2009). The foreign actors, the UN International Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) and the UN Conference of Parties (COP) organization, had by publishing the 
large IPCC AR report in 2007, and holding the COP15 convention in Copenhagen 
two years after, enacted a strong salience on CC Mitigation. However, the emerging 
Valuation framing was not as primarily driven by an aim to achieve CC Mitigation 
as the 1990’s Climate Solution valuation frame was, but also by a high positive 
impact on the quality Industrial. This was due to the high global salience of the CC 
Mitigation quality, which also saw the coalition forming around a new framing to 
include more actors, some of them brought in by a global export potential. The 
Climate-Coalition actors were still pushing hard for the CC Mitigation salience, but 
they now had industrial actors joining them as well as the political party De 
Konservative. This new broad coalition will due to its focus be named the Global-
coalition.  
 
6.1.5 Market-coalition actors fight to resist destabilization 
Although the contours of a new valuation frame were starting to show, there were 
still Market-coalition actors who fought to maintain the existing Market Distortion 
framing of wind power. Below are two examples of such reports, one from the right-
wing think-tank CEPOS and the other from the main agricultural lobby-organization 
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Landbrug og Fødevarer / The Danish Agriculture & Food Council (L&F). Together 
with the L&F report is also a short coverage of the internal struggles in the 
government majority party Venstre.  
 
American fossil fuel interests fund CEPOS report critical of wind power (2009) 
The new-found salience around the CC Mitigation and Industrial qualities of wind 
power would not only come from international venues, it would also draw critique 
from foreign actors. One of these actors would work through the right-wing think 
tank CEPOS, who in 2009 would publish their first calculation on wind power. In 
the days up to the Horns Rev 2 inauguration, CEPOS would present a calculation 
indicating that each family sent the equivalent of 2400 DKK out of Denmark in 
subsidized exported wind powered electricity ever year. CEPOS claimed that 
Denmark exported more than 50% of the wind power it generated (CEPOS, 2009, p. 
2), and concluded from that calculation that it was a “senseless act to continue a 
violently expensive build-out of wind power in Denmark” (Ritzau, 2009). The 
CEPOS director would in another interview state that the Danish energy system 
required “completely stable electricity production because of our electric 
appliances”, and therefore argued that Denmark’s investments in wind power build-
out was comparable to “driving at 180 km an hour over a bridge that is not built to 
the other end yet” (Børsen, 2009), and would spark TV-headlines such as “Wind-
turbines waste money” (Ritzau, 2009). 
Shortly after gaining media coverage, the report came under heavy critique among 
others from Energinet, the public Transmission Systems Operator (K. B. Andersen, 
2010a). But the largest critique would come from a report, which was accompanied 
by a larger energy-plan, which will be covered in chapter 6.1.6. The CEPOS report 
would be discredited completely in 2010, as it was discovered that it had been 
ordered and payed for by the fossil fuel-sponsored U.S. think tank “Institute for 
Energy Research” (K. B. Andersen, 2010a).  
  
Agricultural lobby argues that wind turbines are too subsidized 
Another actor which until then had been confined to a proximate field to the energy 
discussion was the main agricultural lobby-organization in Denmark, Landbrug og 
Fødevarer / The Danish Agriculture and Food Council (L&F). The group represents 
Danish farmers as well as the meat and dairy industry, and would in September 2010 
publish a report titled “Energy with Growth” (EL, 2010). The report used the newly 
announced strike-price subsidy of 105 oere/kWh for the planned Anholt offshore 
wind farm as a point of reference to draw focus to the Subsidy Burden quality of 
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wind power. The report concluded that agricultural producers would pay an 
additional 837 mn. DKK in energy taxes from 2013-2020 (Dyrskjøt, 2010), and 
claimed that a subsidy investment in biomass and biogas would create 8500 
permanent jobs, while offshore wind farms only created “temporary jobs” and 
variable electricity output at a very high cost (EL, 2010). The report recommended 
that politicians stopped all plans for offshore wind farms until 2025 and instead 
invested heavily in biomass and biogas, (Borsen, 2010), which L&F labelled “the 
most important piece of the renewable energy supply” (EL, 2010).  
The proposed ramp-up of biomass for energy production was criticized by one of the 
academic actors from the old Climate-coalition, Klaus Illum. He argued that there 
was not enough land to both produce massive amounts of agriculture and biomass 
for energy production (Soerensen, 2010). Another researcher, who would co-author 
the upcoming from the CEESA (Coherent Energy and Environmental System 
Analysis) group report, Professor Henrik Wenzel, expanded this critique to a global 
scale, stating that there was “far from enough biomass in the future” to bet on it to 
solely decarbonize the energy sector (K. B. Andersen, 2010b). As such the lines 
were being drawn. On one side were the remaining Market-coalition actors, who 
framed biomass and biogas as the future renewable energy sources. On the other 
side was the newly forming Global-coalition which encompassed both Climate-
coalition actors and some defectors from the Market-coalition such as De 
Konservative and Danish Industry.    
The ongoing disassembling of the Market-coalition was most apparent in the 
governing party Venstre during 2008-2010. While the leadership of the VK-
government was cutting ribbons to Horns Rev 2, and rushing to get the plans for the 
prestige project Anholt ready (Østergaard, 2010), other actors were downplaying 
wind power on the internal lines. As previously described, the 400 MW Anholt 
offshore wind farm had not been proposed by Venstre, but was negotiated in by the 
opposition, while Horns Rev 2 and Roedsand 2 were given as compensation to the 
opposition in 2004. Energy spokesman for Venstre at the time, Lars Christian 
Lilleholt, was among the key actors who disagreed with the new direction 
(Loevkvist, 2016).  In the same week Prime minister Lars Loekke Rasmussen 
opened Horns Rev 2, Lilleholt clarified that it was still Venstre’s policy to phase out 
wind power subsidies as soon as the 2008 agreement expired in 2011 (Stenvei, 
2009a, 2009b). Onshore wind build-out was still impeded by local opposition, and 
Lilleholt had actively blocked planned wind-turbines in his home-municipality (C. 
L. Madsen, 2009).  
The 2010 L&F report had responded particularly well with Lilleholt’s ambitions, as 
he had argued strongly for biomass and biogas to be a mandated new focus for 
energy build-out (P. Andersen, 2008). Lilleholt would in 2009 play a leading role in 
developing a strategy for the Venstre parliamentary group, which called for a 
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tripling of biogas-plants (Tang, 2009)134. There were other opponents to the direction 
set in motion by Connie Hedegaard and Anders Fogh, but Lilleholt is worth 
highlighting as he exemplifies the dilemma in Venstre. The Market-Coalition wing 
of Venstre saw biomass and biogas as the future for renewables and fought against 
the focus on wind power. But the market-coalition would face further destabilization 
in the coming years, as the Global-coalition formed new and powerful calculative 
centers. 
  
6.1.6 Global-coalition contest the framings of the Market-Coalition actors 
Two new large calculative centers would emerge within the Global-coalition, in the 
same period as the market-coalition argued against wind power’s value as a societal 
investment.  
 
CEESA research group and IDA Energy Plan shows wind power can be backbone of 
energy system (2010) 
A cross-university research group called “Coherent Energy and Environmental 
System Analysis (CEESA)” would only five months after the previously mentioned 
CEPOS publication launch a comprehensive reply. The CEESA group consisted of a 
broad collection of academics and analysts with varying ties to the climate-coalition 
such as Henrik Lund (AAU), Poul Erik Morthorst (DTU), Frede Hvelplund (AAU), 
Jesper Munksgaard (Pöyry), Peter Karnøe (CBS), Hans Henrik Lindboe (EA), Brian 
Vad Mathiesen (AAU), Henrik Wenzel (SDU) and several others. The credibility of 
the 35 page report was strengthened by the CEESA groups close collaboration with 
the Danish Engineering Society (IDA) (CEESA, 2010b)135. The report argued that 
only a small degree of Danish wind power electricity was exported during the year 
                                                          
134
 Lilleholt also referred to RV’s communicated goals of 50% CO2 reductions by 2020 for “stupid 
and irresponsible” and concurred with the DEC 2002 report point that there would be no point in 
Denmark doing more for CC Mitigation than other EU countries, due to the CO2 quota market 
(Lilleholt, 2007). 
135
 Several members of the CEESA group collaborated with the Danish Society of Engineers 
(IDA), to perform the calculations for a comprehensive energy plan, a document called “the IDA 
Climate Plan 2050” (IDA, 2009). The plan was aimed at pursuing four goals towards 2050; reduce 
Denmark’s CO2 emissions 90% from 1990-levels by 2050, maintain Denmark’s energy self-
sufficiency, develop Denmark’s commercial position within climate and energy-related business 
sectors, and finally to develop the Danish economy and affluence in general (IDA, 2009, p. 7). The 
IDA plan saw wind power as the backbone of the energy system, with an envisioned 2050 capacity 
of 9.1 GW, split evenly between onshore and offshore (IDA, 2009, p. 32), but as the four goals 
showed the wind turbines were not chosen only because of their CC Mitigation effects. 
Expectations for a more than 250% increase of wind turbines exports by 2030 were set out in the 
report, as two of the four goals were related to Denmark’s commercial position in energy, and its 
general economy and affluence respectively (IDA, 2009, p. 16).  
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at a loss during the year, and that the technological circumstances to integrate a 50% 
share of wind power was already in place in 2010 (CEESA, 2010a, p. 6). This 
dispute between CEPOS and CEESA opened the discussion about how much wind 
power could be integrated in the future grid (Wittrup, 2010b).  
The discussion would see the Danish TSO Energinet take a more active role in 
developing future scenarios and communicate about possible technical pathways. 
Energinet released a statement comparing the two reports wherein it concluded that 
the CEESA report was built on a “well-founded understanding of the Danish energy 
system”, while the CEPOS report’s assumptions and results were found to be “not 
serious” (Wittrup, 2010a). The CEESA group would go on to publish its larger main 
report in November 2011 (CEESA, 2011), which would serve as sparring material 
for international researchers such as Stanford scholar Marc Jacobson’s Solutions 
project. At home it would go on to serve as inspiration for a later 2014 report on 
energy costs from the Danish Energy Agency. The Global-coalition drew strongly 
from the same notion of the Climate Solution Valuation Frame. A combination of 
technology cost comparisons and future pathways for build-out. This would also be 
the key theme in another large report from that period, the 2010 Climate 
Commission publication.  
 
Climate Commission frames wind power as key to fossil fuel independence (2010) 
Connie Hedegaard had in March 2008 established “The Danish Commission on 
Climate Change” known as The Climate Commission, to explore how Denmark 
could become independent of fossil fuels  (Keiding, 2008)136. The Climate 
Commission would work closely with Danish Energy Agency and the consultancy 
EA Energy-analysis (EA, 2010), to complete their report “Green Energy – the road 
towards a Danish energy system without fossil fuels” in September 2010.  
The project was headed by Katherine Richardson, Professor in Biological 
Oceanography at Copenhagen University and included Poul Erik Morthorst 
(Professor at DTU, who also worked on the AKF and CEESA reports) in addition to 
eight other researchers, international commissioners and energy professionals 
(Klimakommissionen, 2010, p. 17). One central task that the climate commission 
took on itself was to actually define what “fossil independent” should mean. Anders 
Fogh had mentioned it in his speeches, but he had never put a deadline on the goal 
                                                          
136
 The Climate Commission was first mentioned in the VK 2007 Government Manifesto, wherein 
it was written that a commission should be set down to explore how Denmark could become 
independent of fossil fuels in the future (Klimakommissionen, 2010, p. 18). 
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or defined at what point a country was “independent” of fossil fuels137. The 
Commission therefore took it upon itself to define fossil independent as follows: 
 
“No fossil energy is used in Denmark and domestic production of 
electricity based on renewable energy must on annual average basis 
correspond to the Danish consumption”. (Klimakommissionen, 2010, p. 
18)   
 
The Commission underlined that their plan would correspond to bringing Denmark’s 
fossil fuel share of 80% in 2008 down to 0% by 2050 (Klimakommissionen, 2010, 
p. 18). The climate commission concluded that it was realistic to reach fossil 
independence by 2050 with the technologies available today and technically possible 
to make the energy and heating sector fossil independent already by 2030 
(Klimakommissionen, 2010, p. 20)138. The commission said that it may be a cost 
which seems “surprisingly low” to the reader, but explained that because energy 
imports would disappear if the plan was followed, the total budget costs for the 
energy system would be lower than today (Klimakommissionen, 2010, p. 8). The 
proposed strategy consisted of a strong focus on energy efficiency and on sourcing 
energy from renewables, where offshore wind was singled out as the future 
backbone of the energy system. 
 
“The energy system should in a large scale transition base itself on 
electricity, which primarily should come from offshore wind turbines. 
Further energy should come from biomass...and other forms of 
renewable energy such as geothermal and solar heating”. 
(Klimakommissionen, 2010, p. 28) 
 
                                                          
137
 Until then it had been referred to by Anders Fogh Rasmussen in his speeches, and in Venstre 
published Energy plan from 2007. It was also mentioned in the Government manifesto from 
November 2007. However it was never specified what it would mean that Denmark should be 
“Independent of Fossil Fuels”. Even two years after the initial mention, Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
had still not put forward a deadline or any milestones to get there (Mahfelt, 2008). 
138
 The Commission even went as far as saying that Denmark “in principle “ could transition away 
from fossil fuels “already tomorrow”, if enough fierce restrictions on fossil fuels were enacted. This 
would however stop society, so a gradual transition was judged to be preferable. Although that 
theoretical proposition was not feasible, it underlined the Commissions point that the speed of the 
transition was determined by political will and not be technical limitations (Klimakommissionen, 
2010, p. 21).  
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Wind power was now again framed as the primary future energy source, at a time 
where other options such as geothermal and solar were still considered to be further 
down the road options139. The Commission set a range of installed wind power to be 
between 10 to 18.5 GW by 2050, depending on how the energy system would 
develop (Klimakommissionen, 2010, p. 32). Energy Independence understood as 
long-term energy supply security is a central focus of the report and is frequently 
discussed throughout the entire document (Klimakommissionen, 2010, p. 
3,4,8,13,14,18,20,38). In addition, the authors of the report would highlight the 
Industrial benefits of pursuing a fossil-independent society, or as one of the authors 
phrased it in an interview, “lots of gold on the street, just waiting to be picked up” 
(Mahfelt, 2010). 
The report was positively received as a bipartisan plan that was thoroughly 
researched (Stenvei, 2010c). The head of the green think-tank Concito, Martin 
Lidegaard, especially emphasized that the commission have had five economists and 
the report was not just written by “environmental hippies”. He called the 
commission’s report “a convincing plan for a fossil-free society”, which should 
appeal to both sides of the political spectrum (From, 2010). Lidegaard also 
supported the commission’s focus on offshore wind power and stated that it was 
“completely unrealistic” to make Denmark fossil independent without wind power, 
which he considered the low-carbon energy source closest to commercialization (K. 
B. Andersen, 2010c). Danish Energy, also lauded the report as a sign of “a historic 
unity” in Danish energy policy (Springborg, 2010) and agreed with both the 
proposed investments in offshore wind and biomass (TWC, 2010). Danish Industry 
was positive towards the proposals but cautioned that too high energy taxes could 
move jobs overseas (Stenvei, 2010a). The agricultural organization L&F stayed 
quiet about the offshore wind element, and instead applauded the investment 
recommendation for biomass and biogas (Stenvei, 2010c), which was still a 
contested topic. The only openly critical actor was the VK-governments supporting 
party, Dansk Folkeparti / The Danish People’s Party (DF), who said that the energy 
taxes which enabled wind power would ultimately “kill” Danish businesses 
(Stenvei, 2010a). DF compared the newly announced Anholt offshore wind farm’s 
subsidy level of 105 oere/kWh with the current electricity spot price of 36 
oere/KWh to argue that offshore wind investments were an “economic slap in the 
face”. DF claimed the commission was a group of biased “so-called experts”, whose 
proposal for more offshore wind could only be supported if the majority of the 
onshore wind was removed, so that it no longer “bothered” the Danish citizens (S. 
Petersen, 2010).  
                                                          
139
 An interesting point for the historians is that the report mentions solar heating, and does not 
consider solar PV as a viable large-scale option. This goes to show how fast the cost reductions on 
this solar PV happened as it went from being a non-option to one of the most promising renewable 
energy sources for the future. At the time the 2010 report was written there was less than 10 MW 
solar PV installed in Denmark. This figure had grown to 850 MW by 2017 (Lillevang, 2017). 
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6.1.7 Flawed auction design causes high price of Anholt Wind farm  
In the previous sub-chapter, the Anholt wind farm has come up a few times. This is 
because the strike price agreed in 2010 would become a highly critical point of 
reference for several old Market-coalition actors. It is therefore worth to relay the 
process around how this strike price level came to be set. In April 2010, it became 
clear that the auction for the 400 MW Anholt offshore wind farm had only seen one 
bidder, Dong Energy. Other potential bidders such as Swedish utility Vattenfall had 
stated that the bidding conditions were not good enough, due to a very tight project-
schedule with heavy fines in the event of delays (Holm & Wittrup, 2010a). Without 
competition, Dong Energy thus won the project at the high strike price of 105 
oere/KWh, and committed to deliver first power by the end of 2012.  
Socialdemokratiet, Radikale Venstre and the Socialistisk Folkeparti / Socialistic 
Peoples Party (SF) were critical about the VK government’s auction-design, and the 
resulting high price. They feared that the high price could give the perception that 
offshore wind power was significantly more expensive than it would have been if 
project timelines and related fines had not been so strict. But Minister of Climate 
and Energy Lykke Friis (V) insisted that this was the price, and that focus should be 
on the fact that “the project could be realized” (Holm & Wittrup, 2010b). After an 
examination from the Danish Energy Agency and a validation report from external 
consultants Ernst and Young, it was concluded that the price was not unusually high 
when the strict conditions were taken into consideration. They furthermore noted 
that developers at that time could alternatively spend their efforts on bidding for 
projects with feed-in tariffs in the UK (Wittrup, 2010d).  
Among Anholt’s most unlikely defenders was energy spokesman for Venstre Lars 
Christian Lilleholt, who pointed to the Ernst and Young validation as proof that “it 
has been estimated that the price is reasonable for the project” (Wittrup, 2010c). 
When faced with critique over the decision, Lilleholt responded that “it does not 
come for free” to become “free of fossil fuels, reduce CO2 and make us independent 
of energy supplies from politically unstable areas” (Stenvei, 2010b). Lilleholt would 
emphasize the Subsidy Burden that Venstre took on itself and stated that “it costs a 
lot of money to secure the energy supply and improve the climate, but Venstre is 
willing to pay that price” (Skouboe, 2010). But although the focus was on seeing the 
project through, Lykke Friis would a year later recognize that the short deadlines 
and the high fines in the auction design, had indeed caused the Anholt offshore wind 
farm to be more expensive than needed (T. Jensen, 2011).  
 
6.1.8 Political Parties disagree on definitions (2011) 
In 2010-2011 the government was preparing for a new energy agreement, wherein 
Energy Independence would be a key element. But the government had the Danish 
Energy Agency perform an individual assessment of Danish supply security, 
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wherein they would cite the DEA work to put their main focus on “supply security” 
defined as “having energy-services available at competitive prices” (DEA, 2010, p. 
2; DKGOV, 2011a, p. 13). This differed from the Climate Commission’s definition 
of Energy Independence which was “having access to the energy sources, which are 
necessary to fulfill the needs of society” (Klimakommissionen, 2010, p. 14). Now 
the VK government did not speak of Energy Independence as Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen had in 2008, but instead spoke of a supply security goal with an element 
of “competitive prices” in it. This term also included more options to what an energy 
system independent of fossil fuels could entail, as seen in the VK government 2011 
vision report “Energy strategy 2050”.  
 
“The government’s goal can be summarized as a Green-House-Gas 
(GHG) neutral energy sector, which uses 100 % renewable energy or a 
combination of renewable energy and coal/biomass with CCS (Carbon 
Capture and storage)...With regards to the transportation-sector, the goal 
is also a renewable energy based transportation sector, but here we are 
dependent on the international technology-development, and are 
therefore forced to adjust our level of ambition to the future technical and 
economic realities”. (DKGOV, 2011a, p. 9) 
 
Independence from fossil fuels was thus defined as something that could possibly be 
an energy mix with coal plants included. This illustrates further that although there 
was a high salience of the quality of Energy Independence, the VK government 
defined an energy independent society as still including coal-plants and something 
which should feature “competitive prices”, without defining what such prices are 
benchmarked against.   
This was a way to get negotiations on the way for the broad energy agreement that 
should set the framework for energy policy between 2012 and 2020. The VK 
government recognized wind power as the renewable energy source with “the largest 
physical potential”, which “in principle could cover Denmark’s electricity use 
multiple times over”. However, due to land-restriction concerns, the VK government 
foresaw that offshore wind would “probably” come to have a central role in the 
future energy system (DKGOV, 2011a, p. 18).  
The energy-plan also included concrete goals to build the 600 MW Kriegers Flak 
offshore wind farm as a joint project with Germany and Sweden, 400 MW of near-
shore turbines, and a number of test-site improvements (DKGOV, 2011a, p. 32). 
These planned build-outs would bring the share of electricity from wind power in 
2020 up to 40% (DKGOV, 2011a, p. 47). The VK government’s 2011 energy 
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strategy was thus historically ambitious for a right-wing government, but it still had 
a high focus on the quality Subsidy Burden. 
 
“There is no point in pursuing energy and climate policy at the expense 
of businesses and Danish jobs….With the governments’ strategy, a 
balance is created between the concern for competitiveness and the need 
for a fair distribution of the burdens of the transition”. (DKGOV, 2011a, 
p. 57) 
 
The above quote illustrates how energy and climate policy is subordinated to 
competitiveness concerns for some groups of Danish businesses. The Subsidy 
Burden quality is also salient as the green transition is framed as a counterweight 
that must be balanced against “concerns for competitiveness”, and a “burden” that 
must be distributed. It was especially the long-term goals which separated the 
framings of the VK-government’s energy plan and the one proposed by the 
opposition. There was a general agreement of which direction was to be taken, but 
the opposition’s energy plan had less of a focus on the Subsidy Burden quality and 
focused on the long-term goal of being free of fossil fuels. This framing is seen in 
the left-wing opposition’s shared energy plan, “KlimaDanmark 2050”, which had 
been published in May 2010.   
 
“Our goal is to make Denmark’s energy supply completely free of fossil 
fuels before 2050. The electricity and heating sector is made independent 
of coal, oil and gas already by 2035, while we expect that it will take up 
to 15 additional years for the transportation sector” (SDP, 2010, p. 3) 
 
The opposition cited the IPPC, the 2006 Stern report, and the Danish Engineering 
union (IDA)’s “Energiplan 2050”, which was heavily influenced by the CEESA 
work, as sources for the feasibility of their ambitious goals. Those goals included a 
requirement for all new energy investments to be sustainable, a goal to get 50% of 
Danish electricity from wind power by 2020, and a phase-out of coal power by 2030 
(SDP, 2010, p. 5). On the long-term, the opposition sought to change the flexibility 
of the electricity system so that “wind can become the largest source of energy - also 
for transportation” (SDP, 2010, p. 3). The reasoning for the ambitious plans was laid 
out as three main points. The first reason was global responsibility to mitigate 
climate change, the second was the aim to decrease fossil fuel imports and third, 
becoming a global pioneer in wind power (SDP, 2010, p. 4).   
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Nonetheless, these years were defined by a consensus forming about the direction of 
the Danish energy system, and the central role for wind power. This historically 
broad consensus came after a general push from various actors in the energy 
industry. The powerful utility actor, Danish Energy pointed to the many energy-
plans as proof that there was unity for action, but that ‘now we would like to see 
action’. This call would be echoed by the spokesman for the association of decentral 
heat-plants (mainly gas-powered), Dansk Fjernvarme, who would express frustration 
over the fact that there was ‘fairly large agreement in the energy sector on where 
Denmark should go, but the politicians make no long-term decisions’ (J. S. Nielsen, 
2010). Despite the call for action from many private Global-coalition actors, it was 
not possible for Hedegaard’s successor, Lykke Friis (V), to gather the political 
parties around an agreement in 2011. In September, a new left-wing coalition 
government of Socialdemokratiet, Radikale Venstre and the supporting party 
Socialistisk Folkeparti / Socialistic Peoples Party (SF) formed a new government. 
Martin Lidegaard, Member of Parliament for Radikale Venstre and the former head 
of the green think tank Concito would become the new Minister of Climate, Energy 
and Buildings. 
 
6.2. NEW GOVERNMENT INCREASE CC MITIGATION SALIENCE 
(2012-2014)  
This sub-chapter starts off with a short introduction of the new energy minister 
Martin Lidegaard and the 2012 energy agreement, which he would steer the 
negotiations for. Then follows some general concerns about the costs of the energy 
agreement in the following years. The sub-chapter ends with the passing of a 2014-
law, wherein De Konservative join the left-wing parties to establish the Climate 
Council.  
 
6.2.1 A New Energy Minister lands historic agreement 
The new actor in charge of energy was Martin Lidegaard from the party Radikale 
Venstre. He was a communications-professional by education, who had worked six 
years as head of communications in the Danish anti-poverty NGO Mellemfolkeligt 
Samvirke / MS Action Aid. Lidegaard had been energy and climate  spokesman for 
Radikale Venstre from 2001 to 2007, where he left politics to found and head the 
climate think tank Concito from 2008 to 2011 (FT.dk, 2017c)140. Lidegaard had 
                                                          
140
 Lidegaard had by colleagues on both sides of the isle been described as a well-liked, detail-
oriented and competent politician on matters related to energy and climate.  Despite the fact that 
some colleagues considered him ideologically invested in the climate change mitigation cause, 
Lidegaard was apt at formulating himself in “direct quotable phrases”, and thereby able to keep the 
attention of people who felt less strongly about the cause (N. T. Dahl, 2011).   
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during the early 2000’s worked with Svend Auken to bring back the ambitious 
energy plans which defined the 1980’s and 1990’s, of which he considered the 1996 
plan “Energi 21” to have been the last (J. S. Nielsen, 2012b). In a 2009 anthology, 
Lidegaard described how he saw it as the government’s responsibility to set the 
direction, especially as the environment had become a political battleground. 
 
“Since the end of the 1980’s, the environment has been a political 
battleground, where policies have dramatically shifted in character with 
the changing political majorities. Great achievements in one decade is 
lost in the other…There will of course always be legitimate opposition to 
from the “old” companies, politicians and organizations, which on the 
short term stand to lose on a modern, green development in Denmark. 
But they should only pose a small minority”. (Lidegaard, 2009, p. 60) 
  
Lidegaard had closely followed the negotiations around the Anholt wind farm and 
believed that there was a disproportionate focus on the societal costs of supporting 
wind power141. He was convinced that the environmental aspect had not been 
communicated well enough to create a strong foundation, and that the dramatic 
shifts in policy had been caused by a “small minority” of politicians and companies, 
which wielded high political power. But as the Global-coalition had gained 
momentum in previous years, he would prioritize bridging the differences and land a 
broad energy agreement.   
 
Historically broad Energy Agreement expands offshore wind (2012) 
Lidegaard would take outset in the VK-government’s 2011 energy-agreement 
proposal, and add a number of initiatives to draft the new government’s proposal 
“Our energy” (DKGOV, 2011b). Most notably among these were another 600 MW 
offshore wind Farm (Horns Rev 3), new targets for energy efficiency and targeted 
measures to help energy-intensive industries which could be particularly exposed to 
energy taxes (Kestler, 2012). The discussions up to the agreement would quickly 
come to revolve around the annual costs of the agreement by 2020. The VK-
government’s proposal was estimated to cost 3.6 bn. DKK in 2020, while 
Lidegaard’s proposal would cost 5.6 bn. DKK, a cost which was unacceptable to 
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 Lidegaard explained his position on this in a 2012 interview: “The well-consolidated myth is 
that it is unbelievably expensive to invest in wind and renewable energy, but if you exclude our 
taxes, we are below the average (electricity price, ed.) in the EU. Then you can always discuss 
whether they (energy taxes, ed.) are too high, but they are part of the funding for the society, we 
have chosen (JP, 2012)”.  
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Venstre. They worked under the mantra that “it should not become more expensive 
to be a Dane”, and believed their 2011 proposal should be ambitious enough  
(Kestler, 2012). Lidegaard would then cancel some of the initiatives and reduce 
subsidies for new near-shore turbines, ending up at a proposal which had a cost of 
4.6 bn. DKK in annual costs in 2020. Venstre and De Konservative were not willing 
to negotiate this proposal either, as Lilleholt announced that “if the government 
wants a deal” total costs should preferably “come down to 3 bn. DKK” (Ritzau, 
2012a)142. Venstre was skeptical of the proposed target of having 50% of electricity 
consumption come from wind power by 2020, as the already anticipated 42% 
achieved in 2015 was considered appropriate (Rytgaard, 2012).  
This grid-lock would eventually be solved by the Global-coalition actors outside the 
parliamentary walls. Venstre faced increasing pressure from the two large industrial 
organizations Danish Energy and Danish Industry. Danish Energy stated that it was 
now time that Venstre accepted the slightly higher cost of the proposal on the table, 
while Danish Industry  had repeatedly encouraged an agreement on the basis that “it 
is not an option to do nothing” (Arnfred & Carlsen, 2012). Venstre expressed 
disagreement with Danish Industry, finding it odd that Danish Industry did not care 
more about the costs to Danish companies and consumers (Kristiansen, 2012). As 
Venstre became isolated in these negotiations, the party turned to its long-time allies 
in the agricultural sector. Lilleholt would promise Dansk Gartneri / The Horticulture 
Association, that he would work for higher subsidies for the pot that subsidies 
implementation of Renewable processes in companies (Danish: “VE til process”), 
and a targeted tax-relief of the PSO-tax for the horticulture industry (DG, 2012). 
Venstre was also facing increased pressure from several of their own mayors in 
Jutland, led by Esbjerg Mayor Johnny Soettrup (V), who argued for the potential 
local jobs created in the proposed Horns Rev 3 offshore wind farm (E. Ø. Andersen 
& Vangkilde, 2012; Brandstrup, 2012). In February 2012, Venstre finally softened 
their demand that costs should not exceed 3 bn. DKK, on the condition that the 
government redirected money from the wind power pot to support more biogas 
development (Jessen & Thobo-Carlsen, 2012) 143. 
Following six months of hard negotiation, Lidegaard would in March 2012 sign the 
energy agreement, which was well received by the various industrial organizations 
(Ritzau, 2012b). When it came to wind power, the agreement included the Kriegers 
Flak of 600 MW, Horns Rev 3 of 400 MW, 500 MW of nearshore turbines and an 
expected onshore wind build-out of 1800 MW (DEA, 2012a). Several initiatives had 
been cut from the agreement, most notably 200 MW less on the Horns Rev 3 wind 
                                                          
142
 Lidegaard urged Venstre and De Konservative to recognize that the sharp rises in fuel prices and 
Europe’s high dependency on fossil fuel imports, meant that there also was a cost to not making a 
deal. This would however not affect Lilleholt’s position, as he considered those estimated benefits 
to be “airy money”, whereas the added costs surely was ”an extra bill” (Stampe, 2012). 
143
 A members of Venstre’s parliamentary group would anonymously tell journalists that he 
disagreed with the strong push for biogas subsidies, which was considered an agricultural subsidy 
(Brandstrup, 2012). 
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farm, which brought the total expected 2020 cost to 3.5 bn. DKK. The agreement 
was considered historically ambitious and was supported by all parties in parliament, 
with the exception of the small right-wing party, Liberal Alliance (J. S. Nielsen, 
2012a). The agreement included 2020 goals to get 35% of total energy consumption 
from renewables, along with 34% lower CO2 emissions compared to 1990. A 
supplementary document, which only the government and its left-wing supporting 
party Enhedslisten agreed to, included a list of additional goals. These goals were 
50% of electricity from wind power in 2020, a coal phase-out by 2030, 100% 
renewables in electricity and heat by 2035 and a complete fossil fuel phase-out by 
2050 (DKGOV, 2012a).  
These goals constituted the main difference between the government’s goals of 
being “fossil free” by 2050, and Venstre and De Konservative’s stated goal of being 
“fossil independent” by 2050144. The subsidy costs were connected to the PSO-tax, 
which was designed so it went up by 1 DKK for every 2 DKK the electricity price 
went down and vice versa. Therefore the total cost of the 2012 energy agreement 
was based on an estimate that was dependent on the electricity price. The electricity 
price forecast came from the DEA’s 2011 prognosis (DEA, 2012b). In this 
prognosis, the DEA expected the electricity price to rise from the 2011 level of 300 
DKK/MWh (40 €/MWh) to around 400 DKK/MWh (54 €/MWh) by 2025 (all in 
2009 prices). This 25% price-increase was explained with the IEA’s projections for 
rising fossil fuel and biomass prices, as well as ETS quota prices, which were 
expected to rise by 130% by 2025 – from 100 to 230 DKK (DEA, 2011a, p. 4). But 
these trajectories would not come true, as the following years saw a sharp drop in 
electricity prices, causing the PSO-costs to increase (NordPool, 2018).   
 
6.2.2 Concerns about costs increase (2013-2014) 
The 2012 agreement had for a moment gathered almost all the Danish actors in a 
historically broad consensus which framed wind power as the backbone of the future 
Danish energy system. But the strength of the coalition and the Valuation Network 
build around the agreed direction would be challenged as a material actor, the 
electricity price, did not act as projected.   
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 The difference was that fossil free meant that fossil fuels could not be used in the electricity-, 
heating- or transportation sector. Fossil independent meant that Denmark should be able to produce 
the equivalent of its energy consumption from renewables, but would still be able to consume fossil 
fuels by 2050. I will return to these definitions in more detail in sub-chapter 7.2.   
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CO2 quota prices collapse and fossil fuel prices remain low 
Less than one year after the 2012 energy agreement had been published, Venstre 
expressed a concern that the EU ETS CO2 quota price had not risen as forecasted. In 
the 10 months that had passed, the quota price had fallen from €7/tCO2 to €4/tCO2, 
while the agreement was based on a 2011 DEA prognosis of around €18 tCO2 
(DEA, 2011a, p. 10; Winther & Ussing, 2013a). This caused Lilleholt to announce 
that the Horns Rev 3 and Kriegers Flak offshore wind farms could become “too 
expensive and therefore should not be completed” (JP, 2013). In the summer of 
2013, Lilleholt outlined what Venstre’s response to the unexpected costs would be; 
“no one can give any guarantees for anything until the tender of the (Offshore wind, 
ed.) farms have finished (Winther, 2013a)” and that Venstre ”under no circumstance 
(would) agree to make the energy agreement more expensive” (Winther & Ussing, 
2013b). The Kriegers Flak Offshore wind farm had already been postponed once 
and a new postponement was now being discussed (DKGOV, 2012b). The changed 
CO2 prognosis made the right-wing business newspaper Boersen suggest a 
cancellation of Horns Rev 3 and Kriegers Flak to escape the “ideological straitjacket 
of a planned economy on the verge of collapse” (Jeppesen, 2013a). In July, the same 
newspaper invoked the DEC’s 2002 analysis and the “extremely expensive” Anholt 
offshore wind farm, as reasons to doubt whether the “jewels of the planned economy 
energy policy”, Horns Rev 3 and Kriegers Flak, would even be built (Jeppesen, 
2013b). DF was ready to cancel at least one of the planned offshore wind farms and 
even De Konservative were considering to abandon the agreement (Brandstrup & 
Dyrskjøt, 2013). This caused Lidegaard (Brandstrup & Dyrskjøt, 2013; Winther & 
Ussing, 2013b) and the industrial organizations, Danish Energy, Danish Industry 
and the Danish Wind turbine Industry (Dyrskjøt, 2013; J. S. Nielsen, 2013), to call 
for a halt to speculations in cancellations and postponements, as political risks 
equals investor uncertainty, which could push bidding prices up.  Lidegaard, the 
industrial organizations, wind turbine manufacturers and local industries, such as the 
rapidly growing Esbjerg harbor, emphasized the Industrial advantages of a large 
manufacturing bases in Denmark (Skouboe, 2013; Vestergaard, 2013), as seen in the 
below interview with Lidegaard. 
 
“Yes, it is right. Offshore wind turbines are considerably more expensive 
than onshore wind turbines, and they are not competitive. But should we 
then wait until 2025 to erect them? I do not believe so, because what 
drives the development and lowers the prices is the existence of a market. 
We cannot wait forever until we invest. Denmark produces every fourth 
wind turbine in the world. We have 100.000 employees in clean 
technology, and if we are to have any hope of being ahead in this, we 
must continue developing the future offshore wind market”. (Skouboe, 
2013) 
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It is worth noticing that Lidegaard draws attention to onshore wind being the 
cheaper option, and highlights the need to invest to allow offshore wind to follow 
the same cost trajectory. Although offshore wind power in these years still only 
made up less than 5% of the world’s total installed capacity, the growth of the sector 
was a large Industrial benefit to companies based in Denmark, which still delivered 
the majority of components. Figure 28 is a picture of the mould used to build the 
Siemens 75 meter blade, which was being developed in the Aalborg factory in 2012 
(Source: SGRE).  
 
 
Figure 28: Mould for Siemens 75 meter blade (2012).  
 
The world’s largest offshore wind farm in operation today, London Array (630 
MW), is a good example of Denmark’s presence in the offshore industry during 
these years. It has been installed by DONG Energy, and the wind turbines have been 
produced at Siemens Wind Power’s Danish factories of Brande in Aalborg. Note 
that the London Array wind farm was commissioned in 2013 and therefore does not 
feature the 75 meter blade which was to be developed in the pictured mould from 
2012145. The installation of London Array is pictured in figure 29 on the next page 
(Source: SGRE).  
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 The turbines at the London Array offshore wind farm are SWT-3.6-120 MW turbines, while the 
75 meter blade would be used in the SWT-6.0-154 MW turbine, which was not commercially 
installed until 2015. London Array will continue to be the world’s largest offshore wind farm until 
the British offshore wind farm Hornsea 1 (1218 MW) is commissioned in 2020.        
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Figure 29: Installation at London Array (2012). 
 
The two main players in the offshore wind market at the time were wind turbine 
manufacturer, Siemens Wind Power and the utility DONG energy. These two 
players were also aware of the time pressure to bring down costs of offshore wind, 
something which was needed in Denmark, Germany and the UK. In July 2012 
Siemens Wind Power and DONG Energy signed a large framework agreement for 
300 new 6 MW turbines at an estimated worth of 2.5 bn. Euro (Murray, 2012). Lead 
by these two players, the industry would in the following year pledge to cut costs by 
40%, so that a project reaching Final Investment Decision in the year 2020 would 
cost less than 100 Euro per MWh (Winther, 2013b). Senior vice-president at DONG 
Energy during this negotiation, Bent Christensen, explained the reasoning behind the 
pledge in the interview for this thesis hereafter. 
 
“If the industry had not communicated as it did what would the situation 
then have been? Then you as a government authority would have 
observed an industry that was apathetic and did not act. You would 
quickly grow tired of that…This was a vision that when we got to that 
point, we need to have found the right technical solutions...I don't know 
many other industries who think 6-8 years ahead and set a target for their 
Technology Cost to remain sustainable as an business” (Interview 4: 
Christensen, quote 5). 
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The need to bring down subsidy costs for offshore wind became increasingly clear 
in the following concerns raised about Denmark’s planned offshore wind farms. The 
framing of wind power as a Global Advantage was solid in relation to the Industrial 
quality, but the Subsidy Burden quality was still present in the framing. Although the 
Global-coalition was a heterogeneous and powerful group, the wider Global 
Advantage Valuation network was vulnerable to the materiality of the electricity 
prices since these determine the size of the Subsidy Burden.  
 
Venstre increasingly problematizes wind power build-out 
Venstre and De Konservative became increasingly split on the valuation of wind 
power during 2014. Anders Fogh Rasmussen left for NATO, Connie Hedegaard left 
to become Climate Commissioner in the EU, and Lykke Friis left to work at 
Copenhagen University (Ritzau, 2013). But while De Konservative was only 
periodically expressing concerns about the energy agreement, Venstre was 
increasingly calling the offshore wind farms and the CO2 reduction goals into 
question.  
Lars Loekke Rasmussen did, according to reports from the time, not share his 
predecessors estimated high value of a global scale Industrial business adventure, 
and protection from geopolitical threats, that had caused Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s 
sudden embrace of wind power (Meilstrup, 2010, pp. 21, 104, 133). Lars Loekke 
Rasmussen’s valuation of wind power depended to a much higher degree on how 
little climate policies disturbed Danish businesses and thus how low the subsidy 
costs are. This is seen in his answer to the topic in the below 2014 interview. 
 
“I am not running from the agreement about the 34 percent, but it has 
already created problems on its own, because the world around us has 
changed since we agreed to it. There is the shale-gas, the price of fossil 
fuels has dropped, the EU CO2 quota system has collapsed...real Danish 
businesses are reporting about real problems with their energy-bill. 
Danes, who get district heating, are reporting about real problems with 
rising district heating prices. The slaughter-houses are reporting about 
problems, that you cannot get the necessary raw goods delivered, and 
therefore slaughter-houses are being closed, and we should be careful 
that we do not, detached from reality, sit at Christiansborg (Danish 
Parliament, ed.) and just set new goals”. (Termansen, 2014) 
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Lars Loekke Rasmussen considered the offshore wind power plans to be something 
that changes according to many different changes in condition ranging from shale-
gas discoveries, EU quotas and what he refers to as “real” problems in “real” 
companies. As 2013 and 2014 passed it was clear that it was the very special 
conditions in March 2012, where the CO2 market was projected to recover and 
fossil fuel prices were still somewhat high, Venstre could accept the energy 
agreement in its current form. The DEA prognosis of 2011 was now highlighted as a 
broken promise of costs. As Lilleholt phrased it, there would be “no guarantee” that 
the planned offshore wind farms would proceed. A compromise was made in 2014 
as the S-RV government agreed to lower the cost of the PSO-tax, which had a 
particular high cost in the energy-intensive industries such as cement-production and 
agriculture, by 13 bn. DKK from 2015-2020146.  
This compromise would however only momentarily bring stability. In the fall of 
2014, it was revealed that the EU commission had raised concerns about the design 
of the Danish PSO-tax. The concern was related to the fact that the PSO-tax was 
paid on all electricity in Denmark, including imported electricity, but that onshore 
and solar subsidies were paid on a tariff-based way, which foreign suppliers could 
not bid into (Wittrup, 2014a). Foreign suppliers of electricity was therefore unfairly 
treated according to article 30 and 110 of EU competition law, as their product was 
subject to a Danish tax, which paid for subsidies they did not have access to 
(Wittrup, 2014b). It was a common challenge emerging in the EU, and the EU 
competitions commission therefore only required that Denmark designed future 
renewables subsidy-schemes, so that a minimum of 6% of the subsidy pot was 
opened to companies in one of the three countries which could deliver green 
electricity to Denmark; Sweden, Norway and Germany (DKGOV, 2014a, p. 11). 
The dispute was however heavily problematized by both Venstre and DF as it 
caused a delay to the lowered PSO-taxes, which were agreed in June 2014. Lars 
Christian Lilleholt called the PSO-case “a bomb under Danish energy and climate 
policy” (Tv2, 2014), while DF political-leader, Kristian Thulesen Dahl, stated that 
the EU commission had disqualified the financing for the Danish energy policy, and 
therefore they did not feel obliged to adhere to the 2012 energy agreement (TV2, 
2014a). In December 2014, the Horns Rev 3 Auction was entering its final bidding 
phase, but both Venstre and DF questioned whether the Horns Rev 3 offshore wind 
farm should even be built. At a crisis-meeting the S-RV eventually persuaded the 
two parties to stay in the deal (TV2, 2014b), and three months later, the Horns Rev 3 
farm would be auctioned at a record-low strike price of 77 DKK/MWh 
(€103/MWh), 26% lower than the subsidy ceiling (REnews, 2015). Nonetheless, 
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 The lowered costs were achieved by a number of measures but the majority of the savings came 
from wind power projects. The available subsidies for onshore wind turbines were reduced by 100 
Mn. DKK while nearshore turbine build-out was reduced from 500 MW to 400 MW146, and the 
600 MW Kriegers Flak offshore wind farm was postponed another 2 years. The farm, which 
originally should have been completely built by 2020, should now deliver first power by the end of 
2022 (T. H. Hansen, 2014). 
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there was a need for enhanced stability as the Global Advantage valuation network 
depended on several material actors that were outside the Global Coalition’s control. 
Venstre had in 2012 agreed to the broad energy agreement, but had shortly thereafter 
moved fully back to being the central political actor in the market-coalition. Just as 
it was the case during the Market Distortion period, the actors of the framing what 
had been disassembled were not completely gone. Although a Global Advantage 
Frame was dominating this period, the Market-Coalition’s actors were still active in 
the valuation struggle. I have already mentioned CEPOS and L&F, but the Danish 
Economic Council would also publish several reports in an attempt to maintain the 
Market Distortion Valuation Frame.  
 
The DEC continue to recommend theoretical market solutions 
Throughout the Global Advantage period, the DEC would re-iterate their argument 
that it was not valuable to build wind power in order to achieve CC Mitigation, as a 
carbon market could theoretically solve this in a cheaper way. The DEC was not part 
of the dominant Global-coalition, but was still an authoritative calculative agency, 
which continually argued against Denmark investing in wind power to mitigate 
Climate change. In 2008, there were high expectations that the second reform of the 
EU ETS market would lead to CO2 quota prices above 25 €/TCO2, and thus the 
DEC concluded that the EU ETS market would function to bring forward CO2 
reductions where they were cheapest. This was a reasonable assumption, since the 
CO2 quota price was high at the time of writing.  The DEC argued that wind 
turbines would naturally become competitive, as other sources of energy such as gas 
and coal would become too expensive with a CO2 price of >25 €/tCO2. But 
something interesting would happen in the reports coming out after 2010. The EU 
ETS would not be adjusted in the wake of the financial crisis and significant 
amounts of excess quotas caused the CO2 prices to permanently stay under 8 
€/TCO2. The DEC would however maintain their conclusion that trading in a 
functioning market would be the cheapest way to mitigate CO2. This is despite the 
fact that a purchase of quotas would not necessarily cause prices to increase as there 
was an oversupply. The DEC’s conclusions about the ETS market’s ability to 
deliver CC Mitigation, compared to the annual carbon prices are visualized in table 
6. The table and a further analysis of the reports can be found in Appendix C. I have 
included the 2002 report and the later 2015 and 2016 report for overview purpose, 
although they are not technically within this chapter’s period (DEC, 2002a, 2008, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016).  
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Table 6: DEC statements compared to the average annual EU ETS price. 
 
 
The DEC argument has thus been sustained up to today, even though the EU ETS-
price dropped after 2008, and has remained in the €5-10 per tons since. It can thus 
be argued that the creation of the EU ETS market has hurt the Danish wind power 
build-out, as the presence of the EU ETS comes to nullify the quality of CC 
Mitigation in wind turbines, and become a go-to narrative when market-coalition 
actors advocated for delaying action. A more elaborate walkthrough of the DEC’s 
reports between 2008 and 2016 can be found in Appendix C.   
 
New 2014 law aimed at stabilizing Global Advantage Valuation Network 
Despite the broad coalition of actors, the Global Advantage Valuation Network 
could still be shaken by the material conditions of the failed CO2 quota market and 
continually low electricity prices. In 2014, a new Climate, Energy and Buildings 
minister, Rasmus Helveg (RV), would aim to stabilize wind power world more in 
2014, by setting up a framework to ensure that changing Danish governments stayed 
on track towards its long-term goals. He worked on this with the Left-wing parties 
and De Konservative during 2014 to enact the 2014 Climate act which should keep 
Denmark on track towards the long-term goal being a “low-emission society in 
2050” with an “energy supply based on renewable energy” (DKGOV, 2014b)147.  
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 Venstre was dissatisfied with the law, and felt that they had been left out of influence by Helveg 
and De Konservative (Oeyen, 2014). In the Climate Law, De Konservative joined the Government 
goal of 40% CO2 Reductions in 2020, as opposed to the original 34% goal, which could be agreed 
with Venstre and DF in the 2012 energy agreements law text. Lilleholt said that Venstre did not 
Report Page Average EU ETS price Statement in English
2002 216; 217 Not started until 2005
Subsidies for wind turbines is the most expensive option....If Denmark is to honor its Kyoto commitment as cheaply 
as possible there are however other options than to bring down CO2 emissions in Denmark....They entail creation of 
trading in CO2-quotas. 
2008 234 25 €/tCO2
A sufficiently tight CO2-regulation will make renewable energy profitable and thereby secure a high renewable 
energy share...Since the CO2-regulation adresses these two central concerns in energy policy, namely supply 
security and climate, an independent goal for renewable energy would require an explicit reason, which is not 
connected to these two concerns.   
2010 352; 354 15 €/tCO2
If there through quotas and taxes a high and fairly stable price of CO2 is secured. Going forward, there is no longer 
any reason to subsidize renewable energy...There is no evidence for a claim that politicians and government officials 
generally are better than the market at picking ‘tomorrows winners’ (354). 
2011 201 15 €/tCO2
A further taxation of CO2 in the quota-covered sector...will not lower the number of quotas and therefore not lower 
emissions of GHG’s at an EU-level. The same applies for other measures…i.e. subsidies for wind energy electricity 
(201).
2012 5 8 €/tCO2
Increased support for renewable energy in the quota sector in Denmark, will not lead to lower CO2-emissions on a 
global level (5).  
2013 66 5 €/tCO2
From an economic viewpoint, the low quota price is therefore only a problem, if it does not reflect the political level 
of ambition, which can be caused by market uncertainty of whether the EU ETS will continue to exist…In addition, 
an intervention could provide further uncertainty in the market, as it can create an anticipation of other interventions 
in the future (66).  
2014 32 5 €/tCO2
A higher renewable energy share, achieved through more support to renewable energy in the quota sector, does not 
benefit the climate and is associated with costs to Danish households and companies (32). 
2015 305 7 €/tCO2
A cost-effective climate policy will among other elements constitute that reductions are made in those areas of the 
world, where it is cheapest. This requires a global solution, which as a starting point should be based on economic 
instruments
2016 12 7 €/tCO2
The combined emissions in the EU from the quota-covered sector, is controlled by the quota ceiling, and Danish 
initiatives within the quota-covered sector therefore have as a starting point no effect on the climate. Support for 
renewable energy and other initiatives within the quota-covered sector should therefore be argued for on other 
concerns than the direct effect on the climate (12).  
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The law set up a new advisory body, The Climate Council, which would publish 
reports on whether Denmark was on track for the long-term goal and what could be 
done going forward. The Climate Council would have an annual budget of 12 mn. 
DKK and be headed by Peter Birch Soerensen, a recognized economics professor 
from Copenhagen University, who was head of the Danish Economic councils from 
2004-2009. Peter Birch Soerensen had assembled his team by early 2015, which 
included Katherine Richardson, head of the 2010 Climate Commission and Poul 
Erik Morthorst, contributor in both the 1996 AKF-report and the 2010 Climate 
Commission report. The Climate Council was created to challenge the neo-classical 
economic thinking and market-based assumptions that the Danish economic 
councils (DEC) had advocated for years. They would primarily become active in the 
next period, and are therefore not covered further here.  
The 2012 energy agreement was a historical compromise, which planned for more 
than 1.4 GW of offshore wind and a 1.8 GW build-out of onshore wind. As 
Denmark’s installed wind power fleet had just passed 4 GW in 2012, the plan thus 
equaled a more than 70% increase of the fleet’s size over the next 8 years (When 
accounting for retired onshore wind turbines, ed.). The commitment would however 
quickly be brought into question due to continued low electricity prices and a rise in 
subsidy costs. The Market-coalition, represented primarily by Lars Christian 
Lilleholt, was interested in the Industrial benefits of wind power, but had a 
significantly higher concern for the Subsidy Burden that came with it. This period is 
defined by wind power becoming technically competitive with other energy sources, 
but entrenched meanings about high subsidy costs would entail. This is visible in the 
coming analysis of two 2014 reports on the costs of wind power.  
 
 
6.3. TWO REPORTS CALCULATE WIND POWER AS CHEAPEST 
TECHNOLOGY (2014) 
The Global Advantage period saw the publication of two reports, which would 
cement the strong positive impact of Technology Cost, but one of them would also 
re-use a Market-coalition way of framing wind power costs. The first report is the 
Danish Energy Agency’s calculation on a research note called “Electricity 
Production Costs” (DEA, 2014a), which had a larger validation report by Consultant 
Agency “EA - Energy Analysis” behind it (EA Energianalyse, 2014). The second 
report is “The cost of producing electricity in Denmark” which was ordered by the 
Rockwool Foundation Research unit (RW) to be calculated by two economic 
professors from Copenhagen Business School (CBS) (Rockwool, 2014b). The two 
reports both came from authoring institutions with a highly credible image and had a 
                                                                                                                                        
want to join the 40% goal, because although they “want new reductions, it should not cost jobs or 
money” (Oeyen, 2014). Since Helveg could not guarantee Lilleholt that the increased ambitions 
could be achieved at no costs and without any sectors losing one job, the new energy minister had 
decided to negotiate the deal with De Konservative.   
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stated aim of advising policy makers (EA Energianalyse, 2014, p. 4; Rockwool, 
2014a, p. 2) regarding the societal costs of wind power. The overlap in that they 
both concluded that onshore wind power by far was the cheapest technology to build 
for Denmark (EA Energianalyse, 2014, p. 5; Rockwool, 2014c, p. 2). This shows the 
materiality of a high positive impact from the Technology Cost quality. But an 
additional counterfactual analysis in the RW report concluded that wind power had 
made electricity 13% more expensive than a business as usual scenario (Rockwool, 
2014a, p. 6). The assumptions behind the two reports, as well as the public reactions 
to their conclusions will be examined next.   
 
 
6.3.1 Danish Energy Agency: Wind is cheapest (2014) 
The Energy Analysis (EA) Background report called “Electricity Production costs” 
was written in April 2014, but was not released until it could supplement a research 
note of the same name from the Danish Energy Agency (DEA), published in June 
2014. The EA report is a 42-page validation report to the DEA’s 8-page research 
note. The report and research note examine which of 10 electricity production 
technologies (wind, solar, coal, gas, biomass etc.) are the cheapest to build in 
Denmark, if Denmark would start from a green field energy system148, and that the 
EU ETS CO2 quota prices would rise in the future according to projections made by 
the International Energy Agency. The report concluded that onshore wind power 
was the cheapest energy source to build among the 10 examined (DEA, 2014a; EA 
Energianalyse, 2014). In example, it calculated electricity production costs of 
onshore wind at 321 DKK/MWh, which was considerably cheaper than building 
conventional energy sources such as coal (534 DKK/MWh) and gas (606 
DKK/MWh). The two objects of study will hereafter be referred to as the EA report 
and the DEA note.  
 
Actor Profiles: Danish Energy Agency and EA 
The Danish Energy Agency is an independent agency placed under leadership of the 
Danish ministry of Energy, Utilities and Climate, which is governed by the elected 
minister of the time (DEA, 2016a). It has approximately 300 employees, primarily 
of engineering background but also other professions, with responsibility for energy 
production and supply, transportation and consumption, as well as Denmark’s 
energy efficiency and CO2 emission reduction measures (DEA, 2016a). 
EA energy analysis is a well-renowned consultancy firm, which is frequently used to 
calculate energy-related scenarios and statistics for the Danish Government, Danish 
                                                          
148
 Green field means that the report assumes costs as if a country was building an energy system 
from scratch and there was no existing grid or capacity from the outset.  
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interest organizations (i.e. the Danish Energy calculation in 2006), as well as 
international bodies (i.e. the International Energy Agency). The agency employs 
around 25 full-time employees, with mainly economic and engineering 
backgrounds, and several senior staffers have prior experience from prior positions 
within the Danish government (EA, 2016b).  
 
The DEA and EA calculate wind power as the cheapest available technology 
The EA report is a technology cost comparison report, which resembles the 1996 
AKF report, as it focuses on present Technology Cost and a high salience of the CC 
Mitigation quality of wind turbines. This is seen in the description of the overall 
purpose of the EA report: 
 
“The DEA has requested EA Energy Analysis to analyze costs of 
producing electricity from new plants from a societal-economic 
view...The plants are assumed constructed so that the first year of 
production is 2016...We are presenting long-term marginal production 
costs for new units, wherein capital-, operational-, fuel- and 
environmental costs are included”. (EA Energianalyse, 2014, p. 4) 
 
Wind power is one of the ten examined objects, which are treated as a stand-alone 
technology to be measured on its specific construction and maintenance costs. It is 
thus not considered a supplementary source, but is evaluated on the same terms as 
conventional sources such as coal- or gas-plants. In the comparison, the generated 
heat revenue was calculated for conventional heat-power plants, while a balancing 
cost of 15 DKK/MWh was added to wind power’s costs. When measured on the 
technological costs without CO2 quota costs and other emissions, onshore wind (321 
DKK/MWh) was calculated to be cheaper than coal (346 DKK/MWh) and 
significantly cheaper than gas (528 DKK/MWh). Offshore wind (582 DKK/MWh) 
was calculated as roughly on par with gas but more expensive than coal (EA 
Energianalyse, 2014, p. 13). So the quality Technology Cost was for the first time 
salient as a positive impact. Wind power was framed as the most competitive energy 
source without any coupling to Future Potential or CC Mitigation. It is deemed to 
have a strong positive impact on the Valuation Frame in the report.  
The sources for the Technology Cost for the ten examined energy sources came from 
the Danish Energy Agency’s January 2014 technology catalogue (EA Energianalyse, 
2014, p. 17), while the fuel costs were sourced from the IEA’s New Policies 
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Scenario (EA Energianalyse, 2014, p. 14). The discount rate for the investment was 
set at 4%, which was equivalent to the level of the discount rate for public 
investments in 2013. In 2013, it had been lowered from the previous level of 5% 
(DKGOV, 2013)149. The only system costs included was a balancing cost, which was 
as a charge of 15 DKK/MWh, less than 5% of the total costs. The authors add a cost 
to account for system-costs of short-term frequency balancing, but also for changes 
in output on days with unexpected output for wind power. This is however not the 
same as a cost for a back-up plant for capacity (EA Energianalyse, 2014, p. 22)150.  
In addition to the Technology Cost, the CC Mitigation quality and, to a lesser extent, 
the Environment quality, contributed to categorizing both onshore and offshore wind 
as a significantly more valuable investment than coal or gas. The CC Mitigation 
quality was present as a cost of 163 DKK/MWh for coal and 61 DKK/MWh for gas, 
which was a part of the total cost number for the ten technologies presented in the 
DEA note. The EA report used the IEA’s prediction that the price of EU ETS CO2 
emission quotas would rise from 7 € per ton in 2014 to over 30 € per ton in 2035 
(EA Energianalyse, 2014, p. 10)151, and extrapolated the rising trend from 2035 
onwards to 2050 (EA Energianalyse, 2014, p. 4). The Environmental quality was 
also calculated as a societal costs for NOx (50 DKK/kg) and SO2 emissions (96 
DKK/kg), based on the Danish Energy Agency’s assumptions (EA Energianalyse, 
2014, p. 16).  
The EA report does not discuss reasons for the choices made as it mainly follows the 
general assumptions used in the Danish Energy Agency note. In the expectation of 
rising fuel prices and the extrapolation past 2035, the report envisions an energy 
system wherein wind power becomes more valuable as it functions as a hedge 
against future price increases of gas and coal.  
The EA report and the DEA note both have a high salience on Technology Cost and 
CC Mitigation, while the qualities related to system integration costs are largely 
absent. By making this distinction, the report draws light to the materiality of the 
falling construction costs of wind turbines and frames wind power as the cheapest 
source of energy to build. The EA report uses the same basic assumptions as the 
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 As previously discussed, the lower the discount rate is, the more competitive investments with 
high upfront cost will appear. This is because long-term gains of those investments are valued 
higher, whereas a high discount rate would instead favor short-term gains over long-term benefits. 
The discount rate in any large infrastructure projects is thus very important, as renewable energy is 
more competitive, the lower the discount rate is (Eco-Council, 2013). 
150
 In this periods wind power is calculated as needing more back-up capacity than a gas plant or 
similar. But a power-system will always need back-up capacity in some form independent of which 
power plant capacities are present. I elaborate more on this point in sub-chapter 9.1 
151
 The report also calculated emissions of Methane/CH4 (25 DKK/MWh) and Nitrous 
Oxide/N2O/Laughing gas (295 DKK/MWh) into their CO2 equivalents and added costs for this to 
the calculation. These estimates mainly affected biomass-plants and were based on the Danish 
Energy Agency’s assumptions on costs of these gasses (EA Energianalyse, 2014, p. 16).  
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International Energy Agency (IEA), which is among the worlds most quoted sources 
on energy projections. There is as such not many changes made to the calculations 
from what is in official DEA technology cost catalogue and IEA’s projections. I will 
highlight two elements that are worth noticing.  
EA perform a linear extrapolation of costs past 2035, which means that a coal plant 
built in 2016 will continue to see rising CO2 prices throughout all of its 40 year 
lifetime. In contrast, some of the previous energy prognoses from the DEA have 
seen CO2 prices flatten out sometime past 2030. So in addition to the choice of 
pricing in the expected CO2 quota price increase, the EA also extrapolate further 
fuel price increases in after 2035, which will cause coal and gas to become more 
expensive compared to wind power.  
Additionally, the discount rate of 4% instead of the previous 5% also prices the CC 
Mitigation benefits of wind power higher, as energy sources that have high up-front 
capital investments are valued higher with a low discount rate.  The assumptions of 
continued rising CO2 Emission quota prices and a lowered discount rate, translates 
into a framed energy system wherein long-term decarbonization benefits are 
prioritized higher than short-term affordability.  
 
Reactions to the EA report and DEA note 
I will hereafter describe how the report and the note were received in the media, the 
critiques raised, and analyze how the consultancy EA, as well as DEA perceived the 
process and reaction. The relationship between EA and the DEA is worth focusing 
on for a brief moment, as the DEA was asked to have their hypotheses validated by 
the EA energy analysis consultancy. But it was the DEA who issued the press 
release of their findings on their website along with the background report from EA. 
The EA authors thus consider themselves detached from the use of the report, and 
the following discussion, as explained in an interview for this thesis.  
 
“What they asked us for was quality assurance of something they had 
already done…We do many products, which someone thereafter chooses 
to present, if it supports something that they want”. (Interview 7: EA Co-
Author, quote 1)    
 
It was instead the DEA authors who ended up dealing with the subsequent reactions 
to the EA reports findings. This media coverage would present challenges, since the 
dominant media narrative did not focus on wind power as cheapest, but instead now 
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pivoted to a question of why wind power was still subsidized. Below is the DEA 
press release titled “New analysis: Wind is cheapest” (DEA, 2014b), followed by the 
headlines from the major national newspapers and the industry-media EnergiWatch. 
The exception to the rule was the centre-left newspaper Politiken, who placed 
salience to the same focus as the DEA’s press release. The press release (Gray) and 
the headlines are pictured in the table below (DEA, 2014b; E. Jensen, 2014; 
Johansen, 2014a; Ritzau, 2014a; Winther, 2014).  
  
Table 7: Headline to the DEA Research Note. 
 
In the case of the DEA press release, the Berlingske newspaper published on the 
evening (17.07) before the actual press release from DEA was published (18.07). 
The Ritzau news note which followed quoted the Berlingske article, and the 
subsequently newspaper headlines reflected the focus on subsidies, which was not 
mentioned in the DEA press release. This phenomenon could be dubbed the “Ritzau 
machine”, wherein the first framed focus, the subsidy-focus of the Berlingske article 
becomes a central part of the coverage. Although the report and press note focus was 
on the result that in a green-field analysis, wind power emerged as the cheapest 
energy source, the press coverage pivoted to focus on a possible end of subsidies for 
wind power. This is an example of a story which plays into the entrenched meanings 
that wind power must be expensive because it is subsidized, while fossil fuel energy 
sources are framed as the conventional and unsubsidized energy. The notion that 
wind power should then be cheaper than other energy sources makes the subsidies 
appear as an unnecessary prosthetic device.  
Furthermore, the finding that wind power was indeed the cheapest energy source to 
build would be met contestation.  There was a critique raised about a week after the 
press release, which was covered in Energiwatch, under the title “The DEA accused 
of fraud with wind power prices” (Johansen, 2014a). The article was an interview 
with a retired long-time utility engineer, Paul-Frederik Bach, who was still known 
within energy circles. He questioned the assumptions behind the DEA’s conclusion 
that ‘wind is cheapest’.  
PFB argued that the DEA did not adequately account for the fact that the market 
price are lower for wind power as it has to be sold, when the wind is blowing. In his 
critique, PFB argues that only the ‘market’ can show the true cost of wind power, as 
shown in the quote hereafter: 
Date Newsmedia Headline (Authors translation)
18.07.14 DEA Website - Press Release New Analysis: Wind is cheapest
17.07.14 Berlingske No more subsidies for cheap windpower
18.07.14 Ritzau, Information, Ekstra Bladet, Jyllandsposten (EW) Subsidies for cheap wind is to end
25.07.14 Politiken New Analysis: The energy from windturbines is by far the cheapest
29.07.14 Jyllandsposten (EW) The DEA accused of fraud with wind energy prices
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“The natural fluctuations from wind and PV must also be equalized by 
other technologies…the market will reveal the cost when the share of 
wind power is high enough” (P. F. Bach, 2014, p. 2).  
 
Paul-Frederik Bach noted that EA energy-analysis validation report had included a 
mention of the market costs, but consciously omitted it from the calculation, as the 
reports focus was production costs from a societal view. He goes on to call the 
DEA’s conclusion that wind was cheapest is ‘careless at best and misleading at 
worst’ (Johansen, 2014a), and proposed that the cheapest option was to prolong life 
of current coal plants. 
 
“Due to the subsidies for wind power, large coal fired units are being 
closed down in Denmark…Their production will be cheaper than for any 
of the alternatives mentioned in the report, even including the CO2-cost”. 
(P. F. Bach, 2014, p. 4) 
 
Focus is here on the sunk cost of having to close down existing coal plants, and his 
argument is that even if Denmark payed its CO2 quota prices as they are projected 
in the EA report, it would still be cheaper to run the coal plants. Paul-Frederik Bach 
is here speaking outside the scope of the EA reports focus, but is using the argument 
of energy system cost to attribute a higher cost to wind power. His form of valuation 
of wind power bears the resemblance of an indisputable market logic, which cannot 
be ignored when a society is calculating costs. As he does not consider the phase-out 
costs of coal as a system cost, wind power is framed as the disturbing factor to the 
energy system. His critique is thus similar in nature to the DEC’s 2002 report. The 
high level of scrutiny concerning the underlying assumptions of the DEA note was 
something that the DEA authors had experienced both before and after the results 
were released, as seen in interview excerpts below.  
 
“Despite the fact that the calculations came out in a rather quiet news 
period (during the national summer holidays, ed.), there was actually a 
lot of reaction to it....It surprised us that it (back-up costs, ed.) ended up 
filling so much....There was a critique of the analysis only a few weeks 
ago (May 2015, ed.), that the CO2 price in the analysis was set much too 
high”. (Interview 8: DEA Author)  
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The DEA authors did actually include a caveat in the press release of the analysis, 
stating that they did not consider their analysis a stand-alone conclusion about what 
future energy scenario would be best for Denmark. 
 
“There is a caveat in the research note. If you look at combined scenarios 
and energy systems, then you cannot really use this analysis. But it can 
still say something about that under the simple conditions set up (the 
green field assumption, ed.), then the picture looks like this”. (Interview 
8: DEA, quote 2) 
 
The DEA authors experienced their conclusions being drawn into a larger context 
than the corner of the complex energy system they were planning to highlight. The 
framing that wind power had the lowest Technology Cost was faced with some 
resistance in the public forum and the press release framing that “wind is cheapest” 
was in several large newspapers turned into a narrative about wind power subsidies 
being too high. But a different report from 2014 would also reveal something about 
entrenched meanings in the valuation history of wind power.  
 
6.3.2 Rockwool Report counterfactually removes Danish wind power (2014) 
In November 2014, approximately four months after the EA report was published, 
the Rockwool Foundation would publish a large report about the cost of wind 
power. The reports main calculative comparison would reach the same conclusion as 
the EA report, namely that wind power was superior to alternative energy sources 
when it came to the quality of Technology Cost. The report would also contain a 
counter-factual calculation, which fit into the same entrenched meaning that 
encapsulated the critique of the EA report.  
In the previously analyzed EA report, no distinction was made between wind power 
and other energy sources. In contrast, the RW report supplements the overall goal 
‘to study the costs of generating electricity in the Danish power system’, with an 
additional counterfactual analysis aimed at discovering which addition to the total 
system generation costs, wind power is specifically responsible for (EA 
Energianalyse, 2014, p. 4; Rockwool, 2014b, p. 1,6). The underlying meaning was 
thus that wind power was an added cost to the energy system.   
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Actor Profile - The Rockwool Foundation 
The Rockwool Foundation (RW) report called “The Cost of Producing Electricity in 
Denmark” was ordered and initiated by RW, an independent research body started in 
1981 by six members of the Kähler family, which funded it through 25% of the 
share-value of Rockwool International, a Danish industrial producer of stone wool 
insulation (Rockwool, 2016). RW hires researchers on a project-basis and is well-
renowned for delivering influential reports to stimulate debate within many societal 
areas. Two economics professors, affiliated with the International Centre for 
Economics and Business Research at Copenhagen Business School, were hired to 
create the two-set 180+ page report, which was published in November 2014 
(Rockwool, 2014c). The stated main objective of the report was to “study the costs 
of generating electricity in the Danish power system” (Rockwool, 2014b, p. 1). In 
addition to this objective, the authors use the analyzed generation costs, to perform a 
counterfactual analysis, wherein they removed wind power from the Danish energy 
system in the period 1998-2011. This exercise was done to investigate how the 
“relatively quick introduction of non-conventional generating technology (wind 
turbines)” had affected the production costs of the Danish energy system 
(Rockwool, 2014b, p. FW 1). The results of the report can be summed up in three 
main points. Firstly, onshore wind power was found to be a cheaper power-
generating technology than coal or gas. Secondly, the observed “extensive 
introduction of electricity” from wind power had not increased the average capital 
costs of the Danish energy system in 1998-2011. Thirdly, the counterfactual analysis 
showed that if the constructed wind power in the Danish energy system between 
1998-2011 had not been built, total electricity production costs could have been 13% 
lower (Rockwool, 2014b, p. 6)152. So the counterfactual analysis theorized what the 
total system costs for Denmark would have been if no wind power had been built 
and all coal, gas, etc. plants had been run at a higher capacity factor to create the 
extra electricity needed. What is especially interesting to this study is exactly how 
this third result, produced from a counterfactual analysis, became the public medias’ 
main takeaway.  
 
The findings of the RW report 
The overall purpose of the RW report was to “study the cost of generating electricity 
in Denmark”, which entailed an elaborate comparison of Technology Cost combined 
with a counterfactual analysis. Before I examine the counterfactual analysis, the 
direct technology comparison will be presented. The comparison was motivated 
                                                          
152
 In the remainder of the article, the number 14% will appear several times. This is because the 
savings identified in the calculation became 14% when communicated in the press release from 
Rockwool although the report reached the conclusion that production costs without wind could 
have been 51 oere as opposed to 58 oere/KWh, i.e. 7 oere lower equal to 13 % (Rockwool, 2014b, 
p. 6, 2014c, p. 1).  
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from a certain historical assumption of wind power being more expensive than 
thermal energy sources (coal or gas plants), and as can be seen from the below 
excerpt.  
 
“Subsidies to electricity generated from a renewable energy source have 
been motivated historically by the conclusion that electricity generated 
from renewable sources is more costly relative to non-renewable 
generation (thermal generation, for example) which typically burn fossil 
fuels; a process which emits greenhouse gases into the atmosphere”. 
(Rockwool, 2014a, p. 3) 
 
The report ascribed the motivation for wind power subsidies as being CC 
Mitigation, and was concerned with highlighting the lost revenue of conventional 
generators, when their production was replaced with wind power. 
“The motivation for subsidizing investments in onshore and offshore 
wind power is to reduce CO2 emissions by relying less on thermal 
generation. However, it is important to think about the consequences of 
changing the generation profiles for existing conventional generators. If 
new capacity results in the crowding-out of existing generation this may 
well result in low capacity factors for conventional generators, implying 
that the average costs of these generators will increase. This could result 
in greater overall average costs…Over-capacity is a concern because it 
can potentially lead to inefficient generation levels for thermal 
technologies”. (Rockwool, 2014a, p. 5) 
 
The authors here turn over-capacity and the resulting worse business case for 
thermal generators into a matter of concern. They consider wind power as the added 
factor, which can be removed in order lower the overall aggregate costs of the 
system. So although wind power might individually perform better than thermal 
generation plants, wind power is framed as a supplement, which can be removed as 
it is non-conventional153. The foundation for the analysis is first laid out for 
exploring the individual technical generation costs for the various energy sources. 
Once these numbers are in place, the authors conduct this hypothetical experiment 
of removing the cost of wind turbines from the system. These two parts of the report 
will be explored next.  
                                                          
153
 It should be noted that the EA report also accounted for a heat-revenue from conventional 
generators in their cost comparison of technologies.   
6. WIND AS A GLOBAL ADVANTAGE ON CLIMATE, INDEPENDENCE AND JOBS 
213 
The authors emphasized that they did not have access to actual investment data of 
the already constructed Danish energy sources, but instead relied on technology 
manuals from which they would “apply estimates” for construction and maintenance 
costs (Rockwool, 2014a, p. 7). They would only produce values on what was framed 
as “pure technological costs (Rockwool, 2014a, p. 8)”, as they did “not include the 
social costs of emitting carbon dioxide, CO2, into the atmosphere” (Rockwool, 
2014a, p. 7). The authors did however include the analyzed periods (low) CO2 
emission quota prices in the years it was present, but did therefore not assess 
whether these prices reflected the real cost of emitting carbon (Rockwool, 2014a, p. 
8). So the CO2 price set in the EU ETS carbon market is included during the 
analyzed period of 1998-2011. But this is considered a price that must be paid to 
supply electricity to the grid and thus not an estimate of what the damage of emitting 
one ton of CO2. As one of the authors revealed in an interview, they assumed that 
wind must have made the system more expensive.  
 
“When we started we imagined that it had become more expensive, as 
more wind power was brought into the system. But we have simply not 
been able to see this over the period”. (Interview 9: Rockwool Author, 
quote 1) 
 
In the main analysis it was concluded that wind power was the cheapest of the 
available energy sources and had the best future prospects of price reductions. While 
wind power construction costs have fallen significantly, fuel costs have increased, as 
explained below. 
 
“It is evident that electricity generation is relatively expensive for 
thermal technologies, whereas it is relatively inexpensive wind power. 
Moreover, the gap between the two unit costs is increasing during the 14 
year period. For thermal technologies, the increase is driven by 
increasing fuel costs, whereas the falling unit cost for wind power is 
driven by falling capital costs”. (Rockwool, 2014a, p. 25) 
 
The conclusion of the individual technical analysis is not summed up further than 
the above in the report. But in the press note discussing the report, the second page 
was dedicated to the individual cost analysis in which it stated the following. 
 
THE VALUATION HISTORY OF DANISH WIND POWER 
214
 
“It turns out that the price of thermal production is high and rising, while 
electricity from wind is lower and falling...Electricity produced on oil, 
coal or gas was thus 33 percent more expensive than electricity produced 
on wind (in 1998, ed.) In 2011 the difference was markedly larger. While 
electricity from wind had a cost of 270 DKK/MWh, had the cost of 
thermal production risen to just below 870 DKK. Thermally produced 
electricity was thus 220 percent more expensive than electricity from 
wind.” (Rockwool, 2014c, p. 2) 
 
The authors thus framed wind power electricity as costing less than a third of the 
production costs of the thermal plants (Rockwool, 2014c, p. 2). The Rockwool 
reports main analysis findings thus supported the EA reports finding that the 
Technology Cost quality had a positive impact on the valuation of wind power. This 
finding is important to keep in mind, as the attention of the analysis now turns back 
to the reports’ counterfactual analysis, which would become the main headline for 
the Rockwool press release.   
 
Counterfactual analysis brings back old Fuel Supplement quality 
As mentioned earlier, the report also contained a different analysis, of which the 
calculation of technical data had been necessary. Once the authors had the cost of 
the various plants, they would perform the hypothetical experiment of removing all 
wind power investments from 1998-2011 (Quote 1 below). The stated premise for 
this came in a distinction between conventional energy sources and added non-
conventional sources, which among other places154 can be found in in the authors’ 
foreword to the RW report (Quote 2 below).   
Quote 1: “A counterfactual analysis is carried out to investigate what the 
production cost would have been under the thought experiment that no 
wind power capacity had been introduced into the Danish power 
system”. (Rockwool, 2014a, p. 6) 
Quote 2: “How does the relatively quick introduction of non-
conventional generating technology (wind turbines) into a national power 
system affect the cost of generating electricity?” (Rockwool, 2014b, p. 
Foreword 1) 
                                                          
154
 The authors describe the coal and gas plants as conventional on page 16: “We study seven types 
of thermal generators and two types of wind turbines. Conventional thermal generators 
include steam turbines, CHP generators consist of steam turbines (back pressure and 
extraction) as well as combined-cycle gas turbines and CHP waste (Rockwool, 2014a, p. 16). 
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Once wind power is categorized as a non-conventional generating technology, the 
price of lost production at conventional power plants (mainly coal and gas), become 
calculated as an added cost of total generation. This metric is derived from the 
categorization of wind as non-conventional energy source, which leads to an 
evaluation of the cost of wind as an added resource to an already existing energy 
system, consisting of conventional energy sources, i.e. coal and gas power plants. 
Somewhat similar to the Fuel-Coalition during the Unique Supplement period and 
the Market-coalition in the Market Distortion period, Wind power is again framed as 
a supplement to the existing energy system. The variability of wind power is brought 
to salience several times as the reason for this categorization, as seen below.  
  
“The intermittency and the non-dispatchable nature of wind power 
production have system-wide implications: In order to maintain a secure 
supply of electricity reliable backup generation must be made available.” 
(Rockwool, 2014a, p. 14) 
“Wind power is an intermittent source of electricity. Electricity can be 
generated only when there is wind (or winds are not too strong). 
Intermittency of wind power has system-wide implications: In order to 
maintain a secure supply of electricity, reliable backup generation must 
be made available. Similarly, for power systems to be stable, the mix of 
generators must be able to supply base-load demand, mid-load demand 
as well as peak-load demand…. A mixture of different types of 
generation plants with varying degrees of responsiveness to changes in 
demand and supply (wind conditions) is needed to ensure system-wide 
stability”. (Rockwool, 2014a, p. 33) 
“Reserve capacity will continue to be in demand as the penetration rates 
of intermittent wind power increases.” (Rockwool, 2014a, p. 56) 
 
Once the RW-authors have established the framing that wind power cannot stand 
alone in the analyzed energy system, they can remove it, as it is a supplement. The 
cost of wind power then become calculated as the savings in the Danish energy 
system, as if wind power did not exist between 1998-2011, and thermal power plants 
were used for more hours in the year. Wind Power is framed as something that can 
be removed from the energy system without consequences, because two particularly 
dry years in the examined period resulted in a high level of power exports from 
Denmark to Sweden and Norway. If power plants ran on such high capacity factors 
throughout the entire period, the electricity from wind power production could be 
artificially removed.  This counterfactual analysis is built on a set of assumptions 
about what an energy system without wind power would look like, something the 
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authors themselves call “unobservable” (Rockwool, 2014a, p. 91). They conclude 
that total system costs in the analyzed years (1998-2011) would have been between 
8- 16% lower if no wind power had been in the system. The headline result thus 
become that Danish electricity on average would have been 13% cheaper without 
wind power, as the thermal generators would have had higher capacity factors and 
thus lower generation costs (Rockwool, 2014a, pp. 6, 92). In the press release, this 
number has interestingly increased to 14% as a calculative example became rounded 
down, despite the fact that the 14% number is not listed in the report. Before I turn 
to the media reactions to the RW report, I will briefly discuss the RW’s omission of 
the CC Mitigation quality in this report. 
 
CC Mitigation quality is left out  
One noticeable omission in the report is that the authors consciously place 
considerations about the need for decarbonization in the energy system outside of 
their framing. 
 
“We do not include the social cost of emitting CO2 into the 
atmosphere….We do not evaluate economic or environmental policies 
that influence the Danish energy system”. (Rockwool, 2014a, p. 7) 
 
In the counterfactual analysis, the RW authors do not calculate the added cost of 
reaching the EU CO2 reduction goals through other measures, when wind power is 
removed from the system (Rockwool, 2014b, p. 7). It is by the omission assumed 
that EU would either waiver its unfulfilled CO2 reduction demands, or that 
Denmark would reach these goals without added cost to electricity generation 
system. There is no consideration of whether environmental cost of emissions 
should have been set higher than what the market quota price represented. This is 
along with several other elements considered a ‘political question’ as one of the 
authors stated in the press release for the report.  
 
“Some are of the opinion that wind turbines ruin the visual landscape, are 
noisy, kill birds and bats and are generally in the way. On the other hand, 
the advantages of wind are apparent; A smaller CO2-footprint, less 
pollution and less dependency on fuel. How much you consider that to be 
worth is a political question”. (Rockwool, 2014c, p. 1) 
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The RW author here equates the wind power advantages of “a smaller CO2-
footprint” and “less dependency on fuel” with wind turbine disadvantages such as 
wind turbines being noisy or a danger to bats. By doing this, the RW-author ignores 
the vast difference in scope between mitigating climate change and local residents’ 
concerns about bats flying into blades. The RW report appears to represents an 
attempt to present “clean numbers” and then designate a number of qualities such as 
“CC Mitigation”, in a sphere of politics, which is not part of the calculation.  
 
Reactions to the RW report shows powerful entrenched meanings at play 
Despite the fact that the counterfactual analysis only occupied 14 pages out of the 
total 180 page two-set Rockwool report, it became the main headline of RW’s press 
release, which read “Wind power makes electricity production 14% more 
expensive”. The second page of the press release thereafter paradoxically read “A 
Megawatt from wind is cheapest and the price is falling” (Rockwool, 2014c)155. The 
following media coverage would also reflect the framing of wind power as an added 
cost, as can be seen in table 8 (Johansen, 2014b; J. S. Nielsen, 2014; Ritzau, 2014b; 
Rockwool, 2014c; Skovgaard, 2014) 
 
Table 8: Headline reactions to Rockwool Report 
 
 
The RW authors’ had in the report stated reservations towards their counterfactual 
analysis, which they called “unobservable” (RW, p. 91). This means that there are so 
many uncertain factors to account for in the counterfactual analysis, that it becomes 
a “what if we imagined” estimation exercise. These reservations are however not 
reflected in the media coverage. The counterfactual analysis of the supplementary 
costs of wind power became the main takeaway of the Ritzau press note, which 
several media outlets reproduced. The Newspaper Berlingske conducted a further 
calculation on the 14% numbers in the report and estimated that the added wind 
power costs were equivalent to 400 DKK for an average Danish household, and 
                                                          
155
 The second page of the press release has this heading, because the individual cost comparison of 
the technologies showed wind power to be cheapest. It was the categorization of wind power as 
non-conventional which allowed removing it from the energy system in the counterfactual analysis, 
and enacted a framing where wind power had cost something extra to Denmark. 
Date Newsmedia Headline (Authors translation)
25.11.14 Rockwool - Press Release Wind energy makes electricity production 14% more expensive
25.11.14 Ritzau, TV2, Information, Ekstra Bladet Wind makes your electricity 14 % more expensive
25.11.14 Berlingske Wind makes electricity 14% more expensive
26.11.14 Jyllandsposten (EW) Wind makes Danish electricity 3 billion DKK more expensive
26.11.14 Information For the fourth time: Onshore wind is cheapest
THE VALUATION HISTORY OF DANISH WIND POWER 
218
 
would amount to 3 bn. DKK to society as a whole (Skovgaard, 2014). This new 
calculation of 3 bn. DKK became the headline of the industry media-outlet 
Energiwatch’s (EW) coverage of the report. EW stated that “in the analysis, it is also 
noted that the higher production costs should have another 5-6 bn. DKK added 
annually as of the PSO-expenses of businesses and private households” (Johansen, 
2014b). The PSO-tax is however not mentioned in either the RW report or press 
release and it is also not only used to fund wind power. The Berlingske article did 
mention that PSO-taxes of 5-6 bn. DKK payed for the “green transition”, but this is 
not equivalent to EW’s citation that the total PSO-tax of 5-6 Bn. DKK should be 
added as cost to wind power. The direct equation between wind power costs and 
PSO is thus inaccurate, as wind power subsidies only account for approximately half 
of the total PSO-tax (EnerginetDK, 2015b) 156. The Danish news media’s selected 
conclusions from the RW report could suggest that there is still strong support for 
the viewpoint that wind power is a non-conventional energy source, and therefore a 
Fuel Supplement which could be removed to lighten the general cost-burden to the 
Danish society. This framing is thus easily accepted in public discussions and 
calculated further upon, consistent with one of the RW co-authors impression of the 
reception of the report’s conclusions, as stated in my interview with him. 
 
“What we have done (the counterfactual analysis, ed.) is almost banal in 
its approach and we are completely aware of that. But we wanted to 
show increasing returns to scale, this point that the more you produce the 
lower is your average cost....I don’t know how much value it has apart 
from giving you an indication of what production costs are”. (Interview 
9: Rockwool author, quote 2) 
“I have no opinion towards the 14%, whether that is much or little. It was 
more to get that on the table and say "this is the cost, this is our best 
estimate…The reactions have mainly been about whether one considered 
14% to be expensive or not”. (Interview 9, Rockwool author, quote 3)   
 
The author of the RW report argues that he did not intend to deliver a political 
statement regarding the 14% added cost of wind power, but merely aimed to get the 
numbers “on the table”. In the public, the assumptions behind the numbers in the 
counterfactual analyses are not questioned157, but instead the 14% quickly sparked 
further calculations, such as Berlingske who used the 14% to calculate added 
average household costs to be 400 DKK and 3 bn. DKK for society. This calculation 
                                                          
156
 Subsidies to decentral gas-fired plants, biomass and solar energy account for the remaining 
PSO-budget.  
157
 With the exception of the left-wing niche newspaper, Information (22.000 subscribers) (J. S. 
Nielsen, 2014).  
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directly labels the 400 DKK an “extra annual expense”; despite the fact that the 
Rockwool counterfactual analysis actually stated that electricity prices could have 
been lower. So an accurate phrasing would have been to state that households could 
have saved 400 DKK per year (Skovgaard, 2014). This is an example of how the 
entrenched meaning about wind power being a cost burden resonates with given 
media-publics. The RW co-author naturalizes the production costs as the “real” 
numbers and then considers other “social” elements such as a CO2 tax or similar to 
be politically determined, and therefore not as solidified. This strengthens the 
narrative that coal and gas are the “naturally” cheapest options, despite the report’s 
conclusions that wind power had the lowest Technology Cost.     
The “Ritzau machine” effect mentioned is also present in the RW case. It is seen in 
the case of the left-wing newspaper “Information”, which published the Ritzau news 
note the same day it was released. The following day, the same newspaper published 
an in-depth article with a different heading messaged “For the Fourth time: Onshore 
wind is cheapest” (J. S. Nielsen, 2014). The in-depth article was written by the 
experienced environmental journalist Joergen Steen Nielsen, who correctly cited the 
RW report to show wind power to be  considerably cheaper than electricity 
produced on thermal plants (J. S. Nielsen, 2014). By the time the Ritzau news note 
came out on the evening of the 25
th
 November 2014 several news media, including 
Information, merely quoted the highlighted conclusions about the 14% added cost. It 
was not until Joergen Steen Nielsen came into the office on November 26
th
 that an 
elaborate article on the report was published. The only News-media which on 
November 25
th
 wrote additional information to the news-note, was Berlingske and 
their added cost calculations. This happened on the evening of November 25
th
, 
indicating that they had the material available at an earlier stage than the other 
media-outlets (Skovgaard, 2014).  
 
6.3.3 Summary: Two reports show wind power as cheapest technology 
As we can see from the analysis, the main objectives of the two reports appear 
similar: provide calculations on the cost of producing energy in Denmark to 
determine societal value and costs of various options. However, the envisioned 
worlds, and the Valuation Frame they assemble end up being worlds apart. In the 
EA report, rising CO2 prices are framed as a given, and although some Back-up 
Capacity costs are included, they are small compared to the included 
decarbonization benefits (through a rising CO2 price ultimately surpassing 30 
€/ton). When the quality of CC Mitigation is salient, wind power is highly valuable 
to society. System back-up costs to accommodate the variability of wind is 
accounted for with a small extra charge. But costs in the form of stranded coal and 
gas assets, is not calculated into wind powers costs, and is instead considered a cost, 
which the entire energy system must bear. So in the envisioned world the energy 
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system must transition towards decarbonization and the majority of the incurred 
system costs are not connected to one single energy source.  
The RW report enacts a framing which makes a distinction between conventional 
and non-conventional energy sources. The categorization of wind power as non-
conventional enables the removal of it in the counterfactual analysis. As this is done 
with wind power in Denmark, the energy source is valued on the basis of how large 
a “cost burden” it places on an energy system, which is framed to be able to 
effectively function without wind power. The reason this energy system could 
function without wind power, is partly due to the disregard for the qualities of CC 
Mitigation and Environment, which are left outside of the frame. The RW Co-author 
states that they just want to get the numbers on the table, but by omitting 
environmental policies, the numbers are already assuming a given world. It is just a 
world where politics are already embedded in the existing electricity production 
prices.   
In the case of the EA report, the conclusion that “wind power is cheapest” is 
challenged by some actors and reconfigured into a question of ending subsidies by 
others. The RW report proposes an argument based on an unobservable scenario, 
which equates to something like ‘removing wind power, without accounting for 
climate effects, could potentially have made our electricity 14% cheaper’. This 
conclusion is readily accepted by the majority of media outlets and the numbers are 
even further black-boxed in additional calculations by Berlingske. This indicates 
that calculative agencies and media publics are cultivated to think of wind power as 
an expensive cost burden. The Rockwool report and PFB’s critique of the EA report, 
shows that due to carbon lock-in (Unruh, 2000, 2009) it is possible to calculate a 
cheaper “continuation” solution, than to build wind power. The consequence of such 
a calculation is that a continuation strategy appears as the best possible option. That 
is of course under the assumption that the need to mitigate climate change is 
disregarded from the calculation. The RW report’s framing of wind power as a Fuel 
Supplement shows that this old framing that wind power is something 
supplementary and added could still be conceived of in 2014.   
The EA report fits well within the overall framing of the Global-coalition. The RW 
report also calculates Technology Cost but the counterfactual analysis follows the 
methods of the DEC during the Market Distortion period. This small part of the 
overall report became the main take-away, and this showed that there was still active 
Market-Coalition actors for whom the entrenched meaning that wind power is 
supplementary resonated well. Despite this element, the RW report’s other 
conclusion did re-produce the dominant Global-coalitions framing that Technology 
Cost for wind power is a high positive impact quality. I therefore do not place the 
RW authors or the report in the listed coalitions, but included it here as it was 
beneficial in highlighting entrenched meanings in the valuation history of Danish 
wind power. I did spend a considerable amount of time on these two reports, as they 
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show some interesting things about entrenched meanings. These findings can be 
summed up in the three key observations. Firstly, the speed at which news-media 
work enforce entrenched meanings. Secondly, there was still in 2014 resistance to 
the calculations showing wind power as the cheapest energy source. Thirdly, due to 
this resistance, the counterfactual calculation that resonate with entrenched 
meanings of wind power being an added cost to the system appeared to trigger the 
same or even less resistance than calculations showing wind power to be the 
cheapest technology. This third point happens despite the notion that the authors of 
the counterfactual calculation themselves label it as “unobservable”.  
Although the EA and RW reports have significantly different assumptions and 
results, they both came to the conclusion that wind power is the cheapest energy 
source if one is to build and produce electricity in 2014. This is a rather decisive turn 
in the calculative history of wind power, and will form a large part of the dominant 
Global Advantage Valuation Frame. It therefore marks the end to this empirical 
period and hereafter follows the empirical summary wherein the dominant valuation 
frame and network will be presented.  
 
6.4. GLOBAL ADVANTAGE: VALUATION FRAME SUMMARY 
In this section, I summarize the empirical findings from this chapter, beginning with 
the new valuation frame, since no new qualities emerged during this period. 
 
6.4.1 The Global Advantage Valuation Frame 
The Global Advantage valuation frame reflected a return to the Climate Solution 
framing, but with the positive value drawn from more positive impact qualities. The 
Global Advantage valuation frame was therefore very different from the Market 
Distortion valuation frame. Although the shift was very gradual between 2006 and 
2008, a valuation drama was unfolding, especially within Venstre, as some stuck to 
the old Market-coalition and others joined the new Global-coalition. But members of 
the other three major parties and several large private actors adopted the Global 
Advantage valuation frame, which thus encompassed the broadest group of actors 
during the five periods. The shift in Valuation frames is shown in Figure 30 (GBA).  
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Figure 30: The third (MD: 2002-2006) and fourth (GA: 2007-2014) Valuation Frame. 
 
Energy Independence provides early start to New Dominant Valuation Frame 
As Connie Hedegaard attempted to persuade Anders Fogh Rasmussen to host the 
COP15 in Copenhagen, she emphasized Denmark’s strained relationships with oil 
producing countries, where people were burning Danish flags in the streets in 
response to the Danish cartoon crisis. This element was highlighted by Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen in his 2008 “green speech,” and was one of two key pillars (the other 
being CC Mitigation) motivating the Climate Commission’s 2010 report. Although 
the quality of Energy Independence was not explicitly calculated in the calculative 
reports, it had a positive impact, especially early in the period.  
 
Technology Cost Re-emerge with a Positive Impact 
Whereas the Climate Distortion valuation frame did not measure Technology Cost, 
the Global Advantage valuation frame returned to the 1990’s metric of LCOE; since 
Technology Cost for onshore wind decreased significantly during the 8-year period, 
the quality had a strong positive impact on value. The 2009 CEESA report, the 2010 
Climate Commission report, the 2014 DEA report and the 2014 Rockwool report all 
calculated the technological costs of onshore wind to now be competitive with 
alternative energy sources such as gas and coal.  
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Salience of Industrial Quality Increases as the Market Distortion Quality Fades  
Throughout the period from 2007 to 2014, the Industrial quality, as seen through a 
strong wind industry in Denmark has a high impact. This was especially salient 
during the COP15, when local businesses benefited from Denmark’s exposure as a 
clean energy pioneer touted the industry’s job-creating benefits. The Industrial 
quality was emphasized in the CEESA analysis and the Climate Commission’s plan 
for the decades leading up to 2050. The number of jobs created was another strong 
lever in the discussions related to the two energy agreements (2008 and 2012) 
negotiated during this period. Industrial advantages were recognized throughout the 
period and the Industrial quality was the most broadly agreed upon by actors in the 
Global-coalition. Industrial advantages were touted by the large interest 
organizations DI and DE, while Esbjerg Harbor became increasingly involved in 
promoting the jobs created by the two offshore wind farms, the existing Horns Rev 2 
and the proposed Horns Rev 3. Meanwhile, the Market Distortion quality, which 
was made salient in the 2002 DEC report, disappeared from the dominant valuation.  
 
CC Mitigation Highly Salient, but Subsidy Burden Concerns Remain 
The COP15 conference was, at its heart, a climate change mitigation conference. 
Although many other qualities played a role in forming the new valuation frame, CC 
Mitigation became more and more salient as momentum grew around the conference 
in 2009. CC Mitigation was a key quality for the influential minister, Connie 
Hedegaard, her predecessor Lykke Friis, as well as the two ministers from the S-RV 
coalition, Martin Lidegaard and Rasmus Helveg. The CC Mitigation quality was 
also salient in the calculations of expected prices for CO2 offsets projected in both 
the 2009 CEESA report and the 2014 DEA report. Yet, internal disputes and 
contestations over the strong connection between CC Mitigation and wind power 
expansion continued, especially within the Venstre party. Energy spokesman, Lars 
Christian Lilleholt represented a wing of the party, which together with actors such 
as L&F, viewed biogas and biomass as better solutions for the energy sector 
transition. Likewise, calculative centers that emerged during the Market Coalition 
period, such as DEC and CEPOS, continued to produce calculations which pointed 
to the distortive effects of wind power, yet were not able to destabilize the dominant 
valuation frame. Although the Market Distortion quality faded away, the Subsidy 
Burden quality remained in the framing. This was maintained by constant 
reiterations from actors outside the Global-coalition, such as CEPOS, L&F and the 
members of Venstre who were still part of the Market-coalition. This is most clearly 
seen in the negotiations over the 2012 energy agreement; Venstre members 
successfully negotiated to decrease wind power investments on several occasions, 
both before the agreement was passed and after it had become law. 
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Growing Salience of Future Potential, Non-Influence of Environment and Aesthetics   
The Future Potential quality relates to increasingly lower costs and better technical 
performance of wind turbines over time. Offshore wind was framed as becoming 
more competitive, and in 2012 the wind turbine industry made a pledge to cut costs 
by 40% over the next 8 years. The calculative reports which formed the valuation 
Frame highlighted that onshore wind was now the cheapest new-build option, and 
that offshore wind could follow a similar trajectory. The Future Potential quality 
grew in salience, but was not the defining quality of the valuation frame, as current 
Technology Cost were used to justify wind power investments.  Finally, both the 
Environment and Aesthetics qualities were mentioned in calculative reports at the 
time. In fact, an investigation into possible health impacts of living close to a turbine 
was initiated in 2014. However, neither of these two qualities played a central role in 
political negotiations or calculative reports.  
 
6.4.2 The Global Advantage Valuation Network 
As previously mentioned, the Global Advantage period was defined by a broad 
framing with several qualities around which a broad coalition of actors gathered. 
Although the dynamics of this period had many moving parts, I attempt to outline 
the key actors of the Global-coalition in the sub-sections that follow.  
 
Shifting Coalitions and Broad Compromises 
During this period, a combination of shifting alliances among actors and the 
materiality of a large-scale industry led to the creation of a new valuation network. 
The global coalition comprised a broad range of actors and was built on the notion 
that Denmark could address an international challenge (CC Mitigation) while 
creating positive societal benefits (Industrial, Energy Independence). Large Danish 
organizations supported the framing, which calculated investments in wind power as 
valuable to Denmark. The wind turbine industry had grown significantly, and was a 
major actor in the dominant Global-coalition, along with two previously neutral 
players, Danish Industry and Danish Energy. Another important actor in this 
constellation was the IPCC, which represented the international momentum built 
around the COP15 in Copenhagen. The conference had increased the salience of the 
CC Mitigation quality and the potential of the Industrial quality by promoting 
Danish wind power solutions to the international market to help prevent global 
temperatures from rising more than 2 degrees Celsius.  
The Global-coalition encompassed several independent calculative centers. The 
DEA solidified the valuation frame by concluding in a report that onshore wind was 
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the cheapest energy source. The engineering group IDA and their collaboration with 
the CEESA group at two universities, AAU and DTU, also exercised calculative 
agency in the dominant valuation network. 
On the political side, De Konservative moved to an anchoring position in enabling 
this valuation network, through spokeswoman Connie Hedegaard. Even after she left 
the party to become EU Climate Commissioner in 2010, the party silently pursued 
the direction she had set. Together with the left wing parties, Socialdemokratiet and 
Radikale Venstre, De Konservative found common ground for collaboration.  
The other governing party, Venstre, split into two factions. Anders Fogh set a new 
direction by beginning to value wind power more highly due to the strong positive 
impact of its Energy Independence quality, and prominent members of the Venstre 
party, minister Lykke Friis and environmental spokesman Eyvind Vesselbo, 
animated this perspective for some time after the COP15 in 2009. However, by the 
end of this period, both politicians had either left or were in the progress of leaving 
the party. 
In contrast, Lars Loekke Rasmussen, Kristian Jensen and Lars Christian Lilleholt 
were hesitant to embrace the strong push towards wind power and represented a 
wing of the party which would hold on to the Market-Coalitions way of framing 
wind power. This wing would adhere to Venstre’s historic close ties to the 
agricultural sector and especially Lars Christian Lilleholt had produced framings 
wherein other energy sources were more valuable investments, such as biogas and 
biomass. As Lars Loekke Rasmussen assumed leadership of Venstre in 2009, these 
politicians moved to positions from which they would become central players in the 
period that follows hereafter. The Venstre party split into a “Global” wing, which 
was a key actor in enabling the Global Advantage valuation frame, and a “Market” 
wing, which attempted to destabilize it in 2013 and 2014. The party thus was 
divided, and the “Global” wing that supported Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s new 
direction had lost influence by the end of the period.  The “Market” wing still 
adhered to the market-coalition’s framing, and was more closely aligned with the 
agricultural sector, whose report had also called for lower investments in wind 
power. The market-coalition’s view also continued to be expressed in the DEC’s 
calculations throughout the period starting in 2008, when it reiterated its 2002 
argument for a CO2 market solution. The right-wing think tank CEPOS also met 
resistance to its calculation that wind power has no effect on the climate, based on 
logic similar to that of the DEC. These destabilization attempts were unsuccessful as 
work continued towards the negotiation of the 2012 agreement, which saw the 
largest approved expansion of wind power capacity in Danish history.  The key 
actors are as usual pictured in figure 31 below (GBA). Green is the Global-coalition; 
Blue: The dispersed Market-coalition. The gray boxes are neutral actors.   
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Figure 31: Key actors during the GA period; green: Global-coalition; blue: Market- 
coalition. 
 
Materiality during the Global Advantage Period 
The period from 2007 to 2014 was defined by the expansion of wind power capacity 
recovering from the near-stand-still in the early 2000’s, to grow at an annual rate of 
6% per year. This was driven primarily by three large offshore wind farms, Horns 
Rev 2, Roedsand 2 and Anholt, which collectively accounted for nearly half of the 
1.7 GW of new added capacity. The Anholt offshore wind farm was negotiated into 
the 2008 energy agreement and was made possible due to the green momentum of 
the left wing and De Konservative. The explosive growth of exports observed in 
2006 as the global wind markets started to take off continued until 2008, when the 
industry scaled back operations significantly in terms of both exports and employees 
in the wake of the global financial crisis. In 2014, after the first signs of recovery, 
the Danish wind industry consolidated further and maintained a foothold in several 
large export markets. The 2008 energy agreement restored stability to the onshore 
wind market through a reinstatement of the 25 Oere/kWh compensation to producers 
of wind power electricity. Thereafter, the period was defined by the approval of 
large construction contracts for offshore wind farms, approved in the 2008 and the 
2012 agreement, which stabilized the emerging offshore wind industry. The 
materiality figures are shown in  Figure 32 (GBA) on the next page (Appendix A). 
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Figure 32: Capacity expansion during the Global Advantage period. 
 
When the analysis moves into the last period in the next chapter, the offshore wind 
industry will come to play an even larger role in the framing of Danish wind power 
as there will emerge difference in framing of value between onshore and offshore 
wind power158.   
But there was oncoming concerns from changes to a material actor which also is of 
the Global Advantage Valuation Network, namely the electricity price 
(Energitilsynet, 2002; NordPool, 2018). The electricity price is affected by such 
things as the EU ETS CO2 quota price, and as this does not appear to increase in the 
prognosis near the end of the period the electricity price prognosis is also affected. 
In the year where the 2008 energy agreement was reached the annual average spot-
price at the Nord-Pool market was 57 EUR/MWh, whereas it had fallen to 31 
EUR/MWh by 2014, a 28% drop over 6 years (NordPool, 2018) The electricity price 
is an material actor affecting the Global Advantage valuation network, as the cost of 
subsidies rises when electricity prices falls. This is both due to the design of the 
PSO, but it is amplified by the build-out of offshore wind farms, which have 
subsidies that are set at a fixed strike price. This destabilization from the low 
electricity price will continue in the period that follows hereafter.  
 
                                                          
158
 I will however still keep onshore and offshore wind power portrayed within the same Valuation 
Frame model, although I recognize there are differences. These will be addressed in the text. 
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6.4.3 Key Takeaways from the Global Advantage Period 
The shift away from the Market Distortion valuation frame is a significant moment 
of valuation, although it occurred more gradually than in the previous moment. 
Energy Independence became a salient quality, which again helped frame wind 
power a valuable geopolitical defense, especially in light of the 2005–2006 cartoon 
crisis. This quality was especially salient to the part of the network on the right wing 
of the political spectrum. The CC Mitigation quality was reintroduced into the 
framing, as Connie Hedegaard successfully lobbied to host the COP15 conference in 
Denmark in 2009. In subsequent years, the 2010 Climate Commission and the 2014 
Climate Council (with overlapping team members, Katherine Richardson and Poul 
Erik Morthorst) continued to articulate the need to account for the value of climate 
change mitigation in the Danish energy system. Furthermore, industry growth began 
in 2006, and skyrocketed in 2007 and 2008. Like the rest of the world, the wind 
turbine industry was affected by the financial crisis, but recovered faster than other 
Danish industrial sectors. Accounting for nearly 5% of all Danish exports, growth 
potential in the sector was more broadly recognized than it had been in the 1990s. 
These three events—awareness of Energy Independence in the wake of the cartoon 
crisis, a focus on CC Mitigation through COP15, and a growing export market for 
the Danish wind industry—enabled the shift to the Global Advantage valuation 
frame.  
There are large overlaps between the Global Advantage and Climate Solution 
valuation frames. Although the Climate Solution frame relied heavily on the CC 
Mitigation quality and on capturing Future Potential, by the Global Advantage 
period, this potential had been realized to a great extent. Thus, the new Global 
Advantage valuation frame encompassed a larger set of high-impact positive 
qualities.  The closest wind power came to being “indispensably valuable” in this 
period was in the spring of 2012, when the most ambitious energy agreement in 
Danish history was passed with support from all political parties except Liberal 
Alliance. A very important factor to the stabilization of the Global Advantage 
valuation frame by the end of the period was the strong positive impact of the 
Technology Cost quality. Critiques regarding the competitiveness of wind power’s 
technical costs were not immediately silenced, but it would however come to signal 
a change over time. Both the DEA and the RW calculated wind power to be the 
most competitive energy source in technology comparisons, and in the years to 
follow it would not be the isolated Technology Cost that were contested. Major 
industrial organizations supported the overall positive valuation of wind power, and 
even the DEC softened its position on wind power during this period (Appendix C). 
Outside the valuation Network was the “Market” wing of Venstre, CEPOS and 
L&F, who disagreed with the direction taken, and pushed for a Valuation Network 
with a material configuration mainly based on international CO2 pricing and wind 
power subsidies which did not interfere with proximate sectors. Hereafter follows 
the final moment of valuation, Subsidy Burden (2015-2017), where the valuation 
drama would move from Technology Cost to Subsidy Burden and Aesthetics. 
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7. COMPETITIVE WIND IS FRAMED AS 
A SUBSIDY BURDEN 
The final empirical chapter of the valuation drama will take its start in the summer 
of 2015, where a new minority government of the party Venstre takes office. The 
new administration would see an actor that Market-coalition wings spokesman in 
Venstre, Lars Christian Lilleholt, become Minister of Energy, Utilities and Climate. 
Hereafter would follow a number of significant shifts from the valuation frame 
during the Global Advantage period. The shifts in this moment of valuation are 
struggles between market-coalition actors who try to disassemble central elements of 
the valuation network that had been built up by the Climate-coalition and later the 
Global-coalition. This happens with varying degrees of success as the global 
coalition is still well-represented in both government and among private actors. 
Although the period only covers three years, it is a significant final piece in 
understanding the valuation history of Danish wind power today.  
The first sub-chapter analyzes the shifts marked by the 2015 summer election and 
takes it starting point from an actor profile of Lars Christian Lilleholt and his 
signaled priorities as the new minister of Energy, Utilities and Climate. The sub-
chapter concludes with a walk-through of a number of R&D cuts, here among to 
wind power research projects, enacted within a few months of the election. The 
second sub-chapter is about the 2016 campaign to abolish the PSO-tax, and how the 
near-shore turbines in the 2012 energy agreement were problematized as being too 
expensive despite a record low bid-price for their subsidies. The third sub-chapter is 
about developments in the onshore wind market and the emergence of the notion of 
technology neutrality. The chapter is as usual concluded with a summary of the new 
dominant valuation frame and network.  
 
7.1. NEW GOVERNMENT SIGNALS GREEN REALISM (2015) 
In June 2015, Denmark elected a new right-wing minority government formed by 
Venstre without any coalition parties. Venstre’s energy spokesman since 2005, Lars 
Christian Lilleholt (LCL) became minister for the department of Energy, Utilities 
and Climate (hereafter just referred to as Energy). Hereafter follows a short actor 
profile of LCL which covers his campaign up to the 2015 election, as well as his 
prior activities outside of parliament.  
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7.1.1 A Market-Coalition spokesman takes office 
Lars Christian Lilleholt (LCL) is a journalist by education, and came from a 
professional background of seven years as the first communications-employee and 
later Head of Communications for the Danish District Heating Association (DDHA), 
the union of decentral gas and biomass heat-power plants in Denmark (FT.dk, 
2017a). He would then move on to serve as vice-chair of the DDHA board, which he 
would occupy the five years until he became minister in 2015.  
LCL’s experience with the energy sector also comes from his board-membership of 
several utilities, of which five years were at EnergiFyn (ENF, 2016) and three years 
at NGF Nature Energy (NGF, 2016). From 2014-2015, LCL also served as vice-
chair of “Fjernvarme Fyn”, a municipally owned district heating utility, where he, as 
a board-member in December 2014, agreed to buy the coal and biomass-plant 
“Fynsvaerket” from the Swedish utility Vattenfall for 600 mn. DKK (OKOM, 
2014). Vattenfall had tried to sell the unprofitable plant since 2010 and had signaled 
that it would close the coal-bloc by 2019 (Wittrup, 2014c)159. This represented a 
problem for the many fruit-growers in Funen, who relied on the combined heat-
power output of the plant. Lilleholt stepped in to serve as a board-member of the 
newly acquired Fynsvaerket (DKGOV, 2015a), and the consideration towards the 
Funen growers was clearly visible in the press release of the deal. Herein it was 
emphasized how any further green transition of the coal-plant should only happen 
under “consideration of the challenges that Funen businesses, such as the 
horticulture growers (gartnere in Danish), are facing” (OKOM, 2014, p. 1)160.  
Before the election in 2015, LCL was identified as the non-ministerial parliamentary 
member with the highest annual income at 1.2 mn. DKK, hereof roughly half from 
board-positions (Brandsen, 2015). In 2015 LCL would also break another record as 
he would spend between 800.000-900.000 DKK in what local media reported as a 
historically expensive election campaign (DR, 2015; Nyeng, 2015). Lilleholt would 
himself explain how he was “deeply dependent upon” these donations (V. T. 
Nielsen, 2016), of which a part came from the horticulture industry  (Arnfred & 
Jessen, 2016, pp. 236–237). The overlap of interests was apparent within two days 
of LCL’s appointment as minister, where he scheduled a meeting with the 
horticulture industry’s political organization, Dansk Gartneri. At this meeting he 
reassured them that he would prioritize an industry-specific PSO tax relief 
(Seymour, 2015). In addition to the horticulture, cement and plastic industry, the 
agricultural sector in general (Drustrup, 2015; Ritzau, 2015a) was also pushing 
Lilleholt to lower or abolish the PSO-tax, which he also delivered as fast as 
                                                          
159
 Vattenfall had originally submitted a request to close the plant by 2016, but this was denied by 
the Danish Energy agency as it would hurt energy security and affordability of electricity in Funen.  
160
 The Funen Plant burns approximately 750.000 tons of coal each year according to the previous 
owner Vattenfall’ s estimates (OKOM, 2016). Fjernvarme Funen does not state the amount of coal 
burned in its annual report of 2015, but states that total emissions from Fjernvarme Fyn after taking 
over the Funen Plant was 1.200.000 tons CO2, due to a mild winter (FJF, 2016, p. 57). 
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legislation would allow it (EFKM, 2016b). It is important to note that the targeted 
tax relief was negotiated prior to the discussions about removing the PSO-tax 
started. It was however clear that the horticulture industry preferred to be rid of the 
tax completely, and this possible option was also written into Venstre’s government 
manifest as the only exception to a promise that they would not raise taxes. In the 
manifesto it was stated that it might be needed to raise other taxes if EU legislation 
forced them to change the PSO-tax (DKGOV, 2015b, p. 8).  
LCL can thus reasonably be characterized as a very locally oriented minister and has 
also in several surveys been identified as one of the most “unknown” ministers on a 
national scale (Budolfsen, 2017; Holstein, 2016). LCL has also publicly stated that 
he is not overly concerned about his anonymity as he ultimately considers himself 
liable towards the business interests and the voters in his home district of Funen, 
because they decide his future (Budolfsen, 2017). In summary, LCL is a spokesman 
for an actor-network of incumbent interests, which he represents in the form of 
several board-member positions within the gas industry, and a central role in the 
Funen municipality’s purchase of one out of Denmark’s two last coal plants. But 
what is interesting here is also his connection to a proximate field to the energy 
field, namely the horticulture and agricultural sector in general.  
 
The Subsidy Burden quality is made highly salient  
The first thing LCL did as energy minister was to scrap previously set goals for 
Denmark to remove coal by 2030 and remove gas by 2035. Additionally, confirmed 
that the Venstre-government definition of “fossil independent”, and not “fossil free”, 
meant that Danish companies could still burn coal, gas or oil in 2050. The only 
requirement for being fossil independent in 2050 was that renewable energy could 
produce the equivalent of 100% energy usage. LCL also emphasized that the goal of 
having 50% of Denmark’s electricity come from wind power in 2020 was not 
something that Venstre had signed off on (Færgeman, 2015). Wind power was thus 
only seen as valuable to the extent that it does not disturb current fossil fuel 
infrastructure, upon which Lilleholt was a central player before he became energy 
minister. LCL’s approach to energy policy appears to show a strong focus on 
reaching EU-mandated goals through the lowest possible costs. This is to be done 
through trust in an undefined market selection between what LCL considers generic 
and comparable renewable energy sources, as seen in the following three quotes by 
him:  
 
 
THE VALUATION HISTORY OF DANISH WIND POWER 
232
 
“(We will) ask the market to show how we in the cheapest way can 
achieve the goals (EU goal of 27% renewable energy in 2030, ed.)…If it 
is wind, solar or biomass – that is not decisive for us. On the contrary, we 
want to have it as cheap as possible”. (Færgeman, 2015) 
“We must choose cheaper solutions; Denmark cannot afford the Grand 
Cru edition in the long run”. (Heinskou, Færgeman, & Carlsen, 2015) 
“The goals must be pursued at the lowest possible cost and must not be 
accompanied by sacrificing the competitive ability of our companies on 
export markets.” (With, 2016) 
 
LCL sees wind power as valuable through its quality to achieve a mandated EU-
goal, at a cost that must be deemed cheap enough in the eyes of “companies on 
export markets”. In extension of this LCL has defined his role to primarily be a 
watchdog for consumers who worry about costs, as seen in the three quotes below. 
 
“As minister of supply, the concern to the consumer is the most 
important to me. I exist for the consumers..”. (Lilleholt, 2016) 
“As a minister, I am the spokesman of the consumers”.(Ritzau, 2016a) 
“As the consumers’ minister, I am concerned with getting the supply 
services delivered as effectively, cheaply, environmentally friendly and 
as safe as possible. This should be done by creating more competition, 
where it makes sense.” (Ritzau, 2016c) 
  
This framing of the Danish citizens as being consumers which mainly are concerned 
about costs produces a framing of wind power investments from LCL’s perspective. 
There are a number of EU-mandated goals, which have to be met and LCL’s task is 
to protect the consumers from paying more than necessary in reaching those goals. 
As Danes are framed as consumers they become purchasers of a good, energy 
services, and not as citizens living in a society built on energy structures with certain 
qualities affecting the society they inhibit. Hereafter follows the first actions that 
LCL and the returning Market-coalition actors took, which impacted the valuation 
network of wind power.  
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7.1.2 R&D funding is halved and future wind build-out is problematized 
In September 2015, a Venstre-government memo which detailed substantial cuts to 
green R&D and development aid programs was leaked to the press. Lilleholt 
justified the plan to cut funding with an argument that the government had learned 
that in 2016, there was 3 bn. DKK less in the public budget161 than the previous 
government had budgeted with, and when one looked towards 2020, there was 
allegedly 8 bn. DKK missing (J. S. Nielsen & Stræde, 2015). The government 
argued that substantial cuts had to be made to avoid being penalized by the EU, and 
some of the hardest cuts were within environment and climate programs162. The 
portrayed imminent “budget crisis” was named as the reasons to propose substantial 
R&D cuts, most notable an 85% cut (from 385 to 57 mn. DKK) to the highly 
successful energy research program “Energiteknologisk Udvikling og 
Demonstration” (EUDP)  (J. L. Hansen, 2015)163. The Global-coalition political 
actors of the opposition parties and De Konservative would however not allow such 
a drastic cut, and brought in reserve funds (127 mn. DKK) set aside in earlier years, 
to negotiate the total EUDP budget for 2016 up to 184 mn. DKK, roughly half of its 
average size the previous three years  (DWIA, 2015b). Although the missing 3 bn. 
budgetary crisis was the argument for the substantial cuts to the energy research, the 
government had in the same budget allocated 4 bn. DKK to lower taxes, here among 
the tax on NOx emissions from 25 to 5 DKK (240 mn. DKK in annual costs) 
(DKGOV, 2015d). The cuts to energy research, herein included wind power 
research projects, thus appears to be a political prioritization framed as a “necessary” 
budgetary action.  
The EUDP cuts did however also serve another purpose, as it helped the government 
get Denmark more cheaply into an international research collaboration called 
“Mission Innovation”. In this collaboration of 21 countries, the government should 
commit to double their Energy R&D funding towards 2020. The baseline from 
which to calculate the doubling was calculated as the average funding for EUDP in 
                                                          
161
 This was out of a final annual Danish expense-budget of 1105 bn. DKK in 2016. The “missing” 
3 bn. DKK thus corresponded to less than 0.3% of the budget (DST, 2017).  
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 The numbers that should enact this crisis were disputed by both the Economic Councils (Ritzau, 
2015d), and leading economists in the private sector such as Danske Banks Steen Bocian (Ritzau, 
2015c). The critics stated that Denmark had a healthy economy and that there was not enough 
transparency around the government assumptions. 
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 The EUDP program was designed to help develop technical and system solutions that could 
enable Denmark to become fossil free in 2050 and was co-founded so that the public investments 
was supplemented by private actors who joined the various specific projects. An analysis ordered 
by the government TSO Energinet and published on the Danish Energy Agency’s website showed 
the effectiveness of the program. The previous years’ projects had shown that for each 1 DKK 
invested in EUDP, 2.7 DKK in added revenue was created among the participating firms. These 
firms were demonstrating new technologies and of the 2.7 DKK in added revenue, 2 DKK would 
be in the form of exports (EnerginetDK, 2015a). This report was available at the time of the 
signaled cuts, but the Industrial benefits of this program were not salient in the government’s 
considerations. 
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the 2015 and 2016 budget. Since there were so significant cuts to the EUDP budget 
in 2016, the government got into Mission Innovation with a 2020 target of 580 mn. 
DKK in EUDP funds (As the target for participating countries was set as twice the 
average EUDP level of 2015 and 2016). In the 2017 budget the government would 
then cancel the research program “ForskEL” and move these funds into the EUDP 
program in order to show a small increase since 2016. Although the original EUDP 
budget was again being cut, the added 130 mn. DKK from the closed “ForskEL” 
program, made it appear as if EUDP funding grew in 2017.  Even though the target 
of 580 mn DKK technically would be a doubling of the 2015-2016 level, it would 
not be much higher than the level of those two programs combined funding in 2013, 
2014 and 2015. The figure below shows the developments described above and the 
2020 Mission Innovation Goal (DE, 2016).  The status at the end of 2016 was that in 
the two budgets under LCL, energy research funding was halved compared to its 
previous levels (DE, 2016; DWIA, 2015b)164. Figure 33 (GBA) is based on the 
reported funding levels quotes above.   
  
 
Figure 33: EUDP Funds and the 2020 Mission Innovation Goal. 
 
The dramatic cuts in energy research were well in line the Market-coalitions framing 
and new narrative of “green realism”. LCL had openly explained that he considered 
the green policies under Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s last years in office to have been 
too big of a turn both in how Climate Change was discussed and the actions taken 
(Loevkvist, 2016). LCL argued that it was not beneficial for Denmark to build-out 
renewable energy too fast, concurring well with the Market Distortion Valuation 
Frame. LCL argued that if Denmark was too ambitious, other countries in the EU 
would lose their motivation as we would be “running too far ahead”. This framing of 
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 Note that the numbers in the graph below include a set of smaller pots to the EUDP number, 
which is why the EUDP of 2016 is 188, although it was the 184 mn. mentioned in the text that it 
was negotiated up to in the political compromise. The graph is thus presented to show the rough 
size of the pots and how the Mission Innovation number was reached.  
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action on climate change, makes initiatives such as a coal-phase-out appear as 
symbolic gestures, something which LCL argued had never been the intention of the 
European Union. Instead, he argued that the EU wanted countries to run “roughly 
side by side” in the “marathon” towards the EU 2050 goal (Lillleholt, 2015). This 
was however in direct contradiction with the European Commission’s position on 
the topic in 2008 when it argued that “targets should take account of national 
starting points and potentials, including the existing level of renewable energies and 
the energy mix” (EUC, 2008, p. 7), and in a 2013 Green, wherein the EUC called for 
a shared effort “with a lighter burden falling on lower income member states” (EUC, 
2013, p. 12). In a 2015 country review, the EUC noted that Denmark in general had 
under-invested in energy infrastructure since the early 2000’s (EUC, 2015), and was 
thus nowhere near “running” ahead of the field. Nonetheless, LCL upheld the focus 
on his main task of reducing costs. When asked what ambitions he had for his time 
in office, he replied that implementing 2012 agreement would be difficult enough, as 
seen below.  
 
“We have no plans to take further initiatives, build additional offshore 
wind farms or similar apart from what is already agreed in the energy 
agreement...I actually believe we are facing a very large task in 
implementing the agreement we signed in 2012” (Lynge, 2015) 
 
The Market-coalition and LCL were however not successful in all attempts to 
disassemble the Global Advantage Valuation Network. LCL believed the public 
debate about climate change had become “too elitist” and early on sought to re-
establish the Market-coalition actor Bjoern Lomborg as a government-funded public 
voice in the debate. This plan would however be halted by De Konservative, who 
denied LCL the votes to establish a new government-funded platform for Lomborg  
(Ritzau, 2015b). LCL did however manage to disassemble two successful research 
programs and signify green energy investments as both wrong from a domestic 
viewpoint (can we afford it) and from a foreign viewpoint (the EU does not want us 
to run too far ahead). These early initiatives bear resemblance to the actions taken by 
the Market-coalition in 2002, although with more limited success this time around. 
In this initial phase, wind power as an object is not discussed but a focus to cut 
various research programs supporting wind power is upheld to avert a constructed 
economic emergency. The Market-coalition’s early focus was to decrease tax-levels 
for Danish businesses in general, and would after the first initiatives turn its 
attention to the goal of abolishing the PSO-tax completely.   
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7.2. ARTIFICIAL CRISIS IS INVOKED AROUND PSO AND 
NEARSHORE WIND (2016)   
This chapter will cover the destabilization attempts towards the prosthetic device of 
the PSO, and the proposed nearshore build-out. These elements are part of the 
Global Advantage Valuation Network and would become a main point of 
destabilization for the Market-coalition now that it had regained the Ministry of 
Energy. The chapter will first discuss how the PSO became framed as a matter of 
concern, and after it is shown how the proposed near-shore turbines, agreed in the 
2012 energy law, also became contested.  
 
7.2.1 Proximate field actors argue to be burdened by PSO 
Lars Christian Lilleholt (LCL) would within his first months in office define the 
PSO-tax as his biggest task, and signaled that his highest priority was “to bring 
down the expenses of the Danish industry to the PSO” (Brandstrup & Søndergaard, 
2015). Before embarking on his larger project to abolish the PSO-tax completely, 
Lilleholt received EU approval to give a targeted tax relief of 1.1 bn. DKK to energy 
intensive businesses over five years, thereby shifting some of the PSO’s costs of the 
Danish tax-payers (Stenvei, 2015)165. This marked the beginning of an exercise in 
splitting the bill differently, where the costs of financing green energy would move 
from companies to households.  
 
Tax Ministry calculates benefits of removing the PSO-tax 
The campaign to abolish the PSO-tax began in December 2015, with a §20 answer 
to the Ministry for taxation upon a question from the small right-wing party, Liberal 
Alliance. The question referred to a report from March 2011, during the previous 
VK-governments final months in office, which calculated benefits to lowering 
electricity taxes. The methods used were similar to the DEC’s 2002 calculation 
methodology which considered energy taxes to be more distorting to society than 
income taxes. By using this method, the ministry for taxation calculated that if the 
anticipated annual 4.5 Bn. DKK cost of the PSO-tax in 2020 could be moved to the 
annual budget, it would give a “socio-economic benefit” of 1.5 bn. DKK (SAU, 
2015, p. 2). This benefit came primarily from reducing “distortion losses” and 
thereby increasing anticipated household consumption. Although the answer in its 
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 The Public Service Obligation (PSO) is in DK charged as a fee on top of electricity prices, so 
that it increases by roughly 50% of what the electricity price decreases. It is used to finance DK’s 
green transition, therein wind power. The PSO was in 2014 6.9 bn. DKK, 2015: 8.4 Bn., 2016: 7.4 
bn. Wind power subsidies approximately make up 50% of the PSO-costs (EnerginetDK, 2017).   
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final paragraph emphasized that “It must be emphasized that there are uncertainties 
connected to the magnitude of the total benefits” (SAU, 2015, p. 3), the number in 
the note would be central to the mobilization of the Market-Coalition in the months 
to come.  
In January 2016, a number of Market-coalition actors, the right-wing business 
newspaper Børsen, LCL, Liberal Alliance, but also the previously Global-coalition 
actors, Danish Energy and Danish Industry, would initiate a campaign to abolish the 
PSO-tax completely. It started with a number of Børsen articles with headlines such 
as “New numbers: Scrap PSO and score 1 bn. in BNP-growth”(Søndergaard, 
2016d), “Billion kroner benefit to butchering green special tax” (Søndergaard, 
2016c) and “Headache can be removed in two ways” (Søndergaard, 2016a). In these 
articles, the ministry of taxation calculation would be cited as proof that a 1-1.5 bn. 
benefit could be gained by removing the PSO-tax. The articles would find cases of 
Danish companies that would benefit from this, such as the plastic producing 
company Expo Net (80 employees), which annually payed 800.000 DKK in PSO-
taxes. These payment could according to the CEO be translated into “a little more 
than half an employee every year” (Søndergaard, 2016c). The large Danish food 
producer and member of L&F, Danish Crown, would point to the unfair situation 
where “the people who build wind turbines are guaranteed a fixed price for 10 
years”, while Danish Crown did not know what the future PSO-tax would be (C. L. 
Hansen, 2016)166. In February, Danish Industry and CO-industry (umbrella-
organization representing unions for 230.000 heavy industry workers), wrote a joint 
Op-Ed with the title “the PSO is strangling Danish production”. In the Op-Ed, a 
Funen-located metal welding company Tasso (53 employees) was highlighted as an 
example of a company that suffered due to the PSO-tax. The solution was very 
explicitly identified as being a move to the annual budget. The OpEd cited the 1.5 
bn. DKK benefit from the December ministry note. Likewise it would also be hinted 
that the EU should have declared the PSO-tax to be in violation of EU-law (C. 
Jensen & Dybvad, 2016), something which was the second leg of the destablization 
attempt. 
 
The EU Commission is falsely said to have declared the PSO-tax illegal     
The Børsen articles would in addition to the business losses also highlight that the 
PSO-tax was a “headache” that had to be dealt with due to the EU’s alleged 
problematization of it. Boersen referred to two ways of solving the labelled 
“headache”; 1. Moving the PSO tax to the annual budget and gain an alleged 1-1.5 
bn. or 2. Give foreign producers of electricity access to Danish PSO-funds. The 
second option was not further explained in detail although it was being used in other 
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 Danish Industry would in the same article emphasize that Danish companies were 
disproportionately burdened by the PSO compared to its European colleagues. 
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EU countries. Boersen would only cautionary warn that “if foreign electricity 
producers can get their hands on Danish PSO-funds, there is a risk that the PSO-bill 
could rise further” (Søndergaard, 2016a). Through Boersens highly simplified 
version of the available options, the best choice is presented as obvious to the reader.  
The first is Boersens framed proposal that Denmark moves the PSO-tax to the 
annual budget and get an alleged huge gain in BNP while helping the struggling 
industries of Denmark. Alternatively Denmark could open up the tax-payer coffins 
to unspecified foreign electricity producers, and risk paying an even higher bill. At 
this early stage of the campaign, LCL was present in the discussion, but would not 
specifically mention which solution he preferred. He merely hinted that he found the 
annual budget solution “interesting” and commented on the “large growth-potential” 
in abolishing the PSO-tax (Søndergaard, 2016c, 2016d). Lars Aagaard of Danish 
Energy, and Liberal Alliances energy spokesman, Villum Christensen, would go one 
step further and mention the possibility to raise the income tax, in order to finance a 
potential removal of the PSO (Søndergaard, 2016b, 2016d). Although Lilleholt 
himself did not mention this possibility, the option to abolish the PSO-tax through 
raising taxes elsewhere, was present in the lines of the government’s 2015 
manifesto. Although the Venstre-government had pledged not to raise any taxes in 
their term, they had a clause specifically exempting the PSO-tax from this rule, 
stating that “the government will not raise any taxes in this term…only if there are 
compulsive reasons, i.e. from a discrepancy with EU-rules…in the question of the 
future financing of the PSO-tax” (DKGOV, 2015c). So the option to do this was 
already accounted for back in 2015.  
In the following months, the valuation network would continue their work to frame 
the “foreign option” as a dangerous risk to Danish tax-payers. Especially the utility 
actor, Danish Energy, had a lot to win by a removal of the PSO-tax, as it would 
make their product, electricity, significantly cheaper. Below are three of Lars 
Aagaards press statements with corresponding dates regarding the PSO-tax.  
 
Quote 1 - 19.01.2016: “The (EU, ed.) Commission demands that either 
the PSO-tax is put on the annual budget or we massively open up to 
sending subsidies out of the country. In the latter option we are no longer 
talking about a few million kroner. Then we are talking about several 
hundred million kroner”. (Søndergaard, 2016e) 
 
Quote 2 - 22.01.2016: “I have concerns about whether or not the public 
support will continue to be there, if we send considerable millions out of 
the country to build windfarms in Romania, Poland and the Czech 
Republic or wherever it could be.” (P1, 2016) 
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Quote 3 - 15.02.2016: “All indicators suggest that Denmark will get a 
considerable climate challenge 2021-2030 and will be forced to make 
hard choices. It can be hard to do anything about the agricultural sector 
without hurting the business. Specifically, it is hard to make cows belch 
less. That is why transportation and heating will be a key...There is a 
billion-kroner large growth-opportunity in moving the payment for 
renewable energy, PSO, far away from the electricity bill...to lighten the 
toweringly high electricity taxation will have positive green and 
economic effects”. (Aagaard, 2016) 
 
Note that Lars Aagaard states that the EU Commission “demands” that Denmark 
“massively open up to sending subsidies out of the Country” (Quote 1 of the above). 
Secondly, he would in a later interview state that he feared that “considerable 
millions” to “Romania, Poland and the Czech Republic” (Quote 2 above).  The 
option to open up the PSO to foreign bidders did however not entail a possible 
export of subsidies to eastern European countries. Firstly, access to subsidies could 
only be given to foreign electricity providers from EU-countries that could 
physically transport electricity to Denmark, and had an agreement with Denmark 
about exchange of electricity. Therefore Denmark could only be paying subsidies to 
renewable projects in Sweden or Germany and not Romania or Poland. Secondly, 
the EU had never stated that the PSO was “illegal”, but had merely stated a concern 
about onshore wind and solar subsidies. If Denmark would continue to tax 
renewable electricity from foreign bidders, it was deemed fair that a portion of the 
auctioned subsidies corresponding to the amount of foreign renewable electricity 
going into Denmark was made available to foreign bidders. This amount would 
correspond to 6% for the two years of 2018 and 2019. The 6% would come out of 
the total auctioned pot, and could also be won by Danish suppliers. It would thus 
only be if a German or Swedish provider could provide electricity cheaper, that they 
would have a chance to wind 6% of the total tendered subsidy-pot (DKGOV, 2014a, 
p. 11; EUC, 2014)167.  Despite the existence of these notes and calculations, LCL, 
the Danish prime minister and the Minister of Finance would on separate occasions 
hereafter state that the EU competition authorities had dictated that Denmark to 
abolish the PSO (Horn, 2016; Sunesen, Glerup, Mikkelsen, & Schmidt, 2016). In a 
May 2016 interview, Minister of Finance Claus Hjort Frederiksen simultaneously 
argued that the PSO was illegal, while stating that a removal was valuable as it gave 
a tax relief to businesses. When asked about the PSO-tax, Frederiksen jokingly 
wished that he could send the PSO-tax “out to the Universe”, while stating that it 
was not an option to keep it on as an electricity tax as this would not allow the 
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 In the case that the amount of foreign renewable electricity flowing through Denmark would 
rise considerably, the percentage would also increase. This is however not something that will 
happen overnight, so the critical message that “millions” of taxpayer money immediately would 
flow out of the country does appear to be exaggerated.  
THE VALUATION HISTORY OF DANISH WIND POWER 
240
 
government to “have a special help for gartnere/gartners or Aalborg Portland (a 
cement manufacturer in Northern Jutland, ed.)” (M. G. Jørgensen, 2016). It is from 
such statements clear that the leading quality desired from the removal of the PSO-
tax is a lowered cost related to the quality Subsidy Burden, especially targeted to 
energy-intensive industries. Before I show how the campaign to abolish the PSO-tax 
was concluded it is now necessary to explain the destabilization attempt towards the 
near-shore turbines. This concurred simultaneously with the PSO-tax campaign, as 
the nearshore turbines were seen as an expendable project which could lighten the 
Subsidy Burden of the PSO-tax.   
 
7.2.2 Electricity prices are used to problematize Nearshore wind farm 
The second destabilization attempt against the existing Global Advantage Valuation 
Network would be against the planned near-shore turbines from the 2012 energy 
agreement. The 350 MW near-shore wind turbines were to be built 4-8 km from the 
Danish western shore and put into operation by 2020, receiving a 10-12 year subsidy 
in the form of a guaranteed strike price168, which depended on the result of a 
competitive bidding process (DEA, 2015b)169. The dispute about the near-shore 
turbines would in March be connected to the PSO-dispute as the extremely low oil 
prices had caused electricity prices to drop to unprecedented low levels. The Danish 
Energy Agency would be asked to calculate a new electricity price prognosis on 
current future prices, and LCL used this prognosis to show an expected PSO-tax cost 
of be 70 bn. DKK from 2016-2025. This calculation would lead LCL to state that 
now the “party was much more expensive than expected” and conclude that he had 
to take action (Søndergaard & Hansen, 2016a). Global-coalition actors in the form 
of the left-wing opposition parties and the Wind Turbine Industry Association 
(DWIA) industry replied with a counter-calculation. This showed that the main 
reason PSO-expenses were 27% higher than expected in 2012, was that electricity 
prices had dropped 45%. They would argue that it was misleading to only focus on 
the subsidy costs, as consumers actually payed less in total for electricity than what 
was expected in 2012 (DWIA, 2016b).  The Global-coalition would in this dispute 
find support in the new calculative center that was founded in 2014. The Climate 
Council would in April release a report stating that Danish electricity prices, 
including PSO, were below average in the EU and that less than 5% of Danish 
companies had their competitiveness affected by electricity costs (Klimarådet, 
2016). LCL dismissed the Climate Council’s report and stated that he wanted wind 
subsidies on the annual budget because “the green transition should be part of a 
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 The subsidy would then cover the difference between the current electricity price and the set 
strike price. It is therefore the size of the strike price which determines the size of the subsidy. 
Utilities and financial investors would then bid in a closed-envelope tender auction for the rights to 
construct the nearshore farms.  
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 The 350 MW near-shore wind turbines, were originally agreed in the bi-partisan 2012 energy 
agreement as 500 MW (DEA, 2012a), but was later downscaled as explained earlier. 
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discussion of priorities alongside hospitals, traffic and other necessary investments” 
(E. Ø. Andersen, 2016). Meanwhile, he would in a Boersen interview state that his 
strong determination for abolishing the PSO-tax was motivated by a goal to provide 
businesses with what he described as “the largest business-tax relief I can ever 
remember” (Søndergaard, 2016f).  
Although it had unofficially been floated before, the proposal to cancel the near-
shore turbines was proposed by the government’s parliamentary support, Liberal 
Alliance, and supported by Danish Industry in early march 2016 (Søndergaard & 
Hansen, 2016b). The government took up the proposal and adopted it as its official 
policy to abolish the near-shore wind turbines by removing the funding for the 
turbines in their economic 2025 plan. This plan was presented five days before the 
bidding process for the near-shore turbine projects ended, but the prequalified 
bidders would nonetheless deliver their offers to the auction, having already spent 
millions of kroners to prepare the bid (Crone & Søndergaard, 2016). Despite the 
uncertainty created, the  winning nearshore bid came in at 30% lower than the 
auction ceiling at a record-low level of 64 €/MWh (M. Nielsen, 2016; Steel, 2016b). 
However, when faced with this record-low project costs, LCL maintained that the 
low electricity price still caused the turbines to be too expensive to build (Domino & 
Sørensen, 2016). This was challenged by the Wind Turbine industry Association 
(DWIA) as distorting the discussion about the cost of wind turbines. The DWIA 
argued that the actual technology cost of the project was the cheapest ever in 
Europe, and that it would be paradoxical to cancel the project. The unusual low 
electricity prices made the gap covered by subsidies appear higher than it was 
expected in 2012. But the current situation would apply to all energy build-out and 
was not attributable to the near-shore wind turbines (DWIA, 2016b). The 
government was using the Subsidy Burden of the PSO-tax to justify cancelling the 
near-shore wind turbines.  
As the criticism of cancelling a proposed wind farm at a record low strike price 
intensified, LCL would amplify a previously used argument, namely that the near-
shore turbines would ruin the Aesthetics of the Danish coasts (DR.dk, 2016; Ritzau, 
2016b)170. LCL would bring salience to the local protest groups consisting of beach-
house owners in the area and highlight this as another reason he did not want the 
nearshore turbines. But the road to cancelling the near-shore turbines would increase 
in difficulty in November 2016. The Swedish utility Vattenfall had until then won 
both the Horns Rev 3 and the nearshore bid, and had now also won the auction for 
the third offshore wind farm of the 2012 agreement, Kriegers Flak (Wittrup, 2016b). 
If LCL was successful in cancelling the nearshore wind farm he would jeopardize 
relations with the sole supplier of all of Denmark’s three future offshore wind farms. 
Furthermore, it was hard to LCL to praise the low bid price for Kriegers Flak while 
arguing that the equally low nearshore bid should be cancelled. This could hurt 
investor relations for future projects, and was by the fall of 2016 strongly opposed 
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 Nine out of Denmark’s 13 installed offshore wind farms at the time were however all installed 
at similar distance or closer to the shore than the proposed Near-shore projects (Stenvei, 2016a). 
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by both the left-wing parties, Danish Industry and De Konservative (Ritzau, 2016d). 
LCL was thus not be able to maintain the coupling between abolishing the PSO and 
cancelling the nearshore turbines. LCL and the government did not want the near-
shore turbines at any cost, and were willing to break the bi-partisan 2012 energy 
agreement to cancel them, but it could not be done without the votes of the six De 
Konservative members of parliament. The highly controversial PSO-dispute came to 
its end in November 2016 when the Venstre-government for other reasons was 
forced to resign, and depended on De Konservative to ensure a new tri-party 
government with them and the right-wing party Liberal Alliance. The government 
did manage to abolish the PSO, but was forced to accept the near-shore turbines 
(Ritzau, 2016e).  
LCL generally praised offshore wind power for its Industrial quality and 
Technology Cost during this period. He would speak of wind power as an 
“adventure that Denmark should be proud of”, while he specially highlighted the 
low bid-price on Kriegers Flak as “the cheapest energy that can be made on Danish 
soil” (J. L. Hansen, 2016). Energy was in LCL’s words “Big business for Denmark” 
although the “prices for renewable energy” should be monitored, as they could 
become so expensive that they would “cost Danish jobs” (J. L. Hansen, 2016). 
Offshore wind is by these remaining Market-coalition actors now praised as 
cheapest on Technology Cost although onshore wind is cheaper to build. Offshore 
wind power represents an export opportunity, while is why that despite all of the 
valuation drama, the national wind power test-centers are still expanded during these 
years (Ritzau, 2017a). Denmark should thus remain open for business as LCL would 
refer to Denmark being an “exhibition window” for the world (Korsgaard, 2016). 
But as has been seen in this chapter, this praise only applied to offshore wind power, 
and there were still several destabilization attempts to onshore wind, R&D funding, 
the PSO-tax and the nearshore wind farms. It thus appears that the Market-coalition 
actors were proud of previous coalition’s achievements and praise wind power to the 
extent that it does not cost society anything in terms of investments.  Wind power is 
in this paradoxical period framed as valuable through the Technology Cost and 
Industrial qualities, while the Subsidy Burden and Market Distortion qualities 
contributes to a framing of wind power as not-valuable. This position of Denmark 
being an exhibition window for the world is seen as materially manifested at the 
Østerild test site. The wind turbine industry’s pledge to lower costs meant that 
technology development was moving fast and several large industrial manufacturers 
were testing new larger turbines at the Østerild site. The front cover of this book 
shows the Siemens SWT-7.0 154 turbine, which was being tested at Oesterild 
throughout 2015-2017171. The picture is showed in its full size hereafter172. 
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 The SWT-7.0- 154 has 28% longer blades and nearly double rated the power of the worlds most 
installed offshore wind turbine, the SWT-3.6 120 with 950 turbines (REnews, 2017, p. 21).  The 
SWT-7.0 154 was named the 2016 turbine of the year Wind Power Monthly (Vries, 2016), and 
multiple manufacturers are already testing larger models.  
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Figure 34: SWT 7.0 154 turbine at Oesterild (2017) 
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 Image Credit and copyright for the picture: SWT-7.0 154 at Oesterild: Peter Lyhne Højberg. 
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But the decades of R&D funding that was becoming materially manifested in these 
giant turbines built on Danish soil was not enough to maintain the PSO. Once the 
abolishment became law, the Subsidy Burden would gradually be moved from 
companies to tax payers. Where the PSO-tax was roughly funded 50/50 between 
businesses and households, the new solution meant that households would carry the 
full cost on the annual budget173. Another important change from the PSO-
abolishment was the phase-out of the so-called “green pot”, a part of the current 
onshore subsidy scheme which funded 88.000 DKK per MW to local communities 
that agreed to have wind turbines installed in their area. These funds could then be 
used to build a park, improve the local library or other recreational improvements. 
The funds disappeared when the onshore subsidy scheme ran out in early 2018, and 
LCL pronounced that going forward “these costs should be calculated into the 
project” and settled between the owner and the community (Poulsen & Lange, 
2016). The above described situation marks a paradoxical situation wherein LCL at 
the end of 2016 considered the PSO-abolishment his greatest professional 
achievement, while the failure to cancel the near-shore turbines was his greatest 
regret (J. S. Jørgensen, 2016)174.  
This destabilization attempt is a short moment of valuation wherein the Market-
coalition attempts to bring salience to the Market Distortion quality which was 
introduced in 2002. This is especially apparent through the ‘dynamic effects’ that is 
calculated as a benefit from abolishing the PSO-tax. Wind power is through the 
prosthetic devices of the PSO framed as something which primarily should be 
valued by the Subsidy Burden and Market Distortion qualities. Danish Energy, and 
to a lesser degree Danish Industry, were very active in the PSO-discussions and 
were now not aligned with the Danish Wind Turbine Industry, as was the case 
during the Global Advantage period. When faced with the choice between getting 
lower electricity prices for businesses and ensuring stability for wind power build-
out, the two organizations chose to prioritize the former. Danish Industry did 
however join the coalition that protected the near-shore turbines, once it had already 
been awarded to Vattenfall. So although the Market-Coalition was successful in 
removing the stability of the PSO-tax, the Global-coalition maintained the nearshore 
turbines. The above-described case is the largest valuation struggle of this period 
and mainly relates to the PSO and offshore wind. But the period would also see a 
number of valuation dramas around onshore wind which follows after a short 
segment on a new 2016 and differing visions of the future.  
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 The government justified this with a calculation that calculated a dynamic benefit to the 
household which was larger than the increase in income taxes. This dynamic effect was built on an 
expectation that companies which payed fewer taxes would increase their wages and lower their 
prices, thereby helping the citizens through his role as an employee and a consumer. This way of 
calculating was highly criticized by energy experts and political opponents, but were nonetheless 
included as gains for the Danish citizen in the government’s economic proposals (Stenvei, 2016b).   
174
 Even well into 2017, when the nearshore project had developed further, Venstre would refer to 
the nearshore turbines as something that opposition politicians wanted to “pay excess prices” for in 
order to get “green power which no one is asking for” (Johansen, 2017).     
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7.2.3 New Government coalition would expose differences in ambition 
The Subsidy Burden period has been characterized by a series of destabilization 
attempts of the Global Advantage Valuation Frame and the corresponding network. 
But before I move on to map the Subsidy Burden frame the Market-Coalition 
temporarily manages to establish, I will highlight the parliamentary situation for 
future energy negotiations. The Global-coalition actor De Konservative stepped into 
government with Venstre in 2016, and applies a significantly different interpretation 
of the word “low-emission society” than the rest of the government. This word 
appeared in the 2016 government manifesto wherein it is stated that the new 
government’s long-term goal for 2050 is “a low-emission society, which is 
independent of fossil fuels”, meaning that “Denmark should live up to the EU’s goal 
of 80-95% reduction of GHG emissions in 2050” (VLAK-Gov, 2016, p. 74). As this 
goal is rather vague on specifics, LCL was later asked to specify what “low-
emission society” and “fossil independent” meant to the government. In his March 
2017 answer to parliament LCL specified that “fossil-independent” meant “that 
Denmark in 2050 should be able to produce enough renewable energy to be able to 
cover the total Danish consumption of energy”. He thereafter mentioned that the 
government “additionally” had a goal of “being a low-emission society”, which 
“encompassed emissions from all sectors”, without specifying it further (EFKM, 
2017a)175. As explained earlier, Denmark is centrally placed and thus functions as a 
transit country for a large degree of electricity. Denmark could technically build 
wind power to supply the equivalent of 100% of energy use in the electricity, 
heating and transportation sector. But if 50% of this electricity is exported to other 
countries, because Denmark had not yet integrated its heating and transportation 
sectors with the electricity sector, Denmark could still be burning large amounts of 
gas in the heating sector or be driving gasoline-fueled cars176.  
The ‘low-emission society’ phrase was not new when it was introduced into the 
VLAK-government manifesto, as it was used in the 2014 Climate Law agreed 
between the left-wing parties and De Konservative. In this law-document “low-
emission society” is defined as “a resource-efficient society” with an energy-supply 
based on renewable energy and markedly lower GHG emissions from other sectors, 
which at the same time supports growth and development’ (DKGOV, 2014b). The 
sitting energy minister in 2014, Rasmus Helveg, was back in 2014 asked whether 
the ‘low-emission society’ phrasing had changed their goals. To this he would reply 
that “we have not changed our goal. A low-emission society is a fossil-free society” 
(Djursing, 2014).  
                                                          
175
 This answer did not bring much more light to what low-emission meant apart from the point that 
it was additionally to “fossil-independent”, which meant being able to produce as much renewable 
energy as consumption by 2050. This goal is still rather vague, as it does not specify if Denmark 
should be able to produce 100% renewable energy the whole year of 2050, for a month, or maybe 
just hit above 100% a single day. 
176
 In comparison, the SRSF government had in 2012 set the 2050 target to be have a 100% 
renewable energy in 2050 and ‘a full phase-out of fossil fuels’ (SRSF-Gov, 2012). 
THE VALUATION HISTORY OF DANISH WIND POWER 
246
 
Political spokesman for De Konservative, Mette Abildgaard would pick up on this 
term in a December 2017 Op-Ed, wherein she praised ‘the important conservative 
victory’ of getting the goal of a low-emission society written into the government 
manifesto. This may seem odd to the outside observer, as in Lilleholts march 2017 
answer and the specific 2014 text appears as if ‘low-emission society’ has not been 
quantified but merely attached to the goals of whatever coalition De Konservative 
were signing agreements with. But Mette Abildgaard would in an attempt to 
highlight the green profile of De Konservative define ‘low-emission society’ as even 
more ambitious than a “fossil-free society”.  
 
“Unlike a fossil-free society, a low-emissions society does practically not 
emit any CO2 – neither from agriculture or forestry, which is still 
possible in a fossil-free society. So like most of our neighboring 
countries, Denmark has a goal to transition to a fossil-free economy long 
before 2050”. (Abildgaard, 2017) 
  
The small government party thus considers it necessary to phase out fossil fuels 
“long before 2050”, while the other two governing parties, Venstre and Liberal 
Alliance have no phase-out planned at all177. This short segment was included to 
show that the deep framing differences between Global-coalition actors and Market-
coalition actors is not isolated to wind power, but to the sustainable transition as a 
whole. 
 
7.3. TECHNOLOGY NEUTRALITY AND LOCAL RESISTANCE TO 
ONSHORE WIND (2017) 
Following the abolishment of the PSO-tax in addition to a number of other 
programs, the Market-coalition had by 2017 a nearly open slate to change the 
programs for wind power subsidies after 2020. The next step was to bring salience 
to the Market Distortion quality by introducing the need for “technology neutrality”, 
but only when it came to onshore wind and solar auctions.  
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 The manifesto also included a “stocktake” device so the parties on a running basis could assess 
the “speed of market maturity” of renewables “in relation to other forms of energy” and therefrom 
upscale, but also downscale the build-out of renewable energy (VLAK-Gov, 2016, p. 74). 
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7.3.1 New center of calculation is established to push tech-neutrality 
In the spring of 2016, Lars Christian Lilleholt (LCL) he had established an energy 
commission with 9 members exclusively picked by him and his party (Skærbæk & 
Dalgaard, 2016). The team consisted of three senior business executives, a political 
scientists, two economists and two technical academics, of which only one had 
experience with energy systems (Gormsen, 2016). The team was composed 
primarily on economics and private enterprise, while energy systems analysis was 
thinly represented178. The Energy Commission was asked to explore how the EU 
flexibility-mechanism could be used to trade quotas instead of building more 
renewable energy capacity (EFKM, 2016a, p. 4), and how developments in 
neighboring countries could be used to pay for future renewable energy projects on 
“pure market terms” (EFKM, 2016a, p. 6). The 7-page mission document 
specifically directed the commission to avoid developing “quantitative goals for a 
new energy agreement” or “specific proposals” to achieve anticipated EU 2030 
climate goals (EFKM, 2016a, p. 2,5).  The commission was to focus on lowering 
costs, as seen from the five quotes from the statement in table 8 (EFKM, 2016a).  
Table 9: Five quotes from the 7-page mission statement for the Energy Commission. 
Page Statement 
2 
The Commission’s combined proposals may not have  
consequences for the state budget and may not increase the total 
socio-economic costs. 
3 
The government wishes to make energy as competitive and cheap 
as possible. 
3 It is essential to avoid…a forced build-out of renewable energy. 
4 
There is requested an overall analysis of how Denmark as cheaply 
as possible can fulfill the Danish part of international 
commitments. 
6 
The analysis must contain an assessment of...how the socio-
economic losses of subsidies can be minimized. It should 
furthermore be examined how it is possible to reduce the risk of 
wasted subsidies and subsidy-dependence. 
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 One member was Peter Brixen. A former long-time civil servant of the financial ministry (2002-
2014), who in 2007 had refused to lower the publics discount rate and had been a leading figure in 
the controversial 2014 sale of part of the public ownership of DONG Energy (S. W. Nielsen, 2015). 
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There is thus a frame established wherein subsidies distorting the market and 
burdening Danish economy through todays “socio-economic losses of subsidies”. 
The market can allegedly be arranged differently so that the risk of “a forced build-
out”, “wasted subsidies” and “subsidy-dependence” are minimized. The EK was 
also not allowed to propose new investments in the energy system unless cuts are 
made elsewhere. These premises are important to have in mind when analyzing the 
Energy Commission’s report (EK) from April 2017.  
The EK’s 92-page report “Recommendations to future energy policy” was launched 
in April 2017, and would among its focus point introduce the notion of technology 
neutrality in build-out179. At the launch event, the chairman of the commission, CEO 
of Danfoss, Niels B. Christiansen, started his speech with an attempt to couple lower 
levels of investments with being ambitious. He also added that Denmark have had 
low electricity price despite having 42% of electricity coming from wind power. It 
was not further explained why he assumed that electricity prices were low despite a 
high level of wind power and not also because of wind power (Friis, 2017). Herein a 
classic entrenched meaning is revealed, namely that it is frames as if wind power 
usually would make electricity prices higher, which is actually not the case (Hirth & 
Müller, 2016).  
 
Technology Cost and Future Potential recognized  
The EK report re-iterates the positive impact of Technology Cost that was 
established in the EA and Rockwool reports in 2014. As such it was repeated that 
“falling costs” (D3: #1), “large drops in the costs” (D3: #2), make onshore wind 
“able to compete” (D3: #3) with conventional power plants. The low strike price 
bids for both the near-shore turbines and Kriegers Flak are also mentioned as a point 
of reference to show that offshore wind power has dropped in price (EK, 2017, pp. 
34, 35). The EK report still sees further Future Potential in wind power as they 
consider the annual technology catalogue from DEA to be “too conservative” (D3: 
#4) in its predictions of future cost reductions, as Technology Cost are expected to 
“fall considerably” (D3: #5). The report frames wind power as being on par with 
conventional fossil fuel plants and expected to be cheaper still. But in the same 
report there is a notion that subsidies are expensive and distort the market. 
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 The full quotes from the report can be found in appendix D3. 
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Proposal of technology neutrality brings salience to Subsidy Burden and Market 
Distortion qualities 
While the EK report highlighted the Technology Cost and Future Potential of wind 
power, it also brings salience to the negative impact from the Subsidy Burden and 
Market Distortion qualities. The report concludes that it does not “make sense” (D3: 
#7) to set out a course, since the “market should be used” (D3: #6), as opposed to 
risking “inefficiency” through administrative decisions (D3: #9). It is also noted that 
the burdening subsidies for “existing and expensive” offshore wind farms will be a 
relief to Danish society, once they expire in the future (D3: #8). The report cites 
renewables as being directly subsidized by 6.4 bn., but thereafter mentions the 
presence of “indirect subsidies through tax exemption” (D3: #10). It is not specified 
or calculated further what specifically these exemptions constitute.   
In addition to the four major qualities in the report, Technology Cost, Future 
Potential, Subsidy Burden and Market Distortion, the report also contains a few 
minor mentions of other qualities. Among negative environmental qualities the 
Aesthetics problem of noise annoyance is specifically mentioned as an example of a 
yet unaccounted environmental factor (D3: #11). When it comes to ensuring the 
large degrees of wind power in the system the Back-up Capacity quality is also 
mentioned through the need for flexibility (D3: #12).  
 
Reactions to the EK Reports and its relation to other actors 
The EK report builds on the same notion that the DEC introduced in 2002. Namely 
that there is a perfect equilibrium market, of which the subsidies to wind power 
function as a distortion. The notion that there is an ‘equilibrium state’ within the 
energy market, that wind subsidies are distorting is also especially seen in quote 10, 
where the EK considers it to be a “subsidy” that renewable energy is exempted from 
paying environmental taxes180. A similar example of this assumption is found in a 
2017 editorial from the right-wing newspaper Jyllandsposten.  
  
“There should not be a single wind turbine or solar cell constructed, 
which cannot be driven on market-terms without any form of direct or 
indirect subsidy. Where other producers of electricity must pay for the 
fuel they use, the wind and sun is free, and that must be ample subsidy.” 
(JP, 2017). 
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 This is a reverse understanding of the energy market compared to the IMF’s, wherein fossil 
fuels are considered to be subsidized, since they are not adequately taxed for the environmental 
degradation they cause (Timperley, 2017). 
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These examples serves to show a peculiar logic of the Market Distortion quality, as 
Jyllandsposten implies that it is unfair that a coal producer has to pay for coal to be 
mined, while the wind turbine owner gets his “fuel” delivered freely in the wind. 
The two large organizations who were part of the Global-coalition, Danish Energy 
and Danish Industry, applauded the EK report and agreed with Lilleholt’s proposed 
paradigm shift towards technology neutrality (DI, 2017). DWIA were more critical 
and wondered why technology neutrality all of the sudden was presented as a 
necessary part of the future. The EK report had proposed technology neutrality 
without explaining how it should work in practice (DWIA, 2017c). Senior advisor 
Joergen Henningsen, of Global-coalition think tank Concito, would question why 
the EK insisted on leaving the future energy system in blind trust to the market.  
 
“It is however more problematic when the commission so strongly 
emphasize ‘technology neutrality’ and ‘marketization’ of the future 
efforts. Has the commission completely overlooked, that the elements, 
which were fundamental for the positive development so far, have been 
driven by the exact opposite? Or that the two EU-flagships, which are 
based on “the market”, the liberalization of the electricity market and the 
CO2 quota system,  both have been – diplomatically phrased – failures 
compared to what they should deliver”. (Henningsen, 2017) 
 
Henningsen’s critique relates to the notion that the report did not provide any 
reasoning to why it should be cost-effective notion to use technology-neutral 
auctions, when it historically has been technology-specific auctions that has lowered 
the cost of the green transition. Despite the Global-coalition actors’ critique of 
especially technology neutrality, it would be these exact points that LCL would 
design his future onshore wind policy around (EFKM, 2017b).  
 
7.3.2 Onshore wind is thrown into a technology neutral experiment 
LCL had in the time leading up to the EK report, ensured that existing solar and 
onshore wind subsidy schemes would be phased out by mid-2018 at the latest, and 
was thereafter ready to replace these schemes with a new “technology-neutral” 
device181. The new subsidy scheme should run for 2018 and 2019 until a new energy 
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 LCL had made several interventions to stop various solar subsidy programs  (Bredsdorff, 2016; 
Wittrup, 2017a), and had meanwhile fended off multiple warnings about the market impacts when 
the current onshore wind subsidy program would run out by February 2018 (Ritzau, 2017b). By the 
middle of 2018, the established subsidy programs for both onshore wind power and solar PV would 
have expired or have been removed.  
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agreement would start in 2020. In the proposed scheme, onshore wind, near-shore 
wind and solar would compete for a pot of subsidies, which would roughly equate to 
a total 200 MW over the two years. This would limit potential build-out to less than 
a third of the previous two years182, push out small local consortiums, and jeopardize 
the completion of large onshore wind-energy projects under development 
(Plechinger, 2017e). This scheme attracted criticism from several Global-coalition 
actors. AAU academics labelled it an “uncertain experiment” (Ritzau, 2017c), the 
Danish Wind turbines industry Association (DWIA) called it unambitious 
(Plechinger, 2017g), while the wind turbine owners association argued it would 
“reduce the market for new wind turbines beyond recognition” (Kærgaard, 2017). 
LCL would in an interview express that he was unfazed by this “whining” from the 
wind turbine industry, as his proposed scheme took on the important task of 
minimizing the Subsidy Burden wind power had placed on Denmark since 1979.  
 
“Overall, I am of the opinion that the wind turbine industry should start 
competing and show that they are actually able to deliver the cheapest 
solution….Instead of whining, one should compete and show that one is 
actually able to compete with other technologies. Wind has been 
subsidized since 1979. It is now time to show that you are able to 
compete”. (Plechinger, 2017f)   
 
LCL uses the Market Distortion framing that wind power is considered uniquely 
more subsidized than other energy sources. An energy source is according to this 
framing to be valued by how cheaply one kWh can be produced, but a low strike 
price is not a sign that a technology is cheap. So although the current electricity 
prices are so low that practically any new energy investments can only be introduced 
through subsidies, wind power is specifically problematized. Wind is not deemed 
valuable through low Technology Cost alone, but is instead proven valuable through 
“tough and fierce” 183 competition in the form of a technology neutral auction, 
wherein the build-out of either onshore wind or solar will be taken from the other 
technology. It is worth noticing that biogas and biomass is not exposed to 
technology neutrality. Only a few days before the proposal of tech-neutral auctions 
had been released, LCL received EU approval for a direct grant of 422 mn. DKK to 
cover 1/3 of the project costs of a new 1.2 bn. DKK biomass Bloc (129 MW heat, 25 
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 The two years, 2015 and 2016, had seen a build-out of 468MW onshore wind, 193MW solar. 
Additionally the 350 MW nearshore turbines were agreed in 2016 and could also be counted in the 
comparison (Ravn, 2017). 
183
 LCL Interview quote: ”If we are to achieve it (the goal of 50% Renewable Energy in 2030, ed.), 
we must ensure that the cheapest technologies come forward. We must have a tough and fierce 
competition, and instead of arguing that it can’t be done, one should show that wind is the cheapest. 
I can say the same to solar energy” (Plechinger, 2017f).” 
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MW electricity) at the coal-plant Asnaes-vaerket (Wittrup, 2017b). This subsidy was 
given in the form a direct investment aid payment, which, without any competitive 
bidding or media coverage, had been promised to the developer in December 
2016184. This is a significantly more black-boxed way of receiving subsidies than the 
new frequently discussed wind power subsidy schemes.  
 
7.3.3 The politics of drift – Onshore wind come to a halt in municipalities 
The new onshore subsidy scheme was quietly accepted by Danish Industry and 
Danish Energy, who supported the general notion of tech-neutrality and did not 
further comment on the significantly lower expected build-out (Birkmann, 2017; 
Thure, 2017). The move to tech-neutrality did however blur out the Industrial 
quality of onshore wind as the new energy policy was not focused on generating 
jobs by specifically supporting either onshore wind or solar.  This was a sign of an 
oncoming trend where the Market-coalition and the two private actors, Danish 
Energy and Danish Industry, would adopt different stances to offshore and onshore 
wind power respectively. Offshore wind power would be hailed as the energy 
sources which would make Denmark into an exhibition window for the world, while 
onshore wind would be subjected to the politics of drift.  
Onshore wind farms had in 2016 and 2017 become increasingly harder to get 
approved. This development was partly ascribed to the fact that local municipal 
politicians abstained from approving projects as they feared backlash from local 
opponent groups (Lyall, 2017). In the Spring of 2017, Toender Municipality would 
scrap a proposed 80 MW Windfarm, shortly followed by Esbjerg Municipality 
cancelling plans for 127 MW onshore wind by 2020, and indefinitely cancelling 
future onshore build-out (Plechinger, 2017a)185. Viborg Municipality also moved to 
blocked all onshore wind proposals until absolute certainty could be achieved 
regarding that no one would be harmed, as explained hereafter by Viborg mayor 
Torsten Nielsen.  
 
                                                          
184
 Lilleholt used the transition from coal to biomass at the Asnaes plant as proof that there was “no 
need for parliament to push” for a coal phase-out in Denmark, since “companies themselves will 
show responsibility and phase out coal when it fits into their plans” (Korsgaard, 2017). This was 
said despite the fact that he had promised to cover 1/3 of the costs with tax-payer funded subsidies 
to transition the Asnaes plant to biomass, one element which was not mentioned in the 
announcement of DONG energy’s coal phase-out.   
185
 Another planned onshore wind farm of 78 MW had been delayed in five years before being 
voted down 18-12 in Haderslev city council, where the two major parties, Venstre and the Social 
Democrats had split votes within the party (Plechinger, 2017h). 
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“We shut down the process, but only because of the low-frequency noise. 
As long as we can’t get documentation that it is harmless, I do not 
believe it….If a single person gets sick from having a wind turbine too 
close, it something I will never have in Viborg Municipality”. (Lyall, 
2017)  
 
The burden of proof was thus placed the wind turbine manufacturers to prove that 
not a single person will get sick. A large investigation about any potential links 
between wind turbines and sickness was initiated by the Danish health authorities in 
2014. The report was scheduled to be published by 2018, but is not likely to solve 
the local opposition, as explained by Esbjerg Mayor, Johnny Soettrup (V). 
 
“It has been coming some time now…The rapidly growing local 
opposition to onshore wind turbines. I have also been affected by the 
feedback that I get….Regardless of whether it (Health-report, ed.) 
acquits (Wind turbines) from the low-frequent annoyances, there is still 
something visual which greatly concerns people”. (Plechinger, 2017b) 
 
 
Despite the fact that less than 1% of properties in Denmark lie within 1 km of an 
onshore wind farm (Plechinger, 2017c),  local opposition groups managed to gain 
the attention of politicians and media. The opposition to onshore wind farms appears 
to have increased as offshore wind Industrial benefits have decoupled domestic 
onshore wind build-out. One example of this is Esbjerg Mayor Johnny Soettrup, 
who during the Global Advantage period and this period was a strong advocate for 
future offshore wind build-out186.  
The Aesthetics quality has thus grown in salience through several local debates using 
the narrative that an oppressed group of people is fighting a David vs. Goliath fight 
against a powerful wind turbine industry. The municipality of Mors has in the past 
had several onshore wind farms, but a Social-democratic candidate for mayor would 
in 2017 promise to stop all future onshore projects, arguing that “the time of wind 
                                                          
186
 Esbjerg Municipality would of course stand to gain more by an offshore wind build-out 
compared to an onshore build-out. But there has also been examples of Venstre and Social-
Democratic politicians who changed their stance to oppose further wind build-out in Ikast-Brande 
(Plechinger, 2016) and Aalborg Municipality (Plechinger, 2017i). Both of these municipalities has 
decided to put further onshore wind build-out on hold, despite having wind turbine factories as the 
top municipal employer in both municipalities (Nacelle-factory in Ikast-Brande, and Blades Factory 
in Aalborg). 
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power on the island of Mors was over” as there is “a peoples movement” against it 
(Juhl & Aaberg, 2017). When Haderslev municipality in August 2017, decided to 
cancel a planned project it was presented as the conclusion of a year-long struggle 
for the local opposition. Peter Skeel Hjort, a long-time critic of the industry, would 
paint a near conspiracy-like picture of the wind turbine industry in a local news-
station’s coverage of the Haderslev decision. 
 
“The wind turbine industry tries to steamroll everyone, and in every 
situation they attempt to ridicule and marginalize people or 
organizations, which are of a different opinion. They even have an 
organization, which systematically surveys all opinion pieces in the 
newspapers and answers them. This is often done in a way that is far 
beyond the boundaries of decency”. (Kallenbach, 2017) 
 
The planning branch of the Danish churches would also halt onshore build-out in 
this period. The churches have a special option to veto onshore wind projects that 
are visible within 1-3 km of a church in Denmark, and they exercised this right 
multiple times in the years during this period (Munkholm, 2015a, 2015b; Plechinger, 
2017d). Behind the majority of these vetoes was the central authority of the Royal 
Building Inspector Niels Vium, who oversees the country’s 1500 churches. In a 
2015 interview he justified his many vetoes with the argument that the “green wave 
is an excuse, which wind turbine owners use to generate money”, and thus it was his 
adamant duty to halt wind turbines from ruining the view from the churches 
(Munkholm, 2015a).   
As the majority of Danish municipalities paused, cancelled or stayed silent on the 
possibility of future onshore wind farms, the Subsidy Burden period is defined by an 
increased salience of the Aesthetics quality. But despite these oppositions to onshore 
wind, wind power was established as a competitive energy source of which 
especially offshore wind power featured a promise for future Industrial benefits. The 
Market-coalition was thus not able to re-impose the Market Distortion Valuation 
Frame. This framing was no longer possible due to the materiality of the low 
Technology Cost, the growing export markets, and the still strongly represented 
Global-coalition. Instead this most recent period would be defined by destabilization 
of existing frameworks, and a momentarily assembled Subsidy Burden Valuation 
frame.  This fragile framing and the coalitions of this most recent valuation struggle 
will be summarized next.  
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7.4. SUBSIDY BURDEN: VALUATION FRAME SUMMARY 
In this section, I describe the new dominant valuation frame. 
 
7.4.1 The Subsidy Burden Valuation Frame  
The Subsidy Burden valuation frame can be conceived as a peculiar hybrid between 
the Market Distortion and Global Advantage frames, shown in figure 35 (GBA). 
 
Figure 35: The fourth (GA: 2007-2014) and fifth (SB: 2015-2017) Valuation Frame. 
 
Technology Cost Have Highest Positive Impact as both Onshore and Offshore Wind 
Become Competitive 
Technology Cost had a strong positive impact on the frame, along with the Future 
Potential and Industrial qualities. Just as onshore wind costs dropped significantly 
during the Global Advantage period, offshore wind costs dropped significantly 
during the Subsidy Burden period. Thus, both proponents and challengers of the 
valuation frame appeared to agree on the competitiveness of wind power in terms of 
Technology Cost. The focus of the struggle over the framing of wind power’s value 
thus shifted to how much capacity Denmark could afford to build, and how it could 
minimize the distortive effects of wind turbine subsidies.   
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Subsidy Burden Becomes More Salient when Coupled with Market Distortion 
Despite the presence of several of the same high positive impact qualities, wind 
power was framed as being somewhere between valuable and not valuable during 
the Subsidy Burden period, as the subsidy cost of the PSO tax became more salient 
and the Market Distortion quality re-emerged. The long road toward the abolishment 
of the PSO tax and the Energy Commission’s 2017 report reveals a framing where 
the prosthetic devices that enabled wind turbines were viewed as distorting to the 
market. Although the Subsidy Burden quality was certainly present in the Global 
Advantage frame, it was not as strongly combined with the Market Distortion 
quality. This is a significant difference. In isolation, the Subsidy Burden quality 
frames wind power as a cost to the Danish state and industries. This burden is 
measurable and can be compared to similar costs. To exemplify this, I have 
collected the data on subsidies, R&D grants and connection costs for the years 1979-
2017 in Appendix A4 and estimated approximate added direct expenditures in the 
years where data is not fully available. The estimated average annual cost to the 
Danish society for enabling the existing wind power industry and constructing the 
5.5 GW domestic fleet comes to be less than DKK 1.7 billion (Appendix A4) 187. 
Even in recent years, where annual investment levels are around 5 bn., it is still less 
than 0.5% of the public budget expenditures (Public Budget expenditures in 2016: 
1105 bn. DKK) (DST, 2017). This number can be compared against annual wind 
turbine industry exports of DKK 55 billion (2016), and total tax payments from 
Danish-registered companies and employees in the wind turbine industry of DKK 13 
billion per year (DWIA, 2017a, p. 16).  
However, once the Market Distortion quality is inscribed into the object of wind 
power, this calculation cannot be made. In that case, calculations are based on the 
assumption that companies and jobs in the wind turbine industry would have existed 
elsewhere in Denmark if wind power had not been supported. In the words of 
Financial Minister Thor Pedersen in 2002, Denmark could just as well have 
supported a banana industry (Dahlager & Rothenborg, 2007, p. 82). The 
understanding of markets underneath the Market Distortion quality is thus that the 
state cannot gain Industrial benefits by supporting selected industries. This quality 
also is prevalent in the Energy Commission’s framing of wind power as well as the 
government’s subsequent move towards technology neutrality in auctions.  
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 I acknowledge that this is a rough estimate, but I have yet to see a more accurate number 
performed by other sources. This is surprising as there appears to be many actors who mention that 
wind power has been subsidized since 1979. I am aware that I am now performing the same 
exercises as I am analyzing. But this is done for the purpose of bringing clarity to the point of 
references used by actors who bring salience to the Subsidy Burden quality.    
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Other Qualities: CC Mitigation and Aesthetics  
CC Mitigation continued to be acknowledged and certainly was framed as a more 
Salient quality than in the Market Distortion valuation frame, but it was not as 
intrinsically coupled to wind power’s value as in the Global Advantage valuation 
frame. This is because the Subsidy Burden frame is a frame where neither the 
Market-coalition nor the Global-coalition has complete dominance. The Market-
coalition have a large framing power as it holds the Ministry of Energy, but there are 
strong human and material actors in the Global Advantage Valuation Network that 
resists a translation like the one that happened in 2002. It is after the Paris 
Agreement not possible to dismiss CC Mitigation as it was done in 2002. 
Furthermore, the technological competitive costs of wind power were crystallized by 
the two large reports in 2014 and by the bid-prices on offshore wind during the 
Subsidy Burden period.   
Another unique change during this moment of valuation was the shift in the 
Aesthetics quality from non-significant to having a negative impact on the valuation 
of wind power. The Near-shore wind projects were nearly cancelled, with Aesthetics 
as a key argument once it could no longer be claimed that the projects were too 
expensive. Near the end of the period, several municipalities completely halted 
construction of onshore turbines, arguably due to local opposition or health 
concerns. So the Aesthetics quality appears to be growing in salience when it comes 
to near-shore and onshore wind power.  
 
7.4.2 The Subsidy Burden Valuation Networks 
In this sub-section, I map the coalitions of human actors and briefly summarize the 
material changes during the Subsidy Burden period in terms of physical capacity 
expansion and legislation.  
 
Shifting Coalitions Fight for Dominance 
During the Subsidy Burden period, two coalitions fought for dominance over the 
framing of wind power. Thus, it was not a single coalition that controlled the 
Subsidy Burden valuation frame, but a combination of actors from the market 
coalition and the global coalition. Green is still the Global-coalition and Blue is the 
Market-coalition. Gray equals actors that are neutral. The visualization follows 
hereafter in figure 36 (GBA).   
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Figure 36: Key actors during the SB period; green: Global-Coalition; blue: Market-coalition. 
 
During the Subsidy Burden period, a coalition once again formed around a 
combination of energy sector incumbents and actors from proximate fields. The new 
Minister of Energy, Utilities and Climate, Lars Christian Lilleholt, had formerly 
represented gas and coal plants and had strong ties with the local industry on Funen. 
This coalition focused primarily on reducing taxes; it formed a campaign to abolish 
the PSO tax and eliminate renewable energy goals that were destabilizing the 
business case of these proxy-field actors. Notably, two powerful actors, Danish 
Energy and Danish Industry had supported wind power during the Global 
Advantage period, but moved toward a middle position during the Subsidy Burden 
period. Both supported the abolishment of the PSO-tax, but opposed the cancellation 
of near-shore wind projects. Although they supported the expansion of wind power 
in theory, given the choice between that and lower taxes, they appear to choose 
lower taxes. De Konservative adopted a similar split position. They were willing to 
destabilize the world that had been constructed during the 1990s by eliminating the 
PSO tax and onshore wind subsidies, which in 2008 had been re-modeled after the 
system used in the 1990s. They did, however, support the established Climate 
Council in 2014, stop Venstre’s proposed re-introduction of Bjoern Lomborg in 
2015, and uphold plans to construct near-shore wind turbines in 2016. In some 
instances, the right-wing party De Konservative worked with the left-wing parties to 
form a new red-green majority, but they were not willing to enact what would be 
considered stretch and transform legislation, such as that which established optimum 
framework conditions for wind power during the Climate Solution period188. The 
wind turbine industry found it difficult to find coalition partners across the middle of 
                                                          
188
 One example of this is that De Konservative do not fight for the Wind turbine industry’s 
proposal of holding technology-specific auctions for wind power.  This is despite the fact that the 
proposal to hold technology-neutral auctions emerged from the Energy Commission which was 
exclusively selected by the party Venstre, and therefore not a commission which De Konservative 
had any influence over.  
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the political spectrum for onshore wind, but the large industry that emerged during 
the Global Advantage period enabled the global coalition to maintain stability 
around approved offshore and near-shore wind projects. This stability also emerged 
due to increasingly larger Industrial benefits generated by the sector; thus, it is not 
guaranteed that similar stability could be expected from this factor in other 
countries.  
It was difficult for the Market-coalition to maintain the framing that wind power’s 
devices were a burden to Danish society, as the wind industry was so pervasive in 
Denmark relative to the country’s size. This also was recognized by Venstre, but 
applied mainly to results in the offshore wind sector. Moreover, a valuation drama 
unfolded regarding onshore wind and general research funds, especially in the fall 
2015. Massive cuts were enacted and the market-coalition exerted intense pressure 
to return to the Market Distortion valuation frame.  
 
Materiality during the Subsidy Burden Period 
There was a significant slow-down in onshore capacity expansion in 2015 and 2016 
due to a forecast for lower electricity prices and municipal opposition to onshore 
wind projects. The momentary surge in onshore construction during 2017 occurred 
because many developers were rushing to get their projects finished before the 25 
oere/KWh onshore subsidy scheme expired in February 2018. Since only one small 
technology-neutral auction was scheduled for late 2018, industry officials do not 
expect any notable onshore expansion in 2018 or 2019 (From, 2018). Offshore 
capacity expansion also was stagnant during these years, but a 1.3 GW expansion 
was planned for 2018–2021 based on the energy agreement of 2012. All numbers in 
figure 37 are available in Appendix A.   
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Figure 37: Capacity expansion during the Subsidy Burden period. 
 
This period was an era in which the material frameworks of the Climate Solution 
period were disassembled. The PSO tax was abolished, R&D funds were cut, 
onshore wind subsidies were replaced with small technology-neutral auction tenders, 
and the “green pot” funding for municipalities which erected onshore projects was 
abolished. The only area with legislatively-mandated material expansion was test 
facilities for large-scale turbines. This corresponds well with the dominant 
coalition’s agreement that wind power’s value is derived primarily from the 
industry’s ability to create exports and jobs. 
 
7.4.3 Key Takeaways from the Subsidy Burden Period 
During the Subsidy Burden period, remnants of three former coalitions fought over 
the right to determine the value of wind power. The Market-coalition, comprised of 
Venstre, proximate sectors such as the Funen horticulture industry (tomatoes etc.) 
and right-wing newspapers, attempted to re-establish the calculative centers that had 
been dominant during the Market Distortion period.. However, the Market 
Distortion valuation frame was not reassembled, as Conservatives and two powerful 
private sector actors, Danish Energy and Danish Industry, still ascribed to the Global 
Advantage frame. The Subsidy Burden valuation frame thus was a paradoxical 
hybrid based on a few points of agreement between the Market-coalition and the 
Global-coalition. The remnants of the Climate-coalition, who also were part of the 
Global-coalition in the previous period, worked with the dominant coalition when 
possible. This concludes the five empirical analysis chapters. I will hereafter bring 
the Valuation frames and observations about networks into a general discussion. 
261 
8. DISCUSSION 
In this discussion, I summarize findings from my study of moments of valuation that 
demonstrate the historic role of valuation devices in the struggle to frame wind 
power as a worthwhile investment for Danish society. To address this overall 
problem statement, I answer research question 1 in this chapter:  
 
Research Question 1: Which valuation frames and devices have dominated in the 
history of Danish wind power, and which key qualities were used to produce wind 
power as a valuable societal investment or not? 
 
8.1. VALUATION FRAMES: QUALIFYING WIND POWER AS 
VALUABLE OR NOT 
During the Unique Supplement period, wind power was framed through the device 
of break-even prices relative to fuel import costs for steam plants. Although some 
technical calculations were based on physical properties of turbines, such as capacity 
factors and life expectancy, the metric that ultimately framed the value of wind 
power was a break-even price relative to costs of fuel to power steam plants. 
Although the Fuel- and Unique-coalition struggled over framings, they agreed that 
wind power was measured as a supplementary energy source which could decrease 
fuel import dependency and create jobs. The main difference was that the Fuel-
coalition framed wind power as creating problems for the energy system if 
implemented on a larger scale, while the Unique-coalition framed wind power as 
having a large Future Potential, if the technology was allowed to evolve. Hereafter 
follows the same five Valuation Frame shifts that have been visualized at the end of 
each of the empirical chapters. It is the same graphs as portrayed in Figures 13, 17, 
24, 30, and 35, but are here closer to create an overview for the summary. 
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Figure 38: The historic (ES: 1891-1973) and the first modern (US: 1974-1989) Valuation 
Frame. 
 
During the Climate Solution period, the CC Mitigation quality was decisive in the 
positive valuation of wind power, as evidenced by the new calculations of Energi 
2000 and Energi 21 in 1990 and 1996 respectively, the first energy plans aimed at 
reducing CO2 emissions. Once CO2 emission could be counted, various future 
scenarios justified the expansion of wind power as valuable due to how much CO2 
could be removed by building wind power instead of coal and gas plants. A new 
device for measuring technological costs and performance, levelised cost of energy 
(LCOE), also was introduced in this period. This metric combines Technology Cost 
with energy output and enables comparisons between wind power and other energy 
sources; for example, in the AKF 1996 report, an estimated cost of damage per ton 
of emitted CO2 was incorporated into the final LCOE result for coal and gas. CO2 
thus was a significant factor in framing wind power as a valuable alternative to fossil 
fuels. During this period, wind power was framed as indispensably valuable as a 
climate change mitigation solution; even though it was more expensive on 
Technology Cost. The combined set of qualities framed it as an independent energy 
source with a large Future Potential. 
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Figure 39: The first (US: 1974-1989) and second (CS: 1990-2001) Valuation Frame. 
 
A significant shift in valuation occurred during the Market Distortion period (2002–
2006), as LCOE and the included CO2 emission costs and Technology Cost were 
disregarded as devices for valuing wind power. Instead, wind power’s societal value 
was based on economic calculations of subsidies, taxes and their effects on society 
rooted in the neoclassic economic doctrine of perfect markets. These calculations are 
evident in reports published by the DEC and the IMV. The valuation device shifted 
away from comparing the emissions and technical costs of wind, gas and coal 
power, and toward alleged distortive effects of supporting a given technology. The 
dominant valuation frame in this period was that wind power destroys value, since 
market distorting subsidies and energy taxes far outweigh its ability to mitigate 
climate change, which can be solved less expensively through what was framed as 
naturally efficient quota markets. Whereas the Climate Solution frame had focused 
on how emissions could be mitigated by implementing the technically best suited 
expansion plan from an engineering system perspective, the Market Distortion frame 
focused on how Denmark could either trade or build capacity to only meet the 
required EU CO2 targets in the cheapest possible way. In this framing, subsidies 
payed out to wind turbines became a matter of concern, and since an EU emissions 
quota system was under construction (to be launched in 2005), wind power was 
framed as an expensive way to reduce CO2 emissions. Proponents of this framing 
believed it would be less expensive, and therefore preferable, to buy carbon offsets 
on the new quota market than to build the infrastructure required to significantly 
expand wind power capacity. Wind power was thus more expensive, and required 
subsidies and taxes to stabilize its world in the prevailing market architecture. 
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However, unlike carbon offsets, the material construction of physical wind turbines 
actually lowers CO2 emissions when operating. 
 
 
Figure 40: The second (CS: 1990-2001) and third (MD: 2002-2006) Valuation Frame. 
 
From 2007 to 2014, wind power began to be framed as a Global Advantage, and the 
Market Distortion valuation frame slowly became less dominant. This moment of 
valuation was not as abrupt as the 2002 framing, but occurred over a period of years, 
as international focus on climate change mitigation intensified and export potential 
for the wind power industry increased significantly. Minister of Climate and Energy, 
Connie Hedegaard, worked hard to ensure the COP15 summit was held in 
Copenhagen. Combined with renewed attention to the advantages of Energy 
Independence, De Konservative and members of Venstre began to engage in broad 
collaboration with the left wing parties to promote wind power. Once again, CO2 
emissions were used to estimate the value of wind power, and LCOE was used to 
compare sources of energy. Technology Cost became a positive impact quality as 
onshore wind became competitive with coal power, and potential for large-scale 
offshore wind farms became salient along with the considerable contributions to 
Danish exports. The Global Advantage valuation frame was maintained by a broad 
group of actors, who agreed that wind power was highly valuable as a climate 
solution for the world, as well as a path to become energy independent and build a 
key export industry.  
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Figure 41: The third (MD: 2002-2006) and fourth (GA: 2007-2014) Valuation Frame. 
 
Between 2015 and 2017, the paradoxical Subsidy Burden valuation frame emerged, 
wherein the positive impacts of acknowledged record-low Technology Cost for wind 
power were outweighed by the negative impacts of the Subsidy Burden quality. This 
is evidenced by a return to calculations on tax-costs for consumers and the tax 
burden for proximate field sectors. Although wind power was framed as a highly 
competitive technology with significant Industrial benefits, these qualities are 
counterbalanced by concerns that consumers and proximate industries were 
burdened through taxes and market-distorting wind power subsidies. The CC 
Mitigation quality still had an impact, but not as highly salient in this framing as it 
had been. Instead of being among the decisive qualities that justified wind power 
expansion, as seen in the Climate Solution and Global Advantage frames, in the 
Subsidy Burden frame it was merely part of a larger picture presenting an Industrial 
opportunity.  Whereas the Global Advantage frame was the most stable during the 
studied period, the Subsidy Burden frame was the most narrowly assembled, and 
was already showing signs of destabilization in 2017.  
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Figure 42: The fourth (GA: 2007-2014) and fifth (SB: 2015-2017) Valuation Frame. 
 
All of these Valuation Frames become especially interesting once they are observed 
together. Figure 43 (GBA) is a visualization of the dominant frames in each period 
and how they valued wind power, ranging from value-destroying to indispensably 
valuable, during the 40-year period from 1977 to 2017.189 The y-axis shows to what 
degree wind power was framed as valuable to Danish society, while the X-axis 
represents the 40 year period from 1977 to 2017 in 5-year intervals.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
189
 I am aware that two reports in the chapter on the Unique Supplement period predate 1977. 
However, my analysis reveals that the valuation would not be placed any differently on the figure 
for the early exploratory years of 1974–1976. I therefore plot the x-axis at 5-year intervals, 
beginning with 1977 and ending with 2017.  
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Figure 43: Overview of shifting valuation frames 1977–2017. 
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The Unique Supplement valuation frame elevated wind power from being an energy 
source not worth considering to being valuable for its supplementary benefits of 
Energy Independence and Industrial activity. After a failed destabilization attempt 
in the early 1990’s, the rules of the game changed, as CC Mitigation became a 
decisive quality in energy source investments. The Climate Solution valuation frame 
ascribed wind power the status of an indispensably valuable energy source during 
the mid- to late-1990s—that is, wind power expansion was considered a necessary 
societal investment to mitigate CO2 emissions. A successful destabilization attempt 
followed, and a completely different framing, Market Distortion, was assembled to 
frame wind power as value-destroying to society. Not only was wind power deemed 
not valuable, it was framed as a distortion of the free market in terms of technology 
selection, an expensive way of mitigating CO2 emissions, and a burden to other 
sectors.  
Beginning in 2007, wind power was framed as a highly valuable energy source, 
ushering in the Global Advantage frame. This frame was highly similar to the 
Climate Solution valuation frame, but differed by framing wind as valuable through 
more positive impact qualities (i.e., Energy Independence, Technology Cost). As 
such, the societal value of wind power was framed slightly less on the CC 
Mitigation imperative, and more on the global advantage to Denmark, Energy 
Independence and Industrial, which outweighed the negative impact of the still 
present negative quality, Subsidy Burden. The Subsidy Burden framing represents 
another attempt to destabilize wind power at the end of the study period. Beginning 
in 2015, wind power was framed as imposing a cost burden on proximate fields, and 
therefore not valuable. This valuation frame was a paradoxical hybrid between the 
Global Advantage and the Market Distortion valuation frames. It acknowledged the 
highly positive impact of the qualities Technology Cost and Industrial, but included 
the negative impacts of Subsidy Burden and Market Distortion qualities to frame 
wind power somewhere between a valuable and not valuable investment. Moreover, 
this framing distinguished between framing wind power as a valuable export, while 
it is simultaneously framed as a Subsidy Burden domestically. So while the 
Industrial quality of wind power is salient especially when it comes to offshore wind 
power, there is little-to-no value was assigned to expanding onshore wind power 
capacity in Denmark. Moreover, the Aesthetics quality, which was insignificant in 
the other framing, is for the first time salient enough to have an impact in the 
Subsidy Burden period, as seen through the stalled onshore build-out.  Figure 44 
(GBA) shows how the valuation frame periods correspond to the physical expansion 
of wind power in Denmark over the last 30 years. The numbers indicate wind power 
capacity installed and the arrows show the compound annual growth rate190, 
indicating the average annual expansion of wind turbine capacity over the analyzed 
period.  
                                                          
190
 Compound annual growth rate means that the percentage shown on the arrow equals the average 
expansion of wind power as a percentage of existing capacity that year. To put the numbers into 
perspective, one gigawatt of offshore wind provides power to roughly 900,000 Danish households.     
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Figure 44: Valuation periods and Danish wind power expansion 1987–2017. 
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Upon reading Figure 44, it is important to bear in mind that installations do not show 
in the graph until 1-3 years after an investment decision are taken on them. The 
capacity build-out in the years from 2002-2003 stems from wind power projects in 
planning during 2000-2001. Strong growth occurred during the first two periods, 
Unique Supplement and Climate Solution. Such growth is typical when a new 
technology is deployed, starting from zero, as was the case during the Unique 
Supplement period. However, the high annual expansion to an already large onshore 
fleet during the last years of Climate Solution period is significant. In contrast, new 
installations nearly came to a complete halt during the Market Distortion period in 
the early 2000s. Since this trend was not observed in other European countries, it 
does not appear to have been caused by a general slow-down in technological 
advancement. It also cannot be attributed to a general economic recession, as the 
Danish economy still grew during the period, especially from 2004-2006, which saw 
annual real-BNP growth above 2% (DST, 2018). The build-out gradually recovered 
during the Global Advantage period, and then slowed down slightly during the 
Subsidy Burden period. It remains to be seen how the Subsidy Burden period will 
end, and what framing will emerge or re-emerge thereafter. The remainders of the 
Market-coalition is finding it more difficult to stabilize their framing as the Global-
coalition are part of an even stronger valuation network, through the materiality of 
the low Technology Cost and growing Industrial benefits. Continued expansion 
during the Subsidy Burden period is however not only attributable to a decoupling 
of technology from the dominant framing. It is also a sign that the wind power 
proponent valuation network that was established in the Global Advantage period is 
finally beginning to take an incumbent position reflecting its share of production. 
Having discussed the frames and how expansion has evolved throughout the 
analyzed period, I turn my attention to the second half of research question 1 
regarding qualities used in the valuation of wind power.  
  
8.2. KEY QUALITIES USED IN THE VALUATION OF WIND 
POWER 
Initially, wind power was considered to be a marginal Fuel Supplement and framed 
as a valuable way to improve Energy Independence and create Industrial benefits 
through jobs and exports. During the Unique Supplement period, the first seven 
qualities were present: Environment, Black-out Risk, Aesthetics, Energy 
Independence, Industrial, Future Potential, and Fuel Supplement. Of these seven it 
was most notably three qualities, Fuel Supplement (negative impact), Energy 
Independence (Positive impact, especially in the 1970’s) and Industrial (Positive 
impact, especially in the 1980’s) that determined the valuation of wind power. 
During the Climate Solution period, wind power was evaluated as a stand-alone 
energy source and two qualities, Technology Cost and Back-up Capacity, replaced 
the Fuel Supplement quality. Moreover, CC Mitigation emerged and became the key 
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decisive quality in the dominant framing. Prior to the 1990, this quality was either 
absent from the framing or a component of the Environment quality in the specific 
case of the Unique-coalition’s framing. During the Market Distortion period from 
2002 to 2006, two new qualities emerged that negatively impacted the value of wind 
power—namely, Market Distortion and Subsidy Burden. Hereafter, I briefly discuss 
the 12 qualities in three subsections covering technical (5), environmental (3), and 
societal (4) qualities.      
 
8.2.1 Technical Qualities in Valuation 
Initially, wind power was valued based on a break-even price relative to fossil fels, 
and was only considered valuable as a supplement to a fossil fuel infrastructure, not 
as an energy source on its own. This changed during the Climate Solution period, as 
the two qualities of Technology Cost and Back-up Capacity replaced Fuel 
Supplement. Wind power was evaluated as a stand-alone energy source through the 
LCOE device, and thus was not seen as purely supplementary. Once this occurred, 
Back-up Capacity costs were explicitly calculated, but wind power was not framed 
as a risk factor in maintaining grid stability, as had earlier been the case through the 
Black-Out Risk quality. During the Unique Supplement period, concerns revolved 
around how much physical wind power capacity could be connected to the grid 
without threatening short- and medium-term stability, as exemplified by the 1983 
DEF report on overrun electricity.  This quality faded away during the 1990s, as the 
grid was still functioning well with more than 14% wind power penetration by the 
end of the decade.  
The Fuel Supplement quality which had disappeared during the Climate Solution 
period would reappear in 2002.  During the Market Distortion period, the Danish 
Economic Council framed wind power as not valuable as a stand-alone energy 
source. This was argued from the point of reference that wind power was built on 
top of an already adequate amount of energy production capacity fueled mainly by 
coal. The Market-coalition’s way of calculating was still present throughout the 
Global Advantage period, through the additional reports by the DEC, the 2009 
CEPOS report and partially in the use of the numbers in the 2014 Rockwool report, 
which counterfactually removed wind power from the Danish energy system191. The 
cost of wind power was then framed as an added expense to an otherwise 
functioning energy system. This is another example of calculating wind power as a 
Fuel Supplement, although it did not become part of the dominant valuation frame. 
                                                          
191
 Although the Rockwool Foundation may not has been as such a part of the Market-coalition, as 
the report also calculated Technology Cost, the way that the counterfactual number became the 
leading takeaway, illustrated how the entrenched meaning that wind power is an added cost to 
society still was present in the Global Advantage period.  
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This is one of the qualities made salient in opposition to wind power—namely, that 
due to its variability it cannot be considered more than a supplement.  
The fifth technical quality is Future Potential, which was especially prevalent 
during the first two periods. The ATV valuation network built their promising 
calculations for wind power on ambitious estimates for technical development, for 
example a 35% capacity factor for onshore wind. This was a highly ambitious point 
of reference as the deployed turbines of the 1980s were still small and not yet 
optimized on the energy output-side. But the Future Potential could more easily be 
envisioned during the Climate Solution period, as large-scale future possibilities 
emerged, the size of turbines grew from 0.5 MW to 2 MW, and the first offshore 
wind demonstration projects were built. During the Global Advantage period, 
Technology Cost dropped significantly for onshore wind, and signals indicated that 
offshore wind could follow a similar trajectory. In 2012, key actors in the offshore 
wind industry pledged to reduce Technology Cost below an LCOE level of 
€100/MWh by 2020. This was followed by a 2016 pledge to reduce LCOE below 
€80/MWh in 2025. However, as shown in the Subsidy Burden period, Technology 
Cost of offshore wind dropped significantly faster than expected, and in 2017 an 
independent IEA workgroup declared the 2025 goal to have already been achieved 
(IEA-RETD, 2017, p. 9). It thus appears that the Future Potential goals of previous 
have materialized for both onshore and offshore wind today.  
 
 8.2.2 Environmental Qualities in Valuation 
The Environment quality relates to local environmental benefits such as improved 
air quality, acid rain prevention, etc. These environmental benefits of better air 
quality and less risk of local environmental damage had an impact during the 
Unique Supplement period when the Unique-coalition fought against nuclear power. 
Although it was present in varying extents throughout all later framings, 
Environment was not a decisive quality in any of the five framings. It could however 
become decisive in the future as effects of climate change could come to have more 
local impacts even in western countries. One example could be that it would be 
more salient to calculate how much water an energy source uses to generate 
electricity. This has not been part of the framings so far, but has in recent years 
received more attention from international organizations such as the UN and the IEA 
(IEA, 2012a, 2016b; UN, 2016).     
CC Mitigation, on the other hand, was a highly decisive quality in the valuation 
frame in the 1990s, when Denmark included a CO2 reduction target in its energy 
plan for the first time. Wind power was framed as valuable throughout the CC 
Mitigation quality due to its ability to generate emission-free electricity. The value 
associated with this ability was then negated during the Market Distortion period, 
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when carbon trading markets were emerging. The Market-coalition argued that wind 
power was an inefficient way to reduce CO2 compared to buying carbon offsets. 
During the Global Advantage period, the CC Mitigation quality began to have a 
positive impact once again as Denmark hosted the climate summit and established 
both a Climate Commission and later a Climate Council, which served to keep 
Denmark on track towards fulfilling long-term climate goals. During the Subsidy 
Burden period, the new government called for Denmark to lower its ambitions, and 
decided to scrap a number of climate goals. Despite this effort to down prioritize 
climate goals, CC Mitigation remained a somewhat salient quality, as international 
summits and Global-coalition actors kept it in the frame.  
The last environmental quality is quite different from the other two, who are more 
closely intertwined. The Aesthetics quality was present during the Unique 
Supplement period and calculated during the Climate Solution period to account for 
a very small and insignificant extra societal cost associated with erecting turbines. 
Starting in this period and during the following two, there have been small local 
groups of citizens, who have framed onshore wind farms as ruining the landscape, 
and thus not valuable. This quality has however not been significant enough to have 
any impact until the Subsidy Burden period. In this period, near-shore wind farms 
would be contested, while onshore wind farms would be vetoed by churches, or 
stalled by local politicians fearing retribution from their municipal constituency. 
Thus, the Aesthetics quality could have a future impact in the Danish struggle over 
the valuation of wind power, even though it was a marginal factor during four of the 
five valuation periods. 
 
8.2.3 Societal Qualities in Valuation 
There are four societal qualities present in the valuation of Danish wind power 
during the study period:  the Industrial and Energy Independence qualities had a 
positive impact, while the Market Distortion and Subsidy Burden qualities had a 
negative impact. The Industrial quality covers the job and export benefits of having 
a wind turbine industry, and is one of the few qualities that is included in all five 
valuation frames. It was a key factor driving the Fuel-coalition’s engagement with 
wind power during the Unique Supplement period; even during the Market 
Distortion period, the Industrial quality had a positive impact on the valuation 
frame, albeit a slight one. The Industrial quality was among the decisive qualities of 
the Global Advantage period as the Danish wind turbine industry consolidated and a 
large export market opened up. Since job growth is among the strongest 
“currencies” for policymakers, broad valuation networks tend to form around it.  
Energy Independence is the quality related to the value of long-term independence 
from foreign suppliers of energy fuel or technology. The 1973 oil crisis increased 
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the salience of this quality as wind power was framed as a way to decrease 
Denmark’s dependence on foreign fuel suppliers. This quality faded to the 
background during the Climate Solution period and even more so during the Market 
Distortion period. However, following the Danish Cartoon Crisis of 2005, awareness 
of the risks of dependence on Middle Eastern states for oil and gas increased once 
again. This increased salience of the Energy Independence quality helped usher in 
the Global Advantage period. This quality is evident in both Prime Minister Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen’s 2008 green speech, and in the 2010 Climate Commission report. 
Both the 1973 oil crisis and the 2005 cartoon crisis highlighted the advantage of 
domestic power production, and the Energy Independence quality had a decisive 
positive impact in framing wind power as valuable to Denmark, kick-starting these 
two periods. It is worth noting that in the three periods which did not follow after 
some geopolitical crisis, the quality of Energy Independence appeared to fade or 
completely disappear from the framing.  
The Market Distortion quality was introduced during the period named after this 
framing that lasted from 2002 to 2006. It is a quality which has a highly negative 
impact on the valuation of wind power in three ways: (a) the prosthetic devices of 
energy taxes distort consumption; (b) wind power subsidies, from a neo-classical 
economics perspective, displace jobs that would have been created in other sectors; 
and (c) wind power subsidies, from a neo-classical economics perspective, displace 
other technologies that theoretically could have emerged in a “perfect” market192. 
Although members of the DEC were the main proponents of the Market Distortion 
framing, it also influenced the Fogh government’s exploration of quota purchases 
for CO2 reductions. The Market Distortion quality has a game-changing impact, 
since it both decreases the positive impact of the Industrial quality, and transformed 
the positive impact of the CC Mitigation quality into a small negative impact within 
the valuation frame. Once wind power’s value to society was framed as sub-optimal 
for violating free market principles, the market-coalition brought forward the 
framing that wind powers CC Mitigation quality was actually slightly negative, as 
CO2 reductions theoretically could be achieved less expensively through 
procurement of emission quotas.   
Although the Market Distortion quality is related to the Subsidy Burden quality, I 
treat them separately because the Market Distortion quality builds on a very specific 
understanding of a “self-adjusting economy” that emerged in Denmark during the 
early 2000’s and then again during the Subsidy Burden period. In this last period, 
the quality had a negative impact on the valuation of wind power as the 2017 energy 
                                                          
192
 Explaining the flawed and problematic logic behind the neoclassical idea of naturally occurring 
perfect markets is unfortunately beyond the scope of this thesis. Readers who are interested in the 
topic are encouraged to seek out one of the many excellent publications on this topic (Chang, 2011; 
Davies, 2017; Mirowski, 2013). Specifically to the topic of energy markets can be re-designed to 
accommodate the needed transition, it is worth exploring the Danish research project Innovative 
Re-making of Energy Markets and Business Models (IREMB, 2017a).   
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commission report proposed technology-neutral auctions based on the notion that a 
supposed “neutral market” would choose the best solution. In this line of argument, 
a specific value ascribed to wind power would distort the markets choice and 
therefore render it less valuable. This quality is not present in the other three 
valuation frames, since the dominant valuation networks did not ascribe to this 
understanding of markets. It is thus a fairly new phenomenon that appears to be 
confined to the Market-coalition.  
The Subsidy Burden quality, which is used to value wind based on the tax burden 
borne by Danish consumers and industries, also first emerged during the Market 
Distortion period. This quality emerged strongly in the Market Distortion period, 
reflected in statements such as “money blowing out of the state coffers,” and the 
notion that the overall competitiveness of Danish industry was weakened by 
excessive taxes. Once it was introduced, it continued to be present during the Global 
Advantage period, when the center-left government implemented tax reduction 
measures for heavy industry in 2014. It did however not outweighed the positive 
impact qualities enough to change the dominant valuation frame, namely that wind 
power was a global advantage for Denmark. The Subsidy Burden quality was, 
however, highly salient during the period named after it, wherein the preceding 
energy minister declared it his highest priority to reduce or remove the PSO tax to 
especially help the horticulture industry, cement producers and members of other 
energy-intensive industries. Several calculations were based on the cost of PSO-tax, 
yet competitive technical costs were decoupled in discussions of wind power’s 
value. Subsidy costs were calculated separately, and the history of subsidies for 
wind power was highlighted as a matter of concern.  
This concludes my summary of the 12 qualities used to frame the societal value of 
wind power throughout the 43 years of valuation struggles193. Hereafter I discuss the 
valuation networks and actor coalitions in the valuation struggle of Danish wind 
power.  
 
8.3. VALUATION NETWORKS AND THE MAIN POLITICAL 
PARTY COALITIONS 
It is not within the scope of this thesis to map the power relationships among every 
single actor involved in wind power valuation, but it is relevant to map the political 
coalitions in power during each period since the energy market is highly politically 
                                                          
193
 Later in this chapter, I discuss insights associated with the development of key qualities. In 
Chapter 9, I discuss how some of the qualities with highly negative impacts (i.e., Fuel Supplement, 
Market Distortion, Subsidy Burden and Aesthetics) can be mitigated by an actor representing a 
challenger energy source, and how the positive impact qualities (CC Mitigation, Environment, 
Industrial, Energy Independence and Technology Cost) can be made more salient. 
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regulated. I therefore focus this part of my discussion of valuation networks on the 
four major political parties responsible for implementing energy plans and laws 
throughout the study period. Figure 45 visualizes shifts in the parliamentary power 
each of the four political parties had over policy decisions related to wind power. 
The y-axis reflects the power of a party, ranging from “in control” if it had the 
decisive votes to enact its valuation of wind power or influence through control of 
the energy ministry, and “outside influence” if it was not involved in wind power 
legislation. Between the two anchor points is the “in coalition” point, which signals 
the degree to which a political party was involved in political coalitions that shaped 
wind power policies. Such a map can of course never give a complete picture of the 
parliamentary power play, but I hope that it can help to visualize power relations in 
the period. Note that I use the Political parties’ logo’s to represent them. A = 
Socialdemokratiet (Social Democratic Party), B = Radikale Venstre (Danish Social 
Liberal Party), V = Venstre (Venstre – The Liberal Party of Denmark), C = Det 
Konservative Folkeparti / De Konservative (Conservatives). All logos are used 
under recognition that they are owned by the respective party organizations.  
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Figure 45: Power relationships between the four political actors 1977-2017. 
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As shown in Figure 45, with a few exceptions, wind power has not enjoyed 
bipartisan support; rather, it has been affected by dramatic shifts in coalitions of 
parliamentary dominance. This observation is not unique to wind power; in other 
studies, scholars have confirmed this phenomenon in the context of broader climate 
and environmental policy (Danielsen, 2015; Karnøe, 2012). The Radikale Venstre 
benefitted from collaborating with the left wing in the 1970s and 1980s, and thus 
found itself in a more powerful position than the other three parties, which all 
depended on votes from Radikale Venstre lawmakers. This was how the red-green 
majority was formed, which passed important legislation such as the law to abolish 
nuclear power. As shown in Figure 45, Radikale Venstre was the controlling party in 
the red-green majority that set the dominant framing near the end of the Unique 
Supplement period. After a failed destabilization attempt by a valuation network led 
by Conservative minister of business Anne Birgitte Lundholt, Socialdemocratic 
Minister of Environment and Energy, Svend Auken, would continue along the path 
set forth by Radikale Venstre Minister of Energy, Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen, in 1990. 
Capitalizing on momentum from Bilgrav-Nielsen’s energy plan Energi 2000 and the 
red-green majority, Socialdemokratiet would actively shape the dominant framing of 
wind power during the Climate Solution period of the 1990’s. Serving as a powerful 
spokesman, Auken continued to establish the Ministry of Environment and Energy 
as a calculative center by developing devices to calculate CO2 emissions reductions. 
This set the wheels in motion for an even higher valuation of wind power by 
incorporating CO2 emissions into the calculations determining the build-out parts 
for Denmark’s infrastructure. 
In 2002, the dominant Climate Solution frame was destabilized as the calculative 
centers within the Ministry of Environment and Energy was dismantled. Former 
calculative practices were replaced with neoclassical calculations based on the 
qualities of Market Distortion and Subsidy Burden. The Venstre party drove this 
new valuation of wind power by cancelling offshore wind farm projects, introducing 
uncertainty in the onshore market and establishing new calculative centers to form 
the Market-coalition. This coalition would lose its foothold in the valuation struggle 
in 2007, as several actors would begin to form a Global-coalition. Following 
Denmark’s 2005 cartoon crisis, the Danish prime minister had become occupied 
with the value of Energy Independence. Furthermore, when it was announced that 
the 2009 COP15 meeting would be held in Copenhagen, CC Mitigation became 
salient once again, breaking ground for De Konservative to drive the creation of a 
broad energy agreement in 2008. In 2011, the keys to government changed hands, 
and Radikale Venstre reclaimed the ministry related to energy. Building on the 
bilateral focus on energy, the Global-coalition passed the historic energy agreement 
of 2012. During the Global Advantage period, all four parties were either in control 
or in coalition.194 Finally, during the Subsidy Burden period, Venstre enacted a 
                                                          
194
  It is however important to note that these political negotiations are about prioritizing between 
which energy sources the parties find to be most valuable. When seen through this lens, Venstre 
generally prioritized negotiations for biomass and biogas, and only reluctantly supported the 
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larger number of political changes from the position of the energy ministry, but due 
to De Konservative’s collaboration with the left wing, Venstre was not solely in 
control of wind power policy. The Subsidy Burden valuation frame is what the 
market coalition could get through in a field, where a strong Global Advantage 
valuation network resisted most destabilization attempts.  
Radikale Venstre emerges as the most influential of the four political parties during 
the Unique Supplement period, and was identified by key actors as an important ally 
in introducing wind power into the public energy discussion. Socialdemokratiet then 
took control of energy policy through Auken’s new calculative center in the 
powerful Environment and energy ministry. Radikale Venstre was still involved as a 
coalition partner with Socialdemokratiet at that time, but they were not the main 
drivers of policy. Venstre and De Konservative did not occupy a significant role 
during these two first periods. However, Venstre finally gained an opportunity to 
steer energy policy themselves, when they enacted a new dominant framing after the 
change in parliamentary power in November 2001. The Market Distortion valuation 
frame was driven by the newly formed Market-coalition, which dismantled the 
climate-coalitions centers of calculation. De Konservative played a larger role from 
2007 onwards, as Minister of Climate and Energy, Connie Hedegaard, gained more 
political power and managed to obtain bipartisan support for the expansion of wind 
power. When governmental power shifted again in 2011, the new Radikale Venstre 
energy minister Martin Lidegaard built on the parliamentary collaboration around 
wind power to negotiate a historic 2012 energy agreement. The Subsidy Burden 
period that followed was defined by Venstre attempting to construct a valuation 
frame focused on subsidy costs of wind power. This framing was opposed on several 
occasions by the Global-coalition. So although Venstre was at the center of the 
remaining Market-coalition and had set forth the dominant framing, the valuation 
network of cheap wind power and a large industry that generated exports and jobs 
made it difficult for the Market-Coalition to keep their new Subsidy Burden 
valuation frame stable. 
Three periods were defined by collaboration across the political spectrum but to 
different extents. During the Unique Supplement period, there was some 
collaboration over wind power policies, but Radikale Venstre was in a key position 
of control. During the Global Advantage period from 2007 to 2014, the De 
Konservative and Radikale Venstre parties each played central role; overall, this 
period was defined by a large degree of collaboration. Similar to the parliamentary 
situation in the 1980s for Radikale Venstre, De Konservative were able to drive 
                                                                                                                                        
expansion of wind power in 2008 and 2012 agreements. This is seen through their initial proposal 
for the agreement in 2008, which did not include a plan to expand offshore wind power capacity, 
and their negotiation position in 2012, where they generally advocated for less expansion. There are 
also differences when it comes to long-term planning versus short term target setting. Venstre is the 
only one of the four parties that did not join the 2014 agreement to establish the Climate Council to 
keep Denmark on track towards its 2050 goals.  
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collaboration with the left wing during the Subsidy Burden period, as seen in the fall 
of 2016, when they opposed the Venstre government to save near-shore projects. 
In contrast, the Climate Solution and Market Distortion periods were dominated by 
one side of the political spectrum, with the other side almost completely excluded 
from influence. For most of the Climate Solution period, Venstre and De 
Konservative did not significantly influence the valuation of wind power. What little 
influence they did exercise was in opposition to the expansion of wind power; 
members of the Venstre party in particular opposed the subsidization of proposed 
new offshore wind farms. Similarly, Radikale Venstre and Socialdemokratiet are 
outside of influence from 2002-2006, with the exception of a 2004 agreement, 
wherein Venstre and De Konservative were forced to re-open a political agreement.   
  
8.3.1 Broader Valuation Networks Involved in the Danish Wind Power Struggle 
The four political parties were not the only actors in the valuation networks involved 
in framing the value of wind power, however. The utilities interest organization DEF 
(DEF during the first two periods, DE in the latter three periods) is a private 
incumbent actor that played a major role throughout the five analyzed periods. 
During the first period, DEF functioned as an almost exclusive knowledge center, 
and during the later three periods, it formed an influential coalition with Danish 
Industry, the industry’s interest organization. Danish Industry did not participate in 
the valuation struggle until around 2000, but played an increasingly significant role 
during the last two periods, when it and DE served as the go-to sources for 
evaluations of government policy. These two actors valued wind power higher 
during the last two periods, as if to counter the Market-coalition, who had taken a 
strong oppositional stance to wind power.  
The original challenger coalition emerged during the Unique Supplement period, 
when grassroots movements aligned with ATV academics and turbine-builders to 
gain a foothold in the periphery of the first two energy plans. During the Climate 
Solution period, some incumbent utilities and this Unique-coalition began to bridge 
the wide divide between them. Auken established a strong calculative center within 
the government, having the power to require the utilities to research more in 
renewable energy and establish offshore wind farms. The valuation network that was 
built around the new calculative center in Auken’s ministry was not confined to new 
ways of calculating, however. It also encompassed CO2 taxation and a mandated 
build-out of 750 MW offshore wind power in the form of five large-scale wind 
farms. But this changed in 2002, when the powerful calculative centers within the 
Environment and Energy ministry were dismantled and energy became a subdivision 
under the business ministry. The climate-coalition lost their ally in the government, 
and wind power subsidies and market frameworks were problematized. This brought 
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the expansion of wind power capacity almost to a complete halt for five years. In 
addition to dismantling the existing calculative center, Prime Minister Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen (V) created the market-coalitions new calculative centers such as the 
IMV institute and encouraged the formation of the privately funded think tank 
CEPOS195.  
Actors in the challenger valuation network that once were on the periphery began to 
become more powerful as the wind industry went through a number of 
consolidations during the early 2000s.  The industry began to contribute 
significantly to Danish exports, and large utilities merged to form a global 
powerhouse in offshore wind power, Dong Energy. By this time, the Danish wind 
turbine manufacturers had consolidated into two global powerhouses, Siemens and 
Vestas. The influence of industry thus became more difficult to displace and a 
Global-coalition formed from climate-coalition actors, and actors who were 
previously neutral or market-coalition aligned such as De Konservative, Danish 
Industry and Danish Energy. The difference between the Market Distortion and the 
Subsidy Burden periods show how weakened the remaining Market-coalition actors 
were by 2015. In this latter period, this coalition has fewer actors, as it comprised of 
Venstre, Boersen, JP, Berlingske and select industrial actors from proximate fields. 
These actors especially emphasize the Subsidy Burden to other sectors and attempt 
to drastically impair existing frameworks and capacity expansion plans. This narrow 
valuation network disregarded the Global-coalition’s calculative centers, such as 
when the climate council was labelled as “biased”, and a new commission for 
energy instead was appointed. Despite heavy criticism, future onshore subsidies 
were re-designed as technology-neutral auctions and the budget for energy research 
was cut in half. Unlike during the Market Distortion period, it has during the 
Subsidy Burden period only been possible for the Market-coalition to partially 
construct a new valuation network. The market-coalition has mainly been occupied 
with disassembling the material actors established in the valuation networks 
reaching all the way back to the Climate Solution period, but also the Global 
Advantage. This is seen through the changes to onshore subsidies, the abolishment 
of the PSO-tax and the changes of goals going forward. But the Subsidy Burden 
valuation network met significant resistance to this framing, and several planned 
changes did not come to fruition.  
 
                                                          
195 CEPOS did not deal with energy policy immediately, but in later periods maintained the 
focus on the Market Distortion quality.  
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8.4. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VALUATION FRAMES AND 
VALUATION NETWORKS  
The next question to ask is how the relation between valuation frames and valuation 
networks form around the various energy sources, as it is central to understand who 
decides what gets counted196.  Throughout the history of wind power, there has been 
a strong focus on technical qualities and demand for wind power to reach grid 
parity197. Since wind power became the cheapest available technology to build, 
proponents of wind power must focus on which other qualities are used to either 
strengthen or destabilize wind power. This study has shown that qualities related to 
the technological costs of wind power do not solely determine which valuation 
frames become dominant. The power of political party coalitions also determines 
part of the framing of societal value. Sociologist of valuation, Marion Fourcade 
similarly commented on whether or not superior performance on the technology cost 
metric such as LCOE could explain the success of a given technology:   
 
“In particular, I show that the mere availability of certain economic 
technologies does not guarantee their performative effects for the simple 
reasons that these technologies may not muster enough institutional and 
political support or that they may not resonate enough with the cultural 
claims they are supposed to represent”. (Fourcade, 2011, p. 1724) 
 
Similarly, this study reveals that performative effects are not guaranteed. The wind 
turbine industry has adopted LCOE as the yardstick for comparison to other energy 
sources, and is now ahead of fossil fuel technologies in terms of Technology Cost. 
But as can be seen in the present study, wind power can be re-framed to appear as a 
non-valuable investment through several devices other than LCOE.  
 
Despite significant technological performance improvements during the Climate 
Solution period, wind power capacity expansion was still brought to a near-complete 
halt during the Market Distortion period. Even in the Subsidy Burden framing, wind 
power was recognized as superior to conventional fossil fuel technologies in terms 
of Technology Cost, but not necessarily deemed valuable to the coalition in power. 
As Fourcade explained during a personal interview, the ongoing need to quantify 
                                                          
196
 An example of this can be found in the forthcoming article “Framing the Deal Framing the Deal 
for Hinkley Point C in the UK: Performing political valuation of economic reality for new nuclear 
power” (H. B. Mortensen & Karnøe, 2018 Forthcoming) wherein “baseload” is highlighted by a 
dominant coalition as a necessary quality for the Hinkley Point C nuclear plant. If the UK energy 
system can function reliably without Hinkley Point C, the power plant’s framed value of providing 
assurance against the negative impact of the Black-out Risk quality is diminished.  
197
 Grid Parity has either been defined as cheaper production costs than electricity prices or cheaper 
production costs than competing electricity sources. I discuss this further in Chapter 9: Insights.  
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intangible characteristics into costs can be an attempt to align imagined policies with 
understandings of the market’s construction.  
 
“You could not say that you have the policy and then you value; it is 
actually reverse. It is because you value in a certain way that you can 
imagine the policy, because then the policy makes economic 
sense….When it [i.e., nature] is priceless, it has no price and therefore 
you can’t advocate for it in a way that is relevant. Basically, there are 
two possible ways to advocate for environmental policies. One is, you 
just do it because it is common sense to do it [e.g., precautionary banning 
of fracking in Europe]…the other way is to put a value on more and 
more stuff”. (Interview 12: Fourcade, quote 1)    
 
As explained by Fourcade, it can be the case that the valuation networks in power 
already have a policy goal in mind and then they mobilize devices to realize this 
goal. In this study of wind power, it is clear that valuation networks mobilized 
“certain economic technologies” to assemble valuation frames that enact wind 
power as either valuable or not valuable to society. This relationship applies to the 
Climate Solution period; in the 1990’s, the dominant valuation network framed CO2 
emissions as an unacceptable byproduct of the Danish energy system, shaping the 
new valuation frame.  
Likewise, the relationship is strongly apparent in the correlation between the 
Market-coalition and the Market Distortion and the Subsidy Burden valuation 
frames. This coalition framed the prosthetic devices that enable wind power as 
preventing the natural emergence of theoretically efficient market solutions, thereby 
creating a value-loss distinct from the quantifiable costs of direct subsidies. For 
example, during the Subsidy Burden period, even though near-shore turbines were 
auctioned off at significantly lower subsidy prices than expected, the dominant 
valuation network nonetheless framed these subsidies as too expensive. This shows 
how devices are mobilized to adapt to an entrenched meaning—namely, that wind 
power is too subsidized. Moreover, it is possible that the Market-coalition does not 
want wind power in the system at all as a matter of policy. This is never stated in the 
calculations, but whether or not it was the Subsidy Burden or the Aesthetics quality, 
all the presented conclusions appeared to point towards the same conclusion. It 
points towards a political coalition having agreed on a fate for a given project, and 
then adapting their valuation of it thereafter. This relates to a recent finding of 
researchers Beunza and Ferraro (2018) about fields that deal with politically loaded 
issues, such as how to value mitigation of climate change, calculative devices will 
face. In such fields, “exclusive reliance on calculative devices for performative 
projects faces normative resistance and proves ineffective” (Beunza & Ferraro, 
2018, p. 3). This could indicate that a challenger technology cannot win over the 
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world with the right calculations alone. Until wind power becomes the standard 
investment (together with other renewable technologies), it can still be framed as 
expensive, since it is being built into an already established energy system of ‘sunk 
cost’ power plant investments. I will return to the discussion about sunk cost in the 
following Insights chapter.   
 
8.4.1 The Power of Valuation Networks 
A central finding of this study is that when studying wind power’s valuation history, 
there is no common logic behind the dominant framings of the valuation struggle 
and the evolution of the qualities and the points of reference used to ascribe value to 
them. During the first period, a number of negative impact qualities were associated 
with the technical elements of wind power and its integration into the energy system. 
However, there was an urgent need to achieve Energy Independence in the 1970s 
and the Industrial quality was highly salient because unemployment was a central 
matter of concern. This period followed a classic fit and conform structure, wherein 
wind power had to show that it could deliver the qualities required by the energy 
system. During the Climate Solution period, a new quality, CC Mitigation, was used 
to frame wind power as an indispensably valuable and necessary solution. The 
market thus shifted into stretch and transform mode, wherein the production of 
emission-free electricity became a priority for future build-out pathways. After this 
strong growth phase, there was a dramatic shift in valuation during the Market 
Distortion period. New calculative centers were created and two new qualities, 
Market Distortion and Subsidy Burden, came to define the dominant frame. In 
particular, actors used the Market Distortion quality to redefine how wind power 
was evaluated by dismantling the positive impacts of the CC Mitigation and 
Industrial qualities to reframe wind power as a value-destroying supplementary 
entity. This was followed by the Global Advantage period, when the CC Mitigation 
and Energy Independence qualities returned to salience. Technology Cost of wind 
power became competitive as the quality of Future Potential that was framed during 
the Unique Supplement and Climate Solution periods were realized.  Against this 
background, the last moment of valuation is one the most puzzling. A new 
government and a narrower coalition manages to temporarily impose a valuation 
frame with Subsidy Burden as the overall defining quality, yet while it includes 
technical qualities with highly positive impacts on the valuation of wind power.  
When the shift in valuation frames occurred in 2002, it was not as if the network 
around the Climate Solution frame disappeared; rather, it was placed outside of the 
network of influence. The grassroots and political players of the left-wing continued 
to criticize the directions taken, but they were temporarily unable to influence 
actions. Likewise, during the Global Advantage period, the Market-Coalition actor, 
the Danish Economic Council, continued to produce calculations showing how the 
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quota market was the most efficient way to mitigate CO2 emissions; another 
Market-coalition actor, CEPOS, and new actors, such as the Rockwool Foundation, 
also performed calculations that framed wind power as a supplement that added cost 
to the energy system. However, these calculations did not become part of the 
dominant framing. The dominant framing in a given period is thus not necessarily 
superior in terms of the qualities used and their points of reference; instead, it 
signaled that the valuation network upholding it had managed to impose its 
valuation on others: 
 
“A market implies the execution of these crossed calculations and 
includes only the agencies capable of performing them….Due to these 
asymmetries, the most powerful agencies are able to impose their 
valuations on others and consequently to impact strongly on the 
distribution of value”. (Çalışkan & Callon, 2010, p. 11,13)   
 
As seen in the most recent period, Subsidy Burden, the framework around wind 
power can still be somewhat destabilized in the Danish market. One explanation for 
this could be that the above described “imposed valuations” of wind power as 
subsidized and therefore expensive has turned into an entrenched meaning. Such an 
entrenched meaning can be upheld by “powerful agencies”, which in turn make it 
difficult for new calculations showing wind power as the technologically cheapest 
technology to impact the distribution of value. Even in the Global Advantage period, 
the DEA calculation showed wind power to be the cheapest technology to build, and 
was initially criticized by some actors as being unrealistic. Wind power is still at 
times framed as a supplement to the energy system, and thus a cost. The 2014 
Rockwool report provides an example of how the “business-as-usual” scenario is 
calculated. The calculation includes cost savings based on the assumption that wind 
power can be removed from the energy system without any significant impacts.  
The notion that wind power subsidies and taxes distort an otherwise ‘free’ electricity 
market is built on a number of misunderstandings. Electricity prices occur because 
of the political frameworks which are set to economize certain energy sources in a 
certain way. It may appear that there are some energy sources, which are not 
subsidized, but this is merely because the subsidies not as easily visible as the PSO-
tax. All energy sources have received subsidies or indirect contributions to their 
production costs (CAN-Europe, 2017; IMF, 2015; ODI, 2014; Timperley, 2017). So 
neither the electricity price nor the estimated LCOE of coal or gas power can be 
used to judge what a ‘market’ cost of a valuable energy source should be. It can 
however be used to see where wind power has to be cost-wise to outperform coal 
and gas in the currently skewed market. If one acknowledges climate change 
science, it is necessary to account for what a working group within the IMF labels as 
“post-tax subsidies”, which is where the state does not sufficiently tax the damaging 
effects of emitting CO2 (IMF, 2015, p. 21). Once these subsidies are counted in, but 
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also even if only direct subsidies are counted (Timperley, 2017), it is clear that there 
never existed such a thing as an undistorted free energy market198.  
But this notion of putting the numbers “on the table” and discussing whether or not 
societies can afford to mitigate climate change reverses the order of nature and 
economics (Latour, 2014, p. 6). This is one of the larger paradoxes of the 
Anthropocene epoch, which also comes through in the analyzed valuation struggle. 
While the scientific consensus of climate change can apparently still be cast in doubt 
by leading politicians and media-publics, the order of economics remains 
unquestioned, as explained by Bruno Latour below.  
 
“What is really remarkable is that during the last two centuries the very 
notions of the two natures have exchanged their properties: first nature 
has entered the Anthropocene where it is hard to distinguish human 
action from natural forces and which is now full of tipping points, peaks, 
storms and catastrophes, while only second nature [i.e., economics], it 
seems, has kept the older features of an indifferent, timeless and fully 
automatic nature governed by a few fundamental and undisputable laws 
totally foreign to politics and human action”. (Latour, 2014, p. 6) 
 
What remains outside the discussion is what should replace wind turbines if they are 
not built. This is unfortunate for challengers who seek change, while convenient for 
fossil fuel incumbents or proximate field actors, who seek to maintain status quo. 
All Danish parties have signed on to the Paris Agreement, and if the science behind 
this Agreement is acknowledged, a business-as-usual scenario is not a viable option. 
The calculated cost of adding wind power could also be framed as a necessary 
system transition cost, instead of as an additional cost to the system.  I explore this 
topic further in chapter 9: Insights.  
All valuation frames can be considered flawed by their exclusions, or in other 
words, correct within their assumptions and limitations, since “by definition, to 
frame is to make selective inclusions and exclusions” (Callon, 1998, p. 8). Framings 
which make economic calculations based on sunk costs may appear more realistic 
and intuitively correct since it is based on cost of capacity that may appear as 
historic and given. Some energy sources may therefore appear to be the most 
economic because calculations are based on a locked-in framework that includes a 
                                                          
198
 One example is two of Denmark’s main import countries for Coal, Russia and Colombia. 
Russian coal has had the extraction cost subsidized by the Russian state (ODI, 2014), while 
Colombian coal is extracted through controversial methods which have been shown to damage the 
local communities near the mines (Sommer, KLJE, & Frandsen, 2016). 
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large amount of sunk costs (Mitchell, 2009; Unruh, 2000, 2009). But in a world 
where facts and opinions become “even more mixed up,” it is important to reflect 
deeply on which actors to align with (Latour, 2011, p. 7).  
 
8.4.2 CC Mitigation is not a system-dependent quality 
The present analysis indicates that rather than only technical cost competitiveness, 
struggles over societal qualities will also determine the future of wind power. After 
substantial drops in Technology Cost, wind power was the least expensive option for 
capacity expansion during the last period from 2015 to 2017. Nevertheless, wind 
power continued to be problematized due to costs of the framed Subsidy Burden 
affecting other sectors. The qualities that negatively impacted the value of wind 
power during later periods (i.e., Fuel Supplement, Market Distortion, and Subsidy 
Burden) depend on perceptions of markets and the general regulatory framework 
architecture. The main positive impact quality of wind power, CC Mitigation, on the 
other hand, is not a system-dependent quality. Electricity from a wind turbine does 
not harm the climate no matter how the power is used.199 If we focus this same lens 
on a coal or gas plant, the qualities become reversed. Coal and gas power have until 
recently been framed as cheap, because their damaging effects to the climate are not 
taken into account. Thus, the main positive impact quality used in framings of fossil 
fuels, appearing to be the cheapest technological option (at least until recently), is 
market dependent. But the main negative quality of coal and gas power, that they 
emit CO2 and thereby cause climate change, is a quality that is physical and not 
dependent on the market arrangement. Stored carbon is locked in the fuel; no matter 
how the power output is used, this carbon negatively impacts the climate. This 
thought about the qualities that are market dependent and the qualities that are 
inherent in the energy sources themselves presents an interesting choice when 
combined with the moral imperative to act in response to the Paris agreement. 
The valuation frame approach can reveal the assumptions and reference points 
behind the qualities that make up the valuation frame which produces a given 
meaning. By adopting this approach, it is possible to more accurately challenge 
whether the high impact of a given quality is merited, or if a framing is constructed 
to “resist fundamental change” (Geels, 2014, p. 27).  
 
 
 
                                                          
199
 An offshore wind turbine has a life expectancy of 25 years and has compensated for the CO2 
emissions used to produce it after 9 months of operation (Siemens, 2014). 
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8.4.3 Wind Power as a Shaky Incumbent 
Do the most recent developments mean that wind power has achieved some sort of 
incumbent status? Even though the market had shifted into stretch and transform 
mode during the Climate Solution period, wind power remained a challenger, 
accounting for only 14% of electricity consumption at the beginning of the Market 
Distortion period. Despite rapid domestic expansion in a homegrown industry which 
accounted for 50% of the global market share of wind turbines, the domestic market 
was still brought to a near-complete halt during the Market Distortion period. 
Frames were used not only to institute change or resist this challenger technology, 
but also to derail its stabilization process.  
However, by the time of the Subsidy Burden period, wind had become the single 
largest power source for electricity generation, satisfying more than 40% of the 
Danish electricity demand. The landmark 2012 energy agreement struck during the 
Global Advantage period called for significant expansion of offshore wind capacity, 
with the goal of increasing that share to well over 50% by the early 2020s. By all 
usual measures, this should reflect incumbent status. Yet stabilization remains 
paradoxically elusive for wind power, which continued to be challenged by 
remaining actors from the Market-coalition joined by proximate field actors such as 
the horticulture industry and other energy-intensive industries. These actors were 
loosely associated, but shared a disdain for prosthetic devices such as taxes and 
subsidies that support wind power stabilization. So, why do such setbacks occur 
after a technology should theoretically have achieved incumbent status? This is a 
question Neil Fligstein considered worthy of further empirical examination. In a 
2016 interview, I had the opportunity to ask him whether he thought wind power in 
Denmark today was an incumbent or a challenger given the high share of electricity 
consumption. He responded: 
 
“That is a good question. It sounds to me like almost something that 
would have to be empirically established. At what point do they [i.e., the 
wind industry] stop being a challenger and start being an incumbent? 
Certainly, there was a moment where they were a challenger. They might 
maintain that challenger mentality, but who knows if it is real or not. I 
guess the way you tell is how the rules are written and who gets to say 
what”. (Interview 11: Fligstein, quote 1) 
 
The way to tell who is an incumbent and who is a challenger is based on “how the 
rules are written and who gets to say what.” This shows that wind power was in the 
peculiar position of being an incumbent on paper, but in two out of five periods, the 
rules were re-written with destabilization to follow. Wind power is possibly in the 
paradoxical situation of being both an incumbent and a challenger. During the 
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Climate Solution period, the rules were re-written to frame CO2 emissions as 
something that needed to be eliminated. In this way, wind power could be seen as an 
incumbent. But unlike in the Unique Supplement period, incumbent actors in the 
energy market were not the primary actors that destabilized wind power during the 
Market Distortion and Subsidy Burden periods. It was instead the Market-coalition 
which comprised concerns from proximate fields such as the overall Subsidy 
Burden. This also points towards a higher exposure of energy-related matters in 
media coverage, and destabilization attempts from actors outside the field that wind 
power operates in. 
  
8.4.4 Debunking the Myth of the Danish Consensus on Wind Power 
As mentioned in the introduction, there are at times drawn a line between a few 
broad energy agreements and the conclusion that Denmark’s position in wind power 
was built on a history of bipartisan agreement. But once the related proposals and 
plans are analyzed in depth, a different picture emerges. Although there has been an 
advantage to having broad energy agreements, such as during the Unique 
Supplement period (i.e., among Radikale Venstre, Socialdemokratiet and the left 
wing in 1984 and 1985) and the Global Advantage period (i.e., among all major 
parties in 2008 and 2012), there has never been consensus agreement about which 
direction to take. De Konservative was strongly opposed wind power in the early 
1990s, but came to value it higher with the emergence of Connie Hedegaard on the 
political scene and the assembling of the Global Advantage frame. But prior to this 
fourth period, they are not visible in any coalitions that placed a high value on wind 
power. Venstre saw some potential in wind power as an export good during the 
Unique Supplement period, as exemplified by business minister Knud Enggard in 
the mid-1980s. Some factions of the party also expressed some support for wind 
power during the Global Advantage period. Yet, as it showed in the Subsidy Burden 
period, Venstre’s overall framing of wind power investment appears to be that they 
are not valuable as long as there are subsidies involved. Thus, when it comes to 
energy policy, there were no periods of conflict-free agreement, only periods of 
compromise. What is important to note is that energy agreements and laws 
encompass many interests and pathways of other energy sources, such as biogas and 
biomass. There are several bipartisan laws and agreements that include wind power 
legislation in it, but this rather show a tradition of compromise when it comes to 
overall energy-sector legislation and not agreement over the value of wind power.   
A bold conclusion could be that it appears as if the dominant parliamentary coalition 
is able to choose the calculation that fits their imagined future. This is not 
necessarily an easy task, as new framings are almost always challenged; for 
example, the Subsidy Burden valuation frame, which excluded several points of 
reference of the previously accepted framing, proved difficult to stabilize.  
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This concludes the answer to the first of my two research questions. The theoretical 
toolbox of valuation frames has been useful in opening up the black box of 
valuation, and maps the strategic interplay of political coalition in a dominant 
valuation network. By tracking how various qualities emerge and become central to 
valuation frames, one can reveal how valuation occurs. An important part of the 
strength of a given framing is the power of the valuation network. Mapping the 
simultaneous change in Valuation Frame qualities and the corresponding Valuation 
Networks makes the actors’ assumptions debatable, and thereby makes it possible to 
discuss how the societal value of wind power is produced. According to Callon, no 
framing is an accurate representation of the societal value of wind power, or any 
other technology. There is thus no ultimate formula for the value of wind, but only 
different competing representations of it which reflects exclusions and inclusions 
from the calculative devices used and the network behind it. One must then ask 
which valuation networks one most closely aligns with. I have attempted to map five 
different framings through the most significant moments of valuation in Danish 
wind history. As Dewey stated, we can only describe the world through the tools we 
have available for our inquiry, and I am aware that this analysis will never be able to 
capture the full valuation history of Danish wind power. But I hope to have brought 
new things to light and have laid the early contours of a framework worthy of future 
research endeavors. In the next chapter, I address my second research question, 
which picks up where my first research question leaves off. Thus far, I have mapped 
and analyzed my way up to the current dominant valuation framing of wind power 
as a Subsidy Burden. However, it is possible for a challenger valuation network to 
contest this framing of wind power, which I unfold in the next chapter. 
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9. INSIGHTS FOR CHALLENGERS  
From studying the microcosm of Denmark, I now turn the focus outwards towards 
the EU and the future valuation struggles to come. In this chapter, I address my 
second research question:  
 
Research Question 2: What can be learned from the valuation struggle of Danish 
wind power in terms of stabilizing a field as a challenger energy source in Denmark 
and Europe? 
 
I will in this chapter point to some of the potential upcoming struggles over value 
when it comes to wind power and attempt to leverage insights that are valuable in 
these struggles to come. I will discuss it from the qualities identified and try to 
highlight examples in the broader field of wind power and incumbent fossil fuel 
energy sources it still is in competition with.   
 
9.1. WIND POWER CAN SERVE AS THE BACKBONE OF THE 
DANISH ENERGY SYSTEM 
Wind power started out as practically all new technologies do, namely as a 
challenger in an established market. During the Unique Supplement period, it made 
sense to calculate several small and back then inflexible wind turbines as a Fuel 
Supplement to the overall energy system. The technology was not yet reliable 
enough for the utilities to count on wind power as a source that could generate a 
specific percentage of electricity. This changed during the Climate Solution period, 
wherein wind power accounted for 14% of Danish electricity demand without 
wreaking havoc on the system. Nevertheless, since 2002, several calculations 
performed wind power as a supplement that incurred a cost to an otherwise well-
functioning system. These types of calculations were built on a framing that wind 
power costs should be calculated against a business-as-usual scenario.  
However, if one accepts the science on climate change, it is clear that a business-as-
usual scenario is not an option. The Transmission Systems Operator (TSO) which is 
responsible for the Danish grid, Energinet, does not view large degrees of wind 
power as problematic. During an interview for this thesis, two analysts from the 
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Danish TSO explained how they view the role of wind power in Denmark’s energy 
system: 
 
“Energinet is of the clear opinion that we do not need capacity 
markets…we expect that the demand side will be established to an extent 
where the few hours in the year [when there is not enough wind or 
interconnectors], something will be able to disconnect 
freely…technically, we have enough solutions”.  (Interview 10: 
Energinet, quote 1) 
“Whether the wind-share rises a bit more and such, that is not what really 
costs something on the supply security side….If one talks about 
dispatchable reserve capacity the last 10 to 15 years, this has actually not 
gone up if you look at the northern countries as a whole”. (Interview 10: 
Energinet, quote 2). 
 
The amount of back-up capacity needed has thus not increased even as renewables 
share of consumption has grown significantly. As interconnectors are built, capacity 
can be reduced if participating countries are willing to do so. By developing 
effective sector integration combined with interconnectors to nearby countries, the 
need for capacity markets can be removed. These are smart energy investments, but 
they are at the system level and not connected to a specific energy source. Due to its 
location, Denmark is among the most well-connected countries in Europe. In the 
summer of 2017, a test performed by Energinet showed that the electricity system 
could run on renewables and interconnected capacity alone for several weeks, 
something which had been theoretically acknowledged as far back as 2013 (Wittrup, 
2013, 2017c). These results effectively eliminated the previous justification for 
keeping old coal power plants on the grid to deliver energy security. 
Outside Denmark, technical solutions are being developed to integrate large shares 
of wind power in other countries. In Texas, the U.S. state with the largest wind 
power capacity and where wind power fulfills more than 20% of electricity demand, 
state grid operator “The Electric Reliability Council of Texas” (ERCOT) has had 
very good results with wind power integration. In December 2015, ERCOT 
concluded that the grid was becoming more stable as wind, solar and gas capacity 
grew and replaced coal plants; in fact, they could more accurately predict wind 
variability than unexpected coal plant outages (Osborne, 2015). The important point 
here is that any electricity grid requires either back-up capacity, interconnectors or 
demand-side response capacity equivalent to that of the largest plant on its grid (i.e., 
in Texas, the W.A. Parish generating station has four coal-burning units for a total 
capacity of 2.6 GW). If one or more units of such a large plant go offline, a large 
amount of capacity must be replaced instantly. This is why all back-up costs in a 
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grid are not attributable to wind power alone. In a 2015 report, the American Wind 
Energy Association revealed a cost breakdown for the 2.8 GW of immediately 
available reserves that was in ERCOT’s grid: just 4% were attributed to the need to 
accommodate wind power variability, whereas 67% were attributed to the need to 
accommodate conventional power plant failures. The reserve needs for wind power 
are thus “far smaller and can be met with less expensive, slower-acting reserves” 
(AWEA, 2015, p. 14).  
In the South Power Pool area, a 14-state region in the south-western United States 
which includes Texas, wind power briefly met more than 50% of electricity demand 
in March 2017; afterwards, South Power Pool VP Bruce Rew concluded that the 
area could “reliably manage” 50% wind penetration, adding “it's not even our 
ceiling" (DiSavino, 2017)200.  Back in 2012, the National Renewable Energy 
Laboratories (NREL), which is a sub-department of the U.S. Department of Energy, 
had already examined whether or not the U.S. grid would be able to handle up to 
80% renewable energy penetration. The conclusion was that a combination of 
renewable technologies and flexibility options already available today were “more 
than adequate to supply 80% of total U.S. electricity generation in 2050” (NREL, 
2012). Although NREL had only been asked to examine a penetration up to 80% of 
electricity there are also studies of a complete transition for all sectors. Professor 
Marc Jacobson and his team of Stanford engineers have mapped how all of the 
world’s major countries could get 100% of their energy from renewable energy 
sources  (Jacobson & Delucchi, 2011)201.  
This does not mean that storage technologies should not be developed; quite the 
contrary, they are incredibly valuable in terms of building effective grids. In a June 
2017 report, the European Academies of Science Advisory Council concluded that 
storage is not “fundamentally needed” to transition to a 100% renewable energy 
system (Simon, 2017a). The technological possibility of wind power as a backbone 
in the energy system is not impeded by its variability.    
 
9.2. THE VALUE OF MITIGATING CLIMATE CHANGE IN 
DENMARK 
One of the central understandings in the Market Distortion valuation frame is that it 
does not matter what Denmark builds when it comes to mitigating climate change, 
since Denmark only contributes about 0.1% of global CO2 emissions, and that 
                                                          
200
 There are also examples of small rural towns in Texas, such as Georgetown with a population of 
50,000, who now rely solely on renewables for electricity production (Gross, 2015). 
201
 In 2016, Portugal ran on renewables and hydro-power for 4 straight days (Nelsen, 2016), and in 
2017, the Chinese Quinghai province (population 6,000,000) reportedly did so for 7 straight days 
(CAP, 2017).  
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Denmark instead should seek global market solutions to CC Mitigation. Even if this 
argument is not taken to its extreme conclusion of inaction, it is at times used to 
argue that whatever “market-like” price is set for CO2 by a device such as the EU 
quota system is the only price that Denmark should pay. This price then becomes a 
device to frame the value of wind power’s CC Mitigation quality.  
I find it peculiar and noteworthy that the neoclassical view of markets that is 
embedded in the Market Distortion quality can change the rank of the quality that, in 
my humble view, is the most important quality out of the 12, namely CC Mitigation. 
In Latour’s words it appears that while the natures reactions to our pollution is 
highly disputed, the implications of the neoclassical economic devices paradoxically 
becomes regarded as “undisputed law totally foreign to politics of human action” 
(Latour, 2014, p. 6).  As Latour points out these devices are of course human 
constructs but paradoxically are regarded as undisputable and apolitical.  
If one follows the moral impediment of urgently mitigating climate change, I agree 
with the IEA’s call for the world to take “urgent actions to steer the energy system 
on to a safer path” (IEA, 2014, p. 24), in the form of a “massive build-out of 
renewables”, which would need to occur at an “unprecedented pace”, which goes far 
beyond anything achieved historically or pledged so far in Paris (IEA, 2017a, p. 
75)202.  
I argue that this urgency of mitigation means that the salience of the Market 
Distortion quality should be much more challenged in Denmark and elsewhere it 
may occur. It is remarkably surprising and troubling that the recommendations based 
on the DEC’s neoclassical economic knowledge is so strong that it makes climate 
mitigation appear less important than preventing distortions based on a highly 
idealized version of economic markets.  
Indeed, CC Mitigation is by many seen as the most important issue especially 
because of the need for urgency in mitigating it. There is a monumental difference 
between taking large steps to mitigate climate change within the next 3 to 5 years, 
versus postponing action another 10 to 20 years. In the words of long-time climate 
                                                          
202
 I herein include a short excerpt from the IEA’s 2017 chapter on the needed actions in the Energy 
system: “To keep pace with the overall emissions targets of the 66% 2°C Scenario, unabated coal-
fired power plants, i.e. those without CCS, would need to be phased out as soon as possible. The 
least-efficient coal-fired power plants are phased out by 2030 in most regions; and by 2035 in all 
regions…. The massive build-out of renewables is critical to the low-carbon transition in the 66% 
2°C Scenario and would need to occur at an unprecedented pace – going well beyond the historic 
rates of capacity additions and those projected based on Paris Agreement pledges. Overall, the pace 
of renewables-based capacity additions in the 66% 2°C Scenario would continue robustly through 
2050, surpassing 400 GW per year towards the end of the period. This level is four-times the 
average of new capacity additions worldwide over the past ten years and close to double the 
average level of additions reached in the New Policies Scenario (The Paris Pledges, ed.) (IEA, 
2017a, p. 75).  
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activist and founder of 350.org, Bill McKibben, “Winning slowly is the same as 
losing.”  
 
“By 2075 the world will be powered by solar panels and windmills—free 
energy is a hard business proposition to beat. But on current trajectories, 
they'll light up a busted planet. The decisions we make in 2075 won't 
matter; indeed, the decisions we make in 2025 will matter much less than 
the ones we make in the next few years. The leverage is now”. 
(Mckibben, 2017) 
 
The ultimate success of wind power may seem inevitable if one just let things go 
their path and wait a bit. But according to the IPCC’s projection (IPCC, 2007, 
2014b) and the Paris-Agreements pledged contributions, we do not have time to 
wait. More than 80% of the world’s energy is produced by burning a finite supply of 
fossil fuels; if they are used at currently projected rates, by 2040 the world will have 
forfeited a 50% chance of staying below the agreed 2 degree warming limit (IEA, 
2015, p. 12; IPCC, 2014a). To understand the fierce urgency of mitigating the 
climate crisis of the Anthropocene epoch, one only needs to examine the risk of 
tipping points, such as ice sheet collapse at the poles, or acidification of the world’s 
seas (Rockström et al., 2009; Schellnhuber, H. J. Rahmstorf & Winkelmann, 2016; 
WWF, 2015). Already, evidence suggests an acceleration of the pace of warming: 
14 of the 15 warmest years on record have occurred in the 21st century in what the 
World Meteorological Organization has called an “alarming” trend requiring “urgent 
and far-reaching measures” (WMO, 2016). Jeremy Mathis, the Director of the Arctic 
Research program for the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA), emphasized the urgency of the task ahead in a December 2017 
presentation on the accelerated melting of the polar ice caps:  
 
"When we look at the darkening of the Arctic, reflective, icy surfaces are 
melting to reveal darker surfaces that absorb more of the sun's 
energy…And now we're seeing acceleration—a runaway effect that may 
eventually be a catastrophic runaway effect starting to take hold in the 
Arctic. They're facts—facts weighted in thousands and thousands of 
scientific measurements that have been validated and peer reviewed by a 
community of experts working in the area for decades”. (Gill, 2017) 
 
The risks of these “catastrophic runaway effects” are hard to articulate and 
commensurate into numbers, as they would substantially change the world we live 
in. Several major intergovernmental organizations, thus agree that man-made 
climate change represents a high impact threat to the world that could lead to higher 
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sea levels, longer droughts and stronger and more frequent dangerous weather 
events (IEA, 2015; IPCC, 2014a; WBG, 2012; WEF, 2016b).  As phrased in IPCC’s 
conservative language, the world face a “high to very high risk of severe, 
widespread and irreversible damage” (IPCC, 2014b, p. 13). In less conservatives 
language, Economist Lord Nicholas Stern compared the decision to try to stay under 
the 2 degree limit to deciding whether to play “Russian roulette with two bullets or 
one” (Stewart & Elliot, 2013). The majority of man-made CO2 emissions that cause 
climate change stem from the energy sector (IPCC, 2014a; WBG, 2012), the two 
main sources being coal (865 g/KWh) and gas (450 g/KWh) (IEA, 2012b).203 These 
two energy sources will likely have to be completely phased out from the energy 
system within the next two decades to have a chance of staying below the 2 degree 
limit (Ecofys, 2016; Pfeiffer, Millar, Hepburn, & Beinhocker, 2016)204. But the 
difficult part is to figure out which countries that should phase out fossil fuels first 
and at what pace. Historical emissions data from the World Resources Institute 
indicate that Denmark is the 12
th
 largest per capita emitter of CO2 from 1850-2010, 
and significantly richer than many countries who will feel the hardest impacts of 
climate change. Figure 46 compares Denmark to India and Nigeria, two of the 
fastest growing countries in the world today (WRI, 2015). The graph below the 
numbers was constructed by the author on the listed WRI data.  
 
Figure 46: Emissions and GDP comparison of Denmark, India and Nigeria. 
 
                                                          
203
 Lifetime emissions for a wind turbine, including its construction, is 7 g/KWh and it produces 
energy equivalent to that used to construct it in the first 9 months of operation (Siemens, 2014).  
204
 Renowned consultant agency Ecofys estimates a 2 degree scenario as incompatible with new 
coal plants, and would also require phasing out existing coal plants by mid-century at the absolute 
latest (Ecofys, 2016). Likewise, a recent Oxford University study found that additional gas plants 
could not be built after the year 2017 if the world was to stay under 2 degrees (Pfeiffer et al., 2016).  
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According to the Worlds Resources Institute, Denmark has historically emitted 20-
times more CO2 emissions per capita than either India or Nigeria. Moreover, 
Denmark is more than nine times richer measured by GDP, and thus is better 
equipped to mitigate damages from the 1 degree of climate change that the world is 
already experiencing. The above graph highlights a historic responsibility. But even 
if we ignore historical emissions, it is possible calculate how much CO2 each 
country have left to burn. This is done by dividing the amount of carbon that can be 
burned without causing global temperatures to more than 2 degrees equally among 
the world’s citizens. The Danish Ministry of Energy, Utilities and Climate was in 
2016 asked to calculate this number, and concluded that each world citizen had a 
budget of 116 mn. tons of CO2 equivalents. This led to a budget of 660 mn. tons of 
CO2 equivalents for Denmark (EFK, 2016). According to the most recent data from 
the DEA’s annual basis-prognosis, Denmark emitted 51.9 mn. Tons of CO2 in 2015, 
and is expected reduce emissions to 44.8 mn. tons by 2020. Denmark is thus 
eliminating roughly 7 mn. tons of annual CO2 emissions within the 5 years of 2016-
2020, roughly cutting emissions by 1.4 mn. tons per year (DEA, 2017a, p. 223). 
Even if Denmark reduces emissions at a faster rate (2 mn. tons per year), it would 
exceed its carbon budget by 2035, and thereafter be forced to immediately achieve 
net zero emissions205. Current emissions would need to be cut in half over the next 
13 years, and even then the carbon budget would still be exceeded if we do not 
achieve net-zero emissions in 2035. The problem is that this limited carbon budget is 
not reflected in energy planning, as noted in a 2015 special report on energy and 
climate change published by the International Energy Agency: 
 
“The projected path for energy-related emissions in the INDC Scenario 
means that, based on IPCC estimates, the world’s remaining carbon 
budget consistent with a 50% chance of keeping a temperature increase 
of below 2°C would be exhausted around 2040…If energy sector 
investors believed that not only new investments but also existing fossil 
fuel operations would be halted at that critical point, this would have a 
profound effect on investment even today”. (IEA, 2015, p. 38)    
 
The above quote by the IEA refers to a possible future situation where the “rules of 
the game” would change significantly, and investments in coal and gas plants would 
be near impossible to gather a coalition around. It would have some similarities to 
the Climate Solution period where the rules of the Danish energy field were 
significantly changed. But on the European scale it appears as if this urgency to 
make renewable energy the standard investment (Baake, 2016) has not yet 
completely been established. Judging from the analysis in this thesis, one of the 
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 It is also worth noting that to achieve this, Denmark would have to reduce annual emissions to 
less than 25 million metric tons by 2030. 
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reasons for this lack of urgency could be that the Market Distortion quality prevails 
in valuations of energy. Namely that only global market solution can solve it and 
that it therefore thus not matter what actions individual countries take. I will 
hereafter discuss why I consider this understanding is flawed.  
If Denmark’s decisions did not matter, then it would be even more foolish for the 
local Danish municipality, Soenderborg, a region of only 75,000 people, to pursue 
their ProjectZero strategy of carbon neutrality by 2029. They are investing heavily 
in becoming carbon-neutral before the rest of the country, even though no 
international treaty or national law is forcing them to do so. In the spring of 2017, 
Soenderborg municipality was visited by a delegation of civil servants from the 
Hebei province in China who wanted to learn more about the ProjectZero initiative 
(Rathje, 2017). Although Hebei’s population of 75 million is more than 13 times the 
population of Denmark, it is less than 5% of China’s population. To understand the 
difference in size, Figure 47 (GBA) is a visualization of Soenderborg, Denmark and 
Hebei in cubes each representing 100,000 people below (Statista, 2017)206.  
  
 
Figure 47: Comparison of Soenderborg, Denmark and the Chinese Hebei Province 
 
The civil servants representing the 75 million residents of the Hebei province also 
could think their actions do not matter. They are only 5% of China, which is only 
one country (albeit a very large one) out of many. But if Hebei’s emissions are 
negligible, so are those of major countries in the EU with similarly-sized 
populations (yet much larger CO2 footprints). If an individual’s actions reflect his or 
her desire for universal law, the moral obligation of the individual to help collective 
action move forward is high, even though the impact of the individual’s actions may 
be insignificantly small. Although Soenderborg’s goal of achieving carbon neutrality 
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 It was my original ambition to include China on the same graph, but doing so would render 
Soenderborg and Denmark invisible. 
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by 2029 may not make a detectable difference in the global level of CO2 emissions, 
its example may accelerate the actions of a Chinese province that is 10-times the 
size of Denmark, which in turn may accelerate the actions of a country 200-times 
the size of Denmark.207  
It also appears unlikely that proponents of the “it doesn’t matter what Denmark 
does” or “Denmark should not run too far ahead of other countries” logic would 
apply this consistently to other societal questions. If Denmark is too small to 
mitigate climate change, why do its citizens aim to solve other large problems in the 
world? If Denmark is so insignificant, why does the country invest in medical 
research to find cures for various diseases, or build the finest research institutions? 
Denmark does this because its citizens believe in their ability to make positive 
contributions to the world and to serve as an example for others. Energy scholars 
Morris and Jungjohann (2016, p. 2)  referred to the industrial policies of the German 
Energiewende as a way to “make good for previous emissions.” I believe that this 
also justifies why Denmark should develop its wind industry instead of buying the 
cheapest CO2 emissions offsets available. If Denmark can help speed up the 
transition in other countries, the nation can begin to make up for both its historic 
emissions and its current carbon footprint.      
 
9.3. WIND IS COST-COMPETITIVE, BUT SYSTEM TRANSITION 
COSTS EXIST 
System costs represent another major issue that a challenger technology may face as 
the system built around a different incumbent technology will not be designed for 
the new challenger. Denmark is positioned to lead by example and is technically 
capable of building an energy system with wind power as its backbone (section 9.1), 
and there is an urgent global need to transition away from fossil fuel energy (section 
9.2). According to several studies, this is also technically feasible outside of 
Denmark, but will not happen without substantial system investments (Connolly, 
Lund, & Mathiesen, 2016; Jacobson & Delucchi, 2011). But a complete transition to 
renewable energy requires going even further to view renewables as the new 
standard investment (Baake, 2016) and modify energy markets to fit renewable 
energy sources  (Hopson, 2016). This means that system integration costs are not 
only technical improvements to the grid, but also costs to the business case of other 
energy field actors, and sometimes even actors in proximate sectors.  
                                                          
207
 The Chinese provinces, of course, may have different motivations for reducing CO2 emissions. 
Regardless, they travel to other countries to solicit ideas and inspiration. Although China’s system 
of handling climate change mitigation is different from a that of a Western liberalized open 
economy (Thornton & Goodman, 2017, p. 223), I believe actions in a small province can inspire 
actions in a larger province, and ultimately at the national level.  
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If Western nations are serious about their Paris pledges, renewable capacity, such as 
wind power, must be built with the attached integration costs that follow. Integration 
costs can be minimized if current market arrangements are modified to 
accommodate the large role of renewables (IREMB, 2017b). Inevitably, this will 
lead to stranded assets among conventional energy generators. This is not alone a 
technical challenge, but more importantly a political one. This grand challenge must 
be solved first in a country that can bear the cost of developing a sustainable energy 
system without compromising its energy security or industrial competitiveness. The 
key to a sustainable transition of our energy systems in time therefore depends on 
how we as a society frame the value of our energy choices. But if agreement on the 
value of wind power in relation to the ongoing green transition is a challenge for a 
pioneer like Denmark, it will likely be an even bigger challenge for other EU 
countries. 
This is why it is important to learn from the microcosm of the world’s wind power 
deployment. Looking forward, Denmark currently has an official goal to satisfy at 
least 50% of its energy demand from renewable sources in 2030, and to be 
independent of fossil fuels by 2050. To be independent, Denmark needs to be able to 
satisfy 100% of its energy needs from domestic renewable energy sources such as 
wind, solar, biogas and biomass (Biomass is considered renewable in the Danish 
target). As three to four new datacenters are being built in Denmark over the coming 
years, the demand for carbon-free electricity such as wind power will increase even 
more. Moreover, energy as a whole also covers large heating and transportation 
sectors. When one looks at energy across all three sectors, Denmark currently 
satisfies only about 25% of its overall energy needs with renewables. Therefore, heat 
and transportation systems must be transformed by incorporating components that 
use electricity generated from renewable resources (i.e., heat-pumps, electric cars). 
This requires that some old generating capacity is taken off the grid, in example coal 
plants. In Denmark this discussion is actually confined to a few central power plants, 
as I will hereafter exemplify. In 2016, Denmark had roughly 12.7 GW of installed 
power generation capacity, including approximately 2.4 GW of coal capacity 
(BNEF, 2017b, p. 7; DEA, 2017a, p. 50). In 2017, Oersted (formerly DONG 
Energy) announced that it would phase out coal from its four remaining central 
power plants by 2023,208 and Copenhagen utility HOFOR also has plans to phase 
out coal at the 250 MW Amager Bloc 3 by 2019 (DEA, 2017a, pp. 237–240). By 
2023, a combined 1.6 GW of coal energy should have been retired or replaced by 
biomass. This leaves only two major coal power plants, Fynsvaerket (442 MW) and 
Nordjyllandsvaerket (410 MW), which were bought by municipally owned utilities, 
when the Swedish utility Vattenfall no longer deemed them profitable in 2014 and 
2015 respectively (Brauer, 2015; OKOM, 2014).  
                                                          
208
The four plants are Studstrup Bloc 3 (357 MW), Asnaes Bloc 5 (640 MW), Avedoere Bloc 1 
(250 MW) and Esbjerg Bloc 3 (371 MW). Three plants are already in the process of phasing out 
coal; intentions are to phase out coal from Esbjerg Bloc by 2023, but a concrete plan has not yet 
been made.  
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It is interesting for a moment to consider how powerful a proximate actor can 
become in shaping specific topics of energy policy, as exemplified by the case of the 
Funen horticulture industry. This industry’s annual exports total approximately 3 
billion DKK for the floral industry, which employs 10,000 people, and is 
concentrated primarily on Funen Island. The floral industry on Funen consumes 
25% of all the heat delivered by Fynsvaerket, and the central Funen municipality of 
Odense has specified that “coal is cheaper than straw and other biofuels,” so a 
transition to biomass would entail “substantial price increases for the heat 
[delivered] to the horticulture industry” (Odense.dk, 2017). In the DEA’s energy 
prognosis, it is specifically noted that the municipally owned utility that owns 
Fynsvaerket does not seem interested in converting to biomass due to pressure from 
the horticulture industry (DEA, 2017a, p. 240). As was noted in the Subsidy Burden 
period, this industry was also specifically named in the press release that announced 
the purchase of Fynsvaerket, and managed to obtain substantial reductions to its 
PSO payment before it was eliminated. This case is anexample of the powers of 
actors in proximate fields, as the floral industry operates in a tightly interconnected 
geographic cluster which enables it to mobilize considerable influence, as evidenced 
by close relationship to LCL (Arnfred & Jessen, 2016; Christiansen, 2015).  
But how should this challenge of local sub-optimization of the energy system be 
approached? To make the transition to a fossil free energy system a reality, it is 
necessary to engage with proximate fields of the energy system itself. One way to do 
this is to cast more light on how costs are split between government and the private 
sector. Subsidies come not only in the form of direct payment to an industry, but 
also in the form of relief from fees to offset costs of pollution. It is necessary to 
compare the costs of facilitating an energy system transition for the horticulture 
industry with the costs that they incur by continuing to use coal well into the 2020s.  
Within the next few years, building new capacity for Danish wind and solar is 
expected to be cheaper than operating existing coal plants (DE, 2017, p. 4). 
Moreover, as more technical solutions become available in terms of converting wind 
electricity to heat, using excess heat from data centers, etc., there appears to be few 
to no economic arguments left for the continued use of coal for energy in Denmark 
past 2025. In other industrialized countries, concerns over supply security in the case 
of a coal phase-out may be legitimate, but Fynsvaerket is an example of a plant that 
appears to primarily be kept open due to local concerns. In a 2015 analysis, the DEA 
calculated the societal cost of phasing out coal by 2025 to be between DKK 0.5 and 
1.8 bn., but that included all of Oersted’s power plants (DEA, 2015a). Since Oersted 
and HOFOR will close their plants by 2023, only two other major plants will need to 
close, Fynsvaerket og Nordjyllandsvaerket, and the costs are thus likely to be less 
than DKK 1 bn.. There is thus not an insurmountable societal cost to phase out coal 
by 2025, but the last few plants may stay open to secure low heat prices for Funen 
Horticulture, and heavy industry such as cement producer Aalborg Portland 
(Arnfred & Jessen, 2016, p. 33,207).  
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A risk going forward is that energy system investments, such as interconnectors or 
phase-out plans for coal plants, become framed as actions that must be taken to 
support wind power. One recent example of this is the DKK 8 bn. funding of Viking 
Link, a 740 km long interconnector cable between Denmark and the UK. The 
interconnector was by Minister of Energy, Utilities and Climate, Lars Christian 
Lilleholt, framed as a necessity due its ability to export large amounts of Danish 
wind power; highlighted in October 2017 when the storm Ingolf caused the Danish 
wind turbine fleet to produce more than 100% of Danish electricity demand (DR, 
2017). This framing is problematic as the Viking Link will also be heavily used to 
export German coal energy to the UK, where it will displace British gas plants (H. 
Lund, Mathiesen, Hvelplund, Djørup, & Madsen, 2017). This is an example of 
energy system investments, where wind power is framed as one of the key reason 
that something should be built, while there are other reasons that may very well have 
weighted higher in the decision to invest in a project. It is a difficult proposition that 
wind power could come up against in the future. As it takes on a larger role in the 
energy system, more and more system improvements will in some way be related to 
it. Wind power as an energy source then risk having these system integration costs 
added as a negative impact on its value in calculations that frame it against the zero-
cost of doing nothing in a business-as-usual scenario.  
 
9.3.1 Wind Power Technology Cost and European Potential 
When faced with the IEA prediction about the carbon budget running out around 
2040 (IEA, 2015, p. 38), it is relevant to discuss whether or not the Danish 
difficulties of developing an exit strategy for fossil fuels also occurs in the EU. If 
wind power is to become the backbone of the EU energy sector, existing capacity 
will have to retire prior to its lifetime. It is therefore worth considering whether wind 
power on a European scale can compete with fossil fuels, and whether or not this 
fossil fuel capacity can be retired. The EU consists of several different national 
markets with intricate differences, as well as some overarching shared rules and 
goals. I therefore focus my reflections on Technology Cost, combined with the 
societal qualities comprising the theoretical framework used in the empirical 
analysis.   
One of the major differences between the Danish valuation struggle and a potential 
valuation struggle in the EU is the technological advancement that has occurred 
through decades of political investment in the Future Potential of wind power. 
Having realized that Future Potential, Technology Cost will have a positive impact 
on the valuation of wind power, and concerns over the cost of Back-up Capacity will 
be low. In the next subsections, I briefly outline the current LCOE costs of onshore 
and offshore wind power. Thereafter, I discuss Europe’s existing fossil fuel sources, 
most of which must be displaced by wind power in the coming decades.  
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Onshore Wind – The challenger changes the rules of the game  
When the Danish Energy Agency released its report on onshore wind in 2014, it 
highlighted a cost-trend that was emerging in several European markets. The 
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), observed significant cost 
reductions in its database of installed projects from 2010 to 2016 across major EU 
countries: Spain (48%), Italy (43%), France (42%), Germany (31%) and the UK 
(10%) (IRENA, 2018, p. 87). The U.S. think-tank Lazard similarly observed a 
significant 67% decrease in onshore costs worldwide between 2009 and 2016.209 
Lazard estimates European onshore wind at an average level of €54/MWh making it 
competitive with gas (€51/MWh) even when framed without environmental impacts 
(Lazard, 2017, pp. 3, 9). In a report prepared for the annual Davos World Economic 
Forum (WEF) in January 2017, it was even more aggressively estimated that 
onshore wind Technology Cost had dropped more than 30% in the three years from 
2014 to 2016 and stood at €43/MWh (WEF, 2016a, p. 5). This report estimated that 
wind prices had achieved grid parity with electricity prices in at least 30 countries, 
and an average annual rise in electricity prices of 3% would lead to 80% of the 
world’s markets being at similar grid parity “in the next couple of years” (WEF, 
2016a, p. 6).  
But LCOE comparisons of capacity expansion costs for wind and gas power are 
becoming less relevant as a metric, as wind power now must compete with the 
operating costs of existing gas and coal capacity to justify early closures of CO2-
emitting infrastructure. London-based think tank, Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 
estimated that in Germany, building new onshore wind capacity will be cheaper than 
operating existing gas plants around 2025, and cheaper than operating existing coal 
plants around 2030 (Liebreich, 2017, p. 62). The organization which throughout the 
years has upheld the LCOE yardstick, the International Energy Agency (IEA), has 
also acknowledged that LCOE will not be used to determine when it is valuable to 
build renewable capacity in the future. This was elaborated in a 2017 interview by 
IEA chief economist Laszlo Varro: 
 
“The key coming milestone, to my mind, is when we change our view of 
the competitiveness of renewables. On the level of average cost of 
electricity, that is the levelised cost of energy (LCOE), wind and solar is 
becoming more and more attractive. That’s the good news. But the bad 
news is that at the same time LCOE is a less and less relevant metric for 
variable renewables. Increasingly, we have to look at cost at the system-
level—and ask the question whether an energy system that has a 
significant volume of renewables is cost-competitive with one that 
doesn’t. The answer increasingly is ‘yes’”. (Snieckus, 2017)   
                                                          
209
 The cheapest onshore wind measured by LCOE is found in the U.S. Midwest, where strong 
winds provide good annual energy production (Lazard, 2017, p. 10).   
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Although onshore wind has become the cheapest in terms of the quality Technology 
Cost, increasingly its value will be measured based on cost at the system level. If the 
developments seen in Denmark are to translate to the larger EU market, costs to 
proximate sectors will be a critical factor. Furthermore, if onshore wind is expanded 
significantly, the Aesthetics quality likely will play a more salient role in future 
valuation frames. So although the EU at the end of 2017 had 153 GW onshore and 
only 15.8 GW offshore wind installed (WindEurope, 2018, p. 7)210, it is likely that 
offshore wind will take on a much larger role in the future. 
 
Offshore Wind – The option that will lift the challenger to a European backbone 
energy source 
Even more aggressively than for onshore wind, costs for offshore wind power has 
dropped significantly in recent years. The declines in costs of offshore wind power 
during the 3-year Subsidy Burden period (2015–2017) signal that the game has 
changed. When I began this thesis, I included the goal “to analyze how calculative 
standards in energy markets are established, maintained and challenged” in the main 
objective, thinking that the standard yardstick, LCOE, had to be challenged. I saw an 
example of how the wind industry measured its ability to match coal and gas on the 
metric of LCOE at the annual European Wind Energy Association’s Offshore 
Conference in March 2015.  
Attracting more than 7.500 participants from industry, it is the largest offshore wind 
conference in the world. The theme was “united industry” with a strong focus on 
attaining cost reductions as the main goal of innovation in the industry.  In Table 10 
on the next page, I present some of the phrases used to describe how important it 
was for the industry to achieve 40% cost reductions by 2020 and thus achieve the 
pledged LCOE below €100/MWh (EWEA, 2015). The statements are reproduced as 
heard by the author and later triangulated with the audio proceedings from the 
conference. 
 
 
                                                          
210
 The combined installed wind capacity of 168.7 GW equaled 18% of the EU’s total fleet of 
power generating capacity (937 GW) and supplied 11.6% of electricity demand. On a global scale 
wind constituted a fleet of 540 GW capacity by end 2017, hereof 18.8 GW offshore wind (GWEC, 
2018, p. 3).  
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Table 10: Statements about reaching the 2020 offshore wind cost goal. 
Statement Source Company 
If we do not succeed with cost-out, 
we will be out of business by 2020 
Claus Hviid 
Christensen, 
VP 
DONG Energy 
Society cannot afford paying 
offshore wind at the level it is at. 
Michael 
Hannibal, 
Head of 
Offshore 
Siemens Wind 
Power A/S 
We must act quickly to make sure 
we reach our cost reduction target for 
2020. 
Markus Tacke, 
CEO 
Siemens Wind 
Power A/S 
We are in a car with no road after 
2020. 
Jonathan Cole, 
CEO 
Iberdrola 
Renewables 
Offshore 
There is a significant end-customer 
pressure for lowering levelised cost 
of energy (LCOE) in the wind 
industry. 
Henning de 
Haas, 
Head of Wind 
SCM 
Development  
KK Solutions  
 
Clearly, by the spring of 2015, leading CEOs in the offshore wind industry 
considered the industry to be at risk of being “out of business by 2020,” or 
metaphorically, “in a car with no road after 2020”. Despite the consensus building 
around the upcoming Paris summit during 2015, the actors in the offshore wind 
industry still clearly did not see their energy source having a stabilized future at this 
point in time. But things would change significantly over just three years, as the 
costs of offshore wind power dropped rapidly.  
I have visualized the average LCOE of onshore wind, offshore wind, coal and gas, 
respectively, based on data from Lazard’s annual cost review reports for 2014, 2015, 
2016 and 2017 (Lazard, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017). Figure 48 (GPA) is a visualization 
which shows the central point of Lazard’s unsubsidized LCOE range converted to 
real-2016 EUR. For historical reference, I include 2010—the last year in which 
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Lazard estimated gas to be cheaper than onshore wind. Offshore wind was not 
included in Lazard’s calculation at that time.  
 
Figure 48: Lazard LCOE-levels for 2010 and 2014-2017 (€/MWh, real-2016). 
 
The 31% drop in offshore wind cost over the five reports is significant and has the 
potential to fundamentally change the valuation network of offshore wind power in 
the EU as a whole. It is also worth noting that the most recent offshore wind 
auctions have not yet been factored in, as Lazard measures LCOE based on projects 
for which final investment decisions have been made. The IEA’s Renewable Energy 
Technology Deployment research group (IEA-RETD) expects that the projects that 
were awarded subsidy contracts in 2016 and 2017 and are not included above, will 
show that the industry has “already exceeded its newly set 2025 cost target 
(€80/MWh, incl. grid connection) 8 years ahead of schedule” (IEA-RETD, 2017, p. 
9). The notion that offshore wind has seen a major breakthrough is shared by IEA 
chief economist Varro, who in a 2017 interview emphasized that the offshore cost 
reduction was a bigger impact event for Europe than cost drops in solar panels had 
been for the world. 
 
“In my view offshore wind has certainly been a major recent 
breakthrough—cutting the cost by half in two years is clearly disruptive. 
In the context of Europe, the potential implications of offshore wind are 
even bigger than the impacts of the solar revolution we have witnessed in 
the last decade. In the European climate, there are geographical and 
climatic limits to using solar at very high shares, whereas offshore wind 
is very scalable in Europe”. (Snieckus, 2017) 
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Thus, significant economies of scale advantages are on the horizon for offshore 
wind, and it approaches grid parity with electricity prices. On top of the already 
steep cost reductions, investment bank Goldman Sachs foresees another 50% drop 
between 2022 and 2030 and thus predicts costs falling below average European 
wholesale prices by the mid to late 2020s (GS, 2017, p. 5,7). Over the long term, the 
London-based think tank Bloomberg New Energy Finance, predicts that offshore 
wind costs will fall 71% from current levels by 2040 (BNEF, 2017a, p. 2).  
It may seem as though I am spending too much time discussing the quality 
Technology Cost of offshore wind power, since onshore wind still by far is the 
cheapest solution and offers many of the same advantages as offshore wind power. 
However, the Aesthetics quality which played a more salient role in Denmark during 
the Subsidy Burden period could come to impact valuation in the EU as well. Early 
examples of this trend include the implementation of a policy to block the 
construction of onshore wind in the UK (Hill, 2017), or severe distance-to-buildings 
restrictions in Poland (O’Brian, 2016). Noting this increasing trend in both Denmark 
and other EU countries, it is worth exploring large scale initiatives that can continue 
to reduce offshore wind costs211. Europe has especially favorable conditions for 
offshore wind in the North and Baltic Seas; in a baseline case assessment, 
consultancy BVG calculated that there were enough attractive offshore wind sites to 
satisfy 80% of Europe’s electricity demand by 2030.212 Even if EU decided to only 
develop the most cost-attractive sites, estimated to be possible at an average LCOE 
of €54/MWh, offshore wind power could still supply 25% of Europe’s electricity 
demand by 2030 (BVG, 2017, p. 10). The EU commission has not performed an in-
depth study of the seabed, but in 2017, it did recognize the potential that the North 
Sea alone could satisfy 12% of the EU’s electricity demand (DE, 2017, p. 56). 
However, if this potential is to materialize in time, some fossil fuel capacity must 
come off the grid.   
  
9.4. INCUMBENT FOSSIL FUELS STRUGGLE TO MAINTAIN 
THEIR RELEVANCE 
In the future, onshore and offshore wind power will be competing primarily against 
existing fossil fuel capacity, not new capacity expansion projects. This existing 
capacity has already incurred capital investment costs and may be subsidized 
through various subsidy schemes, such as national capacity market payments or 
                                                          
211
 One example of a cross-country collaboration that enables economies of scale is the North Seas 
memorandum which proposes the construction of the TenneT Power Island in the North Sea 
(Energinet.dk, 2017; Hopson, 2016; WindEurope, 2016b). 
212
 On a global scale, it has been calculated that there are available waters within 200 km of shore 
with a minimum average wind speed of 10 m/s to supply the world’s electricity demand in 2040 
two times over (GS, 2017, p. 23).  
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infrastructure funding schemes from the EU. If Western industrialized nations are 
serious about fulfilling their Paris pledges, infrastructure for challenger energy 
source such as wind power needs to be built at a faster pace. Current market 
arrangements must be radically transformed, and some actors will need to redefine 
their roles. These profound changes to the modern energy system will inevitably 
have repercussions, including stranded assets among incumbent owners of 
conventional power plants (EY, 2016, p. 5; IEA, 2015, p. 38). This is not a technical 
challenge, but a political one.  
The next two sub-sections are meant to set the stage for how a larger field of study 
related to valuation struggles could be identified. As mentioned above, BNEF 
envisions a near future (i.e., the mid-2020s) wherein it will be cheaper to build 
onshore wind and solar capacity than to operate existing fossil fuel infrastructure. At 
this point, the cheapest option for national energy planners will be to fill up their 
systems with as much “baseload”213 renewables as possible, and supplement with 
flexible power capacity or non-plant demand-side response, integration or storage 
solutions (Liebreich, 2017, p. 62).  
Once new-build renewables out-compete operating costs of existing capacity, there 
will be stranded assets at risk for the fossil fuel industry in the EU. To protect these 
assets the fossil fuel industry is today mobilizing its lobbying capacity, which 
significantly dwarfs the renewables industry214, in an attempt to keep their 
framework conditions stable.  
 
9.4.1 Coal Industry – Incumbent that is seeing its world destabilize in Europe 
Although existing coal plants previously has been framed as the cheapest way to 
produce energy, coal is no longer a feasible build-out option in most EU countries. 
According to the London-based think tank Carbon Tracker, 54% of the EU’s coal 
plants are running a deficit, and operations are maintained only through government 
subsidies such as capacity payments. Coal Tracker predicts that the percentage of 
unprofitable coal plants will increase to 97% by 2030 and the cost of keeping them 
running until then will be in the vicinity of €22 billion (Shanklemann & Morison, 
2017).   
                                                          
213
 The term “baseload renewables” is a conscious provocative reversal of the common conception 
that renewables are added on top of “baseload” energy sources such as coal and nuclear power.   
214
 According to the Brussels-based NGO Corporate Europe Observatory, oil and gas giants Shell, 
ExxonMobil, BP and Statoil are four of the top 10 spenders on lobbying in Brussels; combined, 
they spend more than €15 million annually and employ 47 lobbyists (CEO, 2017, p. 8). These 
companies do, of course, engage in minor activities related to renewables, but their major source of 
income is oil and gas production by far. Additionally, the top two spenders, the European Chemical 
Industry Council (€12 million, 82 lobbyists) and General Electric (€5.7 million, 18 lobbyists), align 
with the four gas giants on many issues (CEO, 2017, p. 8). 
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Some hardcore hold-outs, like Euracoal, feel “hated like slave traders,” and interpret 
the COP21 as an example of “the climate bandwagon” causing countries to allow 
the rule of law to be replaced by “mob rule” (Crisp, 2015). The influence of 
Euracoal and its allies is demonstrated by the difficulty associated with enforcing 
legislation on the 550 g CO2/KWh ceiling as a demand for receiving capacity 
payments in the EU. With this ceiling, only gas plants would qualify since nearly all 
coal plants in the EU emit more than 550 g CO2/kWh. If there was agreement to 
move beyond coal as soon as possible, a law to abolish subsidy payments to old coal 
plants should be easy to pass. Nonetheless, in December 2017, the EU Council of 
Ministers proposed that the law should not apply to existing capacity, but only to 
coal plants built after 2025 (Gutman, 2017). This, of course, is an arbitrary number, 
since no new coal plants will be built in Europe after that date anyway. In April 
2017, Eurelectic, a lobby group for utilities in the EU, pledged not to expand coal 
capacity after 2020 in any EU countries except Poland and Greece (Neslen, 2017). 
The critical question about coal capacity that will affect the build-out of wind power 
is thus not how much capacity will be built, but how much of the existing 
infrastructure will be subsidized to stay on the grid. Apart from a few hold-outs in 
Poland and Greece, most of the large European utilities in the EU recognize that 
new coal infrastructure will not be built, and instead are instead focusing on gas. 
One example is CEO for German utility E.ON, Klaus Shäfer, who announced that 
Datteln, a 1.1 GW coal plant slated to be commissioned in 2018, would probably be 
the last one constructed in Germany. Shäfer did not begrudge this but instead 
emphasized that something had to be done to facilitate the construction of new gas 
infrastructure, since “security of supply is too important to leave to the market” 
(Renssen, 2017).  
 
9.4.2 Gas Industry – Struggling to redefine a new role as least polluting fuel 
As previously shown in Figure 47, onshore wind is already cheaper to build than gas 
plants, and offshore wind infrastructure is fast approaching that threshold. But what 
is more concerning for gas power plant operators is the fact that their LCOE levels 
are much more volatile than those of wind power. As fuel costs comprise 
approximately 2/3 of the lifetime LCOE of a gas plant, the gas plant business case is 
highly dependent on fluctuations in gas prices and CO2 quota prices. If a gas power 
plant is built today, the risk of quota prices going up within the 40-year plant 
lifetime would render it a significantly more risky investment than it was 20 years 
ago (Pedersen, 2017). Gas plant operators are therefore trying to re-categorize 
themselves as part of the renewables industry, or as a safety net that guarantees 
uninterrupted energy supply. This push was recently announced when the EuroGas 
lobby organization launched a large event to promote “renewable gas” as a new way 
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of looking at biogas and power-to-gas.215 These types of gas only constitute about 
4% of the gas consumed in the EU today, but the EuroGas organization argues that 
if such gas could be given “a level playing-field” through a subsidy of €130/MWh, it 
would be able to compete (Simon, 2017b). Apart from this changed focus, the 
industry has been able to frame its societal value mainly from a supply security 
perspective, similar to the nuclear lobby’s efforts some years back (Garud, Gehman, 
et al., 2010). The NGO network CAN-Europe has calculated that in the years 2014-
2016, the EU has on average annually spent more than €200 million on gas 
infrastructure projects (CAN-Europe, 2017), to lower the EU’s dependency on 
Russian gas imports (EUC, 2017a, p. 26). This is through the EU infrastructure fund, 
wherein pipelines and liquid natural gas terminals qualify to be funded as “projects 
of Common Interests” if they can be proven to “enhance security of supply” or 
merely “increase competition by offering alternatives to consumers” (EUC, 2017b). 
By funding pipelines and LNG terminals with EU taxpayer money, the EU 
decreases dependence on Russia, but increases dependence on natural gas in general. 
This strategy is dangerous, because too much new gas infrastructure can create a 
lock-in effect post-2030 (Pfeiffer et al., 2016).  
Despite the EU’s support for infrastructure construction, the gas sector is under 
pressure due to low electricity prices throughout Europe. Two of the largest Western 
manufacturers in the gas industry, Siemens AG and General Electric announced 
substantial workforce reductions of 6,900 and 12,000 employees, respectively, in the 
last quarter of 2017, signaling a time of “disruption of unprecedented scope and 
speed” according to a Siemens AG press release (Hsu & Krauss, 2017). Finding 
investors for new gas plants is difficult, even in the UK, where electricity prices are 
among the highest in the EU. In 2014, the UK government offered the utility Carlton 
Power a capacity payment contract to build a new 1.8 GW gas plant in Trafford near 
Manchester. The subsidy contract stipulated a fixed annual payment of €22/kW 
installed, equal to ~€40 million per year. The contract was for the first 15 years of 
the plant’s operations, so the total subsidy would amount to more than €500 million 
(Gosden, 2016). Despite this lucrative contract and after two years of dedicated 
effort, Carlton Power was unable to secure investors and had to give up the subsidy 
contract. They would instead try to bid again in a later capacity auction to receive a 
higher payment per KW (Reuters, 2017). This shows that even traditional 
benchmark competitors for wind power find themselves in a market that does not 
guarantee their expansion. 
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 Power-to-gas is where electricity from some electricity producing facility, which could be wind 
or solar power, is turned into gas to be pumped into the gas grid at a later stage. Currently, it is very 
expensive because conversion losses are high; however, in the future it could be a way to convert 
renewable electricity into fuel for heating that can be stored in the gas grid. It is also a way for 
current gas operators to continue to stay on the grid.  
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9.5. ENERGY INDEPENDENCE – THE FORGOTTEN QUALITY 
The Energy Independence quality helped frame wind power as a valuable energy 
source both in the 1970s and the mid-2000s. Nonetheless it appeared to fade into the 
background after impacts of geopolitical shocks weakened and lawmakers 
collectively began to focus on other issues. This is a geopolitical mistake, as energy 
distribution shapes country interdependencies to a great extent. The EU today 
imports 53% of its fuels (gas, coal and oil), and 67% of those imports are gas. 
Russia is the prime exporter, delivering around 30% of each source of fuel. This is 
shown in figure 49 is edited which I have edited to show only total dependency and 
natural gas dependency, while supplier graphs are edited to show only the top 5 
suppliers. The graphs are all sourced from page 24 and 26 in the European Union’s 
Commission Statistical pocketbook on energy (EUC, 2017a, p. 24,26).  
 
 
Figure 49: Energy import dependency by fuel and supplier. 
 
As mentioned previously, a large portion of Europe’s infrastructure funds is spent to 
subsidize the construction of new gas infrastructure to reduce dependency on Russia. 
Once this infrastructure is built, the EU will nonetheless remain dependent on gas 
imports, just from different sources (i.e., liquid natural gas shipments and non-
Russian oil and gas fields). Thanks to oil and gas fields in the North Sea, Denmark is 
one of a few countries in the EU with very low import levels of these liquid fuels. 
Nevertheless, Denmark is affected by the geopolitical compromises made by the 
EU, as evidenced by the ongoing dispute over the Russian-German consortium gas 
pipeline, Nordstream 2 (Beim & Arnfred, 2017). In 2017, the Danish parliament 
enacted a law that specifically allows the Ministry of Foreign affairs to deny 
infrastructure proposals due to geopolitical risks. The Russian-German consortium 
behind the Nordstream 2 pipeline felt directly targeted by this law, and in a letter to 
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the Danish Energy Committee in Parliament hyperbolically asked if future permits 
to offshore wind farms should also adhere to the principle of L43 and be evaluated 
on how they affect supply security (FT.dk, 2017b, p. 4). To this question, the wind 
power industry could easily respond, “Yes, please.” If wind farms were compared 
with gas plants on the quality of Energy Independence, they would look quite 
favorable. Energy Independence was not translated into numbers during any of the 
five valuation periods studied, which likely explains why it appears to be somewhat 
forgotten after geo-political shocks. But in a world with increasing geo-political 
tensions (Sonne, 2018), gaining Energy Independence from other nations should be 
one of the highest priorities. The visionary entrepreneur Johannes Juul recognized 
this back in 1962, and it is worth re-stating his original question in a slightly re-
framed way: Can we afford not to utilize our only domestic (sustainable and 
renewable) source of energy? 
 
9.6. A FUTURE OF NEW VALUATION FRAMES  
In the configuration of energy markets, the Wind power industry have had to show 
that the benefits and Future Potential of wind power make the investments required 
to cover the Technology Cost worthwhile. Coal and gas infrastructure was built 
decades ago when there was not much diversity or competition among energy 
sources. Their costs were black-boxed as the cheapest and no one calculated what it 
cost to integrate them into the grid or if there were Black-out Risk to doing this. 
Today, the variable nature of wind power is at times used in framings that aim to 
disqualify wind power from playing a significant role in the energy mix. But as 
sector integration and storage solutions have emerged, it has become harder for 
conventional plant owners to maintain the framing that they are necessary baseload 
suppliers. Denmark can serve as the example to the world where wind power is the 
backbone and not the add-on to the system. Wind Power can then serve as a reliable 
source of energy, which is cheaper to build than the incumbent actors that preceeded 
it. We today know more than we did when the old fossil fuel energy systems were 
built. We know that for every piece of coal burned, we are worsening an existential 
threat to our species’ survival. As wind power is materially cost-competitive to build 
and capable of system integration, it produces itself as the standard energy 
investment for the future. 
But the road to get there is not straightforward or simple. Wind power will risk 
being framed as a matter of concern from the two existing incumbent fossil fuel 
sources. Coal and Gas face uncertain futures and large investments are at stake. In 
the near future, it could very well become nearly impossible for new coal plants to 
be built in the EU. Coal plant operators face an uphill battle to stay on the grid, as it 
is becoming cheaper to cease operations of current plants and build renewable 
energy capacity which will not face future CO2 emission fees. The gas industry will 
9. INSIGHTS FOR CHALLENGERS 
313 
position itself as a peak-load specialist, and build a business case around capturing 
high market prices when renewable energy production is low. In the future, both 
existing coal and new gas plants will depend on various support mechanisms from 
nation states or the EU to continue operating. A new valuation framing for existing 
fossil fuel plants will no longer focus on cost, but on stability versus wind power. In 
this valuation struggle, it is important for actors such as Siemens Gamesa 
Renewable Energy to highlight that wind power supports long-term stability by 
reducing fuel imports, and that grid stability can be achieved through available 
sector integration and storage solutions. It is in this discussion that the quality of 
Energy Independence is worth highlighting. There are huge gains to having an 
energy source, which does not render the EU highly dependent on foreign states.  
In this chapter, I have mapped the larger EU energy market and technology trends 
affecting it in an attempt to answer research question 2. I have identified some key 
future moments of valuation, highlighted some points of reference that are useful in 
dismantling negative impact qualities, and proposed a renewed focus on the societal 
quality of Energy Independence. Hereafter, I present my final conclusions. 
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10. CONCLUSION 
In this final segment, I draw conclusions from my key findings to answer my 
problem statement:  
 
What has been the historical role of valuation devices in qualifying wind power as a 
worthwhile investment for Danish society? 
  
10.1. QUALIFYING WIND POWER AS VALUABLE OR NOT 
My empirical analysis of the five moments of valuation reveals how three different 
devices have been used to frame wind power as a worthwhile investment or not. 
During the first period, Unique Supplement, wind power’s value was calculated 
through a break-even price relative to coal imports. This means that the ultimate test 
of wind power’s value was how cheaply it could support existing coal and oil power 
plants as a supplemental source of energy. This valuation device became outdated in 
the 1990s, as wind turbines had grown enough in size to form actual power plants, 
and the need to mitigate CO2 emissions became a central requirement for new 
energy capacity. In the Climate Solution and Global Advantage valuation frames, 
the preferred valuation device was the industry yardstick of LCOE, which enacted 
the value of wind power as a stand-alone energy source and enabled a large built-
out. This stopped with the emergence of Market Distortion valuation frame. It 
signaled the final major shift in valuation practices, as a number of new devices 
emerged that did not base calculations on Technology Cost, but on the ratio of 
subsidies invested or taxes incurred to societal benefits (i.e., cost-benefit analysis). 
This frame transformed not only the device, but also the object of valuation from the 
wind turbine as a technology to the prosthetic devices that enabled wind power in 
the market, namely subsidies and taxes. During the last period of the analysis, 
Subsidy Burden, both LCOE and various cost-benefit-like calculations of subsidies 
were used to value wind power. Findings from this most recent struggle reveal that 
when LCOE is used as the metric, wind power is a highly valuable energy source 
compared to alternative energy sources; however, when the cost of prosthetic 
devices is the metric (i.e., costs of building wind power against a business-as-usual 
scenario or a theoretical quota market price), the high value of wind power is at risk.   
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10.2. COALITION INTERESTS APPEAR STRONGER THAN 
CALCULATIVE DEVICES 
A key finding from the study is that there is no logical progression for how qualities 
are assembled in the valuation frames. The empirical observations suggest that 
rather than calculative devices shaping the perspectives of coalitions, coalitions 
shape calculative devices to support their perspectives. Some qualities appear to be 
inherently connected to certain coalitions. When the constellations of actors change 
within coalitions, the salience and ranking of qualities also change. The valuation 
frames wherein the Future Potential quality had an impact were created by actors 
from the original Unique- or Climate-coalitions. On the other hand, the Market 
Distortion quality is directly associated with Market-coalition actors, who 
incorporated it into the Subsidy Burden valuation frame despite evidence of large-
scale subsidies for several other energy sources. Two significant actor movements 
exemplify this point. First, when the utilities began to invest in wind power during 
the Climate Solution period, the Climate-Coalition changed the market frameworks 
to make a strong Climate Solution valuation network as the Fuel-coalition actors 
dispersed or joined the Climate-coalition. The Fuel Supplement quality was no 
longer applicable until the Market-coalition introduced a completely different 
calculative device. The Market-coalition was not closely aligned with the utilities, 
but was comprised of actors from proximate fields. The second movement is when 
De Konservative left the market coalition in 2007 and become a central actor in the 
Global-coalition. This continued to create friction into the next period, where the 
political party Venstre tried re-introducing the market coalition’s calculative devices 
to stop nearshore projects during the Subsidy Burden period.  Since the Global-
coalition remained influential, Technology Cost could not be ignored as a central 
quality in the Subsidy Burden frame. But the claim that wind power is not valuable 
unless it is subjected to technology neutrality is a sign of an entrenched meaning that 
traces back to the introduction of the Market Distortion quality in 2002. 
My findings thus reveal that entrenched meanings connect certain qualities to certain 
coalitions. These meanings can persist over time and cause public discussions to be 
behind the materially proven technological developments. Wind power still appears 
to be a politically controversial entity in Denmark, resulting in the formation of 
coalitions with widely divergent views fighting to impose their valuations in the 
ongoing struggle. While wind power appears to be an incumbent when seen through 
the materiality of the build-out in Denmark, disparate entrenched meanings continue 
to inhibit the black-boxing of wind power as the standard investment when it comes 
to new energy infrastructure.  
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10.3. LOW COSTS, BUT SOCIETAL QUALITIES WILL 
DETERMINE THE FUTURE 
I have identified 12 defining qualities, split among the technological, environmental 
and societal domains.  My findings show that wind power is valuable when the 
qualities of Technology Cost and CC Mitigation have an impact on the framing. 
Nonetheless, the view that accompanies the Market Distortion quality may interfere 
with the Future Potential for capacity expansion. Future frames that disqualify wind 
power will almost certainly be forced to build on the notion that wind power distorts 
some imagined market equilibrium. This will become increasingly prevalent as wind 
power begins to push conventional gas and coal plants off the grid. In this valuation 
struggle, it is important to highlight that current energy prices do not reflect the 
actual costs of damage incurred during energy production. If one acknowledges the 
urgency of climate change, CC Mitigation should as a result have a decisive impact 
on any future frame. Wind power’s positive value based on this quality is inherent in 
its physical materiality. The opposite applies to any calculations based on the notion 
of Market Distortion. This quality is contingent on a specific way of viewing the 
market that is not anchored in the materiality of the technology. Coal and gas plants 
emit CO2 no matter how the market is designed. Their status as “conventional” 
power generation methods is not rooted in any evidence of superiority, but in 
historical precedence.  
Although the CC Mitigation quality was heavily contested in the Market Distortion 
frame, it was recognized as having a positive impact in the most recent Subsidy 
Burden valuation frame. This means that the CC Mitigation quality is not as 
contested as it had been just 20 years ago. Nevertheless, there is a risk that 
environmental qualities will not be decisive factors in the wind power struggle to 
come. The Environment quality was present, but did not significantly impact any of 
the last four frames, despite the fact that air pollution data is clearly more 
measurable today than it was in the 1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, fresh drinking 
water will be scarcer in the future, which should prompt a move towards energy 
sources that do not waste vast amounts of fresh water to generate power. These 
points of reference are nonetheless absent from all of the valuation frames until now. 
The environmental qualities that impact wind power positively, CC Mitigation and 
Environment, appears to mainly be salient to actors that are already proponents of 
wind power.  Meanwhile, the Aesthetics quality may grow in importance going 
forward, as onshore wind is becoming more contested.  
My findings suggest that broad coalitions are most likely to form around the societal 
qualities, Industrial and Energy Independence. It is particularly surprising that it 
cannot be expected that the environmental quality of CC Mitigation, has not yet 
been the driving quality at the center of a broad policy coalition in Denmark. In the 
present context of concerns, a challenger technology which can mitigate climate 
change, such as wind power, may need to also draw salience to the two societal 
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qualities, Industrial and Energy Independence, to achieve the needed build-out. The 
Industrial quality is present in all valuation frames and is especially strong for wind 
power, as production involves a high degree of manual labor. This quality is 
specifically valuable in Denmark, which has a large domestic industry, as well as in 
several European countries with the ability to expand existing manufacturing 
footprints. The other important societal quality, Energy Independence, was not as 
salient as the Industrial quality throughout the five periods, as it really only had an 
impact in the Unique Supplement and Global Advantage frames. Given recent geo-
political tensions, EU member states are willing to fund gas pipelines and LNG 
facilities to obtain gas from several sources and reduce their dependence on Russia. 
But the Energy Independence quality and the potential for fuel-free energy to be 
used for heating and transportation purposes has not yet been adequately 
incorporated into valuation frames. With the potential to deliver an even better 
solution than merely diversifying sources of foreign gas imports, wind power 
proponents should focus on how to apply Denmark’s infinite domestic energy 
resources to energy needs beyond electricity. 
 
10.4. CONTRIBUTIONS 
This study contributes by empirically elaborating the emerging field of valuation 
studies, which valuation studies scholars have situated at the intersection of 
“technology and organization” and “complex and/or rapidly changing valuation 
situations” (Kjellberg et al., 2013, p. 26).  Power generation technologies such as 
wind power and gas or coal plants have inherent qualities. Some of these qualities 
are particularly salient to the grand challenge of climate change. Whenever CC 
Mitigation is salient as a quality, wind power is highly valuable. Surprisingly, in an 
era in which climate change threatens the very existence of the human species, a 
quality related to a particular understanding of a market (i.e., Market Distortion) can 
change the salience and impact of the quality of CC Mitigation. The case of wind 
power in Denmark is therefore especially well-suited to addressing “how 
organization and technology act as levers or impediments in the reconfiguration of 
value systems” (Kjellberg et al., 2013, p. 26). 
My study has shown how valuation frames of wind power are established, contested, 
changed, maintained and reinforced over time. Moreover, my findings reveal how 
entrenched meanings can impede the stabilization of new technology networks. The 
struggle over the valuation of wind power as a societal investment is an intriguing 
line of research, as it reveals how policymakers justify the decisions they make on 
behalf of citizens. The value our society ascribes to societal investments is not only 
determined by votes every four years, but also through the active agenda-setting of 
influential actors exercising power through calculative asymmetries.  
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This study also contributes to Siemens Gamesa Renewable Energy and the wind 
turbine industry in general by proposing a model comprised of valuation frames and 
valuation networks that can be used to map future valuation struggles. As a 
challenger technology that is still highly politicized, wind power is not as stable as 
fossil fuels, and the dynamics that determine which valuation frames become 
dominant are important to monitor.   
Although wind power recently has been framed and materially solidified as 
economically and technically superior to gas and coal plants, it will continue to rely 
on market frameworks set by lawmakers. This is also the case for gas and coal 
plants, but the market frameworks enabling wind power are not as black-boxed as is 
the case for the fossil incumbents. This study has shown that there is little logic to 
how the rules of the game are set, and that these rules are highly dependent on the 
coalition in charge at a given moment in time. The current system and market 
frameworks that wind power must compete within are indeed “historic, contingent 
and disputable” (Muniesa et al., 2007, p. 3), and it is time to mobilize a higher level 
of resistance to the remaining incumbent frameworks.  As the wind turbine industry 
grows, it will be even more important to identify the key coalitions that set market 
frameworks and to have appropriate tools to understand their valuations of wind 
power. Looking forward from 2018, penetration levels for wind power in several 
European countries will likely match those achieved in Denmark throughout the last 
10 to 15 years. Based on LCOE, onshore wind is already cheaper to install than 
other new-build capacity options in the EU, while offshore wind power is 
competitive with the new gas plants.  
Technology Cost may become a less salient quality in future valuation struggles, and 
the LCOE valuation device will become less relevant. The central struggle will 
pertain to the comprehensive integration of renewables and associated system 
improvements. In this discussion, wind power proponents must challenge framings 
that place the costs of energy system improvements (e.g., sector integration, grid 
reinforcements) on wind power. The wind industry will face many obstacles if costs 
are measured against a business-as-usual scenario, or if the sunk costs of existing 
fossil fuel capacity are calculated against it. I hope that the empirical chapters can 
serve as a historical reminder of the significant struggle associated with the 
implementation and development of wind power. Some obstacles related to material 
limitations of the valuation network (primarily grid limitations during the Unique 
Supplement period), but others related to conscious framings of wind power as a 
disturbance to a fictitious market, or exaggerated problems of variability in energy 
production.    
The most important contribution to me personally, is my attempt to set a research 
agenda around how we as a society value the entities that could help us mitigate the 
existential crisis of climate change. Since society is not an abstract entity, the 
“methodological situationalism” inherent to the valuation perspective requires 
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researchers to identify the sites and tools used for valuation. Following this principle 
my study has improved the understanding of how society’s investment decisions are 
qualified (i.e., by mapping the qualities organized in valuation frames), and how 
assumptions about technologies and the energy system can be examined. Once these 
assumptions are visualized, they can establish links between a given valuation frame 
and the valuation network upholding it. Certain valuation networks may inhibit the 
green transition, not only through material obstacles in the form of grid constraints 
or sunk costs, but also through coalitions of powerful actors, which impose their 
valuation frames upon citizens who may not share their views of the world. Here, it 
is important to identify valuation frames based on how the market devices that 
enable wind power are valued and changed. Influential actors may praise the 
competitive Technology Cost of wind power, yet destabilize the market structures 
that enable it. The rules of the game are still being negotiated for wind power 
although it may be approaching a shaky status as somewhere between challenger 
and incumbent. Asymmetries of power are still present in how wind powers costs 
can be framed against business as usual fossil fuel based scenarios, or have its 
climate change mitigation potential compared to a hypothetical functioning carbon 
market. According to valuation studies, there are no neutral valuations of objects 
such as wind turbines, gas plants or interconnector cables, as the existing energy 
system and market frameworks are designed with a certain valuation of energy 
sources in mind. It is important to open and challenge these assumptions to re-frame 
valuations and build a society free of fossil fuels and full of renewables. 
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Content 
Appendix A contains a large number of key figures on wind power and the Danish 
energy system. It has exports, employees, estimated subsidies and investments, 
export markets and several other data. It also has a list of the ministers responsible 
for energy as these also determine the materiality of wind power.  
Appendix B gives the background of the key actor interviews in this dissertation 
and the translation of the Danish quotes that are used in the dissertation.  
Appendix C is a further discussion of the DEC’s framing of wind power and carbon 
markets between 2008 and 2016. This is not critical for the analysis, but is still 
included as an appendix to show the development in this actor’s position. 
Appendix D features additional quotes for three reports in the analysis (AKF 1996, 
DEC 2002, EK 2017). These reports had several text-bites that I needed to refer to 
and it was therefore better to have the full quotes listed here in the appendix. 
 
Note to readers: Note that although the Appendices contain figures and tables, I do 
not number or list them in the table overview, as this is only for the main thesis. The 
Appendices are individually not that long and the largest appendix is split into A1, 
A2 etc. It should be possible to navigate the figures and tables without numbering.   
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Appendix A. Materiality of wind power 
in the Danish energy system 
 
A1: Wind Power build-out in Denmark  
Below are graphs and source data on installed wind power reproduced from the 
Danish Energy Agency latest updated overview tables from 2018 (DEA, 2018). The 
first Gray columns are the total active capacity each year. The Green Columns are 
onshore wind and the blue columns are offshore wind. 
 
Year
Number of 
Turbines
Capacity 
(KW) Production kWh
Number of 
Turbines
Capacity 
(KW)
Number of 
Turbines
Capacity 
(KW)
1977 2 52 0 2 52
1978 13 813 120.492 13 813
1979 23 1.090 239.881 23 1.090
1980 68 2.666 2.235.719 68 2.666
1981 165 6.252 4.606.217 165 6.252
1982 259 10.605 11.924.214 259 10.605
1983 334 14.270 19.307.389 334 14.270
1984 439 19.903 25.648.341 439 19.903
1985 828 47.076 44.090.250 828 47.076
1986 1.137 72.573 104.107.878 1.137 72.573
1987 1.475 112.138 154.121.309 1.475 112.138
1988 1.959 190.623 265.624.150 1.959 190.623
1989 2.286 246.973 397.899.125 2.286 246.973
1990 2.665 325.981 567.211.080 2.665 325.981
1991 3.013 392.859 684.082.588 3.002 387.909 11 4.950
1992 3.215 435.949 832.315.178 3.204 430.999 11 4.950
1993 3.345 468.099 920.126.705 3.334 463.149 11 4.950
1994 3.488 521.237 1.055.420.642 3.477 516.287 11 4.950
1995 3.656 599.499 1.089.705.951 3.635 589.549 21 9.950
1996 4.082 814.221 1.190.123.769 4.061 804.271 21 9.950
1997 4.648 1.123.347 1.891.256.701 4.627 1.113.397 21 9.950
1998 5.132 1.438.482 2.762.848.701 5.111 1.428.532 21 9.950
1999 5.561 1.753.445 3.001.700.498 5.540 1.743.495 21 9.950
2000 6.235 2.390.015 4.216.028.540 6.194 2.340.065 41 49.950
2001 6.286 2.497.153 4.312.332.563 6.245 2.447.203 41 49.950
2002 5.430 2.894.531 4.857.840.557 5.307 2.680.581 123 213.950
2003 5.372 3.119.916 5.560.255.581 5.158 2.696.566 214 423.350
2004 5.380 3.123.712 6.579.879.402 5.166 2.700.362 214 423.350
2005 5.276 3.127.836 6.612.638.579 5.062 2.704.486 214 423.350
2006 5.258 3.135.696 6.105.519.082 5.044 2.712.346 214 423.350
2007 5.207 3.124.214 7.138.305.076 4.993 2.700.864 214 423.350
2008 5.095 3.162.870 6.975.204.677 4.881 2.739.520 214 423.350
2009 5.099 3.482.087 6.716.178.321 4.785 2.821.237 314 660.850
2010 5.015 3.801.829 7.856.347.169 4.611 2.933.979 404 867.850
2011 4.951 3.951.981 9.793.744.412 4.546 3.080.531 405 871.450
2012 5.002 4.161.930 10.251.068.440 4.583 3.240.080 419 921.850
2013 5.236 4.819.112 11.128.529.706 4.720 3.548.062 516 1.271.050
2014 5.285 4.886.592 13.076.522.912 4.769 3.615.542 516 1.271.050
2015 5.770 5.077.165 14.126.137.504 5.254 3.806.115 516 1.271.050
2016 6.111 5.245.772 12.771.094.449 5.595 3.974.722 516 1.271.050
2017 6.157 5.520.634 14.771.583.326 5.649 4.228.834 508 1.291.800
Onshore Wind Offshore WindActive Turbines (Total)
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A2: Energy Mix and historical development in Denmark 
All of the key data in Appendix A6 are reproduced from The Danish Energy Agency 
Publication Dansk Energistatistik / Danish Energy Statistics 2016 (DEA, 2017b, p. 
9,13,14).. The first graph below shows wind powers share of Danish electricity 
production (p. 9). The next table shows the installed capacity of electricity 
producing capacity (p. 14) The last table shows that fuels are used to generate 
electricity in Denmark (p. 13).  
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A3: Exports and Jobs 
This appendix depicts key numbers on exports and jobs of the wind power industry. 
Below is a combined graph of exports and thereafter employees. The details of my 
estimate, which is gathered from multiple sources, can be found after the two tables.  
 
 
 
 
 
Early Period 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 Total
Exports (Bn. DKK - Real 2017) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,5 1,3 3,4 2,1 0,6 0,3 0,7 0,8 1,0 10,9
Per Year: 0,8
Middle Period 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total
Exports (Bn. DKK - Real 2017) 1,4 1,8 3,0 4,5 4,7 9,2 6,9 11,1 11,0 21,4 21,1 19,7 22,3 138,0
Per Year: 10,6
Late Period 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Exports (Bn. DKK - Real 2017) 20,4 39,5 46,5 62,9 58,2 48,9 52,0 50,1 46,2 54,9 49,0 55,6 55,6 639,8
2017 is an estimate based on 2016 Per Year: 49,2
Early Period 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Employees N/A 50 70 200 500 1100 3300 2000 900 1200 1200 2500 2500
Middle Period 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Employees 2600* 2700 3300 9000 9950* 10900 12000 14000 16000 20000 21000 20900 20900
Late Period 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Employees 21000 27500 31400 34600 29800 28300 28800 28100 27200 30100 31200 32900 32900
2017 is an estimate based on 2016
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The years 1979-1989 
The numbers from 1979 to 1989 are sourced from Peter Karnøe’s dissertation on 
wind power from 1991 (Karnøe, 1991, p. 16). They are adjusted for inflation from 
Real-1990 to Real-2015.  
 
The years from 1990-1996 
Export and employment numbers are hard to come by in the early 1990’s, so I have 
had to rely on estimates based on news-sources that reported on each years industry 
statistics. Below are the numbers in a table that have been converted (DST, 2016). 
The numbers with an asterisk are estimates based on the numbers from the 
neighboring years.   
 
Numbers from available sources 
1990: 2500 employees and 500 mn. in exports (Pol, 1991a)  
1991: 2500 employees and 620 mn. in exports (Skaaning, 1993c) 
1992: 915 mn. in exports (Nørgaard, 1993b) 
1993: 2700 employees (Skaaning, 1993b) and 1.2 bn. In exports (Skaaning, 1993c)  
1994: 3300 employees (Andreassen, 1994) and 2 bn. In exports (Skaaning, 1995) 
1995: 9000 employees and 3 bn. (article mentions 4 bn. sales of which “majority” is 
exports) (AKT, 1996) 
1996: 3.2 bn. (The majority of 4.3 bn. sales) (Panduro, 1997; Tornbjerg, 1997) 
 
The wind turbine export numbers for 1997 and 1998 has been read from the export 
graph from the DWIA’s 2007 industry report (DWIA, 2007). The Wind Turbine 
Export numbers from 1999-2006 are from the DWIA Industry’s report from 2010 
(DWIA, 2010, p. 16). The estimates for 2006 and 2007 have in the later 2016 
publication been adjusted (Damvad, 2016, p. 11).  
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Full-time employees for 1997-2007 was found in the industry’s 2007 report (DWIA, 
2007). The numbers for 2006 and 2007 were later readjusted according to the 
industry’s 2016 publication (Damvad, 2016).  The most recent numbers on exports 
are sourced from the Danish Wind Industry Association (Damvad, 2016; DEA, 
2011b; Soendergaard, 2016). The 2016 numbers are from the DWIA industry 
statistics (DWIA, 2017b).  
 
A4: Subsidies and investments in wind power 
The subsidies estimate is good as it provides an overview of proportions when it is 
combined with the exports calculated in Appendix A3. Below is a table of the 
estimates for each of the costs for the early, middle and late period of the 39 years. 
The table that follows has the estimate for each of the individual years. It is these 
years that provide the numbers for the totals for each 13-year period. Note that there 
may be small discrepancies in the totals, as the numbers are rounded off to the 
nearest whole number in the displayed years.  
 
 
 
Exports do of course not equal direct revenue back to the state. But it does however 
equal jobs in a manufacturing sector that supplies other countries and therefore 
brings in tax revenues to the country both through company profit taxes and the 
taxes payed by employees. The DWIA recently calculated that the Danish wind 
turbine industry contributed with roughly 13 bn. in tax-revenues in 2016 (DWIA, 
Investments (Mn. DKK, 2017-Real) 1979-1991 1992-2004 2005-2017 Total
Subsidies 995 15041 31155 47190
Research 570 764 910 2243
Grid Connection Onshore 132 563 1042 1736
Grid Connection Offshore 0 1350 4149 5499
Total Costs (Subsidies, Research, Grid Connection) 1696 17717 37255 56668
Average Costs per year 130 1363 2866 1453
Exports 10901 138005 639798 788704
Exports (Year) 839 10616 49215 20223
DKK exported per DKK spent on devices 6,4 7,8 17,2 13,9
Societal Wind Power Investments (mn. DKK, 2017-Real) 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 Total
Subsidies 3 5 4 6 9 11 16 48 76 126 173 238 279 995
Research 96 20 28 55 50 39 44 42 35 39 39 40 45 570
Grid Connection Costs (Onshore) 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 12 132
Grid Connection Costs (Offshore) 0
Total: 1696
Per Year: 130
Societal Wind Power Investments (mn. DKK, 2017-Real) 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total
Subsidies 335 374 403 406 411 662 863 804 1599 2394 2422 2000 2367 15041
Research 52 56 51 44 44 70 50 49 70 70 70 70 70 764
Grid Connection Costs (Onshore) 15 20 25 30 35 41 46 51 56 61 61 61 61 563
Grid Connection Costs (Offshore) 150 1200 1350
Total: 17717
Per Year: 1363
1,251
Societal Wind Power Investments (mn. DKK, 2017-Real) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Subsidies 2312 1490 1820 618 1189 1000 1361 2111 2975 3953 4538 3747 4043 31155
Research 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 910
Grid Connection Costs (Onshore) 61 71 79 87 48 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 1042
Grid Connection Costs (Offshore) 1297 1352 1500 4149
Total: 37255
Per Year: 2866
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2017a, p. 16). Throughout the 39 years from 1979-2017, the wind turbine industry 
has on average spent less than 1.7 bn. DKK per year on wind power investments. 
What can also be seen over the split of the 39 years into an early, middle and late 
period is that the relationship to how much the industry exports compared to the 
incurred societal costs to the domestic fleet increased significantly since the mid-
2000. If current trends continue, the state will annually spend in the proximity of 5-6 
bn. DKK on costs of wind power, and receive tax revenues around 13 bn. Denmark 
thus receives 2 DKK in tax revenues from the wind industry per 1 DKK it invests. I 
acknowledge that some of the numbers are benchmark estimates and does not 100% 
accurately depict the costs. I have noted that there are some counterfactual costs to 
the grid that could have been added, but even if these would add 10-15% to the total 
costs, the conclusions about less than 1.7 bn. DKK as annual average investments 
would still hold, as well as the conclusion about 12 DKK exported per 1 DKK 
invested.   
 
Sources and assumptions 
Below is a walkthrough of where I have collected the various numbers used in my 
estimate. The subsidies are very well accounted for. The research grants after 1999 
are not as easy to locate, but I have used I high estimate from the year in the 1990’s 
where there was spent a high degree of money on wind power research, 1997. Grid 
Connection costs for onshore are featured in some of the Energinet Annual report, 
but these were not published before 2005. I have therefore also taken a high estimate 
to account for the post-2005 years where I do not have data. This number is then 
slightly lowered in the early years, as it was a smaller installed fleet. On Offshore 
grid connections costs I have used the Horns Rev 3 costs as a benchmark for the 
other major wind farms built in Denmark. Horns Rev 3 is further from shore than the 
earlier farms, so these benchmarks will also likely overestimate the actual costs 
incurred. The final number covers balancing costs, Grid reinforcements and extra 
grid losses from the decentral production of wind power. This is a much more 
difficult entity to find actual numbers on but in 2013 the DWOA created an estimate 
based on the 2012 fleet. I have used this estimate to benchmark the other years. The 
number is lowered for the earlier years, as these costs correspond closely to the size 
of the installed fleet. It can be discussed whether or not some grid reinforcements 
and grid losses would have occurred anyway, if something else had been built 
instead of wind power. However, I have decided to take the full number to ensure 
that if I do make an error in this estimation exercise, it will likely be that I 
overestimate the costs. All numbers have been converted to 2017-Real using the 
official Statistics Denmark database (DST, 2018).  
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Subsidies 
The numbers from 1979 to 1999 are from the DEC 2002 report on wind turbines 
subsidies. These numbers were sourced directly from the Danish Energy Agency by 
the DEC and are thus fairly straightforward (DEC, 2002a, p. 194).  
 
Numbers from 2000-2004 are estimates based on available sources 
Known Data Wind turbine subsidies in 2005 (2005 currency): 1952 mn. Wind 
power and other renewables’ share of the total PSO costs was 54% in 2005 (3597 
mn. DKK). I therefore attribute 55% of the total PSO-costs for 2001-2004 to wind 
power to gain my estimate.  
The five years between 2000 and 2004 are the only ones where I do not have 
accurate data on wind turbine subsidies. I do however have a rough overview of the 
total PSO costs on “Environmental electricity” from 2001-2004 (P.-F. Bach, 2014, 
p. 2). I will therefore make an estimate of the costs based on the following 
assumptions. Since the publication I am reading the missing PSO numbers from is 
published in 2014, I have assumed that the numbers in the graph are 2013-Real.  
Known data: Wind-turbine subsidies in 1999: 634 mn. DKK (2002-R): 804 mn. 
DKK (R-2017) 
Unknown year 2000: Estimate is placed halfway between 1999 and 2001 number: 
1599 mn. DKK (R-2017) 
Total Environmental Subsidies 2001: 4250 mn. DKK hereof 55 % wind = 2338 mn. 
DKK (2013-R) = 2394 mn. DKK (R-2017) 
Total Environmental Subsidies 2002 : 4300 mn. DKK hereof 55 % wind = 2365 mn. 
DKK (R-2013-R) 
Total Environmental Subsidies 2003 : 3550 mn. DKK, hereof 55 % wind = 1953 
mn. DKK (R-2013-R) 
Total Environmental Subsidies 2004 : 4200 mn. DKK hereof 55% wind = 2310 mn. 
DKK (R-2013) 
 
This is likely higher than the real share of wind power, but I want to be sure I do not 
underestimate the costs.  
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Research 
There are accurate numbers on the research grants given to wind power research 
from 1979-1999. To estimate the amount of Research grants apart from subsidies 
that are given to wind power after 1999, I take the highest number for one year 
during the 1990-s This is 1997, where 55 mn. DKK was spent (70 mn. DKK in 
2017-Real). I use this number for the remaining years in the analysis as the wind 
turbine research is spread over several different pots and it has not been possible 
within the scope of this thesis to more accurately track it. By placing the high 70 mn. 
DKK number for all years between 2000 and 2017 I am more likely to overestimate 
how much R&D funding has been given too wind power since several years in these 
periods so significant cuts to wind power funding. But as any analysis of the costs of 
wind power investments will likely be charged with not adequately attributing costs, 
I want to be on the safe side.  
 
Onshore Grid Costs 
These costs are not specified by the DEC. There is however estimates of grid 
connection costs for Wind-power and other renewables in two of the annual reports 
of Energinet (Energinet, 2006, p. 45, 2010, p. 42). Where the 2005 annual report has 
a number for 2005, the 2009 report has a number for 2008 and 2009. I use these 
estimates to set a general benchmark for the post-2000 years where there is no data 
available. In the years from 1979-1990, I keep a grid cost of 10 mn. DKK per year 
as there is a limited fleet. Thereafter the grid costs towards the next available 
number from the data, which is 61 mn. DKK, the one found in the 2005 annual 
report from Energinet converted to 2017-Real (51 mn. in R-2005). I decide to bring 
the estimate of 61 Mn. DKK on the table already from 2001. This is to ensure I do 
not underestimate the grid costs during the years were expenses allegedly was a 
problem. In the years after 2009, I use the highest estimate year-cost from the 2009 
annual report (The 87 mn. DKK in R-2017 for the year 2008) as the mark for the 
other costs. It is worth noting that this cost includes connections costs to other 
decentral stations, so it might not only be wind power connection costs.       
 
Offshore Grid Costs 
When it comes to added costs for large offshore wind farms, I have used the 
Energinet annual reports as the key source and therefrom made estimates for earlier 
parks. The cost for Horns Rev 2 was reported as 867 mn. DKK, Roedsand 2 as 300 
mn. DKK (Energinet, 2010, p. 18), Anholt at 1319 mn. DKK (Energinet, 2014, p. 
38), while Horns Rev 3 is budgeted to 1500 mn. DKK (Energinet, 2016). I have 
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estimated the earlier wind farms (Middelgrunden, Horns Rev 1 and Roedsand 1) 
based on the highest cost-total I have, the Horns Rev 3 costs. The added costs for 
offshore wind farms will therefore be as listed in the table below. Note that the year 
is just the year where I place the costs in the subsidies table, it is not necessarily the 
construction year of the farms.   
Year Wind Farm(s) Size 
(MW) 
Costs - 
Nominal 
Costs (R-
2017) 
1999 Middelgrunden 40 Estimate 10% 
of HR3 
150 mn. 
DKK 
2002 Horns Rev 1 & 
Roedsand 1  
325 Estimate 80% 
of HR3 
1200 mn. 
DKK 
2009 Horns Rev 2 and 
Roedsand 2  
424 1167 mn. DKK 1297 mn. 
DKK 
2013 Anholt 400 1319 mn. DKK 1352 mn. 
DKK 
2017 Horns Rev 3 400 1500 mn. DKK 1500 mn. 
DKK 
 
Note on possible additional costs (Balancing Services and grid losses) 
There are a number of services that are needed to balance the grid which is also 
incurred by the electricity consumers. In addition to grid losses that occur in the 
energy system. These numbers are significantly more difficult to calculate, and they 
are in a territory where it can be discussed whether or not similar costs would not 
also have occurred in the absence of wind power. I will therefore not include any 
such costs in this calculation, although I recognize that there may be some expenses 
with regards to this. The Danish Wind turbine Owners Association attempted to 
calculate such costs for the year 2012 (DWOA, 2013, p. 2)., but since it is only one 
estimate for one year (393 mn. DKK in 2012-Real, ed.), it is not solid enough to 
extrapolate to all other years. These costs are loose estimates and depend on the size 
of the installed fleet and other system-dependent factors. I asses that if these costs 
were to be estimated to the calculation, they would not change the total costs with 
more than 10%, but they would however add a large degree of counterfactual 
estimations to a calculation that otherwise is based on available official sources. I 
therefore leave these costs out for the purpose of having solidified investment 
numbers, but do however recognize the existence of such costs. 
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A5: Age and model type of the Danish wind power fleet 
The below graph is from the Danish Wind Turbine Owners Association (DWOA) – 
The table has data up to the end of February 2017, so the final numbers will be 
slightly higher than the listed installed capacity of 5,2 GW by end of 2016 (DKvind, 
2017). These numbers are found in detail in the DEA graph in Appendix A1. This 
table serves to show the age and size of the various installed turbines. The first graph 
next to it shows erected wind turbines for onshore and offshore in each year from 
1996-2016. The second graph shows that the average age of the Danish onshore fleet 
of 3,9 GW, which in 2017 will be 19 years (DWOA, 2017).  The table below and the 
two graphs are reproduced as depicted in the two publications. 
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Appendix A6: Global Wind Power installations 
The below table is a simple overview of the size of the global wind power markets 
sourced from the Global Wind Energy Council (GWEC). In addition to the total 
installed capacity, I have visualized the top three countries as they were placed at the 
end of each five year period. It is worth noting that in 2000, Denmark was the fourth 
largest market (13.4%) only slightly behind Spain (14.1%) in third place. In 2005, 
Denmark was the fifth largest market (5.3%), by 2010 it was the tenth largest market 
(1.9%) and by 2015 it was outside the top 10 (1.2%). As the 2020 number is a 
forecast I have not speculated as to what countries will form the top three markets. It 
is however commonly agreed that China will remain the largest market with around 
30-34% of global capacity (GWEC, 2007, p. 8, 2017, p. 17,23).  
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Appendix A7: Ministers responsible for Energy legislation 
Below is an overview of the Danish ministers, who had responsibility for energy 
after the ministry was first established in 1979. Note that there is one period, where 
the Ministry responsible for energy was not named after the area (2001-2005). The 
Ministry of Economy and Business is listed as it was therefrom the decision to 
cancel the planned offshore wind farms was taken in 2002. The rough length of the 
period is reflected in the height of the box (DEA, 2016b).  
 
 
Period Name Name of Ministry
1979-1982 Poul Nielson (S) Energy
1982-1986 Knud Enggaard (V) Energy
1986-1988 Svend Erik Hovmand (V) Energy
1988-1990 Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen (RV) Energy
1990-1993 Anne Birgitte Lundholt (C) Industry and Energy
1993-1994 Jann Sjursen (Christian Democrats) Energy
1994-2001 Svend Auken (S) Environment and Energy
2001-2005 Bendt Bendtsen (C) Economy and Business 
2005-2007 Flemming Hansen (V) Transportation and Energy
2007-2009 Connie Hedegaard (C) Climate and Energy
2009-2011 Lykke Friis (V) Climate and Energy
2011-2014 Martin Lidegaard (RV) Climate, Energy and Buildings
2014-2015 Rasmus Helveg Petersen (RV) Climate, Energy and Buildings
2015- Lars Christian Lilleholt (V) Energy, Utilities and Climate
APPENDIX B. INTERVIEW QUOTES 
397 
Appendix B. Interview Quotes 
This Appendix contains the original quotes as I have transcribed them in Danish as 
well as the corresponding translated quotes that are featured in the text. Note that 
some of the Danish quotes in the tables below might be longer than the translated 
English quote, as I have trimmed the quotes in the text. The analysts from EA, DEA, 
Rockwool and Energinet are not listed by name, but their identities are known to the 
author. Below is a short description of the actors and which chapters their quotes are 
featured in.      
 
 
# Interviewee Relevance Chapters
1 Mogens Johansson
Lead Engineer on renewables for "Danske Elværkers Forenings udredningsenhed" 
DEFU. Central in first 1974 DEF report on wind power and part of the group writing the 
ATV 1975 report. 
Unique Supplement
2 Niels I. Meyer
Head of ATV and founder of Wind Power Committee. Central in ATV-coalitions 1975   
and 1976 reports and later alternative energy plans. 
Unique Supplement
3 Henrik Stiesdal
Early wind power entrepreneur and responsible for early patented danish designs. Chief 
Technical officer for Bonus and later Siemens Wind Power from 1987-2014. 
Unique Supplement, 
Climate Solution
4 Bent Christensen
Project and General Manager for ELSAMs renewable Units from 1986-2000. Senior VP in 
DONG Energy (2000-2013 and Siemens Wind Power 2014-ongoing. 
Unique Supplement, 
Climate Solution, 
Global Advantage
5 Steen Gade
Head of Danish Parliament's Environmental committe 1994-1997, Director of Danish 
Environmental Agency 1999-2003. Energy spokesman for Socialistic Peoples Party SF 
throughout 19
Unique Supplement, 
Climate Solution  
6 Jesper Tornbjerg
Journalist with focus on energy and environment for Ingenioeren and Politiken during 
the 1990's. Thereafter working as journalist with energy as focus for Danish Energy. 
Market Distortion
7 EA Energy Analysis Consultants
The Two Energy Analysts who wrote the background report to the Danish Energy 
Agency note about Electricity Production Costs in 2014 
Global Advantage
8 DEA Energy Analysts
The two energy analysts in the Danish Energy Agency, that were responsible for the 
note on Electricity Production Costs in 2014, and had hired the EA consultants to 
validate their findings. 
Global Advantage
9 Rockwool report co-author
One of the two authors from the 2014 Rockwool report which featured the counterfactual 
analysis on wind power.
Global Advantage
10 Energinet Analysts
Two analysts in energy system development at the danish Transmission System 
Operator Energinet. They were interviewed about how much wind power could be 
integrated in the system. 
Insights
11 Neil Fligstein
Co-Author of the Strategic Action Field theory. I had the chance to discuss the project 
with him at a visit in Berkely in the fall of 2016. 
Discussion
12 Marion Fourcade
Author of several impotant papers concerning the task of setting a value on 
environmental matters. I also interviewed her about the project during my 2016 fall visit 
to Berkeley. 
Discussion
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# Translation (English) Original (Danish)
1
This was different people. You had Bent Sørensen who pulled very much in 
the direction that it should be doable, and Niels Meyer as well...Where we 
(DEF) probably used 4-5% (Discount rate), he (Bent Sørensen), was arguing 
that it should be down to almost zero. In that way he skewed it. 
Der var andre folk ikk'. Man havde jo Bent Sørensen som trak meget i 
retning af at det skulle kunne lade sig gøre, og Nils Meyer sådan set også. 
Det er derfor jeg sagde det med real-renten, fordi Bent Sørensen eksellerede 
i det realrente. Hvor vi (DEFU) har vel brugt 4-5 %, men han var nede på at 
det nærmest skulle være 0. På den måde vred han jo på det
2
But then the ATV and Niels Meyer took initiative for windpower 1, which I 
was a part of… it lead to the wind power 2 committee, which was about the 
question 'what should we do, because there might be something in this'. And 
that turned into a program (proposed program in WindPower 2 report, ed.), 
which there was no money for 
Men så var det at ATV og Nils Meyer tog initiativ til Vindkraft 1, hvor jeg 
så kom med. Og det første vindkraftudvalg var lidt af det samme. Der blev 
diskuteret meget realrente og al sådan noget. Men ellers var det 
nogenlunde det samme.  Men så første det jo så til det andet vindkraft-
udvalg, som gik på 'hvad skal vi gøre, fordi der er måske noget i det her'.  
Og det mundede jo så ud i et program, som der ikke var nogen penge til. 
3
I proposed to the utilities, ELSAM and Power import, that we should set 
something up and make a plan, but they did not want to do this. ...But then 
sometime during the summer of 1976, the government sat aside money for 
energy research in connection with the employment-stimulating efforts, 42 
mn. DKK i believe. Niels Gram had been secretary in Wind-power 1 (the first 
ATV report, ed.), and had studied together with me, so I knew him quite well. 
He was in the trade ministry, and then he called and asked us, if we had any 
suggestions about what could be done to improve employment. We had such 
a thing right there in the drawer. That suggestion did not become reality, it 
was actually a bit larger. They (the government) would give us 11 mn. DKK 
and the utilities would then also come with 3 mn. DKK, so we had 14 mn. 
DKK in total (61 mn. DKK in 2017-Real, ed.). 
Så foreslog jeg elselskaberne, ELSAM og kraftimport, at man satte noget 
igang og lavede en plan, og det ville man så ikke. ...Men det var dog ikke så 
tosset, fordi så engang i 1976 omkring sommeren, afsatte regeringen så 
penge til energiforskning i forbindelse med beskæftigelsfremmende 
foranstaltninger., 42 mio. tror jeg. Niels Gram der havde været med i 
vindkraft 1, han havde været sekretær der., som jeg havde læst sammen med 
så jeg kendte ham nogenlunde godt. Han sad i handelsministeriet, og så 
ringede han og spurgte om vi havde noget forslag til hvad man kunne gøre 
for det (beskæftigelsen). Det havde vi lige i skuffen. Det blev så ikke det 
forslag der blev gennemført, det blev faktisk pustet lidt op. De (regeringen) 
kunne give os 11 mio. og kraftværkerne, ELSAM, Kraftimport og DEFU kom 
så med 3 mio., så vi havde 14. 
4
I actually got in touch with a Dane who worked in a utility in one of the New 
England area states. He had read the report (DEFU 1974) and wrote 
me...Travelling to the U.S. At that time was expensive and troublesome, so 
there had to be something to travel for...It came to four visits for a combined 8-
10 days I was over there. DEFU was always well-consolidated, so it was not 
an economic limitation. It was more a matter of how much it was considered 
reasonable to spend on it. 
Så kom jeg faktisk i forbindelse med en dansker som var ansat i et elselskab 
i en af de der new england stater. Han læste rapporten (DEFU 1974) og 
skrev til mig...Dengang til USA det var både noget der kostede penge og 
var et hyr. Så der skulle ligesom være noget at hænge det op på....Det var 
vist de 4 besøg der, men der var en 8-10 dage jeg var derovre alt i alt. DEFU 
var altid velkonsolideret, der havde ikke været nogle problemer økonomisk. 
Det var mere hvad man mente der var rimeligt at bruge på det. 
5
In 1976 it was unemployment which caused wind energy research to get 
funding. Then you started talking about wanting to become independent of 
the Arab states, the oil-nations. This was also something you wanted in 1985. 
Before CO2 became salient, it did not appear until in the 1990's....the whole 
supply security question was important.
I 1976 var det arbejdsløsheden, der gjorde at forskningen fik penge. Så 
begyndte man at sige at vi ville være uafhængige af arabiske lande, 
uafhængige af olie-nationerne. Det vil man også der i 1985. Inden CO2 
kommer på banen, det gør den jo først der i 1990'erne..hele 
forsyningssikkerhedsspørgsmålet var vigtigt. 
1: Mogens Johansson
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# Translation (English) Original (Danish)
1
The official Denmark wanted to bet on coal and nuclear, and that was very 
broadly agreed, it was both industry, utilities and political parties, almost 
everyone. The idea of suggesting to bet on renewable energy was pretty 
original in the public debate. But because it was ATV that did it together with 
the grassroots, the grassroots could draw an advantage from our prestige.
Det officielle Danmark ville satse på kul og atomkraft, og det var meget 
bredt, det var både industri, elværker og politiske partier, næsten alle 
sammen. Det at foreslå at man skulle satse på vedvarende energi var ret 
originalt i debatten. Men fordi det var ATV som gjorde det sammen med 
græsrødderne, så kunne græsrødderne have fordel at vores prestige. 
2
I did not have the entire ATV behind me, as they tried to have me removed as 
president of ATV. They did not believe you could have an ATV president 
who was "anti-technology". But I did however succeed in convincing them 
that there also was much technology in wind power 
Jeg havde ikke hele ATV bag mig, for de prøvede på at få mig smidt ud som 
præsident for ATV. De mente at man kunne ikke have en præsident som var 
"anti-teknologisk" for ATV. Men det lykkedes dog for mig at overbevise 
dem om at der også var meget teknologi i vindkraft. 
3
Already by January (1973), I had invited him (Dennis Meadows) to give a 
lecture at Copenhagen University. There was 500 people there to discuss....It 
was rather important because we got many of the younger politicians to join, 
Kristen Helveg Petersen, and some other older and experienced one....Lone 
(Dybkjær, ed.) and several other became very occupied with it. Radikale 
Venstre fully supported wind power and they were luckily the decisive vote in 
many situations. It was important that we had them.  
Allerede i Januar (1973) havde jeg inviteret ham (Dennis Meadows) op til et 
foredrag på Københavns Universitet. Der var 500 mennesker til stede og 
diskuterede...det var ret vigtigt fordi der fik vi faktisk mange af de unge 
politikere med, Kristen Helveg, og nogle andre fornuftige gamle 
erfarne...Lone og flere af de andre blev meget optaget af det. ..De radikale 
støttede helhjertede vind, og de var heldigvis tungen på vægtskålen i 
mange sammenhænge. Det var vigtigt at vi havde dem. 
2: Niels I. Meyer
# Translation (English) Original (Danish)
1
At one point (during the early 1980’s), we came up to 0.1% of Denmark’s 
electricity consumption, and we thought that was fantastic. It was a 
motivation to people that it could now be compared, and you could compete a 
little. 
På et tidspunkt kom vi op på en promille af Danmarks elforbrug og det 
synes vi jo var fantastisk. det var jo en motivation for folk at man kunne 
sammenligne og man kunne konkurrere lidt. 
2
The people I came to know in the environment, where for the most part driven 
by this opposition to nuclear power,..(some) objected to the first onshore 
wind farm Vestas was set to build in Ringkoebing. Wind power was supposed 
to be implemented through craftsmanship and not based on an industrial 
approach….From thereon I noticed that we differed too much on this topic. 
De jeg kom til at kende i miljøet, For mange var det også den her atomkraft-
modstand, der var driftkraft....(De) gjorde indsigelse mod den første 
vindmøllepark i Ringkøbing som Vestas skulle bygge...det skulle være et 
håndværk og ikke industrielt. Derfra bemærkede jeg at vi så for forskelligt 
på dette område. 
3
I had long hair and wooden clogs, and met these older men, a bit set in their 
ways. At meetings, there would be this characteristic cigar-plate, wherefrom 
you could get cigars, cheroots, cigarettes, often accompanied by a shot of 
fine spirits. When I visited ELSAM during the 1980’s, it would always start 
with a “Gammel Dansk” (A Danish Schnapps-like spirit, ed.). They often saw 
us as noise, and seem to think ‘why should we take these people seriously, 
what is the logic of it’…It had been hinted at the utilities that they should 
engage…I do not think they cared much about the economics of it (wind 
turbines, ed.). It was a completely regulated system….They did not politicize 
on the employee-level, but they politicized a lot on the managerial level. They 
wanted nuclear power, it should be central, it should be big. We started as 
noise and then we became a threat. 
Jeg havde jo langt hår og kom i træsko. Det var jo ældre mænd (Elværkerne) 
og gerne sådan lidt satte i det. Og det var et karaktertræk at der var cigarfad, 
så man kunne få cigarer, cerutter, cigaretter osv. , og der var også tit en 
dram. Når jeg kom i ELSAM i 1980'erne, så startede det altid med at man  fik 
en gammel dansk.  og De så jo på os som støj, 'hvorfor er det vi skal tage 
dem her alvorligt, hvad er logikken i det'....Elværkerne havde jo fået et vink 
med en vognstang om at de også skulle engagere sig...Jeg tror at 
økonomien var de fuldstændige ligeglade med. Det var et totalt reguleret 
system...De politiserede ikke på medarbejderniveau, de politiserede helt 
vildt på lederniveau. De ville have atomkraft, det skulle være centralt, det 
skulle være stort. Vi startede med at være støj, og så blev vi en reel trussel. 
4
When we got to 2000 we were at 14%, which just happened. That thing about 
"what could the system take" was brought up from time to time, but anyone 
could see that it (the grid) could easily handle this level and that we were 
nowhere near any limit...From where I observed it that problem faded away. 
Da vi kom til 2000 var vi på 14% , som jo bare var sket. Det der med 'hvad 
kunne systemet holde til' blev bragt op engang imellem, men enhver kunne 
se at det kunen sagtens holde til det her og vi var ikke nær nogen grænse. 
...Fra min stol fadede det der problem. 
3: Henrik Stiesdal
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# Translation (English) Original (Danish)
1
There is a transition from when you are forced to do something, to when you 
have an organization in which it is a fun work-day which gives purpose. At 
that point, other forces start to push within the company.  
Der er en transition fra at man bliver pålagt noget til at man så pludselig har 
en organisation for hvem det er en skæg hverdag, for hvem det gir mening. 
Så begyndte der at være nogle andre drivkræfter  inde i virksomheden
2
At that time, a wind turbine was a bit "dumb" compared to today. Today a 
turbine can be expected to actively help in keeping grid-stability, which they 
could not do earlier. ...the toughest challenge was that all distribution-grids 
and local-grids were designed and dimensioned from the idea that the power 
only ran one way (From central power stations to users, ed.). Now the power 
started to run the other way, and it required a lot to upgrade the grid to 
handle that unpredictability.
På det tidspunkt der (start 1990'erne) var en mølle noget mere dum end den 
er idag. Forstået på den måde at idag kan en mølle jo tage aktiv del i at 
holde stabilitieten i nettet, det kunne de ikke tidligere....Der hvor man var 
hårdest ramt var reelt at alle distributionsnet og lokalnet var designet og 
dimensioneret ud fra at strømmen løb i én retning. Nu begyndte strømmen 
at løbe i den modsatte retning. Det krævede ret meget i nettet at få det 
opgraderet til at kunne håndtere den uforudsigelighed. 
3
In a parallel track, you had all of these decentral heat-power plants that were 
emerging everywhere. In those you had the same challenges, with who would 
pay for grid-costs etc. 
Parrallelt med det her havde du alle de decentrale kraftvarmeværker der 
skød op som paddehatte alle steder. Der havde du de samme 
problemstillinger med hvem der skulle betale de nettilsslutninger.
4
When you planned new build-out, wind power had traditionally been given a 
capacity factor of 0%. At some point (during the mid-1990, ed.) you raised it 
to 10%, and that was kind of a Eureka moment that you could now ascribe 
wind power a capacity factor of 10%. 
Når man så dem der lavede planlægninger af ny udbygning, Der gav man til 
at starte med vind en kapacitetsfaktor på 0. På et tidspunkt løftede man det 
så til 10% og det var sådan en "aha" oplevelse at man kunne begynde at 
tilskrive vindkraft en kapacitetsfaktor på 10%
5
If the industry had not communicated as it did what would the situation then 
have been. Then you as a government authority would have observed an 
industry that was apathetic and did not act. You would quickly grow tired of 
that…. This was a vision that when we got to that point, we need to have 
found the right technical solutions...I don't know many other industries think 
6-8 years ahead and set a target for their technology costs to remain 
sustainable as a business.
Hvis industrien ikke havde kommunikeret ud som den gjorde, hvad havde 
situationen så været. Så ville du som myndighed havde set på en industri 
der var apatisk og ikke gjorde noget, den ville du hurtigt blive træt af....Det 
her er jo en vision om at når vi kommer derud, så skal vi have fundet de 
rigtige teknologiske løsninger der gør at vi kan lave et nyt system....Jeg 
kender ikke så mange andre industrier der tænker 6-8 år frem og sætter et 
target på deres teknologi-cost derude for at det er sustainable. 
4: Bent Christensen
# Translation (English) Original (Danish)
1
It was a tough discussion in Socialdemokratiet. They had a large party-
gathering in Silkeborg…their position was ‘we are against nuclear power, if 
you do not handle waste properly’. There was about 1000 people in that 
room, and they all knew what this was about…When Anker (Joergensen, ed.) 
then starts to say: ‘The Socialdemocrats are against nuclear,…’ he was 
interrupted. A minute long interruption (of cheers and applauds, ed.), …it was 
a symbolic description of the shift within the Socialdemocrats. 
Det var en hård diskussion i socialdemokratiet. Så holdte de et stort møde i 
Silkeborg....deres position var "Vi er imod A-Kraft, hvis man ikke fik 
atomaffalds-håndtering etc. på plads". Der sad så 1000 mennesker i den her 
sal og de vidste godt hvad det handlede om. 28:00: Da Anker så siger 
"Socialdemokratiet er imod A-kraft...", så bliver han afbrudt. Et minutlangt 
afbrydelse, han kommer ikke tilbage på talerstolen.....det var en symbolsk 
beskrivelse af at så var det skiftet i socialdemokratiet....Når partiet ikke 
kunne komme igennem med at fuldføre sine tale. 
2
The moment you became minister of something with as much money in it as 
oil, you became more important when you walked into the financial ministry, 
and could then negotiate more. It was also to be able to push the electricity 
sector (utilities, ed.) more
I det øjeblik du blev minister over noget der var så mange penge i som olie, 
så blev du vigtigere når du gik ind til finansministeren og du kunne 
forhandle mere. Det var også for at presse elsektoren. 
The aim was that the overall environmental concerns should direct more than 
the energy sectors own interests, that was the intent. The other thing was 
that  Svend and the rest of us were concerned with jobs. It was a little bit 
down-prioritized (by others, ed.) in the general public discussions.”
Her var sigtet at de overordnede miljøhensyn skulle styre mere end 
energisektorens egne interesser, det var meningen. Det andet der også var 
meningen. Det var at Svend og vi andre var optaget af jobs. Det var en lille 
smule underprioriteret i debatten. 
5: Steen Gade
# Translation (English) Original (Danish)
1
From 2001 and some years onwards, the (Venstre-Conservative) government 
seriously questioned the question about climate change. There were some 
sceptical researchers that were a lot more active. There was the whole 
controversy around Lomborg and Svensmark. There was a different 
psychological climate in Denmark. 
Fra 2001 og nogle år frem der blev der jo sat alvorlige spørgsmålstegn ved 
klimaet fra regeringens side. Der var nogle forskere der var noget mere 
aktive blandt de skeptiske forskere. Der var hele balladen med Lomborg og 
Svensmark. Der var et andet psykologisk klima i Danmark. 
6: Jesper Tornbjerg
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# Translation (English) Original (Danish)
1
What they asked us for was a quality assurance of something they had 
already done…We do many products, which someone thereafter chooses to 
present, if it supports something that they want. 
Det de bad om var vel egentlig kvalitetssikring af det de havde lavet...Sådan 
laver vi rigtig mange produkter hvor nogen vælger at gå ud med det hvis 
beregningerne peger på at det understøtter et eller andet de vil.
# Translation (English) Original (Danish)
1
Despite the fact that the calculations came out in a rather quiet news period 
(during the national summer holidays, ed.), there actually was a lot of reaction 
to it....It surprised us that it (back-up costs, ed.) ended up filling so 
much....There was a critique of the analysis only a few weeks ago (May 2015, 
ed.), that the CO2 price in the analysis was set much too high
På trods af at beregningerne kom ud i en pressemæssigt ret død periode, så 
er der faktisk rimelig meget reaction på det....Der har været alle mulige 
henvendelser og kommentarer...Det overraskede os at det kom til at fylde så 
meget....Der var en kritik af analysis for bare et par uger siden (May, 2015, 
ed.), om at CO2 prisen i analysen var sat alt for højt. 
2
There is a caveat in the research note. If you look at combined scenarios and 
energy systems, then you cannot really use this analysis. But it can still say 
something about that under the simple conditions set up (the green field 
assumption, ed.), then the picture looks like this.
Der er også et forbehold i notatet.  Hvis man kigger på samlede scenarier og 
samlede energisystemer, så kan man ikke rigtigt bruge den her analyse. 
Men den kan alligevel sige noget om at under de her simple forhold, så ser 
det sådan her ud. 
# Translation (English) Original (Danish)
1
When we started we imagined that it had become more expensive, as more 
wind energy was brought into the system. But we have simply not been able 
to see this over the period. 
Da vi startede havde vi nok en forestilling om at det var blevet dyrere i takt 
med at man havde hevet vind ind i systemet, men det har vi simpelthen ikke 
kunne finde over denne periode. 
2
What we have done (the counterfactual analysis, ed.) is almost banal in its 
approach and we are completely aware of that. But we wanted to show 
increasing returns to scale, this point that the more you produce the lower is 
your average cost....I don’t know how much value it has apart from giving 
you an indication of what production costs are. 
  
Det vi har gjort her det er næsten banalt i sin tilgang og det er vi helt 
bevidste om. Men det vi bare gerne vil have frem. Vi snakker jo increasing 
returns to scale, det her med at desto mere du producerer dets lavere er din 
gennemsnitsomkostning....Jeg ved ikke hvor meget værdi den analyse har 
andet end at den gir dig en fornemmelse for hvad er 
produktionsomkostningerne så.
3
I have no opinion towards the 14%, whether that is much or little. It was more 
to get that on the table and say "this is the cost, this is our best 
estimate'…The reactions have mainly been about whether one considered 
14% to be expensive or not.
Jeg har ingen holdning til de 14% om det er meget eller lidt. Det var ligesom 
for at få den på bordet og sige "det har det så kostet, det er vores bedste 
bud"...Det som reaktionen egentlig mest har været det har været i forhold til 
de 14% er om man synes det er dyrt eller ikke er dyrt.
# Translation (English) Original (Danish)
1
Energinet is of the clear opinion that we do not need capacity markets…we 
expect that the demand side will be established to an extent where the few 
hours in the year [when there is not enough wind or interconnectors], 
something will be able to disconnect freely…technically, we have enough 
solutions. 
Energinet mener sådan klart og tydeligt, at der er ikke behov for 
kapacitetsmarkeder...forventer vi, at forbrugssiden den er aktiveret, i en 
sådan grad, at de der få timer en gang om året, at der er der noget der kan 
koble af....Teknisk der har vi jo løsninger nok,
2
Whether the wind-share rises a bit more and such, that is not what really 
costs something on the supply security side….If one talks about 
dispatchable reserve capacity the last 10 to 15 years, this has actually not 
gone up if you look at the northern countries as a whole
Om vindandelen den stiger lige lidt mere, og sådan nogle ting, det er ikke 
det, der virkelig koster på forsyningssikkerheden...Altså, af regulerbar 
reservekapacitet, de sidste 10-15 år, eller sådan noget. Og det er faktisk ikke 
steget, hvis man ser på Norden samlet.
7: EA Energy Analysis Consultant
8: Danish Energy Agency Analysts (DEA)
9: Rockwool Report - Co-Author
10: Energinet Analysts
# Translation (English) Original (English)
1
That is a good question, It sounds to me like almost something that would 
have to be empirically established, at what point do the stop being a 
challenger and start being an incumbent. Certainly there was a moment where 
they were a challenger. They might maintain that challenger mentality, but 
who knows if it is real or not. I guess the way you tell is how the rules are 
written and who gets to say what. 
Same
# Translation (English) Original (English)
1
You could not say that you have the policy and then you value; it is actually 
reverse. It is because you value in a certain way that you can imagine the 
policy, because then the policy makes economic sense….When it [i.e., nature] 
is priceless, it has no price and therefore you can’t advocate for it in a way 
that is relevant. Basically, there are two possible ways to advocate for 
environmental policies. One is, you just do it because it is common sense to 
do it [e.g., precautionary banning of fracking in Europe]…the other way is to 
put a value on more and more stuff.
Same
11: Neil Fligstein
12: Marion Fourcade
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Appendix C. Reports from the Danish 
Economic Councils 2008-2016 
This appendix contain a more elaborate walkthrough of the Danish Economic 
Councils recommendations towards energy policy and the quota market from 2008-
2016. It gives a short overview of how the DEC discuss the notion quota markets 
and additionally how they frame wind power.  
 
2008 DEC Report: Market Exposure to prove affordability of wind power 
In 2008, DEC would return to the question of socio-economic value of pursuing a 
wind power build-out. The cost-benefit analysis was again a central piece of the 
theoretical approach and was explained as such in their 2008 report:  The analysis 
includes (in principle) a full quantification of both costs and benefits, meaning also 
valuation of changes in the supply of environmental goods. The analysis is based on 
welfare-economic calculation-prices. (DEC, 2008, p. 29) 
In maintaining their 2002 calculation methods, the DEC noted that subsidies 
“obviously result in a redistribution which benefits the subsidized sector” (DEC, 
2008, p. 34). From this starting point, the DEC went on to explore the distortion 
effects of what would otherwise be an untouched market through the cost-benefit 
analysis. The conclusion reached was that wind power should not be supported as 
explained early on in the reports main findings. 
 
“As a starting point, renewable energy which can function on market 
terms should not be supported. This applies in example to wind power, 
and the support for this should therefore be dismantled”. (DEC, 2008, p. 
19) 
 
The DEC defined Energy Security as being primarily related to independence of 
foreign fossil fuel imports (DEC, 2008, p. 13,229), and argue that while energy 
security has been in focus throughout the energy policies of the 1970’s and 1980’s, 
it was now the case “in recent years”, that climate change has been the central factor 
of Denmark’s climate change policies (DEC, 2008, pp. 144, 229). This is a bit odd 
considering the Market Distortion period, but they likely refer to the 1990’s. The 
DEC further concludes that with regards to energy security, the problem is mainly 
with gas and oil, while there is an abundance of coal (DEC, 2008, p. 229). As a 
THE VALUATION HISTORY OF DANISH WIND POWER 
404
 
functioning CO2 market should theoretically solve both issues of climate change 
mitigation and Energy Independence, setting up goals for wind power build-out, was 
deemed “a risk” to achieving a “cost-effective way” of reducing CO2 and enabling 
energy security to set up specific goals for renewable energy. The weigh-off of 
measures (energy savings, renewables etc.) to achieve a reduction in the use of fossil 
fuels should “as a starting point not be made by politicians, but by the market” 
(DEC, 2008, p. 234). This statement is not directly related to the value of wind 
power, but it does become relevant in the fact that it places the responsibility for 
pricing energy independence and CC mitigation in the hands of the current market 
arrangement. What becomes even more interesting is to compare this with answer 
that the DEC authors gave in their follow up answers to critique of their report. Later 
in 2008, two of the economic wise-men would write the following in an Op-Ed 
discussing the results of the 2008 report. 
 
“The great question is, how large resources the current generation must 
use to fight off future climate changes…There cannot be given a final 
macro-economic answer, because it to a high degree relates to how great 
amounts of natural resources…our generation is willing to transfer to 
future generations. Such a problem of distribution is fundamentally 
political in its nature”. (Amundsen & Andersen, 2008)  
 
It is intriguing that the economic wise men here argue that the problem of setting the 
value of mitigating climate change is ‘political in its nature’, yet according to their 
report, the method and pace of mitigating climate change should be determined by 
the market and not politicians (DEC, 2008, p. 19).  
 
Reactions to the 2008 report 
All the four major newspapers in Denmark covered the DEC’s conclusion regarding 
wind power, as the report was released, see the table hereafter (Dahlager, 2008; 
Gardel, 2008; J. S. Nielsen, 2008b; Stenvei, 2008).  
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Date News-source Headline 
12.03.2008 Information Wisemen: The market must save the 
climate 
12.03.2008 Politiken Wisemen: Expose of the support to 
wind turbines 
12.03.2008 Jyllands-Posten Dangerous Climate Course 
12.03.2008 Berlingske Wisemen: Stop supporting wind 
turbines 
 
The EU ETS system had at the time just gone into its second phase, and expectations 
were that CO2 prices would stay high. The economic wise-men thus concluded that 
the EU ETS would come to constitute the well-functioning market, which would 
mean that subsidies could be removed. It was at this point reasonable to assume that 
the ETS market could have functioned. But it is worth noting that the DEC maintain 
this conclusion in the reports that follows although the prices of CO2 quotas 
dropped and stayed flat.  
 
DEC 2010-2013: Wind power deemed less valuable than Carbon trading 
From 2010-2013, the conclusion from 2008 regarding wind power subsidies and 
market interventions to build wind power was reinforced without significant 
changes. These reports will therefore not be covered in detail, but key assumptions 
and conclusions can be found in the table below. After the table, the author will 
hereafter go into detail with the three most recent DEC reports from 2014, 2015 and 
2016 respectively, as these individually added to the original line of logic. Sources 
are as follows for 2010 (DEC, 2010, pp. 352, 355), 2011 (DEC, 2011, p. 201) 2012 
(DEC, 2012, pp. 5, 45–46), 2013 (DEC, 2013, p. 66). As can be seen in the table 
below, the DEC recognize that the CO2 quota market is not functioning but still 
advices Denmark that there is “no longer any reason to subsidize renewables 
energy” as seen in 2010. Their 2002 point is re-emphasized in 2012, where they 
state that support for renewable energy in Denmark will not decrease CO2 
emissions. 
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Year Quote 
2010 
Renewable Energy can be a way to reduce GHG emissions, but if 
the primary target is such a reduction, the most targeted instrument 
is to increase the price through taxes and quotas… If there through 
quotas and taxes a high and fairly stable price of CO2 is secured. 
Going forward, there is no longer any reason to subsidize 
renewable energy (352).  
 A disadvantage to using subsidies over taxes is…that subsidies in 
reality are technology specific. There is no evidence for a claim 
that politicians and government officials generally are better than 
the market at picking ‘tomorrows winners’ (355).  
2011 
A further taxation of CO2 in the quota-covered sector...will not 
lower the number of quotas and therefore not lower emissions of 
GHG’s at an EU-level. The same applies for other measures…i.e. 
subsidies for wind power electricity (201). 
2012 
Increased support for renewable energy in the quota sector in 
Denmark, will not lead to lower CO2-emissions on a global level 
(5).   
2013 
From an economic viewpoint, the low quota price is therefore only 
a problem, if it does not reflect the political level of ambition, 
which can be caused by market uncertainty of whether the EU ETS 
(The quota system, ed.) will continue to exist…the effect of 
investments in green technology will therefore likely be very 
small. In addition, an intervention could provide further 
uncertainty in the market, as it can create an anticipation of other 
interventions in the future (66).   
 
2014 DEC: what could be saved if all wind subsidies were removed 
The DEC 2002 report started the DEC’s research interest into the societal costs or 
benefits of wind power and the accompanying subsidies, by analyzing what the 
societal cost of the wind power build-out had been in the 1990’s. The 2014 report 
would conduct a similar calculation, but looking at future years instead. The DEC 
thus decided to do a cost-benefit analysis of  a 10-20 year future horizon to calculate 
how much money could be saved if all non-promised renewables subsidies were 
cancelled (DEC, 2014, pp. 38–39). By calculating the savings, the DEC could then 
conclude what the cost to consumers was by treating the difference between a “no 
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subsidy” scenario with a “subsidies as planned” scenario. The conclusion of this 
Business as Usual type calculation was that the planned renewable subsidies 
constituted an added cost to end-users of 3.5 bn. DKK, which could be saved in 
2020 (2014 currency) (DEC, 2014, pp. 38, 42). Additionally, the DEC calculated 
that the distorting effects of the renewable subsidies would lead to a drop in private 
consumption of 5 bn. DKK, and to an employment loss equivalent to 5000 jobs in a 
2-3 year period (DEC, 2014, pp. 40–41).  This led the DEC to recommend the 
Danish government to “cancel further support for renewable energy in electricity 
production” (DEC, 2014, p. 42). The 2014 report would thus reinforce the frame 
from 2002 of calculating subsidies enabling wind power, as being an added cost to 
society, which does not enable lower CO2 emissions at a European level.  
 
DEC2015: A philosophical approach to economic calculations 
In 2015, the DEC dedicated a full chapter to go into a more philosophical discussion 
of how to estimate the value of mitigating climate change and what a right CO2 
emission price should be. They argue that traditional economic models are often 
underestimating future environmental damages (DEC, 2015, p. 304), and that a 
focus on BNP has a tendency to cause world policies to prioritize the need for 
material growth over environmental concerns (DEC, 2015, p. 309). They conclude 
that the world needs a significantly more ambitious climate policy and that this need 
makes it “correspondingly more important, that the climate policy is conducted cost-
effectively” (DEC, 2015, p. 305). The DEC specify cost-effectively to mean a 
“global solution…based on economic instruments”, wherein “concrete reductions 
should take place where it is cheapest…middle-income and developing countries” 
(DEC, 2015, p. 305,306).  Wind power was only mentioned once in the report, as an 
example of how a renewable energy source could substitute an fossil fuel energy 
source such as coal (DEC, 2015, p. 234). Despite this mention, the overall DEC 
conclusion about how it was not recommended to subsidize wind power in 
Denmark, was not changed in this report.  
 
DEC 2016: Cheap wind power, but expensive wind power scenarios 
In 2016, the DEC would again calculate an added cost of Denmark’s possible wind 
power build-out, this time in a larger context. They would set up the premise that it 
was assumed that the EU would not take any further climate mitigation actions than 
what had been agreed towards 2030, and Denmark would then proceed to become 
independent of fossil fuels by 2050 (DEC, 2016, p. 193). This analysis is by the 
DEC “connected with considerable uncertainties” as they include more factors than 
wind power build-out alone (DEC, 2016, p. 200). The electrification of the heating 
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and transportation sector comes at considerable costs, and even with the calculated 
climate benefits, the DEC conclude that if Denmark was to go fossil independent by 
2050 on its own, it would mean an additional cost of 16 bn. DKK (2015 Currency, 
compared to a base-case scenario (DEC, 2016, p. 10). The DEC specifically mention 
that although wind power is among the cheapest energy sources to build, a scenario 
in which Denmark deploys wind power on a large scale is more expensive than a 
base-case scenario (DEC, 2016, pp. 203–204).  
The question of societal value of wind power is now recognized as being a different 
question whether one inquires whether wind power is cheap or whether wind power 
is cheap to build in the current system. The cost of the latter question is highly 
dependent on how much avoiding climate change impacts are assumed to be worth 
in the DEC’s calculation. This assumption consist both of what the DEC estimate 
the social cost of carbon to be, but also what they expect the rest of the world to do, 
as this will determine fuel and CO2 quota cost. The estimate of the social cost of 
carbon and thereby the calculated benefits, is set to be 450 DKK/tCO2 (2015 
prices), the average between two estimates of the period 2015-2050 (DEC, 2016, pp. 
233–234). This number is sourced from a study conducted by an US interagency 
working group, using Integrated Assessment Models, such as the DICE model used 
in the 2002  DEC report (DEC, 2016, p. 234).  To learn about the costs, one must 
analyze a background -note made by the consultancy firm EA energy analysis, 
which the DEC cites as their source for cost calculations (DEC, 2016, p. 201; EA, 
2016a).   
EA Energy Analysis (EA) has in the background-note “the societal added cost of a 
fossil free energy supply”, set up the system assumptions that lay the ground for the 
conclusions in the DEC 2016 report. EA’s analysis is only related to the societal 
costs, and has not been asked to calculate the benefits. As a result, they do not 
consider economic benefits on a global level, “as a result of lower temperature-rise 
and fewer climate changes” (EA, 2016a, p. 3).  
EA use the IEA’s ‘New Policies scenario for calculating fuel costs and CO2 quotas 
in the future (EA, 2016a, p. 7,18). This is not the societal benefit of mitigating 
climate change, which the DEC themselves calculated, EA’s analysis is in fact about 
what the expected quota prices to maintain the fossil fuel scenario would be. EA 
reach the conclusion that difference in energy system costs between the fossil fuel 
scenario and the wind scenario is 11 bn. DKK (EA, 2016a, p. 13), a lower number 
than the final 16 bn. DKK in the DEC report, due to the fact that the distortion 
effects of subsidies and taxes are left to DEC to calculate. But the CO2 and fuel 
price assumptions become of interest due to a paragraph on page 19 of the 
background-report, cited hereafter. 
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“The 450 scenario leads in a direction, which meets the goal of 
maximum 2 degrees of global temperature-rise, while the new policies 
scenario lead to an approximate 4 degrees temperature rise. An 
assessment of the plans which have been submitted in connection to the 
global climate summit in Paris, indicates, for comparison, a global 
temperature rise of approximately 2.7 degrees. The Climate policy after 
Paris can thus be assessed to be somewhere between the New Policies 
scenario and the 450 scenario”. (EA, 2016a, p. 19) 
 
The EA calculation of how much it will cost to emit CO2 under the fossil scenario is 
thus based on an assumption that the world will steer towards a 4 degree temperature 
rise by 2100. This a significantly higher rise than what is expected after the COP21 
meeting in Paris, wherein more than 190 countries delivered their internationally 
determined contributions (INDC’s), as EA mentions. Assumptions about the cost of 
transitioning through the wind-scenario is based the notion that the rest of the 
world’s countries will continue emitting consistent with a 4 degree scenario, equal to 
a future environmental state significantly ravaged by climate change. Secondly it is 
an inconsistency from the DEC’s argumentation in the 2015 report, wherein there 
was a strong need for global action. It is understandable that DEC cannot guarantee 
that global action will happen, but it is nonetheless a contrary position to argue that 
emissions should happen where it is most efficient, and thereupon enact an 
assumption about the world where no such action is taken. It is in principle not a 
wrong calculation by the DEC, but it is a performative assumption of inaction, 
which is treated as a self-fulfilling prophecy.                                   
Below is a summary table with some of the key quotes in relation to wind power and 
carbon markets for the years from 2014-2016. Sources are as follows for 2014 
(DEC, 2014, pp. 38, 40–42), 2015 (DEC, 2015, pp. 234, 305) and 2016 (DEC, 2016, 
pp. 204–205) respectively.  
 
Year Quote 
2014 
A higher renewable energy share, achieved through more support 
to renewable energy in the quota sector, does not benefit the 
climate and is associated with costs to Danish households and 
companies (32).  
The model-calculations show that it costs welfare when cost-
ineffective technologies are forced through, so costs are increased 
for companies and consumers….a direct added cost for end-users 
of approximately 3.5 bn. DKK (2013 currency) (38)…the 
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calculations should primarily be perceived as illustrative of a 
medium-long 10-20 year perspective (39).  
The added costs inhibit Danish competitiveness, which triggers a 
fall in sale of Danish-produced goods. This leads to a fall in the 
Danish level of production and thereby also employment. In a 2-3 
year perspective there is according to the model-calculations, a 
employment rate equivalent of 5000 people less…As 
competitiveness gradually improves, companies will improve 
employment, which over time will return to the original level. The 
salary level will however be permanently reduced (40)….As a 
result hereof (Lower salary level, ed.), private consumption falls in 
the same order of size, equivalent to about 5 bn. DKK (41).   
Recommendation: Cancel further support for renewable energy in 
electricity production and save approximately 3.5 bn. DKK in 
2020. (42) 
2015 One example of substitution between nature- and human-made 
capital is the construction of wind turbines as an alternative to 
coal-fired power plants. Here one type of human-made capital 
(coal-fired power plants), which are dependent on the consumption 
of particular non-renewable resource, is replaced by another type 
of human-made capital (wind turbines), which instead depend on a 
renewable natural resource (wind power) (234).   
The need for a considerably stronger effort in the climate policy at 
an international level makes it correspondingly more important 
that the climate policy is conducted cost-effectively. Otherwise, 
the disadvantages will be unnecessarily high. A cost-effective 
climate policy will among other elements constitute that reductions 
are made in those areas of the world, where it is cheapest. This 
requires a global solution, which as a starting point should be 
based on economic instruments (DEC, 2015, p. 305). 
2016 
The calculations show, that under the given assumptions there can 
be expected a rise in energy-costs of approximately 16 bn. DKK 
by transitioning to fossil free production (10).  
The combined emissions in the EU from the quota-covered sector, 
is controlled by the quota ceiling, and Danish initiatives within the 
quota-covered sector therefore have as a starting point no effect on 
the climate. Support for renewable energy and other initiatives 
within the quota-covered sector should therefore be argued for on 
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other concerns than the direct effect on the climate (12).   
Wind power is among the cheapest energy sources on the market 
(203).  
The wind-scenario presupposes an extensive electrification, which 
requires larger costs to i.e. the electric grid and reserve capacity. In 
addition there are a number of derivative investments in the shape 
of heat-pumps and electric kettles. All of this contributes to 
making the wind-scenario more expensive, despite the relatively 
cheaper wind power (204).  
 
This concludes the Appendix C walkthrough of the DEC’s discussions of Climate 
change mitigation and wind power. As the dissertation is already quite long, I 
estimated that these additional DEC reports did not have to be part of the Global 
Advantage or Subsidy Burden period in high detail. But it was also a shame not to 
connect a few comments to these reports, if there would be a reader or two who 
shared my interest in the DEC as an actor. This appendix has hopefully served to 
show that the 2002 report was not a single isolated calculation from the DEC. They 
have continually argued for global market solutions to CC mitigation and this is why 
I still list them as an actor in the Market-coalition in the Global Advantage period.   
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Appendix D. Full quotes from three 
reports (AKF 1996, DEC 2002, EK 2017) 
Below are the quotes that I cite from three of the reports in the analysis, namely the 
AKF 1996 report (D1), the DEC 2002 report (D2) and the Energy Commission (EK) 
2017 report (D3). The number is in the left-most column, while the page where they 
can be found in the source report is in the second column from the left.   
 
D1: AKF - The Societal value of wind Power (1996) 
# Page Text 
1 5 
The foundation of the project has been the analysis, which 
the Danish Energy Agency performed in 1991 and 1994 
respectively, to shed light on the private economic conditions 
of wind turbines. The analyses did not constitute a broader 
socioeconomic assessment of wind power. It has been the 
main purpose of our project to conduct such an assessment.  
2 5 
The build-out of 1000 MW corresponds to approximately 
2000 larger wind-turbines. Our analysis only relates to wind 
turbines that are erected on land. We compare wind power 
build-out with two reference alternatives: a coal-fired and a 
natural gas fired power plant of 420 MW respectively. 
Despite lower electricity effect, the reference power plant 
can produce the same amount of electricity as the wind 
turbines. As the power plant can also produce electricity in 
periods of no wind, we have assumed, that the wind power 
build-out must be supplied by 220 MW back-up capacity 
from a gas-fired plant, to be equal.  
3 6 
A calculation of electricity production costs for wind 
turbines, measured per produced kWh, has been conducted. 
Additionally, a valuation of the wind turbines reduction of 
CO2 (Carbon dioxide), SO2 (Sulfur Dioxide) and NOX 
(Nitrogen-filter) from the electricity system and from noise 
and visual effects of wind turbines.  
4 6 
We have not conducted a valuation of the effects on 
employment and balance of payments of a build-out of wind 
turbines, but have calculated these effects in the natural key 
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numbers: people pr. Year and million DKK respectively.  
5 7 
A build-out of the danish electricity system with another 
1000 MW wind turbines is socioeconomically reasonable, 
when the assessment considers the CO2-savings of wind 
turbines - compared to traditional power plants based on coal 
or natural gas.  
6 7 
The costs per produced kWh electricity is today typically 7-8 
oere higher for the most cost-effective wind turbines 
compared to traditional power plants, which among other 
things is due to the fact that wind turbines need 
supplementing electricity capacity for periods of no wind.  
7 7 
The total Danish employment and balance of payments is not 
affected significantly whether one or the other strategy is 
chosen.  
8 7 
Noise and visual annoyances for households, in the close 
vicinity of existing wind turbines have practically no 
influence on wind turbines combined environmental 
advantages as measured in oere/KWh. 
9 8 
The main result of our analysis is that the environmental 
advantages of wind power are so considerable, that it from a 
broad societal assessment is competitive with natural gas-
based electricity production and more advantageous than 
electricity produced on coal power plants.  
10 8 
In figure 1.1 the broad socio-economic electricity production 
costs for wind, coal and natural gas are shown. The figure 
reflects our expectation towards costs around the turn of the 
millennium. 
11 9 
It must be strongly underlined that in the broad socio-
economic assessment of wind power, the environmental 
effects have had a decisive effect, herein especially the CO2 
aspect. We estimate that the value of the reduced CO2 
emissions compared to a coal-fired power plant account for 
18-26 oere pr kWh for the most cost-effective wind turbines. 
Compared to a natural gas fired plant, the value is somewhat 
smaller - 9-14 oere pr. kWh for the most cost-effective 
turbines.  
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12 9 
The value of noise and visual annoyances  for households, 
which live close to existing wind turbines, we have 
calculated to 0.04 oere pr. kWh, which diminishes in relation 
to the other valued effects. 
13 9 
We have valued wind turbines CO2-savings on the backdrop 
of newer Danish analyses, which asses the scope of the 
socio-economic costs, which are necessary to pay, in order to 
meet the CO2 target.  
15 10 
We estimate that wind turbines also in the coming years 
typically will be a more expensive build-out alternative than 
coal power or natural gas-powered plants...We have 
estimated, that the future - and likely larger wind turbines of 
up towards 1 MW - can be up to 25% cheaper pr. KW wind 
turbines effect than the cheapest wind turbines on the market 
today.  
16 11 
The main result of the analysis is that there is no decisive 
difference in the effects between wind  and coal power built-
out as seen over a 20 year period.  
17 11 
We have not found it reasonable to make a valuation of these 
macro-economic effects, meaning a calculation into oere pr. 
kWh. This is among other things due to the fact that in our 
view, it is problematic to let short-sighted economic cycle-
political considerations have a decisive influence on long-
term Infrastructure investments in the electricity sector.  
18 11 
The valuation of the CO2-advantage of wind power has a 
decisive influence on the assessment of whether wind power 
is socio-economically profitable. The CO2-advantage is 
valued on the basis of existing Danish analyses, which asses 
the socio-economic costs by having to fulfill the energy-
policy CO2 target 
19 11 
It is assumed that the Danish CO2-target is fulfilled in the 
context of Danish mitigation measures. This means that 
international agreements about an optimal distribution of 
CO2 quotas, which incorporated which countries the largest 
CO2 reductions can be achieved per invested crown, is 
disregarded.  
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20 12 
In the calculation of production-costs for wind power and for 
conventional power plant, some conditions which have an 
influence on the assessment of the electricity systems total 
costs, have been disregarded. This relates among other things 
to grid reinforcement costs, control and regulation costs and 
merit order effects, which all would position wind power 
worse compared to a conventional build-out.  
21 17 
We expect that wind turbines in the coming years will be 
cheaper pr. KW installed turbine-effect. This is among other 
things due to the technological development as well as 
economies of scale advantages. We estimate that in the 
coming years, wind turbines of up to 1 MW will enter the 
market and these can be from 0 to 25% cheaper per KW 
installed effect - compared to todays 600 KW wind turbines. 
On the contrary, we expect the coming power plants to be 
more expensive than today. The plants will however at the 
same time become more effective, which means a lower fuel-
usage and thereby a lower fuel-costs - all other things being 
equal.   
22 21 
It is decisive for the calculations of the saved alternative 
production costs, that more wind power reasonably can be 
claimed to displace either coal-fired or gas-fired power plant 
capacity in the electricity system. If the wind power displaces 
central or decentral heat-power plants, the value of the wind 
power is lessened. We do not know how much less, as we 
have not conducted this complex calculation.   
 
D2: DEC - Assessment of the 1990’s Environmental policies (2002) 
 
# Page Text 
1 205 
For CO2 there is used an estimate of pollution damages of 
CO2 emissions of 47 DKK and 270 DKK per ton. 
2 206 
In the calculations there is included a tax distortion loss. 
Taxes are distorting, among other things because they reduce 
labor-supply, which entails a loss of welfare 
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3 210 
As there is already abundant electricity production capacity in 
Denmark, it is assumed that the build-out of wind turbines, 
decentral heating, etc., in real terms have resulted in the build-
out of surplus capacity for electricity production and thereby 
have only saved fuel costs at the heat-power plants.  
4 210 
It is calculated that the amount of electricity, which is 
produced by privately owned wind turbines, have caused an 
added costs of approximately 19 bn. DKK (2002-Real), which 
corresponds to 37 oere/kWh....combined the privately owned 
and utility owned wind turbines are estimated to give a 
societal loss of 5 bn. DKK 
5 208 
It is a conscious choice to use a (real) discount-rate of six 
percent, as the main scenario, which is also used in the 
financial ministry et. Al. (2001). To illustrate the sensitivities 
of the results there is alternatively used a discount rate of three 
percent.   
6 217 
If Denmark is to keep its Kyoto-commitment as cheaply as 
possible, there are however other options than bringing down 
CO2-emissions in Denmark. The Kyoto protocol opens the 
option to use the so-called flexible mechanisms. They entail 
establishment of trade in CO2 quotas and potential 
implementation of reductions in other countries.  
7 233 
It is assumed that the growth in the wind turbines industry 
employment does not affect the total employment level...The 
potentially positive employment effects must also be held 
against the costs of supporting the industry, there among 
distortions by collecting a tax revenue.  
8 234 
If there did not exist wind turbines in Denmark, there could be 
imported environmentally friendly electricity from Norway or 
Sweden, which are lower than the prices of Danish wind 
turbine electricity. The same satisfaction of need as today, 
could thus be reached by lower costs.  
9 252 
From the available information about prices and sales of wind 
turbines, there is nothing which indicates that home-market 
sales should contribute with very much experience.  
10 263 The wind power build-out of the 1990's is an example of a 
policy, which has been socio-economically unprofitable, even 
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when the industrial benefits of the wind turbines industry's 
achievements are accounted for.  
11 264 
These policies should not have been enacted with the 
knowledge that exists today. To that extent, the enactment of 
these policies is due to a lack of a socio-economic analysis of 
the consequences of the policies.  
12 265 
The erected wind turbines in Denmark in the 1990's results in 
a societal loss of approximately 3 bn. DKK...the cause of the 
loss is first and foremost that there from the starting point was 
abundant electricity production capacity in Denmark. The 
wind-turbines build-out has thereby resulted in the build-out 
of a surplus capacity for electricity production and only saved 
fuel costs on the hear-power plants. 
13 266 
In addition to this, smoke-cleaning measure on the heat-power 
plants have meant, that the electricity production which wind 
turbines electricity replaces, is far from as environmentally 
damaging as in start of the 1990's.  
14 266 
The industrial benefit of roughly 2 bn. DKK of the electricity 
production subsidy comes from the fact that the subsidy 
increases sales of wind turbines and thereby stimulates 
experience-building in the wind turbines industry. This has 
entailed reduced costs and improved competitiveness in the 
industry. 
15 266 
Although the bet on wind turbines historically has been 
resulting in a deficit, wind turbines projects today could be 
profitable investments due to the technological developments.  
The best wind turbines on land are today likely societally 
profitable....Coming generations of wind turbines must as a 
result of the technological development be expected to 
become more profitable.  
16 267 
Many environmental industries received support in the 1990's, 
but as mentioned it is only the wind turbines industry, which 
has done especially well....Although a policy down the line 
turns out to have entailed economic advantages, this is not 
adequate to ensure a successful business-policy. The proven 
advantages could be caused by luck or the circumstance, at the 
business policy has been directed at many industries, but that 
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the policy has only succeeded a few places.  
17 268 
There should however not be kept a narrow focus on 
developing environmental- and energy policies, which have 
economic advantages, as one can overlook alternatives, which 
have economic costs, but nonetheless give a higher net value 
of society due to environmental advantages.  
 
D3: Energy Commission (EK): “Recommendations to future energy policy” 
(2017). The analysis of report is on pages 250-254 
# Page Text 
1 13 
The falling costs of production of electricity from wind 
turbines and solar-cells, combined with expectations of 
increasing market-prices for electricity means that the 
transition to and build-out of a low-emission energy society  in 
time – and maybe already by 2030 – can happen on market 
terms.   
2 13 
The production prices of onshore wind and solar-cells have 
over the recent years fallen, while there has occurred large 
drops in the costs of erecting new offshore wind farms. This 
means that the costs of producing power from onshore- and 
offshore wind turbines and solar cells, in many areas today are 
cheaper, than they would be if the power was to be produced 
on newly established fossil fuel power plants.  
3 33 
The cheapest sources of renewable energy, in example onshore 
wind, are in principle already today able to compete with new 
investments in conventional coal power plants.  
4 33 
It is very difficult to predict future costs of renewable 
energy….The Energy commission consider the (DEA 
Technology) catalogues costs to be too conservative.  
5 34 
The current electricity market prices are at a level, which 
cannot recoup any type of new renewable energy capacity, 
despite the fact that the costs of renewable energy capacity has 
fallen. Neither would it be possible to recoup fossil capacity 
with current electricity prices. The electricity price is expected 
to rise towards 2030, while costs of establishing and operating 
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new renewable energy technologies are expected to fall 
considerably. 
6 5 
This support should…start from a principle of technology-
neutrality, in order to support a build-out of renewable energy 
in the best and cheapest way from a consideration to the 
complete energy system. The market should be used to bring 
prices down, and the different technologies based on renewable 
energy should compete with each other.  
7 5 
There are in all areas considerable uncertainties around the 
price development of fuels, CO2-quota prices and not least 
technological development. Therefore, it does not today make 
sense to set a certain course towards 2030, let alone 2050.   
8 17 
As subsidies to some of the existing and expensive renewable 
energy capacity, herein several offshore wind farms, will 
disappear during the 2020’s, it is estimated as likely that the 
total subsidy to renewable energy will be reduced in the period 
compared to today.   
9 24 
There is a risk of inefficiency, when investments in 
infrastructure capacity are decided administratively.  
10 32 
The current share of renewable energy is the result of a 
political prioritization and founded upon economic support 
through a longer period. In 2015, renewable energy was 
subsidized with 6.4 bn. DKK in direct support, additionally 
comes the indirect subsidies through tax exemption.  
11 36 
Support should be given under a principal of technology 
neutrality, which also accounts for other relevant 
parameters…this could in example be negative environmental 
consequences such as noise-annoyances from wind turbines…” 
12 39 
The fluctuating energy-production from wind and solar 
increase the need for flexibility to ensure a continued high 
supply security and stability in the grid.  
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The renowned philosopher John Dewey understood that we can only replace 
our doubts and ideas about the world with settled beliefs through the tools we 
have available in our inquiry. Likewise, the characteristics that make tech-
nical objects like wind turbines visible are not pre-given. Instead, the value 
depends on the tools we use to make some characteristics visible. These 
characteristics are then framed to produce a given meaning about the value 
of wind power. It could be characterized as a supplement to an energy system 
locked in to past fossil fuel choices. It could be characterized as a subsidized 
distortion in a certain economic doctrine’s conception of a free market. Or 
it could be seen as an indispensable solution to the existential climate crisis 
humankind has brought upon itself. Valuation of an object is never given nor 
objective, but produced through frames and networks that are contingent and 
disputable. This thesis uncovers how Danish wind power came to be thought 
of as a worthwhile societal investment through a long and ongoing struggle 
of valuation. When facts and opinions are increasingly mixed up, one must 
look beyond the numbers and to the valuation networks of humans, materi-
als and calculative devices. As we are faced with the fierce urgency of the 
Anthropocene, we must make the social practices of valuation discussable 
to expose the limits and consequences of the metrics of the past.
